Did the pilot originally scheduled to fly [i]that[/i] Concorde refuse?
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JN,
This thread has already run it's course elswhere on the forum so I suggest perhaps you re-read what has gone before.
I would venture to suggest that the report was not written by our DoT AIU so maybe it does not read wholly as we might like but nontheless it reaches a satisfactory conclusion.
Like it or not Brits & French do things differently that's life I'm afraid.
This thread has already run it's course elswhere on the forum so I suggest perhaps you re-read what has gone before.
I would venture to suggest that the report was not written by our DoT AIU so maybe it does not read wholly as we might like but nontheless it reaches a satisfactory conclusion.
Like it or not Brits & French do things differently that's life I'm afraid.
1. What was the max RTOW for a Concorde on that day? That can be recalculated given the ATOW and an aftercast.
2. What was the ATOW? That can be recomputed from the declared ZFW and the load sheets which must have been signed by the Commander and lodged with the Company.
3. Did the Concorde CVR tape indicate that the surface wind had been passed to the crew?
4. If 2 was greater than 1 due to a change in atmospheric pressure, OAT or surface wind, that surely must constitute reckless endangerment. Notwithstanding the later failure and the uncommanded engine shut down, to ignore basic Perf A calculations in such a cavalier manner would, if proved true, mean that the Commander was putting his passengers and crew at unacceptable risk from the moment the take-off roll commenced.
[ 22 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
2. What was the ATOW? That can be recomputed from the declared ZFW and the load sheets which must have been signed by the Commander and lodged with the Company.
3. Did the Concorde CVR tape indicate that the surface wind had been passed to the crew?
4. If 2 was greater than 1 due to a change in atmospheric pressure, OAT or surface wind, that surely must constitute reckless endangerment. Notwithstanding the later failure and the uncommanded engine shut down, to ignore basic Perf A calculations in such a cavalier manner would, if proved true, mean that the Commander was putting his passengers and crew at unacceptable risk from the moment the take-off roll commenced.
[ 22 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
Thread Starter
Translation required - I'm ok on MTOW, AUW, V1, V2, and VR, but ATOW and RTOW - I know I know, but I'm buggered if I can remember right now, and I can't find my aviation dictionary!
Edited for this message to Magplug: Thanks. Have read and re-read all previous Concorde strands. The Observer one concentrated most on the missing spacer - I was fascinated by the weight/cg issue and the garbled report I had that the Captain (perhaps now I mean co-p?) was unhappy about what he was being asked to do. Would suggest that the strand will die all on it's own when it has 'run its course', but at the moment, people still seem interested in the subject, and happy to answer my damn fool questions and try and educate me - for which I'm immensely grateful.
[ 22 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]
Edited for this message to Magplug: Thanks. Have read and re-read all previous Concorde strands. The Observer one concentrated most on the missing spacer - I was fascinated by the weight/cg issue and the garbled report I had that the Captain (perhaps now I mean co-p?) was unhappy about what he was being asked to do. Would suggest that the strand will die all on it's own when it has 'run its course', but at the moment, people still seem interested in the subject, and happy to answer my damn fool questions and try and educate me - for which I'm immensely grateful.
[ 22 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]
RTOW: Regulated take-off weight. Effectively the maximum weight at which the aeroplane may take-off with regard to actual conditions of surface wind, atmospheric pressure, runway length, outside air temperature, etc, etc. NOT the same as the maximum permitted stuctural take-off weight. In fact, in some circumstances it is possible for theoretical RTOW to be in excess of max certificated structural take-off weight; this does NOT mean that take-off weights in excess of the certificated limit are permitted on such occasions. The aircraft could probably take-off without difficulty as performance would be adequate, but the aircraft would have been overstressed.
ATOW: Actual take-off weight. For example, some aeroplanes may be permitted to adopt a reduced thrust take-off technique if there is more than a minimum defined difference between ATOW and RTOW - even if RTOW is above certificated structural limits as described above.
Fairly obviously ATOW must never be greater than RTOW!!
For example, if max certified limit for an aeroplane is 185T, RTOW at the time is 186T and ATOW is 185T then fine. But if RTOW drops to 183T because of a change in conditions, take-off must not be attempted!!
