SAS Q400 gear collaps CPH 27/10
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And today the Norwegian newspaper Dagens Næringsliv reported:
Says Kjell Klevan in the N-CAA in a letter to the CAA in Sweden and Denmark in march of this year.
He goes on to state that there is a poor safety culture in the company, with little ability to admit errors, and poor cooperation with the aviation authorities.
(My translation)
In Norwegian: http://www.dn.no/forsiden/utenriks/a...=article_title
Story picked up by Danish newspaper Jyllandsposten as well.
Not the kind of thing SAS want to be associated with perhaps?
"SAS is a fragile and vulnerable airline"
He goes on to state that there is a poor safety culture in the company, with little ability to admit errors, and poor cooperation with the aviation authorities.
(My translation)
In Norwegian: http://www.dn.no/forsiden/utenriks/a...=article_title
Story picked up by Danish newspaper Jyllandsposten as well.
Not the kind of thing SAS want to be associated with perhaps?
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Kjell Klevan himself has now made a comment in the media:
"Han mener at mye har endret seg i SAS siden notatet ble skrevet."
Translation:
"He says that, since this report was drafted, a lot of changes has been made in SAS."
"Han mener at mye har endret seg i SAS siden notatet ble skrevet."
Translation:
"He says that, since this report was drafted, a lot of changes has been made in SAS."
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Mr Klevan is retired from SAS, as in pensioned. As M609 states, he is now employed by the Norwegian CAA.
I believe his report was made for scandinavian CAA-use, not intended for the media. Maybe that's why it has been fairly misinterpreted.
I believe his report was made for scandinavian CAA-use, not intended for the media. Maybe that's why it has been fairly misinterpreted.
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QANTAS obviously has faith in the airplane:
Qantas Places Firm Order For 12 Bombardier Q400 Turboprops
Toronto, November 20, 2007
Previously announced Qantas Airways commitment now firm order
Bombardier Aerospace announced today that Qantas Airways of Sydney, Australia has signed a firm order for 12 Bombardier Q400 turboprop airliners on behalf of its QantasLink regional airline. Qantas has also taken options and purchase rights on an additional 24 Q400 aircraft. Four of the 12 firm-order aircraft announced today represent conversions of existing aircraft options. On October 22, 2007 Bombardier Aerospace confirmed it was in discussions with Qantas Airways with regards to this transaction.
Based on the list price of the aircraft, the contract for the 12 firm Q400 airliners is valued at approximately $339 million U.S.
“Our initial investment in the Q400 in 2005 has resulted in new regional routes, an increase in capacity and reduced flight times on some routes by up to 20 per cent,” said Narendra Kumar, Group General Manager, Regional Airlines, Qantas Airways. “These additional aircraft will be used to increase capacity and service frequency on key regional routes, as well as pursue new growth opportunities.”
“This follow-on order is further evidence of the Q400 airliner’s value to the airlines that operate the aircraft,” said Steven Ridolfi, President, Bombardier Regional Aircraft. “Quite simply, no other regional turboprop aircraft matches its speed, passenger comfort and operating economics.”
QantasLink currently operates seven Q400 aircraft and another two ordered in January, 2007 are to be delivered in January, 2008.
Including the order announced today, Bombardier has received firm orders for 276 Q400 airliners, with 164 having been delivered as of July 31, 2007.
http://www.bombardier.com/index.jsp
Qantas Places Firm Order For 12 Bombardier Q400 Turboprops
Toronto, November 20, 2007
Previously announced Qantas Airways commitment now firm order
Bombardier Aerospace announced today that Qantas Airways of Sydney, Australia has signed a firm order for 12 Bombardier Q400 turboprop airliners on behalf of its QantasLink regional airline. Qantas has also taken options and purchase rights on an additional 24 Q400 aircraft. Four of the 12 firm-order aircraft announced today represent conversions of existing aircraft options. On October 22, 2007 Bombardier Aerospace confirmed it was in discussions with Qantas Airways with regards to this transaction.
Based on the list price of the aircraft, the contract for the 12 firm Q400 airliners is valued at approximately $339 million U.S.
“Our initial investment in the Q400 in 2005 has resulted in new regional routes, an increase in capacity and reduced flight times on some routes by up to 20 per cent,” said Narendra Kumar, Group General Manager, Regional Airlines, Qantas Airways. “These additional aircraft will be used to increase capacity and service frequency on key regional routes, as well as pursue new growth opportunities.”
“This follow-on order is further evidence of the Q400 airliner’s value to the airlines that operate the aircraft,” said Steven Ridolfi, President, Bombardier Regional Aircraft. “Quite simply, no other regional turboprop aircraft matches its speed, passenger comfort and operating economics.”
QantasLink currently operates seven Q400 aircraft and another two ordered in January, 2007 are to be delivered in January, 2008.
Including the order announced today, Bombardier has received firm orders for 276 Q400 airliners, with 164 having been delivered as of July 31, 2007.
http://www.bombardier.com/index.jsp
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Flight International
Accident report: SAS crew nearly loses control of a Dash 8 Q400 on approach
By David Learrmount
A mishandled propeller overspeed in an SAS Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 on approach almost led to loss of control, says a new report by the Swedish accident investigation board. The board was critical of the crew, their training, SAS's maintenance, and the emergency checklist and operations manual for the type.
