Mid-air collision over Brasil
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OK, then who has the power to release these pilots?
With the authorization given to the NTSB to release this report, we can see that the Brazilian government finally took heed of the US Dept of State's call for action.
Latest back channel news (rumours, rumours) from Washington suggests the men will be processed out of Brazil's civil system. Possibly within days.
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It is almost a consensus here that these guys should go home immediately, unless they´re still playing some sort of role on the investigation (which I don´t think they are). But I agree, the image of Americans being held hostage in some military-driven Banana Republic in South America is too tempting to be ignored.
What do you think if the same tragedy happened, but instead of being americans the pilots of the Legacy, they where from, let´s say, Venezuela.
Do you think that they were going to stay for such a long time detained in Rio?
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http://www.brazzilmag.com/content/view/7565/53/
Don't Blame Us, But Blind Spots and the Americans, Say Brazil's Air Controllers
Written by José Wilson Miranda Wednesday, 22 November 2006
The 13 Brazilian air traffic controllers who were on duty in the Brasília control tower, September 29, when a shock between a Boeing 737 and a Legacy executive jet ended up causing Brazil's deadliest air accident ever, with 154 deaths, say they have no part in the accident despite what the media or authorities might have said in recent days.
Normando Augusto Cavalcanti, the lawyer representing all of them, says his clients are unanimous in declaring two things: they are not at fault for the air accident and they all agree that there is a blind spot, where communication is very hard, in the area the collision occurred.
Cavalcanti also revealed that the flight controllers are very upset at the congressional testimony by Air Force commander, Luiz Carlos da Silva Bueno, who told Brazilian senators, Tuesday, November 21, that a misinformation by a controller in Brasília might have contributed to the crash.
According to the controllers, they were induced to error by a defective equipment. They argue that the radar showed that the Legacy was at 36,000 feet when flying through Brasília. In reality the executive jet was at 37,000 feet, the same altitude in which the Boeing was flying only in the opposite direction.
As for the "blind zone," the lawyer informed, this is an old problem that has been presented in the past to the Brazilian air authorities: "The controllers had already told the Air Force about these problems," said Cavalcanti.
Contradicting Defense Minister, Waldir Pires, who has often stated that Brazil has no problem of communication in the skies, the flight controllers assert that airplanes cannot talk to control towers in the North of Mato Grosso state where the accident occurred.
This "blind zone," according to them starts 200 miles north of Brasília and stretches to almost the Mato Grosso and Amazonas states border.
Once again, since the information has already appeared in the media, the lawyer stressed that the controllers at work that day were not tired or in any condition that would adversely affect their performance.
He also denied a report published in the press that the controller who was guiding the Legacy was 20 years old and had no experience. According to the lawyer, the worker in question is 27 and has 5 years of experience in the job.
After ruling out any chance that the controllers might have made a mistake, Cavalcanti said he has two possible explanations for the tragedy: inducement to a mistake due to a failure in the communication system or an error made by the Legacy's American pilots.
Don't Blame Us, But Blind Spots and the Americans, Say Brazil's Air Controllers
Written by José Wilson Miranda Wednesday, 22 November 2006
The 13 Brazilian air traffic controllers who were on duty in the Brasília control tower, September 29, when a shock between a Boeing 737 and a Legacy executive jet ended up causing Brazil's deadliest air accident ever, with 154 deaths, say they have no part in the accident despite what the media or authorities might have said in recent days.
Normando Augusto Cavalcanti, the lawyer representing all of them, says his clients are unanimous in declaring two things: they are not at fault for the air accident and they all agree that there is a blind spot, where communication is very hard, in the area the collision occurred.
Cavalcanti also revealed that the flight controllers are very upset at the congressional testimony by Air Force commander, Luiz Carlos da Silva Bueno, who told Brazilian senators, Tuesday, November 21, that a misinformation by a controller in Brasília might have contributed to the crash.
According to the controllers, they were induced to error by a defective equipment. They argue that the radar showed that the Legacy was at 36,000 feet when flying through Brasília. In reality the executive jet was at 37,000 feet, the same altitude in which the Boeing was flying only in the opposite direction.