Taking off just above max. certificated take-off weight might overstress the aircraft and lead to the aircrfat being grounded for fatigue investigation; taking off above RTOW will probably kill everyone if there is a failure when the aircraft is in gap between being able to stop within the distance remaining or being able to accelerate to take-off and clear all ostacles by the stipulated margin. That is what scheduled performance is designed to prevent; with modern aircraft (especially twin jets with capable brakes) it is often possible to reject a take-off right up to rotate speed - this is certainly NOT the case in older aircraft which, having reached V1, MUST continue the take-off if a malfunction subsequently occurs.
OK pedants, this is a simplification I know, but it's supposed to explain things in lay terms.
[ 22 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
ATOW: Actual take-off weight. For example, some aeroplanes may be permitted to adopt a reduced thrust take-off technique if there is more than a minimum defined difference between ATOW and RTOW - even if RTOW is above certificated structural limits as described above.
Fairly obviously ATOW must never be greater than RTOW!!
For example, if max certified limit for an aeroplane is 185T, RTOW at the time is 186T and ATOW is 185T then fine. But if RTOW drops to 183T because of a change in conditions, take-off must not be attempted!!
Taking off just above max. certificated take-off weight might overstress the aircraft and lead to the aircrfat being grounded for fatigue investigation; taking off above RTOW will probably kill everyone if there is a failure when the aircraft is in gap between being able to stop within the distance remaining or being able to accelerate to take-off and clear all ostacles by the stipulated margin. That is what scheduled performance is designed to prevent; with modern aircraft (especially twin jets with capable brakes) it is often possible to reject a take-off right up to rotate speed - this is certainly NOT the case in older aircraft which, having reached V1, MUST continue the take-off if a malfunction subsequently occurs.
OK pedants, this is a simplification I know, but it's supposed to explain things in lay terms.
[ 22 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
Thread Starter
Anecdotally, the allowance was said to be 70-kg per pax - for a plane-load of (and please excuse the apparent racial stereotypeing, I'm only repeating the report) 'fat Germans'.
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You guys at the beginning don't know your Concordes very well. That airplane was one of several concordes that were certified to takeoff with 2 engines. Maybe not on one side. Whatever went through the wing and caused the fire caused the crash. I am sure that if the pilots could have seen the future they would have stayed on the ground and bought the parking lot versus becoming a lawn dart later, but hind site is 20/20. 
[ 22 August 2001: Message edited by: 747FOCAL ]
[ 22 August 2001: Message edited by: 747FOCAL ]
Thread Starter
Doh!
The whole point is that many experts - including former Concorde Captains have said that the tyre failure, tank rupture and ensuing fire would all have been survivable had the aircraft had sufficient speed to stay controllable and either land back or (better yet) turn and land at Le Bourget - which was presumably visible through the left hand cockpit window, if not the windscreen itself.
The whole point is that many experts - including former Concorde Captains have said that the tyre failure, tank rupture and ensuing fire would all have been survivable had the aircraft had sufficient speed to stay controllable and either land back or (better yet) turn and land at Le Bourget - which was presumably visible through the left hand cockpit window, if not the windscreen itself.
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There are a number of key phrases in the transcript of the VCR. The detail is buried in the report which you can find at http://www.bea-fr.org/docs/f-sc00072...c000725e2.html .
The full report spends about three paragraphs discussing how the wind was generally variable and less than ten knots. Only in the interim report does the erratum give the surface wind as 080/08. The rest is 15k, NIL, FEW018,FEW023,BKN033,19/--, H1008
BEagle asked what was the actual take-off weight:
14 h 13 min 13 s, OMN « alors jauge total carburant moi j'ai quatre-vingt-seize quatre avec quatre-vingt-seize trois pour quatre-vingt-quinze à bord ».
gauges total fuel I have 96.4 with 96.3, for 95 on board
14 h 14 min 04 s, OPL « ZFWZFCG », OMN « alors j'ai quatre-vingt-onze neuf et cinquante-deux deux ».
ZFW and ZFW Cof G I have 91.9 and 59.2
I assume that the three fuel figures are ramp/taxi/take-off fuel so I calculate that the a/c left the stand at ZFW + taxi fuel = 91.9 + 96.3 = 188.2 tonnes
14 h 40 min 19 s, commandant de bord « on a consommé combien ? », OMN « là on a huit cents kilos ».
How much have we used? .. There you had 800kgs
14 h 42 min 31 s, commandant de bord « top ».
Go
So 2 min 12 sec before the start of take-off they had used 800kgs of their 96.3 giving 95.5 tonnes remaining, lets be kind and give them another 200kgs up to the start of the take-off roll ie 95.3 tonnes. Therefore the weight at the start of the take-off roll was ZFW + take-off fuel = 91.9 + 95.3 = 187.2 tonnes, which is 2.13 tonnes above the structural limit.
