Comair Lexington Crash CVR
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I asked this question much earlier in this thread, and I do not think anyone answered it. How unusual, how rare, is it to have a transport aircraft take off before sunrise on an unlit runway?
Trash du Blanc
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FAR Part 121 carriers Operations Manuals typically allow a takeoff at night with "inoperative" runway lighting, provided adequate visual reference is available, and leaning heavily on Captain's discretion. In other words, if something bad happens it's his fault.
Trash du Blanc
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It's not a reg (I don't think). It's part of the flight ops manual written by the airline and approved by the FAA. It is as binding as a regulation for that airline's pilots. I don't have a copy of Comair's FOM, but I do have another....
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Huck:
I must disagree with you about your interpretation of the regulations regarding takeoff/night/unlit etc.
While many FAR 121 0perators ( this is the US federal regulation codes for most airlines in the USA...scheduled air carriers ), have a sort of waiver allowing for instrument takeoffs without certain lighting systems, including runway edge lights as long as adequate visual reference exists, IT IS NOT A WAIVER OF regulations clearly saying you need runway lights (or authorized flare pots) for takeoff at night. The time of the comair crash was legally not day and runway lights WERE required.
Over the years there has been much confusion about the above.
But seldom do pilots check the legal time of sunrise prior to takeoff...could there have been enough light to THINK that it was daylight? we will probably never know...at least till the same day this year, with similiar wx conditions etc.
how often does it happen? or how often does it kill people?
I must disagree with you about your interpretation of the regulations regarding takeoff/night/unlit etc.
While many FAR 121 0perators ( this is the US federal regulation codes for most airlines in the USA...scheduled air carriers ), have a sort of waiver allowing for instrument takeoffs without certain lighting systems, including runway edge lights as long as adequate visual reference exists, IT IS NOT A WAIVER OF regulations clearly saying you need runway lights (or authorized flare pots) for takeoff at night. The time of the comair crash was legally not day and runway lights WERE required.
Over the years there has been much confusion about the above.
But seldom do pilots check the legal time of sunrise prior to takeoff...could there have been enough light to THINK that it was daylight? we will probably never know...at least till the same day this year, with similiar wx conditions etc.
how often does it happen? or how often does it kill people?
Ohcirrej
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Just as a little heads up folks, Mr Chickenlittle has started 2 lovely little threads in the ATC forum on this subject, and isn't exactly forthcoming in entering into logical discussion with some controller types who are questioning his "interpretation" of the transcripts. I really wish he would try to answer his critics rather than run away again.
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But my original point in asking the question was to better understand how unique the experience of a takeoff roll down an unlit runway must have been for this crew. Even more disturbing, the runway lights of the correct intended runway 22 were lit. And these lights were passed very early in the t/o roll, early enough to allow for a throttle back and a re-evaluation of just what was happening had those lights registered on this flight crew.
Lots of clues and cues were missed by this crew, and they have paid for their mistakes dearly, one with his life and one severely disabled. The culture that allowed this happen must be what is closely studied and remedied.
Lots of clues and cues were missed by this crew, and they have paid for their mistakes dearly, one with his life and one severely disabled. The culture that allowed this happen must be what is closely studied and remedied.
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I believe FAR 121.590 is the relevant FAR, which reads in part:
(2) For an airplane carrying passengers at night, the pilot may not take
off from, or land at, an airport unless--
(i) The pilot has determined the wind direction from an illuminated wind
direction indicator or local ground communications or, in the case of
takeoff, that pilot's personal observations; and
(ii) The limits of the area to be used for landing or takeoff are clearly
shown by boundary or runway marker lights. If the area to be used for takeoff
or landing is marked by flare pots or lanterns, their use must be approved by
the Administrator.
(2) For an airplane carrying passengers at night, the pilot may not take
off from, or land at, an airport unless--
(i) The pilot has determined the wind direction from an illuminated wind
direction indicator or local ground communications or, in the case of
takeoff, that pilot's personal observations; and
(ii) The limits of the area to be used for landing or takeoff are clearly
shown by boundary or runway marker lights. If the area to be used for takeoff
or landing is marked by flare pots or lanterns, their use must be approved by
the Administrator.
