TOM stall?
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The date Nov 07, Doesn't mean anything With the AAIB.
The AAIB will get round to investigating the 'stall' wether it be next week or next year, Time is irrelevant.
I'm sure there are other similar 'stall' incidents that don't get reported??
The AAIB will get round to investigating the 'stall' wether it be next week or next year, Time is irrelevant.
I'm sure there are other similar 'stall' incidents that don't get reported??
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Total beginner asks: Just out of interest, what would happen in this scenario?
Although not quite the same as your question, worth a read is this extract from:
REPORT 7/2003 - Date: 22 January 2003
serious incident to icelandair BOEING 757-200 at oslo airport gardermoen norway 22 january 2002
At the time, 0946 UTC, the aircraft was cleared by ATC down to 2 500 ft, and this altitude was set on the MCP. This setting was maintained through the aborted approach. The gear was selected down. When the aircraft finally was established on the LLZ, it was at least 1 dot high on the GP. Flaps 20o had been set with appropriate speed selection.The aircraft descended through 1 000 ft AAL (Above Aerodrome Level) in an unstabilized mode without the mandatory “call out”.
At an altitude of approx. 580 ft AAL (Flight Data Recorder (FDR) radio altimeter reading) the Commander decided that he discontinued the unstabilized approach and initiated a missed approach. The time was 09:49:11 UTC. He announced his decision to the First Officer and started a “Go-Around” (GA).
The status of the flight was as follows: The aircraft was above the GP, and the SOP calls for the GA altitude to be set when stabilized on GP, therefore the GA altitude was not set on the MCP. Flaps were not in landing configuration, because landing Check List was not completed. The Commander’s instrument panel indicated intermittent ILS failures of raw data without any flag warnings. The lowest altitude AAL indicated on the FDR was approx 460 ft.
The “pitch over” incident is here described mainly based on the FDR information with the Commander’s and First Officer’s reports incorporated:
When the go-around manoeuvre was started by the use of the auto go-around system, the speed was 182 kt. The aircraft was flown manually. The aircraft pitch was increased to approx. 20o and the aircraft started to climb. Upon initiating the go-around, the A/T automatically engaged and increased the thrust to the EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio) limit. In addition, the application of the under wing engine power also gave pitch up movement. During the climb the landing gear was retracted. The flight director pitch initially targeted a pitch attitude of 15o. The airspeed reached a maximum of 198 kt before it started to decrease.
Because of the aircrafts proximity to the MCP selected altitude of 2 500 ft when the go-around was started; the AFDS transitioned to Altitude Capture almost immediately after a positive rate of climb was achieved. At time 09:49:19 UTC the aircraft climbed rapidly through the MCP altitude of 2 500 ft, The FD continued to give commands targeting the MCP selected altitude. The A/T changed from go-around mode to targeting the MCP selected speed (150 kt). The maximum aircraft pitch (21o) was reached. The thrust remained near maximum because the Commander held the throttles forward. The speed was decelerating and quickly dropped below MCP speed. The pitch flight director continued to give command to lead the pilot back to the MCP altitude.
At time 09:49:34 UTC the aircraft reached a peak altitude of 2895 ft (FDR QNH corrected altitude) and the speed had decreased to 137 kt. (The reference speed for flaps 20o is 131 kt.) Nose down was applied manually by the control column. The First Officer called for “bug up” (for the flap up manoeuvring speed) to set the airspeed indicator, and the Commander pushed on the Flight Level Change Switch (FLCH) button to break the flight director altitude lock on. The speed selected on MCP was changed from 150 kt to 210 kt. During the next seconds, a full nose down input on the control column was made manually. The aircraft pitched over to an attitude of approx. –30o, and for a period of approx. 5 seconds the FDR indicates negative g-values with a maximum load factor of –0.6 g.
The control column was briefly returned to near neutral, and then another abrupt large nose down column input was made. The aircraft pitched over rapidly with the speed increasing excessively. The FDR data show that the Ground Proximity Warning System (GWPS) aural warning of “Pull up” was activated. The aircraft was now in a steep dive and rapidly descending. During the dive the flight director pitch bar gave pitch up commands relative to the pitch attitude. The A/T reduced the trust from 98% N1 to 45% N1. At time 09:49:44 UTC the aircraft pitch attitude had peaked at -49o and was beginning to increase positively.
At this time the First Officer called out “PULL UP!” - “PULL UP!”. The GPWS aural warnings of “TERRAIN” and then “TOO LOW TERRAIN” were activated. Both pilots were active at the control columns and a maximum “up” input was made. A split between left and right elevator was indicated at this time. It appears the split occurred due to both pilots being active at the controls. The pilots did not register the aural warnings. During the dive the airspeed increased to 251 kt and the lowest altitude in the recovery was 321 ft radio altitude with a peaked load factor of +3.59 g’s.