Cousin Nigel and I guestimated a max take-off weight for that runway in those conditions with a tailwind of 7kts of something like 176 tonnes. You make up your own mind.
You can visit the report to look at how they accounted for the passengers, but let’s face it, it was full of people going on a cruise holiday with luggage for a cruise holiday. What weight do you think they should have used?
The latest report addresses the consequences of the missing spacer in the left gear. They do allow that the missing spacer would allow the axle to skew through about 3-5º. The assertion is that with a large downforce on the bogie, the misalignment of the wheels would be resisted by the weight of the aircraft pushing the axle into the top of the ‘tube’ as you will. Clearly then, by the same assertion, with the weight of the aircraft lifting off the wheels at rotation, the axle would have slid to the ‘back of the tube’, skewing the wheels, creating a significant drag and causing the aircraft to veer to the left at the point of rotation. Consistent with the evidence.
The metal strip? A good theory to cling to, but how’s this? The report describes the piece of metal as titanium alloy, 435x31x1.4mm. With the density of titanium as about 4510kg/m3, that comes out as 85g. What fate do you think a bit of metal weighing 85g would suffer behind a DC10 at take-off power/speed? Where would you look for such a piece of metal? The middle of the runway? More likely the edge if you ask me.
She rolled, very overweight for the conditions prevailing, as she rotated the missing spacer dragged the aircraft to the left of the runway where it ingested an edge light, hit the metal strip. The Captain, concerned that the aircraft was about to leave the runway and hit the 747-400 rotated and became airborne way out side the aircraft’s performance capabilities with the inevitable result.
”Rafistolage Français” – a classic French fudge.
The full report spends about three paragraphs discussing how the wind was generally variable and less than ten knots. Only in the interim report does the erratum give the surface wind as 080/08. The rest is 15k, NIL, FEW018,FEW023,BKN033,19/--, H1008
BEagle asked what was the actual take-off weight:
14 h 13 min 13 s, OMN « alors jauge total carburant moi j'ai quatre-vingt-seize quatre avec quatre-vingt-seize trois pour quatre-vingt-quinze à bord ».
gauges total fuel I have 96.4 with 96.3, for 95 on board
14 h 14 min 04 s, OPL « ZFWZFCG », OMN « alors j'ai quatre-vingt-onze neuf et cinquante-deux deux ».
ZFW and ZFW Cof G I have 91.9 and 59.2
I assume that the three fuel figures are ramp/taxi/take-off fuel so I calculate that the a/c left the stand at ZFW + taxi fuel = 91.9 + 96.3 = 188.2 tonnes
14 h 40 min 19 s, commandant de bord « on a consommé combien ? », OMN « là on a huit cents kilos ».
How much have we used? .. There you had 800kgs
14 h 42 min 31 s, commandant de bord « top ».
Go
So 2 min 12 sec before the start of take-off they had used 800kgs of their 96.3 giving 95.5 tonnes remaining, lets be kind and give them another 200kgs up to the start of the take-off roll ie 95.3 tonnes. Therefore the weight at the start of the take-off roll was ZFW + take-off fuel = 91.9 + 95.3 = 187.2 tonnes, which is 2.13 tonnes above the structural limit.
Cousin Nigel and I guestimated a max take-off weight for that runway in those conditions with a tailwind of 7kts of something like 176 tonnes. You make up your own mind.
You can visit the report to look at how they accounted for the passengers, but let’s face it, it was full of people going on a cruise holiday with luggage for a cruise holiday. What weight do you think they should have used?
The latest report addresses the consequences of the missing spacer in the left gear. They do allow that the missing spacer would allow the axle to skew through about 3-5º. The assertion is that with a large downforce on the bogie, the misalignment of the wheels would be resisted by the weight of the aircraft pushing the axle into the top of the ‘tube’ as you will. Clearly then, by the same assertion, with the weight of the aircraft lifting off the wheels at rotation, the axle would have slid to the ‘back of the tube’, skewing the wheels, creating a significant drag and causing the aircraft to veer to the left at the point of rotation. Consistent with the evidence.
The metal strip? A good theory to cling to, but how’s this? The report describes the piece of metal as titanium alloy, 435x31x1.4mm. With the density of titanium as about 4510kg/m3, that comes out as 85g. What fate do you think a bit of metal weighing 85g would suffer behind a DC10 at take-off power/speed? Where would you look for such a piece of metal? The middle of the runway? More likely the edge if you ask me.