As for the "blind zone," the lawyer informed, this is an old problem that has been presented in the past to the Brazilian air authorities: "The controllers had already told the Air Force about these problems," said Cavalcanti.
Contradicting Defense Minister, Waldir Pires, who has often stated that Brazil has no problem of communication in the skies, the flight controllers assert that airplanes cannot talk to control towers in the North of Mato Grosso state where the accident occurred.
This "blind zone," according to them starts 200 miles north of Brasília and stretches to almost the Mato Grosso and Amazonas states border.
Once again, since the information has already appeared in the media, the lawyer stressed that the controllers at work that day were not tired or in any condition that would adversely affect their performance.
He also denied a report published in the press that the controller who was guiding the Legacy was 20 years old and had no experience. According to the lawyer, the worker in question is 27 and has 5 years of experience in the job.
After ruling out any chance that the controllers might have made a mistake, Cavalcanti said he has two possible explanations for the tragedy: inducement to a mistake due to a failure in the communication system or an error made by the Legacy's American pilots.
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Yes, I think so. This has nothing to do with the fact that they are from USA. Any foreigner would be in the same situation. Well, maybe not on a 5-star hotel, but they´d be here anyway. Ridiculous, but unfortunately true.
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I do not wish for anyone to be found guilty nor am I knowledgeble enough to comment on the Brasilian legal system - I just wish to understand the correct SOP applicable when I am being carted through the sky.
Either of two things should have happened if I read the below rules and the NTSB statement:
ICAO Annex 02 - Rules of the Air ,3.6.5.2 Communication failure.
3.6.5.2.2 If in instrument meteorological conditions or when the pilot of an IFR flight considers it inadvisable to complete the flight in accordance with 3.6.5.2.1 a), the aircraft shall:
a) unless otherwise prescribed on the basis of regional air navigation agreement, in airspace where radar is not used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude if higher, for a period of 20 minutes following the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
b) in airspace where radar is used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude if higher, for a period of 7 minutes following:
1) the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached; or
2) the time the transponder is set to Code 7600; or
3) the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point; whichever is later, and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
Either of two things should have happened if I read the below rules and the NTSB statement:
- The flight announces being at the waypoint and askes for FL 360 as per flight plan - receives approval and sinks to FL 360
- The flight calls with a request for FL 360, receives no reply and sinks to FL 360 seven minutes later as per ICAO
ICAO Annex 02 - Rules of the Air ,3.6.5.2 Communication failure.
3.6.5.2.2 If in instrument meteorological conditions or when the pilot of an IFR flight considers it inadvisable to complete the flight in accordance with 3.6.5.2.1 a), the aircraft shall:
a) unless otherwise prescribed on the basis of regional air navigation agreement, in airspace where radar is not used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude if higher, for a period of 20 minutes following the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
b) in airspace where radar is used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude if higher, for a period of 7 minutes following:
1) the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached; or
2) the time the transponder is set to Code 7600; or
3) the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point; whichever is later, and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
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b) in airspace where radar is used in the provision of air traffic control, maintain the last assigned speed and level, or minimum flight altitude if higher, for a period of 7 minutes following:
1) the time the last assigned level or minimum flight altitude is reached; or
2) the time the transponder is set to Code 7600; or
3) the aircraft’s failure to report its position over a compulsory reporting point; whichever is later, and thereafter adjust level and speed in accordance with the filed flight plan;
foxtrot xray
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foxtrotxray
600XL passed BRS level at 370 as previously cleared and in radar contact with Mode C reporting working
ATC had info at that time that A/C was at 370 not 360
At 4:53 ATC had no confirmation of altitude of 600XL other than last mode C report NW of BRS which indicated 370
600 XL could not have realized it was in "lost com" situation until sometime after 4:53 as it heard ATC call at that time and tried to confirm freq with 7 callback atempts.
Collision occurred at 4:56 54.
What am I missing here???
