TOM stall?

[whatdoesthisbuttondo]

I'm surprised you can still get a job with 'another airline' after being involved an event like this. Good news I suppose, for any of us pilots who could make a similar mistake.

Poor buggers. 80 kts and 40 degrees must be unpleasant in a 737.

[Tee Emm]

80 kts and 40 degrees must be unpleasant in a 737.

Certainly would focus your attention..

[Tee Emm]

et upset or unusual attitude recovery has never received as much attention in the airlines as it clearly deserves.

Never a truer word spoken. Despite many excellent flight safety papers available on these manoeuvres, airline operations departments pay lip service to the subject and simulator instructors invariably dismiss unusual attitude recovery and stall recovery training as low priority and merely "fun" exercises thown in at the end of a session if time permits. Seems to me the whole basis of type rating and recurrent simulator training is to get the automatics in as quickly as possible after lift off then everyone can relax and breathe easy..

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by Checkboard

For this accident, or the Turkish at Schiphol, all the pilots had to do to save the situation was shove the thrust levers up.

- NB That is exactly what they did! Problem is that they appear not to have kept them there and in order to apply full nose down stick I suspect the TC (or HP) took his hand off the throttles to use both hands - and they closed.

I have never tried it, but I don't think the autopliot has a cat's chance in hell of controlling the pitch-up from an aft-trimmed situation with full power. Note also that Boeing (in the FCTM) suggest disconnecting the A/P where ground contact is a factor and then using roll and rudder if necessary to get the nose down from the ensuing loop entry. What fails to be stressed, over and over again in run-of-the-mill airline 'training', is that such a recovery will take you STRAIGHT in to a nose-high 'upset' which requires A/P disengaged. Are you saying you flew 4 stick shake recoveries with full power applied - and the A/P coped? You never got more that 25 deg nose up? What Boeing say about this is interesting, and I do not think properly addressed.
" An approach to a stall is a controlled flight maneuver; a stall is an out-of-control, but recoverable, condition. Note: Anytime the airplane enters a fully developed stall, the autopilot and autothrottle should be disconnected.".

I cannot somehow see either Tom or TK as 'a controlled flight maneuver'

It is looking as if Boeing and AB (and others?) need to produce some system to prevent this excessive aft trim occuring below Vref - if we can no longer expect pilots to watch airspeed.

[Checkboard]

Problem is that they appear not to have kept them there and in order to apply full nose down stick I suspect the TC (or HP) took his hand off the throttles to use both hands - and they closed.

When I said "all they had to do", that's what I meant. That is, they didn't need to "apply full nose down stick".

Are you saying you flew 4 stick shake recoveries with full power applied - and the A/P coped? You never got more that 25 deg nose up?

I'm saying exactly that. Set up on the ILS, autopilot following the glide path, autothrottle disconnected and throttle at idle. Full flap and gear, autopilot trims aft as the aircraft slows to stick shake, wait 2 seconds to make it more "realistic" then simply advance the thrust.

Speed increases slowly at first, with the high drag, autopilot maintains the descent on the glide path. Speed increases back to Vref, as the autopilot re-trims. If you wish , you could simply reduce the thrust and continue the approach from there.

Obviously you are guarding the controls, in case the autopilot disconnects under the trim load.

[MU3001A]

It would seem the solution is to train pilots in and require demonstrated competence in stall recovery from low altitude, high drag configurations with adverse pitch trim. Or alternatively, restrict AP trimming below a preset AOA by having the AP disconnect and hand the aircraft back to the pilots in a state which it can be recovered without exposure to an adverse trim regime leading to the likes of 80kts IAS and 40 degrees pitch up.

Or is all that too obvious?

I also like Checkboard's solution. Wouldn't have worked without manual intervention in the Buffalo situation though, as the shaker operation disconnects the AP.

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by Checkboard

autopilot maintains the descent on the glide path.

-aha! Yes, it may work there, I think (although I'm surprised the A/P has enough authority to oppose the trim change), but I would not mind betting that 99% of pilots right now would take 'normal' stall recovery action with stick shake at that height with possible 'ground contact' at the back of their minds? Let's have a straw poll - stick shake at around 500'; how many will leave the A/P coupled to the ILS, select full power, not touch TOGA or the trim switch and continue the approach? I would expect most would conduct a g/a since presumably you would anyway, even if you recover. I don't think landing of that sort of approach is 'a good idea'! Maybe a re-emphasis of the footnotes by company training departments is called for.

