Air Europa 738 at Katowice?
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What about the GP at EPKT?
Still u/s?
Hate those LOC APP w/o DME and w/o PAPI's on RWY27, especially at marginal weather!
Not to mention the TWC we have to face sometimes!
RWY 09 is only for circling!
Still u/s?
Hate those LOC APP w/o DME and w/o PAPI's on RWY27, especially at marginal weather!
Not to mention the TWC we have to face sometimes!
RWY 09 is only for circling!
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Good read this thread - missed it previously.
I might take issue with U2 on just one small point in post #135, though.
In my view the oysters from Southern EI might well give those from PEI a run for the money
I might take issue with U2 on just one small point in post #135, though.
In my view the oysters from Southern EI might well give those from PEI a run for the money
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During the Safety Conference on April 9th the Chief of the Investigation Commission
Dr. Edmund Kilch reported (among others) about this accident.
It was not the final report, just the description of the work in progress...
I am quoting from my memory (his presentation was not published),
so excuse any errors...
1. they approached too high over the ILS glide slope,
2. to catch the glide slope they were descending
with double the prescribed vertical speed,
3. crossed the glide slope with high vertical speed below decision height in clouds,
4. FO was flying, CPT took over when they were already below glide slope,
pulled, but it was too late
5. they started cutting the approach lights with the gear and engine cowling
6. they hit the ground 900m before threshold, jumped and hit the runway
7. they taxied to the apron without reporting to the ATC about the event
8. they were told by ground crew about the damage, but left for the hotel
without filing any report.
9. they were interviewed by police and prosecutors office next day
10. ILS was checked after the event and was OK and operational
I leave it without comment, because (as I stated before) there may be some errors...
BUT what I remember VERY well, the Chief of the Commission was using very
strong and explicit words describing the accident itself and
the behaviour of the crew, especially after the accident...
Let's wait for the official report for the conclusions.
I have my private opinion on this one.
With my best regards to:
boeingir, bradford737 and others...
Dr. Edmund Kilch reported (among others) about this accident.
It was not the final report, just the description of the work in progress...
I am quoting from my memory (his presentation was not published),
so excuse any errors...
1. they approached too high over the ILS glide slope,
2. to catch the glide slope they were descending
with double the prescribed vertical speed,
3. crossed the glide slope with high vertical speed below decision height in clouds,
4. FO was flying, CPT took over when they were already below glide slope,
pulled, but it was too late
5. they started cutting the approach lights with the gear and engine cowling
6. they hit the ground 900m before threshold, jumped and hit the runway
7. they taxied to the apron without reporting to the ATC about the event
8. they were told by ground crew about the damage, but left for the hotel
without filing any report.
9. they were interviewed by police and prosecutors office next day
10. ILS was checked after the event and was OK and operational
I leave it without comment, because (as I stated before) there may be some errors...
BUT what I remember VERY well, the Chief of the Commission was using very
strong and explicit words describing the accident itself and
the behaviour of the crew, especially after the accident...
Let's wait for the official report for the conclusions.
I have my private opinion on this one.
With my best regards to:
boeingir, bradford737 and others...
Last edited by Ptkay; 9th May 2008 at 15:23.
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In the meantime I found out that the presentation m.a.
was published on the official page of the Polish Civil Aviation Office:
(see pages 8-12)
http://www.ulc.gov.pl/_download/bezp...mund_klich.pdf
So once again, this time translation from the original document.
- approved direct approach
- approach on autopilot
- meteorological conditions below minima class I
- app. 5.4 NM from threshold intecepted direction above 3 deg. glideslope
- high descent rate (1200-1800 fpm) 2 x higher than acc. to ILS
- crossing the glide slope below decision altitude
- approach not stabilized
- activation of EGPWS (sink rate, pull up)
- CPT takes over
- hitting 2 and then following rows of lamps of the CALVERT system
- touch down 850 m before threshold
- landing run on runway
- no reports about ILS malfunction
- substantial damage to the aircraft
- approach light system destroyed
- no report about accident
was published on the official page of the Polish Civil Aviation Office:
(see pages 8-12)
http://www.ulc.gov.pl/_download/bezp...mund_klich.pdf
So once again, this time translation from the original document.
