Comair Lexington Crash CVR
Trash du Blanc
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It would appear that Comair pilots generally are of the lowest common demominator
Hey there BoeingMEL,
Mmmmmm.....point taken. I must say that we did crank up the apu, in fact the stews that came on board our aircraft were going to London, and we were going to Paris. That's when we found out we were in the wrong aluminium tube. So we walked over to the next gate. Was pretty hilarious.
Mmmmmm.....point taken. I must say that we did crank up the apu, in fact the stews that came on board our aircraft were going to London, and we were going to Paris. That's when we found out we were in the wrong aluminium tube. So we walked over to the next gate. Was pretty hilarious.
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Huck is right about a few things. I wrote a lengthy analysis of this CVR transcript and its meanings ...way beyond the sterile cockpit stuff.
And HUCK is quite right, a bit of small talk is vital to "team building" in the cockpit.
I won't publish my analysis here, yet. I will attempt to have it published where it will do more good, somehow the public must understand what airline flying in the USA is becoming.
When it is published elsewhere, I may reprint it here.
And guys, there is so much more in the transcript than what you have already mentioned...read it like your life depends on it...every word...don't skip anything.
===
the following is to be taken with a grain of salt and not reflect the tragedy of the Lexington accident...if you think you will read it the wrong way, don't read it at all.
Huck is right too about managing a subway restaurant/sandwich shop.
The question to modern pilots is this: is it easier to hit on a babe with the line: I fly for comair and make crappy $, or I manage a subway and make crappy sandwiches but twice as much money as that comair guy?
And HUCK is quite right, a bit of small talk is vital to "team building" in the cockpit.
I won't publish my analysis here, yet. I will attempt to have it published where it will do more good, somehow the public must understand what airline flying in the USA is becoming.
When it is published elsewhere, I may reprint it here.
And guys, there is so much more in the transcript than what you have already mentioned...read it like your life depends on it...every word...don't skip anything.
===
the following is to be taken with a grain of salt and not reflect the tragedy of the Lexington accident...if you think you will read it the wrong way, don't read it at all.
Huck is right too about managing a subway restaurant/sandwich shop.
The question to modern pilots is this: is it easier to hit on a babe with the line: I fly for comair and make crappy $, or I manage a subway and make crappy sandwiches but twice as much money as that comair guy?
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The salary at Comair has absolutely nothing to do with this KLEX accident, and it more than likely would have happened if the crews salary was twice what it was.
The VERY basic fact is, poor training combined with a culture that is NOT safety oriented, which is confirmed by the CVR transcript.
These Comair guys are there simply because they hope to either have (eventually) the regional salaries higher (not likely to happen) or they hope to get hired by a major carrier....where they will find declining salaries, and there is positively nothing that they or ALPA/APA can do about it.
Period.
If bigger bucks are required (to hit on the babes etc) then these guys might as well try Subway management.
Indeed, by the looks of the transcript perhaps this is where they belong.
In short, shape up, or ship out.
The VERY basic fact is, poor training combined with a culture that is NOT safety oriented, which is confirmed by the CVR transcript.
These Comair guys are there simply because they hope to either have (eventually) the regional salaries higher (not likely to happen) or they hope to get hired by a major carrier....where they will find declining salaries, and there is positively nothing that they or ALPA/APA can do about it.
Period.
If bigger bucks are required (to hit on the babes etc) then these guys might as well try Subway management.
Indeed, by the looks of the transcript perhaps this is where they belong.
In short, shape up, or ship out.
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The salary at Comair has absolutely nothing to do with this KLEX accident, and it more than likely would have happened if the crews salary was twice what it was.
The VERY basic fact is, poor training combined with a culture that is NOT safety oriented, which is confirmed by the CVR transcript.
These Comair guys are there simply because they hope to either have (eventually) the regional salaries higher (not likely to happen) or they hope to get hired by a major carrier....where they will find declining salaries, and there is positively nothing that they or ALPA/APA can do about it.
Period.