If ATC believed that 600XL was supposed to be at 360 and the only information it had showed that the flight was still at 370 passing BRS based on Mode C, what was its duty in terms of Gol flight given its assessment of a lost com situation, and no report of an altitude change by 600XL? 660XL was cleared to remain level at 370 unless cleared otherwise by ATC or in the event of lost com provisions of rules. Any requirement for 600XL to change level without a clearance/instruction from ATC kicked-in only after ITS realization of lost com....which had to be sometime after 4:53. Collision occurred at 4:56 long before end of any 7 minute window.
ATC had info at that time that A/C was at 370 not 360
At 4:53 ATC had no confirmation of altitude of 600XL other than last mode C report NW of BRS which indicated 370
600 XL could not have realized it was in "lost com" situation until sometime after 4:53 as it heard ATC call at that time and tried to confirm freq with 7 callback atempts.
Collision occurred at 4:56 54.
What am I missing here???
If ATC believed that 600XL was supposed to be at 360 and the only information it had showed that the flight was still at 370 passing BRS based on Mode C, what was its duty in terms of Gol flight given its assessment of a lost com situation, and no report of an altitude change by 600XL? 660XL was cleared to remain level at 370 unless cleared otherwise by ATC or in the event of lost com provisions of rules. Any requirement for 600XL to change level without a clearance/instruction from ATC kicked-in only after ITS realization of lost com....which had to be sometime after 4:53. Collision occurred at 4:56 long before end of any 7 minute window.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
According to the controllers, they were induced to error by a defective equipment. They argue that the radar showed that the Legacy was at 36,000 feet when flying through Brasília. In reality the executive jet was at 37,000 feet
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A few more inputs about responsibilities from ICAO PANS Doc 4444 Air Traffic Management
Rule on position information and reporting when under
radar
Interruption or termination of radar service
AIRCRAFT RADIO TRANSMITTER FAILURE
Rules in Brazil may be locally adjusted, that can be found under the Jeppesen country information tab
4.11.1.3 Under conditions specified by the appropriate
ATS authority, flights may be exempted from the requirement
to make position reports at each designated compulsory
reporting point or interval. ....
Note.— This is intended to apply in cases where adequate
flight progress data are available from other sources, e.g.
radar (see, Chapter 8, 8.6.4.4), and in other circumstances
where the omission of routine reports from selected flights is
found to be acceptable.
4.11.1.5 If a position report is not received at the
expected time, subsequent control shall not be based on the
assumption that the estimated time is accurate. Immediate
action shall be taken to obtain the report if it is likely to have
any bearing on the control of other aircraft.
ATS authority, flights may be exempted from the requirement
to make position reports at each designated compulsory
reporting point or interval. ....
Note.— This is intended to apply in cases where adequate
flight progress data are available from other sources, e.g.
radar (see, Chapter 8, 8.6.4.4), and in other circumstances
where the omission of routine reports from selected flights is
found to be acceptable.
4.11.1.5 If a position report is not received at the
expected time, subsequent control shall not be based on the
assumption that the estimated time is accurate. Immediate
action shall be taken to obtain the report if it is likely to have
any bearing on the control of other aircraft.
radar
8.6.4.1 An aircraft provided with radar service should be
informed of its position in the following circumstances:
...
8.6.4.3 Whenever practicable, position information shall
relate to positions or routes pertinent to the navigation of the
aircraft concerned and displayed on the radar map.
8.6.4.4 When so informed (//i.e. a radar position information was passed on,
the author//), the pilot may omit position
reports at compulsory reporting points or report only over
those reporting points specified by the air traffic services unit
concerned, including points at which air-reports are required
for meteorological purposes. Pilots shall resume position
reporting when so instructed and when advised that radar
service is terminated or that radar identification is lost.
informed of its position in the following circumstances:
...
8.6.4.3 Whenever practicable, position information shall
relate to positions or routes pertinent to the navigation of the
aircraft concerned and displayed on the radar map.
8.6.4.4 When so informed (//i.e. a radar position information was passed on,
the author//), the pilot may omit position
reports at compulsory reporting points or report only over
those reporting points specified by the air traffic services unit
concerned, including points at which air-reports are required
for meteorological purposes. Pilots shall resume position
reporting when so instructed and when advised that radar
service is terminated or that radar identification is lost.