The effect of power/pitch couple is not uncommon - even BA had a 747 at extreme attitudes and very low speed during a g/a at LHR with this.

[slip and turn]

I am surprised neither the AAIB nor any of you pros have made any comment of any formal safety recommendation that something should be done to avoid brushing an incident like this under the carpet for as long as it was.

If I read the report correctly, the aircraft and crew flew on for damn near two weeks before the seriousness of the incident surfaced in any regulatory sense

[Checkboard]

I don't think that the "brushed under the carpet" comment is fair. The company reported it, immediately they knew the details and they discovered the details in a timely fashion - that is, they were following their correct procedure.

The AAIB did comment that the original filed ASR didn't quite describe the extent of the event - but without access to the text nothing can be said on how "under reported" it was. The aircraft itself wouldn't have suffered any damage from the underspeed.

[BOAC]

Didn't know about that S&T, but I agree. On the face of it a major lack of professionalism from the crew and a surprisingly slow reaction by the airline's safety dept to the ASR - there was one, wasn't there?

[Baron buzz]

But - if the ASR was as vague as has been suggested, how was the company to react? Only when the seriousness of the event became apparent, from the flight data (from the FDM system) was the company able to react properly - which they did.

[olster]

You guys are on the case;let's just say that there is a lot more to this than you may believe at first instance.A sorry tale that is embroiled with politics and spectacular training management incompetence.Watch this space.

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Originally Posted by slip and turn

I am surprised neither the AAIB nor any of you pros have made any comment of any formal safety recommendation that something should be done to avoid brushing an incident like this under the carpet for as long as it was.

If I read the report correctly, the aircraft and crew flew on for damn near two weeks before the seriousness of the incident surfaced in any regulatory sense

I think the Findings on "Safety Management" in section 3.1 pretty much cover this issue. What I believe has "saved" an SR on the topic is the seventh item in that section:

The operator has undertaken significant changes in their OFDM and safety management system following this event.

I think if that had not been the case, there'd likely be an SR to make it happen.

[Tee Emm]

Interesting to read the latest Flight International editorial comment (26 May- 1 June, page 5). Selected extracts:

"As flight deck automation becomes so reliable it hardly ever fails, it is becoming more of a human factors problem.....pilots familiar with operating older aircraft, which had more variable reliability, are nearing the end of their careers, and there is a generation of pilots whose only experience is of operating aircraft with highly reliable automated systems....is the AAIB implying that younger pilots are less good than the older ones when things go wrong?..It seems so...Maybe that is because the excercises mandated in recurrent training programmes have scarcely changed since the days of the Super Constellation...so training no longer represents what crews are likely to have to deal with today.."

For years, Flight International editorials have made similar comments following automation related accidents and incidents and yet it seems operators and manufacturer's are simply not interested and blind use of automation wins every time.
In Australia, even the smallest turbo prop operators are embracing automation with indecent haste to fly like the big jets do, and this is showing up markedly when pilots of these regionals front up for a basic instrument flying assessment as part of the interview process for a jet job in the domestic airlines.

A surprising number of pilots with hours on the larger turboprops are shown to be frankly incompetent when faced with hand flown non-automatics raw data flight with some unable to stay with legal limits on an ILS. But these pilots renew their instrument ratings each year - not by hand flying but on the autopilot. Despite all this, they are still welcomed by the airlines whose interview technique is aimed almost universally at ticking the boxes of human factors questions. "Tell us about how you resolve conflict on the flight deck?" How would you describe your reaction if the captain was intent on making an unstable approach?" "Do you sometimes get angry with your fellow crew members?" State an example of threat and error management?"

No technical questions any more. Just psycho-analysis of the candidate. Can't fly raw data in the sim, mate? No problem: you won't ever need that again. The automation will just blow you away. Bournemouth, Amsterdam, Adam Air Indonesia, - nah! Just aberrations - nothing to do with automation complacency.

Operators and regulators should heed the Flight International editorials on the seemingly unstoppable tide of automation and start thinking outside the square for a change and before more lives are lost.