If bigger bucks are required (to hit on the babes etc) then these guys might as well try Subway management.
Indeed, by the looks of the transcript perhaps this is where they belong.
In short, shape up, or ship out.
The VERY basic fact is, poor training combined with a culture that is NOT safety oriented, which is confirmed by the CVR transcript.
These Comair guys are there simply because they hope to either have (eventually) the regional salaries higher (not likely to happen) or they hope to get hired by a major carrier....where they will find declining salaries, and there is positively nothing that they or ALPA/APA can do about it.
Period.
If bigger bucks are required (to hit on the babes etc) then these guys might as well try Subway management.
Indeed, by the looks of the transcript perhaps this is where they belong.
In short, shape up, or ship out.
Having read the transcript, the only thing that is really clear to me is that they were both extremely tired and not thrilled about their jobs. Most of the conversation is spent talking about "moving on". Not to mention how the FO called for the briefing even though it had already been completed. Less than 10 hours on overnights? That probably includes time traveling to and from the hotel and going through the ridiculous TSA loops.
This should be a wake up call to the FAA and NTSB. They guys messed up, there is no covering that. But what needs to be scrutinized is that they were definetely affected by Fatigue. This should be "the straw that broke the camels back" for overhawling the Duty/Flight time limitations. They are outdated and something needs to be done to ensure the proper rest of crewmembers.
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Dude?
Oh dear, 7700, you do indeed use the same terms that the Pinnacle guys did, just before they fell out of the sky from FL410...which clearly indicated the level of experience the regional guys have.
How very sad.
When you get to my level (25K hrs, the last 19K in command in heavy jet transports...and still flying 'em) of experience, 7700, you can tell me ALL about your problems.
Fatique?
Find another job.
The duty/flight time regulations have been used as a whipping boy for years by some malcontent pilots that many times simply fail to do the job for which they were hired.
Perhaps Subway is indeed more suited for these folks.
In short, find another job if you don't like the one you have now.
Rather basic, actually.
Oh dear, 7700, you do indeed use the same terms that the Pinnacle guys did, just before they fell out of the sky from FL410...which clearly indicated the level of experience the regional guys have.
How very sad.
When you get to my level (25K hrs, the last 19K in command in heavy jet transports...and still flying 'em) of experience, 7700, you can tell me ALL about your problems.
Fatique?
Find another job.
The duty/flight time regulations have been used as a whipping boy for years by some malcontent pilots that many times simply fail to do the job for which they were hired.
Perhaps Subway is indeed more suited for these folks.
In short, find another job if you don't like the one you have now.
Rather basic, actually.
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http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070118/...tucky_crash_25
Louise Roselle, one of the attorneys representing victims' families, said the pilots' conversation about searching for other jobs reinforces one of the central issues in the lawsuits related to the crash. "It reinforces how Comair has been treating its pilots," Roselle said.
So, it would actually seem that the rather basic option of a different job was being considered. Perhaps they'd even filed applications with dodgy third rate operators - bags of duty with no fatigue issues, just like old 411A.
Louise Roselle, one of the attorneys representing victims' families, said the pilots' conversation about searching for other jobs reinforces one of the central issues in the lawsuits related to the crash. "It reinforces how Comair has been treating its pilots," Roselle said.
So, it would actually seem that the rather basic option of a different job was being considered. Perhaps they'd even filed applications with dodgy third rate operators - bags of duty with no fatigue issues, just like old 411A.
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System Factors at LEX
Here's a short list of "system factors" that seem to have been at work, not "causal", but any one of which might have changed the outcome it it had been different:
* the airport has a rise (hill) in the middle of it.
* Runway 26 was 150 feet wide, but shown on the airport diagram as 75 feet wide.
* The lights were out at the takeoff end of runway 22 for something like 30 minutes, the samewindow of time as when the First Officer arrived friday night and noted the situation.