8.6.7.1 An aircraft which has been informed that it is
provided with radar service should be informed immediately
when, for any reason, radar service is interrupted or
terminated.
provided with radar service should be informed immediately
when, for any reason, radar service is interrupted or
terminated.
8.8.3.1.1 If two-way communication is lost with an
aircraft, the radar controller should determine whether or not
the aircraft’s receiver is functioning by instructing the aircraft
on the frequency so far used to acknowledge by making a
specified manoeuvre and by observing the aircraft’s track, or
by instructing the aircraft to operate IDENT or to make code
changes.
aircraft, the radar controller should determine whether or not
the aircraft’s receiver is functioning by instructing the aircraft
on the frequency so far used to acknowledge by making a
specified manoeuvre and by observing the aircraft’s track, or
by instructing the aircraft to operate IDENT or to make code
changes.
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Legacy checked in with Brasilia at 1551 at FL370 and Brasilia acknowledged. Mode C was lost at 1602. No attempt was made to contact Legacy until 1626. Impact was at 1657. Lots of questions.
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ICAO rules and ethics
I find it hard to believe that this is a professional pilot's forum and most seem to accept that two of our fellow professional colleagues are be held against their will and the ICAO rules to protect the incompetence of the local ATC, military and local government agencies!!
Most anyone who has flown through Brazilian airspace can attest that it's not exactly fully capable of up to date performance. ( the self serving ATC job actions speak well for their incompetence )
The world's pilot professionals should feel threatened by the actions of Brazilian politicians!
Those two fellow professionals that are incarcerated by Brazilain politicians need our support!!
Most anyone who has flown through Brazilian airspace can attest that it's not exactly fully capable of up to date performance. ( the self serving ATC job actions speak well for their incompetence )
The world's pilot professionals should feel threatened by the actions of Brazilian politicians!
Those two fellow professionals that are incarcerated by Brazilain politicians need our support!!
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BRS (Brasilia) VOR S15° 52.42' W048° 01.28'
TERES S12° 28.54' W051° 22.09'
NABOL S10° 33.67 W053° 11.76'
the crash is 10,8nm from NABOL.
NABOL is the Fix where the change of ACC occurs.
According to FDR, those are the time that the N600XL tried to make contact, in UTC.
16h54min16
19h54min40
19h55min00
19h55min43
19h56min41
19h56min53
19h55min16
19h56min54 - collision time (GLO1907 FDR and N600XL FDR hour)
19h54min40
19h55min00
19h55min43
19h56min41
19h56min53
19h55min16
19h56min54 - collision time (GLO1907 FDR and N600XL FDR hour)
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ct. yankee
and how should we support them? a boycott of brazillian airspace...I pledge not to fly to brazil or through their airspace till the boys come home.
earlier in this thread some of us who recalled the athens/swissair travesty mentioned it.
A LONG time ago when I had a chance to make a choice about where I flew, I made the choice...and my hat is off to ATC in Canada and the USA. I flew to Mexico Once and I thought it was not a fun situation.
I am relatively sure that the other first world aviation countries are fine too ( NZ, AUS, Japan, UK etc)
the IFALPA has made statements trying to hlep these two pilots despite the fact that neither pilot is a member of an IFALPA group. Thought the copilot seems to be a furloughed American Airlines pilot (APA, NOT ALPA)...I will bet this...when he does get recalled to American , he will try to fly only in the USA.
and how should we support them? a boycott of brazillian airspace...I pledge not to fly to brazil or through their airspace till the boys come home.
earlier in this thread some of us who recalled the athens/swissair travesty mentioned it.
A LONG time ago when I had a chance to make a choice about where I flew, I made the choice...and my hat is off to ATC in Canada and the USA. I flew to Mexico Once and I thought it was not a fun situation.
I am relatively sure that the other first world aviation countries are fine too ( NZ, AUS, Japan, UK etc)
the IFALPA has made statements trying to hlep these two pilots despite the fact that neither pilot is a member of an IFALPA group. Thought the copilot seems to be a furloughed American Airlines pilot (APA, NOT ALPA)...I will bet this...when he does get recalled to American , he will try to fly only in the USA.
foxtrot xray
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more foxtrot xray
Further to my earlier post....................