The incident took place on 6 April 2006 during an instrument landing system approach to Runway 16 at Kalmar, near Sweden's south-east coast, with four crew and 69 passengers on board. The report says: "During the flight a technical failure occurred, which meant that the right-side propeller overspeeded. According to the emergency checklist a number of actions are to be taken, ending with feathering the faulty propeller and switching off the engine to reduce the drag of the propeller.
"The commander decided, however, to keep that engine at flight idle during the approach, which meant that the angle of the propeller blades remained flat to the aircraft direction, thereby causing severe drag. This severe drag caused great control problems for the aircraft and the commander thus had to use a power output from the other engine that exceeded the maximum permitted power. The approach was not stabilised and the final stage was at a very low height."
According to the report: "The crew had not practised dealing with faults in this system during approach and landing, and considered that the emergency checklist was unclear. During the three-week period immediately preceding the incident, three failures of the same type occurred on this individual aircraft. In no case had the crew completely followed the instructions in the emergency checklist. Nor had the technical fault been located correctly."
The investigators have recommended that the European Aviation Safety Agency "makes efforts to set up a working group, with representatives of the manufacturer and the airline, and possibly other operators of the Q400. The purpose should be to improve both the content and the method of application of the emergency checklist for the Q400".
By David Learrmount
A mishandled propeller overspeed in an SAS Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 on approach almost led to loss of control, says a new report by the Swedish accident investigation board. The board was critical of the crew, their training, SAS's maintenance, and the emergency checklist and operations manual for the type.
The incident took place on 6 April 2006 during an instrument landing system approach to Runway 16 at Kalmar, near Sweden's south-east coast, with four crew and 69 passengers on board. The report says: "During the flight a technical failure occurred, which meant that the right-side propeller overspeeded. According to the emergency checklist a number of actions are to be taken, ending with feathering the faulty propeller and switching off the engine to reduce the drag of the propeller.
"The commander decided, however, to keep that engine at flight idle during the approach, which meant that the angle of the propeller blades remained flat to the aircraft direction, thereby causing severe drag. This severe drag caused great control problems for the aircraft and the commander thus had to use a power output from the other engine that exceeded the maximum permitted power. The approach was not stabilised and the final stage was at a very low height."
According to the report: "The crew had not practised dealing with faults in this system during approach and landing, and considered that the emergency checklist was unclear. During the three-week period immediately preceding the incident, three failures of the same type occurred on this individual aircraft. In no case had the crew completely followed the instructions in the emergency checklist. Nor had the technical fault been located correctly."
The investigators have recommended that the European Aviation Safety Agency "makes efforts to set up a working group, with representatives of the manufacturer and the airline, and possibly other operators of the Q400. The purpose should be to improve both the content and the method of application of the emergency checklist for the Q400".
Last edited by maxrpm; 22nd Nov 2007 at 20:48.
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European Air Agency Affirms Bombardier Q400 is Safe
(Moderator...I promise to keep it clean!)
http://www.aviation.com/safety/07110...airworthy.html
To all the people who made false allegation about the Q400...told you so!
The Danish media & politicians have made a big fuss about this issue. They have caused much damage towards the reputation of Canadian quality aircraft!
Will they tell make the effort to admit they were wrong?
http://www.aviation.com/safety/07110...airworthy.html
According to the EASA, the most recent incident "was not due to a design error" and said the airworthiness of the aircraft is maintained.
Danish aviation authorities had earlier issued a preliminary report indicating that a piece of rubber stuck in the landing gear had prevented the gear from extending properly, causing the incident.
Danish aviation authorities had earlier issued a preliminary report indicating that a piece of rubber stuck in the landing gear had prevented the gear from extending properly, causing the incident.
The Danish media & politicians have made a big fuss about this issue. They have caused much damage towards the reputation of Canadian quality aircraft!
Will they tell make the effort to admit they were wrong?
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Rotornut:
To use a poker-expression: Quantas is pot committed.
And their Q400 might actually work fine, lets not rule that out.
When they work properly, its a very nice aircraft. Indeed.
Regarding the source of the O-ring:
I'm very convinced, that the Danish HCL (the "NTSB") is very interested in finding out, where that O-ring came from, and I'm sure they will actually print their findings in the FINAL report.
So to all the wICEguys: put a sock in it, and read the FINAL report. Prrretty please.
To use a poker-expression: Quantas is pot committed.
And their Q400 might actually work fine, lets not rule that out.
When they work properly, its a very nice aircraft. Indeed.
Regarding the source of the O-ring:
I'm very convinced, that the Danish HCL (the "NTSB") is very interested in finding out, where that O-ring came from, and I'm sure they will actually print their findings in the FINAL report.
So to all the wICEguys: put a sock in it, and read the FINAL report. Prrretty please.