* The airport diagram did not correspond to reality, lacking the extra runway. The airport diagrams that are current are still not updated. The small versions of the airport diagrams on the instrument procedure plates make it look like there is a closed runway that comes all the way down to runway 26, marked by an "X", even though the larger diagram shows there is a gap (from the one marked with several "x" flags.)
* There is at least one possible confusion of route to the takeoff point that the diagram discrepancy allows, in which a sharp left turn onto a 150-foot wide runway at the end of the taxiing made perfect and unambiguous sense.
* Only the pilot in the left hand seat could steer the nosewheel steering, which separated the pilot in command (the first officer) from the activity that was done incorrectly by the senior Captain in the left-hand seat.
* Unquestioned cultural convention demands that the higher ranking officer sit on the left side, even though it would make more sense in this aircraft to have the pilot in command sit on that side.
* The tower was understaffed, and the lone occupant was (correctly) busy with other traffic at the crucial few seconds when he otherwise might have idly watched flight 5191 taxi into position and noted the error. It wasn't the tower responsibility to do that, but it could have occured and caught the problem.
* The only person who noticed the error, apparently, a ramp worker, had no way to communicate by radio to the aircraft and his attempt to run to the runway and wave down the plane did not succeed.
* The aircraft was not equipped with the $18,000 piece of equipment that would have automatically detected the runway error and alerted the crew, possibly because the airline was in bankruptcy proceedings.
* The crew seemed to behave as if operating in violation of FAA regulations was something they were routinely expected to just do and shut up about - judging from the fact that they continued to attempt a takeoff from an unlit runway, even though the first officer sighed when he commented that the lights were out all over the place.
These are intended to be a list of factors beyond individual performance that are potential intervention points to prevent similar events in the future.
Do I have those right?
* the airport has a rise (hill) in the middle of it.
* Runway 26 was 150 feet wide, but shown on the airport diagram as 75 feet wide.
* The lights were out at the takeoff end of runway 22 for something like 30 minutes, the samewindow of time as when the First Officer arrived friday night and noted the situation.
* The airport diagram did not correspond to reality, lacking the extra runway. The airport diagrams that are current are still not updated. The small versions of the airport diagrams on the instrument procedure plates make it look like there is a closed runway that comes all the way down to runway 26, marked by an "X", even though the larger diagram shows there is a gap (from the one marked with several "x" flags.)
* There is at least one possible confusion of route to the takeoff point that the diagram discrepancy allows, in which a sharp left turn onto a 150-foot wide runway at the end of the taxiing made perfect and unambiguous sense.
* Only the pilot in the left hand seat could steer the nosewheel steering, which separated the pilot in command (the first officer) from the activity that was done incorrectly by the senior Captain in the left-hand seat.
* Unquestioned cultural convention demands that the higher ranking officer sit on the left side, even though it would make more sense in this aircraft to have the pilot in command sit on that side.
* The tower was understaffed, and the lone occupant was (correctly) busy with other traffic at the crucial few seconds when he otherwise might have idly watched flight 5191 taxi into position and noted the error. It wasn't the tower responsibility to do that, but it could have occured and caught the problem.
* The only person who noticed the error, apparently, a ramp worker, had no way to communicate by radio to the aircraft and his attempt to run to the runway and wave down the plane did not succeed.
* The aircraft was not equipped with the $18,000 piece of equipment that would have automatically detected the runway error and alerted the crew, possibly because the airline was in bankruptcy proceedings.
* The crew seemed to behave as if operating in violation of FAA regulations was something they were routinely expected to just do and shut up about - judging from the fact that they continued to attempt a takeoff from an unlit runway, even though the first officer sighed when he commented that the lights were out all over the place.
These are intended to be a list of factors beyond individual performance that are potential intervention points to prevent similar events in the future.
Do I have those right?