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On a related point;
We've all been puzzled about why the pilots tried to takeoff from an unlit runway. I found this Reuters article dated from August 28th, the day after the crash (meaning it could have incorrect information):
http://www.topix.net/content/reuters...58380536564416
It says in part:
Today I read again a post by a Delta pilot in the original thread from the crash, that runway 22 has a hump in the middle, making it impossible to see the lower (southern) 2/3rds of the runway until you get near the top of the hump. I assume the "top half" of the runway discussed above would be the northern takeoff end of 22. If the facts above are true, then the takeoff on 26 would have looked the same to the FO, as he thought runway 22 should have looked, if the lights on the "top half" were out. He may also have known he would not be ble to see the lights on the southern end before reaching the hump. Others have pointed out that 26 is in fact 150 ft wide, the same as 22, but only 75 ft are marked and used, so in the dark the width would easily look the same. All of this could explain the comments on the CVR transcript regarding the runway lights.
Question, is anyone aware of a notam or temporary advisory indicating lights were out on the top half of 22, on the Friday preceeding the Sunday accident?
The facts from the article may be wrong, but could come close to explaining the fateful decisions made that morning. Holes in the cheese lining up (i.e. additional confusion), as some have said.
(edited to add the following comment)
Due to the taxiway arrangment on that Sunday, the runway numbers for 26 would have been behind the aircraft when it turned onto 26, as shown in photos in the original accident thread. The runway numbers would have been behind the aircraft on either runway on that day. If the above information about runways lights for 22 is true, then it seems to me that 26 would have looked almost the same as 22, except for the compass heading.
We've all been puzzled about why the pilots tried to takeoff from an unlit runway. I found this Reuters article dated from August 28th, the day after the crash (meaning it could have incorrect information):
http://www.topix.net/content/reuters...58380536564416
It says in part:
Instead, the Comair jet, bound for Atlanta before dawn on Sunday in a light rain, took runway 26. That runway is half as wide and half as long as runway 22 and was unlit, Hersman said in a media briefing.
One possible explanation involved a temporary advisory to pilots warning of lighting outages on the longer runway that expired the day before the crash, aviation sources said.
However, the co-pilot of the ill-fated Comair flight flew into the airport on Friday night when the top half of the runway, where planes begin their takeoffs, had been dark. Aviation experts said he might have been unaware the advisory had been lifted and mistook the dark runway for the correct one.
One possible explanation involved a temporary advisory to pilots warning of lighting outages on the longer runway that expired the day before the crash, aviation sources said.
However, the co-pilot of the ill-fated Comair flight flew into the airport on Friday night when the top half of the runway, where planes begin their takeoffs, had been dark. Aviation experts said he might have been unaware the advisory had been lifted and mistook the dark runway for the correct one.
Question, is anyone aware of a notam or temporary advisory indicating lights were out on the top half of 22, on the Friday preceeding the Sunday accident?
The facts from the article may be wrong, but could come close to explaining the fateful decisions made that morning. Holes in the cheese lining up (i.e. additional confusion), as some have said.
(edited to add the following comment)
Due to the taxiway arrangment on that Sunday, the runway numbers for 26 would have been behind the aircraft when it turned onto 26, as shown in photos in the original accident thread. The runway numbers would have been behind the aircraft on either runway on that day. If the above information about runways lights for 22 is true, then it seems to me that 26 would have looked almost the same as 22, except for the compass heading.
Last edited by Flight Safety; 28th Jan 2007 at 22:16.
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flight safety is quite right about the FAR 121.590.
Hold West...this may not be as nutty as you might think...the plane may have been empty, ferrying to a new trip...pilots may have been told initially that a flight attendent was already at the new airport and off we go into the wild blue yonder...only to get a message from the company that the f/a was somewhere back at the ranch...rather than land and have to get redispatched, a quick go around was much easier on the paperwork and reduced the cycles on the plane by one.