REPORT 7/2003 - Date: 22 January 2003
serious incident to icelandair BOEING 757-200 at oslo airport gardermoen norway 22 january 2002
At the time, 0946 UTC, the aircraft was cleared by ATC down to 2 500 ft, and this altitude was set on the MCP. This setting was maintained through the aborted approach. The gear was selected down. When the aircraft finally was established on the LLZ, it was at least 1 dot high on the GP. Flaps 20o had been set with appropriate speed selection.The aircraft descended through 1 000 ft AAL (Above Aerodrome Level) in an unstabilized mode without the mandatory “call out”.
At an altitude of approx. 580 ft AAL (Flight Data Recorder (FDR) radio altimeter reading) the Commander decided that he discontinued the unstabilized approach and initiated a missed approach. The time was 09:49:11 UTC. He announced his decision to the First Officer and started a “Go-Around” (GA).
The status of the flight was as follows: The aircraft was above the GP, and the SOP calls for the GA altitude to be set when stabilized on GP, therefore the GA altitude was not set on the MCP. Flaps were not in landing configuration, because landing Check List was not completed. The Commander’s instrument panel indicated intermittent ILS failures of raw data without any flag warnings. The lowest altitude AAL indicated on the FDR was approx 460 ft.
The “pitch over” incident is here described mainly based on the FDR information with the Commander’s and First Officer’s reports incorporated:
When the go-around manoeuvre was started by the use of the auto go-around system, the speed was 182 kt. The aircraft was flown manually. The aircraft pitch was increased to approx. 20o and the aircraft started to climb. Upon initiating the go-around, the A/T automatically engaged and increased the thrust to the EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio) limit. In addition, the application of the under wing engine power also gave pitch up movement. During the climb the landing gear was retracted. The flight director pitch initially targeted a pitch attitude of 15o. The airspeed reached a maximum of 198 kt before it started to decrease.
Because of the aircrafts proximity to the MCP selected altitude of 2 500 ft when the go-around was started; the AFDS transitioned to Altitude Capture almost immediately after a positive rate of climb was achieved. At time 09:49:19 UTC the aircraft climbed rapidly through the MCP altitude of 2 500 ft, The FD continued to give commands targeting the MCP selected altitude. The A/T changed from go-around mode to targeting the MCP selected speed (150 kt). The maximum aircraft pitch (21o) was reached. The thrust remained near maximum because the Commander held the throttles forward. The speed was decelerating and quickly dropped below MCP speed. The pitch flight director continued to give command to lead the pilot back to the MCP altitude.
At time 09:49:34 UTC the aircraft reached a peak altitude of 2895 ft (FDR QNH corrected altitude) and the speed had decreased to 137 kt. (The reference speed for flaps 20o is 131 kt.) Nose down was applied manually by the control column. The First Officer called for “bug up” (for the flap up manoeuvring speed) to set the airspeed indicator, and the Commander pushed on the Flight Level Change Switch (FLCH) button to break the flight director altitude lock on. The speed selected on MCP was changed from 150 kt to 210 kt. During the next seconds, a full nose down input on the control column was made manually. The aircraft pitched over to an attitude of approx. –30o, and for a period of approx. 5 seconds the FDR indicates negative g-values with a maximum load factor of –0.6 g.
The control column was briefly returned to near neutral, and then another abrupt large nose down column input was made. The aircraft pitched over rapidly with the speed increasing excessively. The FDR data show that the Ground Proximity Warning System (GWPS) aural warning of “Pull up” was activated. The aircraft was now in a steep dive and rapidly descending. During the dive the flight director pitch bar gave pitch up commands relative to the pitch attitude. The A/T reduced the trust from 98% N1 to 45% N1. At time 09:49:44 UTC the aircraft pitch attitude had peaked at -49o and was beginning to increase positively.
At this time the First Officer called out “PULL UP!” - “PULL UP!”. The GPWS aural warnings of “TERRAIN” and then “TOO LOW TERRAIN” were activated. Both pilots were active at the control columns and a maximum “up” input was made. A split between left and right elevator was indicated at this time. It appears the split occurred due to both pilots being active at the controls. The pilots did not register the aural warnings. During the dive the airspeed increased to 251 kt and the lowest altitude in the recovery was 321 ft radio altitude with a peaked load factor of +3.59 g’s.
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I think it has been mentioned before, but AFAIK this does not NEED to be an AAIB investigation and the company can sort it out, as has happened in other 'mishandling' events in other airlines.