[ajd1]

Only a 1000% correct ..... children of the magenta line etc (or the Airbus equivalent)

[JW411]

I have been holding off commenting on this subject for some time, but I do think that it is high time that a serious discussion about what actual level of skill really remains on the modern flight deck when the sh*t hits the fan and the FCOM and the automatics don't work any more.

Those of you out there who come from my vintage will remember the old CAA Base Check and Instrument Rating. During the resulting two hours, the entire exercise was hand-flown and the only time that the examiner would allow you to use the auto-pilot was while you made your let-down brief.

I duly left the Royal Air Force after 18 years and joined this civilian way of doing things without too much difficulty.

And so things continued until JARs came along.

As an examiner (by then), I simply could not believe how much the candidate was allowed to resort to auto-flight.

It went like this:

EFATO: Hand fly until clean wing and then allowed auto pilot.

Subsequent Actions and Holding Pattern: Auto Pilot.

Attempted Relight: Auto Pilot.

Traffic Pattern: TCAS event etc to base leg. Auto Pilot.

Three-engine ILS: Arrange failure of automatics resulting in hand-flown ILS

To Go Around: Which invariably was "untidy"

Then: Invariably the call was "Engage the Auto Pilot"

For the next exercise, which was a Non Precision Approach (using the auto-pilot once again).

This could hopefully (inshallah) end up with a manual landing (or G/A) on 3-engines.

Apart from things like renewing the 3-engine ferry take off certificate, a bit of flapless etc etc, that was it.

So why am I worried?

I am very, very, worried that basic handling skills have been removed by the basic JAR renewal tests to the extent that our youngsters could very soon just find themselves doing something for the very first time with a very expensive piece of equipment crammed full of passengers.

Let us hope that EASA is going to be more realistic.

PS I managed to survive for 13 hours and 30 minutes in an aeroplane without a working ar*se end and during which the FCOM was of absolutely no help to me or anyone else around me.

[sharksandwich]

rainboe's point

Quote:
I am not one for commenting on things normally on PPRuNe but feel it would be a shame for people like me who are not in the industry but are interested in it all the same not being able to read the wealth of knowledge and experience that appear on these boards.
Fine if people like you in these sections stuck to 'reading' but far too many people with limited knowledge are involving themselves in discourse way beyond their comprehension or knowledge, without letting on. It makes a mockery of any serious discussion by industry people. We've even had aviation armchair hobbyists announcing here how they would have handled a recent emergency (differently to the pilots involved)!

Dogma raised a very valid point, and was quite correct in criticising the post. It is an absurd statement for anyone that knows the 737-300. Perhaps until more information is released, we can refrain from postulating or stabbing in the dark? A lot of what has been written is evidently junk.
Good point.Those of us who are not pilots but enjoy learning more about real day to day aviation should read but not post ill-informed speculation.It just clogs up the thread. Like this post. Sorry, just making a point.

[Denti]

Tee Emm, is it really that bad? Over here in my outfit (which is in JAR or now EU-land) we have to prove every six months that we are able to fly one engine out raw data manual approaches and go-arounds. Raw Data Holdings however are rare and only covered by the 3 year recurring cycle, TCAS RAs are mandatory hand flown, be it in the SIM or outside of it.

I guess a lot depends on training philosophy and local CAA requirements.

[Tee Emm]

prove every six months that we are able to fly one engine out raw data manual approaches and go-arounds

I guess a one engine inoperative manually flown ILS with no doubt with radar vectors plus a go-around would take say fifteen minutes of simulator time at the most. . Some would argue that fifteen minutes of manual flying once every six months is not a serious attempt to maintain competency.

[Denti]

I agree there, however raw data flying is actively encouraged in daily line flying and is actually necessary as we do a lot of visuals (not setting those up in the FMC) and circling approaches. The SIM is usually a OEI approach followed by a GA with FD failure at the same time and standard missed approach procedure which is made a tad more difficult as we cannot use any maps during the GA (EFB is not allowed to be used below 1000ft AGL and no paper map backup). From the missed approach procedure fix either radar vectors are provided to set you up on the subsequent approach or a standard approach procedure has to be flown, if the latter is used the FMC is failed to not have the nice shiny lines on the ND. Unfortunately lately there are usually other problems present at the same time like flight control problems, missing hydraulics, electric problems, a spontanous fire on the APU or remaining engine which really raises the stress level a tad too high.