Airline flying is like making sausage...if you saw it being made, you might stay on the ground (round?;-0 )
Hold West...this may not be as nutty as you might think...the plane may have been empty, ferrying to a new trip...pilots may have been told initially that a flight attendent was already at the new airport and off we go into the wild blue yonder...only to get a message from the company that the f/a was somewhere back at the ranch...rather than land and have to get redispatched, a quick go around was much easier on the paperwork and reduced the cycles on the plane by one.
Airline flying is like making sausage...if you saw it being made, you might stay on the ground (round?;-0 )
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So, if you can post your garbage on more than one forum, I can cross-post my reply. Moderators, trim us both out if this is bad!
Well, starting to play the game a bit here, I can see your statements are utterly incorrect as you try to shade the controller's actions at the critical moments.
Wrong. The aircraft is NOT rolling down the runway at this point (and why can't you quote the UTC times, given the plethora of sources, unless you are trying to obscure the facts?). The transmission you reference above is made at 1005:33 UTC. According to the FDR, the aircraft did not commence moving after the takeoff clearance until 1005:22, commences the left turn on the runway 1005:39, and stops the turn (but not the aircraft), lined up on runway 26 at 1006:00, simultaneously as the N1s start to rise to takeoff thrust. The airspeeds actually start to increase at 1006:05.
Wrong again, it's 20 seconds after the takeoff clearance, which was issued at 1005:17. And, it's two seconds before the aircraft begins the left turn to line up on the runway. The aircraft is not yet "rolling" on the wrong runway, and in fact is not yet on any runway.
As to the "scan the runway" issue, I personally scan the runway before I issue the takeoff clearance. That clearance was given at 1005:17, while the aircraft was stopped on the taxiway short of runway 26, according to the FDR. Note too that the distance from the correct and incorrect runway positions is very short, and on the same sight-line from the tower - take a look at the sat pictures or airport diagram. Again, if the controller scanned the length of runway 22 at 1005:17, he would have seen an aircraft on more-or-less the right part of the airport, still on a taxiway, and no reason to withhold takeoff clearance.
The critical moments where the controller could have possibly had an effect on the outcome were between 1006:00, when the aircraft completed its turn to line up on runway 26, and about 1006:24, when the aircraft passed through 100 knots, and (my assumption) probably could no longer have stopped on the runway, and thus an accident was inevitable. V1 was not reached until 1006:31, but that was calculated for the longer runway length.
The controller thus had about 24 seconds to notice the aircraft starting a rolling takeoff on runway 26. I have no idea what he did during this 24 second period, and the tape is silent. If he says he looked down or turned away for a while to perform other duties, there is no reason to disbelieve him.
By the station agent's statement, he was doing nothing else but watching the aircraft head out. The controller had other things to do, being that he was alone in the tower, since the tower manager was not providing FAA-required staffing for the shift.
Utterly incorrect. The CVR records "sound of impact" at 1006:33. The controller initiates the call to the FD at 0607:23. That's 50 seconds later.
A stupid, evil statement. Your facts are wrong, therefore your assumptions are even more so.
He told them that because that's where the aircraft actually was. He obviously looked out the window, and told them what he saw, in relation to the runways. And at that point, as far as he knew, the aircraft DID take off from runway 22.
Bergquist rambles on with many more baseless assumptions that he does NOT have the background knowledge to make. They depend on the layout of the tower cab, among other things, and we don't know anything about that. None of it holds water.
Any response there, Chicken-man?
Well, starting to play the game a bit here, I can see your statements are utterly incorrect as you try to shade the controller's actions at the critical moments.
At 22:30 [1005:37], CD is probably looking at the radar scope as he is talking to Eagle 882 and giving him a frequency change to center.
This is 16 seconds after he cleared Comair for takeoff and he hasn't seen him rolling on the wrong runway. He was supposed to scan his runway when he cleared him for takeoff and should have noticed him on the wrong runway.
This is 16 seconds after he cleared Comair for takeoff and he hasn't seen him rolling on the wrong runway. He was supposed to scan his runway when he cleared him for takeoff and should have noticed him on the wrong runway.