Also need to correct some peoples' lack of understanding of 737 systems - there is no 'Alpha-Floor' on the beast. Select full power at low speed and do not control the pitch and those parameters are a doddle.
Also need to correct some peoples' lack of understanding of 737 systems - there is no 'Alpha-Floor' on the beast. Select full power at low speed and do not control the pitch and those parameters are a doddle.
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from the UK AAIB website
The United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) is part of the Department for Transport and is responsible for the investigation of civil aircraft accidents and serious incidents within the UK. The Chief Inspector of Air Accidents reports directly to the Secretary of State for Transport.
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Regardless of the debate above, you all need to remember this:
Statutory Instrument 1996 No. 2798
The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 1996
The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 1996
(4) Subject to paragraphs (5) and (6) below, the Chief Inspector may, when he expects to draw air safety lessons from it, carry out, or cause an Inspector to carry out, an investigation into an incident, other than a serious incident, which occurs—
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Are there parallels here with the Turkish incident at Schiphol ?
The bells and whistles, the honkers and hooters, the flashing lights and disembodied electronic voices, the omniscient computers are all - REPEAT ALL - aids for the Flight Crew to use at their discretion and not to rely upon for all flight operations.
They are not (and never were intended to be) a substitute for good airmanship.
But, increasingly, that is how they are being used. We are breeding flight crews who simply have no idea what 'seat of the pants' flying is all about - something that Captain Sully alluded to in at least one of his interviews after his Hudson River escapade.
Yeah - I'll get flamed here but I've been flying aeroplanes for 30 years. During my training and during all subsequent ratings and renewals I had one mantra drummed into me over and over and over again "AIRSPEED and ATTITUDE" and it is still there, running through the back of my mind, through take-off, climb, cruise and approach.
The most high-tech dials I ever get to use are an ADF and a VOR. For all other purposes the standard 'T' gives me all the information I need to fly the aeroplane correctly and accurately.
Have we really reached the point where those basic skills are beginning to disappear in favour of an MSFS approach to professional aviation?
Because, if there is the slightest indication that this might be true, then I may never set foot aboard a commercial aircraft again.
Last edited by Xeque; 6th Mar 2009 at 17:56.
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Xeque - I agree with you.
The B737 is now an entry-level airliner - it is quite often the first aircraft a newly qualified pilot will fly commercially. Yet, it is by no means the easiest jet to fly, and it will bite HARD if mishandled - not exactly the best beast to be consolidating newly learned flying skills. I wonder if anyone has done any statistical analysis on the accident/incident rate for B737 vrs other types, for low time aircrew.
Yes, I know, with the right amount of quality training....etc, etc, etc
It used to be said that there is no subsitiute for experience. Sadly, I hear that said less often these days.
The B737 is now an entry-level airliner - it is quite often the first aircraft a newly qualified pilot will fly commercially. Yet, it is by no means the easiest jet to fly, and it will bite HARD if mishandled - not exactly the best beast to be consolidating newly learned flying skills. I wonder if anyone has done any statistical analysis on the accident/incident rate for B737 vrs other types, for low time aircrew.
Yes, I know, with the right amount of quality training....etc, etc, etc
It used to be said that there is no subsitiute for experience. Sadly, I hear that said less often these days.
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When considering the release of an accident report from the AAIB - These investigations take time.
The really big investigations take many years. Even smaller scale accidents take a fair time to complete. Even when the actual investigation is completed there is a period where interested parties are able to review and comment on the report. Only then can the final version be published. The Colin McRae helicopter crash occurred in Sept 07 and the investigation was only released Feb 09. The TOM stall was Nov 07 so the report might still be a few months away. If there are parallels with the Turkish crash at AMS , then the report may be further delayed to incorporate relevant info.
Patience ..........
The really big investigations take many years. Even smaller scale accidents take a fair time to complete. Even when the actual investigation is completed there is a period where interested parties are able to review and comment on the report. Only then can the final version be published. The Colin McRae helicopter crash occurred in Sept 07 and the investigation was only released Feb 09. The TOM stall was Nov 07 so the report might still be a few months away. If there are parallels with the Turkish crash at AMS , then the report may be further delayed to incorporate relevant info.
Patience ..........
Thunderbug,
Completely agree that the reports take some time. But is is now roughly 18 months since an alleged incident occurred that could very well have lost all on board. The CVR/FDR & crew were all available after the incident. Surely accident investigation is mostly about preventing future accidents. At least an interim report should have been released like the Easyjet test dive.
Completely agree that the reports take some time. But is is now roughly 18 months since an alleged incident occurred that could very well have lost all on board. The CVR/FDR & crew were all available after the incident. Surely accident investigation is mostly about preventing future accidents. At least an interim report should have been released like the Easyjet test dive.