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training and culture are a huge part of this accident.
as to the 18000dollar piece of equipment...there is already a localizer receiver on the plane...tune it to runway 22 ils (gs ots, but loc ok) and the "needle" would center up if the plane was on the correct runway.
ask comair if they trained their pilots to do that?
demanding excellence as standard by the company would help...but there is a quid pro flo there.
also note that comair was in talks to lower pay to all employees at the time or approx time of the accident...
as to the 18000dollar piece of equipment...there is already a localizer receiver on the plane...tune it to runway 22 ils (gs ots, but loc ok) and the "needle" would center up if the plane was on the correct runway.
ask comair if they trained their pilots to do that?
demanding excellence as standard by the company would help...but there is a quid pro flo there.
also note that comair was in talks to lower pay to all employees at the time or approx time of the accident...
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You get what you pay for. As things shake out in this industry, why would anyone with any ability or talent want to go into it. I love to fly, but if I was going to make peanuts for a flying career I would have gone into another endeavor and then flown on the side. Why would any highly trained military pilot leave for what is becoming available in the civilian world? The flying public that pays $4 for a latte and then surfs the internet for an hour to save 10 cents on a ticket are going to get exactly what they pay for. This is just a wake up call for what is on the horizon. Management may think they can buy an aircraft with all the latest doo dads that anyone can fly but when it comes down to it, experience, talent, dedication, and many other factors make the individual pilot the only reason the system works so well today.
Trash du Blanc
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Fatique? (sic)
Find another job
Find another job
You do understand, don't you, that the above-quoted statement is a violation of the FAR's?
Last edited by Huck; 20th Jan 2007 at 17:12.
Seem to remember a major hickup years'n'years ago with some charter outfit which had parked 4 planes overnight. Nobody was sure which plane went where so it came as it must, pilots for Glasgow, cabin for London, Pax for Manchester and baggage for Birmingham. Now fill in all variations of the above and you'll get what the other 3 planes had. Took until lunch to sort out. Oh, yea, and 2 of the planes were off blox when the cabin announcement got people shouting "waitaminite!!" in a big chorus.....
It tends to focus the attention of the passengers....
r
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No, not harsh at all. One question, though: how do you feel about KLM and Pan Am pilots?
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411A, regional guys flying jets are some of the most experienced in the industry. They fly 4-6 leg days, 4-5 days a week in some of the most chalenging airspace/weather out there. You probably never did any time at a regional. Right now you probably start briefing 500 miles from your destination for an ILS into a 12000ft runway. I would love to see you do a BOS-EWR with delays, low weather and 3 runway changes on final. Remember, no autothrottle or autoland.
In this job, you never stop learning, but I bet you decided you knew enough a long time ago. The only good news is that with so many hours you are probably pretty close to retiring or kicking the bucket.
(Edited by moderator DANNY)
In this job, you never stop learning, but I bet you decided you knew enough a long time ago. The only good news is that with so many hours you are probably pretty close to retiring or kicking the bucket.
(Edited by moderator DANNY)
Last edited by Sqwak7700; 21st Jan 2007 at 15:43.
Sqwak7700:
You might be new on the Pprune website.
There are many experienced pilots here who, based upon not just their experience levels but also on their searching for factors which contributed to accidents, want to help broaden the big picture behind many accidents. This might help the rest of us better anticipate what can go wrong either at a given airport or in a new situation.
These seem to be in the majority (although at first glance, other non-pilots often want you to believe that they are pilots).
There can be a very tiny minority of real pilots who appear to have been, based upon their comments, never involved in any accident, incident, nor even a mistake. Truly super-human, apparently able to fly for 30 hours without a mistake in planning, c0ckpit 'flow-patterns', crew-coordination or judgement. Not just a "5-striper", but maybe wearing 6 strips.
Most impressive-at least from the anonymity of a distant computer monitor and keyboard.
Of course this impression is only based upon their comments on Pprune by way of their ability to quickly and accurately judge others by excluding any and all external factors, including correct Jepp. charting or not.
We continue to be impressed by this unprecedented ability to avoid any mistakes, under whichever conditions.