As to the "scan the runway" issue, I personally scan the runway before I issue the takeoff clearance. That clearance was given at 1005:17, while the aircraft was stopped on the taxiway short of runway 26, according to the FDR. Note too that the distance from the correct and incorrect runway positions is very short, and on the same sight-line from the tower - take a look at the sat pictures or airport diagram. Again, if the controller scanned the length of runway 22 at 1005:17, he would have seen an aircraft on more-or-less the right part of the airport, still on a taxiway, and no reason to withhold takeoff clearance.
The critical moments where the controller could have possibly had an effect on the outcome were between 1006:00, when the aircraft completed its turn to line up on runway 26, and about 1006:24, when the aircraft passed through 100 knots, and (my assumption) probably could no longer have stopped on the runway, and thus an accident was inevitable. V1 was not reached until 1006:31, but that was calculated for the longer runway length.
The controller thus had about 24 seconds to notice the aircraft starting a rolling takeoff on runway 26. I have no idea what he did during this 24 second period, and the tape is silent. If he says he looked down or turned away for a while to perform other duties, there is no reason to disbelieve him.
Bergquist rambles on with many more baseless assumptions that he does NOT have the background knowledge to make. They depend on the layout of the tower cab, among other things, and we don't know anything about that. None of it holds water.
Any response there, Chicken-man?
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All pilots are capable of making mistakes that end in tragedy.
Instilling the discipline and "excellence" takes time and effort by many. It also takes money.
To all pilots out there...every takeoff, every approach, every landing demands your highest level of skill and attention. Being laid back might be a warning you are about to be Laid to rest.
ANything short of your highest level of attention is shortchanging aviation.
However, we should demand the same from everyone in aviation. Especially the FAA. There are warnings for flights at too low an altitude...there should have been a warning for wrong runway operations.
I am guessing another accident in the unwarned regime may happen. Anyone out there thinking along these thoughts should post their scenarios.
Instilling the discipline and "excellence" takes time and effort by many. It also takes money.
To all pilots out there...every takeoff, every approach, every landing demands your highest level of skill and attention. Being laid back might be a warning you are about to be Laid to rest.
ANything short of your highest level of attention is shortchanging aviation.
However, we should demand the same from everyone in aviation. Especially the FAA. There are warnings for flights at too low an altitude...there should have been a warning for wrong runway operations.
I am guessing another accident in the unwarned regime may happen. Anyone out there thinking along these thoughts should post their scenarios.
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By far the most effective 'warning' for the money: another body in the tower cab.
We'll never danger-proof the world, folks. The trick is to minimize the danger in the most cost effective manner.
We'll never danger-proof the world, folks. The trick is to minimize the danger in the most cost effective manner.
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NTSB (according to Kentucky.com news source) released the following overlay of CVR transcript and a timeline graphic here in PDF format.
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NOT the controller's fault!!
Those of you who continue to put blame on the controller need to think about some things: First, regionals still operate into uncontrolled airports--no controller to blame in that scenario. Secondly, during many operations (low vis, night, etc.), controllers are not able to see the aircraft unless they have ground radar (very rare).
If there is any chance, due to runway/taxiway geometry, that finding the correct runway entrance is a little more difficult, then the crew should be even more on guard, using every means available to identify the runway--and they had two, probably 4, depending on the Nav Display selections, right in front of them--HEADING INDICATIONS!!! This was simply disgusting pilot error--stop trying to deflect the blame from these guys.
Maybe the FAA should make age 40 the max, then you young know-it-alls could really get in the left seat quickly and exhibit the undoubtedly flawless performance of youth.
If there is any chance, due to runway/taxiway geometry, that finding the correct runway entrance is a little more difficult, then the crew should be even more on guard, using every means available to identify the runway--and they had two, probably 4, depending on the Nav Display selections, right in front of them--HEADING INDICATIONS!!! This was simply disgusting pilot error--stop trying to deflect the blame from these guys.
Maybe the FAA should make age 40 the max, then you young know-it-alls could really get in the left seat quickly and exhibit the undoubtedly flawless performance of youth.