She rolled, very overweight for the conditions prevailing, as she rotated the missing spacer dragged the aircraft to the left of the runway where it ingested an edge light, hit the metal strip. The Captain, concerned that the aircraft was about to leave the runway and hit the 747-400 rotated and became airborne way out side the aircraft’s performance capabilities with the inevitable result.
”Rafistolage Français” – a classic French fudge.
Thread Starter
Cripes!
I hope to hell someone can contradict that lot, 'cos I'd really prefer not to think of what really seems to have killed all those people. A burst tyre is one thing, but human negligence and error somehow seems worse 'cos it ought to be so much more preventable.
I hope to hell someone can contradict that lot, 'cos I'd really prefer not to think of what really seems to have killed all those people. A burst tyre is one thing, but human negligence and error somehow seems worse 'cos it ought to be so much more preventable.
All this sounds very worrying but it would not be the first time that an accident report has been "doctored".
What about the insurance companies and the liability issue? With all the vested interests is there not a case for a totally independent body being called in to do their own investigation - ie somebody with no axe to grind?
I am sorry but at the risk of being accused of discrimination I just do not trust the French to produce an unbiased report!! I await the arrows!
What about the insurance companies and the liability issue? With all the vested interests is there not a case for a totally independent body being called in to do their own investigation - ie somebody with no axe to grind?
I am sorry but at the risk of being accused of discrimination I just do not trust the French to produce an unbiased report!! I await the arrows!
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Surely this, coupled with the language issues, must result in sanctions being put in place by crews - if not the airlines themselves - against flying to France? As far as I can see, it's only if such drastic measures are taken that they will clean up their act. Oh, and whilst we're at it, we can also get them to change their policy on over 55s flying commercially in their airspace!
Thread Starter
Cap'n!
Source of structural weight limit, s'il vous plait?
Also don't we know that the aircraft hit the strip and was on fire (cos of the soot marks) before it diverged from the centreline? And then diverged before the Captain rotated?
[ 22 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]
Source of structural weight limit, s'il vous plait?
Also don't we know that the aircraft hit the strip and was on fire (cos of the soot marks) before it diverged from the centreline? And then diverged before the Captain rotated?
[ 22 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]
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Hi chaps, ATCO here.
This is a most interesting thread but I am finding it quite troubling to read. Without wishing to cause offence to the French people, given other incidents that have occured in France, I smell a rat.
Irrespective of what actually caused or contributed to the crash there is a list of issues in this accident that need to be investigated in their own right. To me, when it is all put together it reads as a very damning indictment of Air France. Should Air France have been found to be criminally neglegent I believe the resulting law suits could have put them out of business and that is a very good motive for covering it up.
I get a feeling I have had before. Wasn't there a couple of lines of code missing from the black box readout of the A320 that crashed (CFIT) at that airshow? We have recently discussed here the language problems at CDG and the death that 'caused'.
It seems to me that the French nation is not acting responsibly. If we allow that to go unchallenged we must accept the consequences.
9Left
This is a most interesting thread but I am finding it quite troubling to read. Without wishing to cause offence to the French people, given other incidents that have occured in France, I smell a rat.
Irrespective of what actually caused or contributed to the crash there is a list of issues in this accident that need to be investigated in their own right. To me, when it is all put together it reads as a very damning indictment of Air France. Should Air France have been found to be criminally neglegent I believe the resulting law suits could have put them out of business and that is a very good motive for covering it up.
I get a feeling I have had before. Wasn't there a couple of lines of code missing from the black box readout of the A320 that crashed (CFIT) at that airshow? We have recently discussed here the language problems at CDG and the death that 'caused'.
It seems to me that the French nation is not acting responsibly. If we allow that to go unchallenged we must accept the consequences.
9Left
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Two other factors to consider:
1. What's the big hurry to shut down an engine? Is Air France procedure to shut down a failed engine immediately after takeoff? Or was this the Flight Engineer's individualized procedure?
2. During an emergency, the usual simulator training scenario concludes with a successful return to the airport, or a landing at one nearest "suitable" airport!
That training "mind set" obviously had influenced Marty and his crew to head for Le Bourget 10 miles down the road, a reasonable decision if the airplane were still flyable.
But the airplane was at 200 feet, gear down, one engine shut down, one engine producing intermittent thrust, and airspeed was decreasing.