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Ladusvala,
An O ring will always be in the wrong place if someone put it there in error.............
quote from the initial Danish report:
An O ring will always be in the wrong place if someone put it there in error.............
quote from the initial Danish report:
Investigators said the ring did not belong in the system, but were not sure when it was introduced. They said it could not be ruled out that it came in by mistake during the maintenance checks ordered by SAS on all its turboprops after the first two accidents in September.
Last edited by flyingbug; 25th Nov 2007 at 22:17. Reason: incorporate quote
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Swedish media (Dagens Nyheter) are currently reporting that Bombardier has admitted deficencies in an oil filter relating to the October accident according to danish aviation authorities. Bombardier is said to have agreed to introduce a new stronger filter, as the current one might collapse.
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Oh come on! That's media rubish & you know it! Before everyone starts taking a news report as the gospel, keep in mind that BBD is a public company and is under an obligation to file "material change" reports and issue press releases in respect of material events (good or bad).
Yes clearly a failed filter caused the O-ring to magically appear in the hydraulic actuator.........
"Bombardier has up to now banked on a preliminary report from the Danish Accident Investigation Commission, where it says that SAS mechanics had used parts for the rear of the landing gear that were intended for the nose portion."
BBD 1, SAS 0
Sorry for picking sides here, but Just trying to introduce some balance to counter all the Q400 bashers from Scandinavian countries!
No I ask, why only SAS?
Yes clearly a failed filter caused the O-ring to magically appear in the hydraulic actuator.........
"Bombardier has up to now banked on a preliminary report from the Danish Accident Investigation Commission, where it says that SAS mechanics had used parts for the rear of the landing gear that were intended for the nose portion."
BBD 1, SAS 0
Sorry for picking sides here, but Just trying to introduce some balance to counter all the Q400 bashers from Scandinavian countries!
No I ask, why only SAS?
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flaps2billion wrote:
From the Preliminary Report, dated 03-11-2007:
Not much magic involved here, me thinks...
flaps2billion wrote:
From the same report:
In other words, an identical part, with identical functions, but with different external fittings on it, as indicated by the different dash-number on the part...
Yes clearly a failed filter caused the O-ring to magically appear in the hydraulic actuator.........
The physical dimensions of the rogue O-Ring was similar to that of the NAS1611-110 O-Ring identified on the drawings for the door solenoid sequence valve (SSV). It was further determined that the only component in the landing gear system that incorporated this O-Ring was the SSV.
A review of the maintenance history identified that an SSV on the right main landing gear system had been replaced on 16 October 2007. This component was located and examined. The examination revealed that a filter element and an O-Ring were not present in the down port in the SSV.
To establish similarity with the rogue O-Ring, an O-Ring was removed from a second SSV and was examined. They were found to be identical in both size and in material composition.
In the course of this investigation, the Danish AIB became aware that past occurrences showed that filter elements in the SSV can collapse and migrate into the landing gear hydraulic system. In the past occurrences, O-Rings (situated adjacent to the filter) from the SSV´s are not known to have migrated into the landing gear hydraulic system.
However it is the conclusion of the Danish AIB, that the O-ring found blocking the right main landing gear actuator restrictor valve, was from the SSV that was previously installed on the occurrence aircraft.
A review of the maintenance history identified that an SSV on the right main landing gear system had been replaced on 16 October 2007. This component was located and examined. The examination revealed that a filter element and an O-Ring were not present in the down port in the SSV.
To establish similarity with the rogue O-Ring, an O-Ring was removed from a second SSV and was examined. They were found to be identical in both size and in material composition.
In the course of this investigation, the Danish AIB became aware that past occurrences showed that filter elements in the SSV can collapse and migrate into the landing gear hydraulic system. In the past occurrences, O-Rings (situated adjacent to the filter) from the SSV´s are not known to have migrated into the landing gear hydraulic system.
However it is the conclusion of the Danish AIB, that the O-ring found blocking the right main landing gear actuator restrictor valve, was from the SSV that was previously installed on the occurrence aircraft.
flaps2billion wrote:
"Bombardier has up to now banked on a preliminary report from the Danish Accident Investigation Commission, where it says that SAS mechanics had used parts for the rear of the landing gear that were intended for the nose portion."
BBD 1, SAS 0
BBD 1, SAS 0
A further review of the maintenance history revealed that the MSV (mechanical sequence valve) of the right main landing gear was replaced on 22 October 2007.
According to the maintenance records, the replacement MSV, supplied, was a P/N 48303-7 which was initially configured for installation into the nose landing gear hydraulic system. Prior to installation on the occurrence aircraft, the supplied MSV was reconfigured by maintenance personnel. To make the MSV P/N 48303-7 compatible with the installation requirements for the main landing gear, the unions from the replaced MSV P/N 48303-5 were used.
According to the maintenance records, the replacement MSV, supplied, was a P/N 48303-7 which was initially configured for installation into the nose landing gear hydraulic system. Prior to installation on the occurrence aircraft, the supplied MSV was reconfigured by maintenance personnel. To make the MSV P/N 48303-7 compatible with the installation requirements for the main landing gear, the unions from the replaced MSV P/N 48303-5 were used.