- approved direct approach
- approach on autopilot
- meteorological conditions below minima class I
- app. 5.4 NM from threshold intecepted direction above 3 deg. glideslope
- high descent rate (1200-1800 fpm) 2 x higher than acc. to ILS
- crossing the glide slope below decision altitude
- approach not stabilized
- activation of EGPWS (sink rate, pull up)
- CPT takes over
- hitting 2 and then following rows of lamps of the CALVERT system
- touch down 850 m before threshold
- landing run on runway
- no reports about ILS malfunction
- substantial damage to the aircraft
- approach light system destroyed
- no report about accident
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I would assume one notices contacting structural parts and ground contact 850m before threshold.
Running away from the scene straight to the hotel, not mentioning the incident, seems just a tad strange to me....
(then again I have only a limited number of posts on my account yet...)
Running away from the scene straight to the hotel, not mentioning the incident, seems just a tad strange to me....
(then again I have only a limited number of posts on my account yet...)
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Running away from the scene straight to the hotel, not mentioning the incident, seems just a tad strange to me....
In the published document it says in original:
"brak informacji o zdarzeniu",
which translates to:
"no report about event"
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Air Europa 
Two publisised incidents - EPKT and GCRR. 2 unstable approaches culminating in two landings. Both with EGPWS hard warnings of 'PULL UP.' One incident causing damage to the aircraft (crew advised and elected not to report); the other results in a runway excursion.
It's what isn't publisised that worries me. I'll give this lot a wide berth.
Two publisised incidents - EPKT and GCRR. 2 unstable approaches culminating in two landings. Both with EGPWS hard warnings of 'PULL UP.' One incident causing damage to the aircraft (crew advised and elected not to report); the other results in a runway excursion.
It's what isn't publisised that worries me. I'll give this lot a wide berth.
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You don't need to worry about the one at GCRR. Investigation findings are published here:
http://www.fomento.gob.es/NR/rdonlyr...041_IN_ENG.pdf
http://www.fomento.gob.es/NR/rdonlyr...041_IN_ENG.pdf
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A report has now been published.
Report: Europa B738 at Katowice on Oct 28th 2007, touched down 870m before runway threshold on ILS approach
Report: Europa B738 at Katowice on Oct 28th 2007, touched down 870m before runway threshold on ILS approach
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This accident is eerily similar to the Smolensk disaster of April 10, 2010. Had this report been published in timely fashion and properly studied, it might have prevented a national calamity and all that has followed since. The damage to the B738 is astonishing, but they were very lucky just to take out a bunch of lights instead of colliding with a solid tree as at Smolensk and losing much of one wing causing a barrel roll into the ground.
yikes the photos are astonishing - this one passed me by --- beggars belief they did nowt and popped to the hotel without saying a word
i see there was an ''instructor'' on the jump seat - how many landing accidents have there been now recently with this scenario?
i see there was an ''instructor'' on the jump seat - how many landing accidents have there been now recently with this scenario?
I suspect that most pilots already know, without having to read the Smolensk report, that colliding with solid objects is likely to ruin your entire day.
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I've read the report, especially the flight data and crew actions section. Astonishing. 3 experienced pilots must have known they were outside legal limits attempting the approach. Were they hoping for a tiny RVR improvement outside the OM? Dodgy. They discussed fuel use for the approach, but no mention made if they discussed diversion options and fuel available. Surely the diversion plan should have been made and understood before TOD to destination; but even the approach set-up & brief was done late in the descent, and the captain's decision to shorten the approach, put them high from that time, but with plenty of distance to recover. In those Wx conditions I'd expect sharp pilots to be well ahead of the game, no rushing and be very certain everything would be set up to give the best chance of success. Proper descent profile planning with idle thrust does not use extra fuel. It doesn't matter what route they chose, there is no excuse for getting high on the glide. Noting the point when they lowered the gear and had F40 shows they knew they were rushed. The CVR text doesn't tell the whole story. I'm sure the LHS captain would have been prompting drag etc. considering it was his idea to shorten the approach route. An idle thrust descending orbit uses a breath of fuel, so why not do it?
The whole approach, from FL100, would have had my neck hairs tingling like a barbecued pig on a spit. Continuing as they did in such weather questions their self-survival instincts. Different on a good vis day flight with 1000' cloud base, but CAT 2 RVR at night to a man land. No way. And what was PIC doing? Not a lot it seems.
As they had gear down & F40 very early they might have made a 1:1 profile and captured the glide earlier. The chopping & changing of LVL CHG & V/S suggests a weak understanding of the a/c and systems. I can not understand how 3 professionals can hurtle towards a black concrete hole, having no sense of danger to their survival, in the hope, rather than expectation, of success. There was no startle factor in this.