Obviously it's unthinkable and unimaginable for a jet crew, much less a Concorde crew, to deliberately put the jet down in a field or on a highway whilst there still is some control. And with Le Bourget in view it was Marty's instinctive reaction to continue to extract performance from the jet.
The airspeed indicator (referenced three times by the F/O on the CVR) was the chief instrument upon which Marty should have relied upon to make the ultimate decision to put the jet down immediately. A controlled crash, as opposed to a stall and assured death. But Marty hesitated. It's not a decision which would have required time or thought, only immediate instinctive reaction.
The first important lesson a pilot learns when flying a single engine trainer: If the engine quits right after takeoff, don't even think about making any turns, land straight ahead!
When flying a crippled multiengine jet, crash land before stalling at any cost.
1. What's the big hurry to shut down an engine? Is Air France procedure to shut down a failed engine immediately after takeoff? Or was this the Flight Engineer's individualized procedure?
2. During an emergency, the usual simulator training scenario concludes with a successful return to the airport, or a landing at one nearest "suitable" airport!
That training "mind set" obviously had influenced Marty and his crew to head for Le Bourget 10 miles down the road, a reasonable decision if the airplane were still flyable.
But the airplane was at 200 feet, gear down, one engine shut down, one engine producing intermittent thrust, and airspeed was decreasing.
Obviously it's unthinkable and unimaginable for a jet crew, much less a Concorde crew, to deliberately put the jet down in a field or on a highway whilst there still is some control. And with Le Bourget in view it was Marty's instinctive reaction to continue to extract performance from the jet.
The airspeed indicator (referenced three times by the F/O on the CVR) was the chief instrument upon which Marty should have relied upon to make the ultimate decision to put the jet down immediately. A controlled crash, as opposed to a stall and assured death. But Marty hesitated. It's not a decision which would have required time or thought, only immediate instinctive reaction.
The first important lesson a pilot learns when flying a single engine trainer: If the engine quits right after takeoff, don't even think about making any turns, land straight ahead!
When flying a crippled multiengine jet, crash land before stalling at any cost.
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The First Officer on three separate occasions draws the Captain's attention to the Airspeed Indicator.
Unfortunately, he only uses the words...
"Warning, The Airspeed Indicator, The Airspeed Indicator, The Airspeed Indicator"...
"The Airspeed Indicator"
"The Airspeed Indicator"
There's a lot going on in between, but it must be assumed that as handling pilot, the Captain's selective radial scan had broken down due to sensory overload, and he was therefore not responding to the prompts from the First Officer, which seem to indicate to me that in a desparate attempt to retain/gain altitude, airspeed (which they didn't have to spare) was being sacrificed.
A better call from the First Officer would have been...
"Speed! (or Airspeed Indicator, if you like)"
but backed up with the COMMAND "PITCH DOWN".
Failure to comply should have resulted in his taking control. Better to plough into a field/motorway/whatever the right way up with some aerodynamic control than upside down and vertically.
Having said that, it's easy to sit here and pick up on every little thing. If they did commence take off 10 tonnes overweight, they were digging a pretty big hole for themselves, but nevertheless, it is most likeley that with the sequence of events as they were, it would always have been an unsurviveable incident.
I'm not religious but... There but for the grace of God, go I.
Unfortunately, he only uses the words...
"Warning, The Airspeed Indicator, The Airspeed Indicator, The Airspeed Indicator"...
"The Airspeed Indicator"
"The Airspeed Indicator"
There's a lot going on in between, but it must be assumed that as handling pilot, the Captain's selective radial scan had broken down due to sensory overload, and he was therefore not responding to the prompts from the First Officer, which seem to indicate to me that in a desparate attempt to retain/gain altitude, airspeed (which they didn't have to spare) was being sacrificed.
A better call from the First Officer would have been...
"Speed! (or Airspeed Indicator, if you like)"
but backed up with the COMMAND "PITCH DOWN".
Failure to comply should have resulted in his taking control. Better to plough into a field/motorway/whatever the right way up with some aerodynamic control than upside down and vertically.
Having said that, it's easy to sit here and pick up on every little thing. If they did commence take off 10 tonnes overweight, they were digging a pretty big hole for themselves, but nevertheless, it is most likeley that with the sequence of events as they were, it would always have been an unsurviveable incident.
I'm not religious but... There but for the grace of God, go I.