The books which I've found interesting, i.e. "Fate Is The Hunter" (Gann), "Flying The Hump" etc, were written by superior pilots who enjoyed long and colorful careers, but admitted to some mistakes, and avoided the self-centered desire to appear superior to all other fellow pilots. The late Len Morgan also wrote valuable books.
You might be new on the Pprune website.
There are many experienced pilots here who, based upon not just their experience levels but also on their searching for factors which contributed to accidents, want to help broaden the big picture behind many accidents. This might help the rest of us better anticipate what can go wrong either at a given airport or in a new situation.
These seem to be in the majority (although at first glance, other non-pilots often want you to believe that they are pilots).
There can be a very tiny minority of real pilots who appear to have been, based upon their comments, never involved in any accident, incident, nor even a mistake. Truly super-human, apparently able to fly for 30 hours without a mistake in planning, c0ckpit 'flow-patterns', crew-coordination or judgement. Not just a "5-striper", but maybe wearing 6 strips.
Most impressive-at least from the anonymity of a distant computer monitor and keyboard.
Of course this impression is only based upon their comments on Pprune by way of their ability to quickly and accurately judge others by excluding any and all external factors, including correct Jepp. charting or not.
We continue to be impressed by this unprecedented ability to avoid any mistakes, under whichever conditions.
The books which I've found interesting, i.e. "Fate Is The Hunter" (Gann), "Flying The Hump" etc, were written by superior pilots who enjoyed long and colorful careers, but admitted to some mistakes, and avoided the self-centered desire to appear superior to all other fellow pilots. The late Len Morgan also wrote valuable books.
Thank you Ignition Override, I´ve just got the notion of posting something similar, when I observed your post and saw you sparred me the effort.
In real world, 411A is worldwide (in)famous L1011 instructor, I guess he still flies sims. 411A is the type of airplane he owns. Most of things listed here are applicable to 411A too.
As for the Lexington disaster, bear in mind that:
I´ve got this one from Skygod.
In real world, 411A is worldwide (in)famous L1011 instructor, I guess he still flies sims. 411A is the type of airplane he owns. Most of things listed here are applicable to 411A too.
As for the Lexington disaster, bear in mind that:
Whenever we talk about a pilot who has been killed in a flying accident, we should all keep one thing in mind. He called upon the sum of all his knowledge and made a judgment. He believed in it so strongly that he knowingly bet his life on it. That his judgment was faulty is a tragedy, not stupidity. Every instructor, supervisor, and contemporary who ever spoke to him had an opportunity to influence his judgment, so a little bit of all of us goes with every pilot we lose.
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Hmmm, lets see.
A young guy (or gal) wants to be an airline pilot.
So, out they go and obtain their ratings and get hired by a regional airline.
Even Comair perhaps.
Especially Comair, and I suspect that many of the guys there eventually expected Delta to absorb the operation, and they would have a DAL seniority number.
Ain't gonna happen, and never will, which is perhaps just as well, as DAL is bankrupt anyway.
Pensions gone, etc.
Anyway, these folks are hired by the regional into the RHS of a nice shiney new jet.
So far, so good.
Before being hired, they are informed of...
Salary.
Working conditions.
If they agree, and agree is the operative word, they proceed to ground school, where in addition to systems knowledge about the airplane, they receive information about flight and duty time limitations, as laid down by the company, and the FAA.
There it is, in black and white, for 'em to read and (hopefully) understand.
Then on to sim, line training etc, and presto, a newly minted jet transport First Officer.
What's one of the first items on their agenda that they complain about?
Salary, and duty/flight time limitations.
Oh dear... 'we are tired, we never see our families, we don't make enough to make ends meet.'
Well, so what?
You wanted to be an airline pilot, and now you are one.
Welcome to the club.
Tough beans.
Cry me a river.
Not happy in your present position?
Write your Congressman about changing the flight/duty time regulations, and if you really are unhappy, I expect Subway is accepting applications.
However, if you decide that airline flying is really what you want to do as an ongoing career, then pay attention to what you are doing on the FD, and don't attempt departure on an unlit (and too short) runway.