It is always curious to read the investigations 'cause of the accident'. The prime reason is given as failure to make a go-around. That may be true; indeed they would not then have crashed, true, but the root causes goes much further back. Indeed there might even have been trends in the individuals' history, but it would be the bad luck coincidence of all bad lucks to have 3 weak performers on the same flight deck.
The report mentions CRM improvements at the operator. To me that is to be welcomed, but I find weak CRM is often trotted out as an excuse for what is loss of SA, lack of basic airmanship and lack of self-survival. Those were required characteristics of individual pilots long before CRM was ever thought of. CRM came about as a counter to the dictatorial dogmatic semi-deaf belligerent captains. CRM did not suddenly replace good airmanship. The PIC instructor should have had no qualm chirping up and telling the PM captain that the approach was not on and they should divert. Not doing that he should have still have chirped up and said the 1000' gate was missed by a mile and called a GA. That's exercising authority when as a relaxed observer, who is PIC, can see the manure is about to hit the ventilation and he's going to have all the paperwork to write.
Is the report really saying that an EU airline, in 2008, did not have a strong landing gate discipline in its approved OM? Air Europa is not a young airline. Extraordinary. The root cause of this crash started a long time before, perhaps contributed to even by the choice of fuel load at departure. They were not that flush after a medium length flight. I'm sure there was fuel left in the bowser.
I take the point about the delay in the publishing of the report. The FDR & CVR & Crew and a/c were all available PDQ after the event. From the data it seems a slam dunk for the investigators. Perhaps there should be a report about the delay, but perhaps that could also take 8 years. I can't remember the Smolensk event, but this event seems pure human self-inflicted, not mechanical/systems. How would the Smolensk event have been avoided?
The whole approach, from FL100, would have had my neck hairs tingling like a barbecued pig on a spit. Continuing as they did in such weather questions their self-survival instincts. Different on a good vis day flight with 1000' cloud base, but CAT 2 RVR at night to a man land. No way. And what was PIC doing? Not a lot it seems.
As they had gear down & F40 very early they might have made a 1:1 profile and captured the glide earlier. The chopping & changing of LVL CHG & V/S suggests a weak understanding of the a/c and systems. I can not understand how 3 professionals can hurtle towards a black concrete hole, having no sense of danger to their survival, in the hope, rather than expectation, of success. There was no startle factor in this.
It is always curious to read the investigations 'cause of the accident'. The prime reason is given as failure to make a go-around. That may be true; indeed they would not then have crashed, true, but the root causes goes much further back. Indeed there might even have been trends in the individuals' history, but it would be the bad luck coincidence of all bad lucks to have 3 weak performers on the same flight deck.
The report mentions CRM improvements at the operator. To me that is to be welcomed, but I find weak CRM is often trotted out as an excuse for what is loss of SA, lack of basic airmanship and lack of self-survival. Those were required characteristics of individual pilots long before CRM was ever thought of. CRM came about as a counter to the dictatorial dogmatic semi-deaf belligerent captains. CRM did not suddenly replace good airmanship. The PIC instructor should have had no qualm chirping up and telling the PM captain that the approach was not on and they should divert. Not doing that he should have still have chirped up and said the 1000' gate was missed by a mile and called a GA. That's exercising authority when as a relaxed observer, who is PIC, can see the manure is about to hit the ventilation and he's going to have all the paperwork to write.
Is the report really saying that an EU airline, in 2008, did not have a strong landing gate discipline in its approved OM? Air Europa is not a young airline. Extraordinary. The root cause of this crash started a long time before, perhaps contributed to even by the choice of fuel load at departure. They were not that flush after a medium length flight. I'm sure there was fuel left in the bowser.
I take the point about the delay in the publishing of the report. The FDR & CVR & Crew and a/c were all available PDQ after the event. From the data it seems a slam dunk for the investigators. Perhaps there should be a report about the delay, but perhaps that could also take 8 years. I can't remember the Smolensk event, but this event seems pure human self-inflicted, not mechanical/systems. How would the Smolensk event have been avoided?
Last edited by RAT 5; 23rd Dec 2017 at 16:50.
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RAT 5
Well meaning post no doubt, but the above highlights all the aspects of a little knowledge being a dangerous thing.. it would take about 30 minutes to address correctly the multiple wrong ends of sticks and reality of flight ops & investigation
Well meaning post no doubt, but the above highlights all the aspects of a little knowledge being a dangerous thing.. it would take about 30 minutes to address correctly the multiple wrong ends of sticks and reality of flight ops & investigation