In the world's second fastest 4-jet still in service, we teach a golden rule: Above V1, NEVER NEVER order an engine shut down until you know you can survive without the thrust from that engine. If it's on fire, use the thrust for as long as you can - or for as long as you need it if that's greater. So the scenario is: Engine failure/fire at V1 - order full power and continue the take-off, achieve V2 as a priority, then landing gear up, then deal with the failure/fire. If a second engine failure or fire occurs with the gear down, carry out the double engine failure drill and leave the gear down; if a second fire/failure occurs after the gear has been selected up, carry out the double engine failure drill. The aircraft configuration is then adjusted in accordance with a strict speed/configuration management regime. During all this, all engines are set to max thrust. If an engine on fire stops producing thrust, well, you've at least had the benefit of the thrust whilst it was available. There is NEVER any hurry to shut down an engine, and no FE would EVER do so on his own initiative. Our aircraft has LE slats and TE flaps which, although normally moved together, can be moved independently. The double engine failure drill requires that full power is set, aieron upset is dis-armed and the flap/slat lever 'split'; immediate fuel dump is also initiated. Once V2 is achieved, the flaps ONLY are selected up and the aircraft accelerated to V2+25. During this critical phase, NO OTHER DRILLS are called for or actioned!! Once the aircraft has achieved V2+25 with the flaps up, it should continue to climb even following a double engine failure with the gear down at max weight - so it's then safe to action engine fire/failure drills.
Sorry to go on, but this is an emergency which demands very precise and methodical action and high CRM skill as well as precise flying.
CRM? - Merde alors - qu'est que c'est que ca?
[ 22 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
Sorry to go on, but this is an emergency which demands very precise and methodical action and high CRM skill as well as precise flying.
CRM? - Merde alors - qu'est que c'est que ca?
[ 22 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
Thread Starter
One can't help but wonder whether maintaining speed at say 100 ft wouldn't have been preferable to struggling up to 200 ft - especially when you look how close Le Bourget's threshold is.
As a PPL I was astonished at how long he went on flying straight ahead, since it seemed as though even a very, very, very gently banked turn (into the draggy side of the aircraft and the dead engines) would have put Le Bourget 'bang on the nose'. One almost wonders whether he wasn't holding it straight when it's natural inclination would have been to head towards Le Bourget anyway. I know, I know, never turn back, never trade height for manoeuvre, but if I always thought that if you don't have to move your head or eyes to see it, you can treat it as being straight ahead anyway!
If I'm talking out of my hat, then would this kind of gentle turn have been possible if the FE hadn't shut down the No.2?
Looking at the open country available, would a controlled crash landing have killed fewer people?
PS: Guv. Sorry - absolutely no intention to hide the fact that professionally I'm an aviation journo (mainly defence) - hence the unscrupulous signature - my only excuse for not making it even more clear is that over on mil pilots, where I lurk most of the time, everyone knows that I'm this particular type of pond-life. However, I am a recreational pilot, and I like to think that I'm
a) aviation sympathetic and aviation friendly.
b) committed to doing my research properly and telling the stories responsibly, and in a way which is broadly helpful to the aviation community which I think of myself as being part of.
c) willing and eager to be educated by those who know better.
So to all of you who've contributed so far, a very hearty thank you!
As a PPL I was astonished at how long he went on flying straight ahead, since it seemed as though even a very, very, very gently banked turn (into the draggy side of the aircraft and the dead engines) would have put Le Bourget 'bang on the nose'. One almost wonders whether he wasn't holding it straight when it's natural inclination would have been to head towards Le Bourget anyway. I know, I know, never turn back, never trade height for manoeuvre, but if I always thought that if you don't have to move your head or eyes to see it, you can treat it as being straight ahead anyway!
If I'm talking out of my hat, then would this kind of gentle turn have been possible if the FE hadn't shut down the No.2?
Looking at the open country available, would a controlled crash landing have killed fewer people?
PS: Guv. Sorry - absolutely no intention to hide the fact that professionally I'm an aviation journo (mainly defence) - hence the unscrupulous signature - my only excuse for not making it even more clear is that over on mil pilots, where I lurk most of the time, everyone knows that I'm this particular type of pond-life. However, I am a recreational pilot, and I like to think that I'm
a) aviation sympathetic and aviation friendly.
b) committed to doing my research properly and telling the stories responsibly, and in a way which is broadly helpful to the aviation community which I think of myself as being part of.
c) willing and eager to be educated by those who know better.
So to all of you who've contributed so far, a very hearty thank you!