In short, do the job (properly) for which you are being paid, and stop using fatigue and duty/flight time limitations as an excuse for poor performance.
A young guy (or gal) wants to be an airline pilot.
So, out they go and obtain their ratings and get hired by a regional airline.
Even Comair perhaps.
Especially Comair, and I suspect that many of the guys there eventually expected Delta to absorb the operation, and they would have a DAL seniority number.
Ain't gonna happen, and never will, which is perhaps just as well, as DAL is bankrupt anyway.
Pensions gone, etc.
Anyway, these folks are hired by the regional into the RHS of a nice shiney new jet.
So far, so good.
Before being hired, they are informed of...
Salary.
Working conditions.
If they agree, and agree is the operative word, they proceed to ground school, where in addition to systems knowledge about the airplane, they receive information about flight and duty time limitations, as laid down by the company, and the FAA.
There it is, in black and white, for 'em to read and (hopefully) understand.
Then on to sim, line training etc, and presto, a newly minted jet transport First Officer.
What's one of the first items on their agenda that they complain about?
Salary, and duty/flight time limitations.
Oh dear... 'we are tired, we never see our families, we don't make enough to make ends meet.'
Well, so what?
You wanted to be an airline pilot, and now you are one.
Welcome to the club.
Tough beans.
Cry me a river.
Not happy in your present position?
Write your Congressman about changing the flight/duty time regulations, and if you really are unhappy, I expect Subway is accepting applications.
However, if you decide that airline flying is really what you want to do as an ongoing career, then pay attention to what you are doing on the FD, and don't attempt departure on an unlit (and too short) runway.
In short, do the job (properly) for which you are being paid, and stop using fatigue and duty/flight time limitations as an excuse for poor performance.
Trash du Blanc
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However, if you decide that airline flying is really what you want to do as an ongoing career, then pay attention to what you are doing on the FD[....]
This crew commited an error, as in so many accidents. That should not, however, stop us from looking at all the other links in the chain, should it, 411A?
By the way, how much rudder pedal force is needed during a V1 cut in the 411? Isn't it ~125 pounds? Quite the aircraft....
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V1?
No V1 with the 411, Huck, it's a CAR 3 certificated aeroplane.
Now, as to rudder force to keep it straight in the air, with one engine unserviceable/propeller feathered, at the published Vmca speed/max weight, it would be 140 pounds...which, oddly enough, is about the same as an old straight pipe powered B707-300 with an outboard engine failed at rotation.
Yeah, I've flown these too, extensively.
Now, to look at the reasons why the Comair accident occured, a rather long investigation by the NTSB will certainly be necessary.
But, when was the last time a professional jet transport crew attempted departure on an unlit runway, during the hours of darkness, and at the same time failed to note that the runway magnetic track was positively NOT what it was supposed to be?
To NOT notice these very basic errors, leads me to believe that the crew was not properly trained, and further, that the specific airline has poor standard procedures.
Crew 'fatigue?'
Phooey.
They had the mandated rest, and that should be sufficient.
Sorry, so-called fatigue, as well as poor pay are red herrings with this accident.
Now, as to rudder force to keep it straight in the air, with one engine unserviceable/propeller feathered, at the published Vmca speed/max weight, it would be 140 pounds...which, oddly enough, is about the same as an old straight pipe powered B707-300 with an outboard engine failed at rotation.
Yeah, I've flown these too, extensively.
Now, to look at the reasons why the Comair accident occured, a rather long investigation by the NTSB will certainly be necessary.
But, when was the last time a professional jet transport crew attempted departure on an unlit runway, during the hours of darkness, and at the same time failed to note that the runway magnetic track was positively NOT what it was supposed to be?
To NOT notice these very basic errors, leads me to believe that the crew was not properly trained, and further, that the specific airline has poor standard procedures.
Crew 'fatigue?'
Phooey.
They had the mandated rest, and that should be sufficient.
Sorry, so-called fatigue, as well as poor pay are red herrings with this accident.