If you start with 600XL crossing BRS at 15:56 LT, level at 370, after having just reported into CINDACTA (less than 5 minutes earlier) at 15:51 where it reported level at 370 and note that the ATC record indicates that Mode C continued(reporting 370) until 30nm NW of BRS at 16:02 at which time secondary radar was lost but primary continued, it is clear that all systems were normal up to this point.
At this time there would be no expectation that 600XL would descend to 360 because(1) the pilots had no way of knowing the Mode C was lost and (2) the condition triggering reversion to a flight plan altitude rather than an assigned altitude is loss of communications not loss of altitude reporting. Furthermore, the crew had every reason to believe it was still in "radar contact" and therefore not expected to make position reports.
CINDACTA made no attempt to contact the aircraft until 16:26 (one call) which was not received by 600XL. At 16:48 600XL began calling ATC(12 attempts) At 16:53 the CINDACTA controller called with a frequency change. 600XL received one or more of these transmissions but it was at least partially unintelligible (asked for clarification of frequency change assignment) and its reply was not received by ATC.
At this point, 600XL has heard a response to its calls(or would have every reason to believe that it was in response to its calls started a few minutes earlier) but it is not completely readable. It's now later than 16:53; Do we have lost communications yet??
Impact was recorded at 16:56:54.
The principal problem here is clear.
Let the pilots go home for some cold turkey today; the rest of the turkeys are somewhere else.
If you start with 600XL crossing BRS at 15:56 LT, level at 370, after having just reported into CINDACTA (less than 5 minutes earlier) at 15:51 where it reported level at 370 and note that the ATC record indicates that Mode C continued(reporting 370) until 30nm NW of BRS at 16:02 at which time secondary radar was lost but primary continued, it is clear that all systems were normal up to this point.
At this time there would be no expectation that 600XL would descend to 360 because(1) the pilots had no way of knowing the Mode C was lost and (2) the condition triggering reversion to a flight plan altitude rather than an assigned altitude is loss of communications not loss of altitude reporting. Furthermore, the crew had every reason to believe it was still in "radar contact" and therefore not expected to make position reports.
CINDACTA made no attempt to contact the aircraft until 16:26 (one call) which was not received by 600XL. At 16:48 600XL began calling ATC(12 attempts) At 16:53 the CINDACTA controller called with a frequency change. 600XL received one or more of these transmissions but it was at least partially unintelligible (asked for clarification of frequency change assignment) and its reply was not received by ATC.
At this point, 600XL has heard a response to its calls(or would have every reason to believe that it was in response to its calls started a few minutes earlier) but it is not completely readable. It's now later than 16:53; Do we have lost communications yet??
Impact was recorded at 16:56:54.
The principal problem here is clear.
Let the pilots go home for some cold turkey today; the rest of the turkeys are somewhere else.
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Explaining Brazilian Legal System...
Hi folks!
Since I noticed most contributors know nothing about the Brazilian legal system, I hop I can help you.
I am an aeronautical engineer from Sao Jose dos Campos, where the Legacy was designed and made. I also have intense contact with lawyers since I run a real estate business here. I am sure I can explain many doubts regarding the Legacy pilots passports seizure and release.
From the date of the crash, the Air Force organ in charge of aircraft accidents investigation started to do its work. It follows ICAO guidelines and it is a technical investigation, not a criminal one.
At the same time, state police (Brazil has several states, as the US), state prosecutors, the federal police (the Brazilian FBI) branch in Mato Grosso state and federal prosecutors based in Mato Grosso state started their own criminal investigations and asked state and federal judges in Mato Grosso state to seize the pilots passports. Both judges issued the order to seize the passports while the criminal investigations are pending.
Some weeks later, the state judge asked a higher court about the criminal investigation jurisdiction. This court ruled that this is a federal investigation and the state authorities dropped the case.
So now there are 2 investigations: the technical one, carried out by the Air Force (under the Department of Defense) and a criminal one, carried out by the federal police and the federal prosecuters.
The federal police is an organ under the Department of Justice. In theory, they could be stopped by political pressure. In the other hand, the federal prosecutors have independence from the executive branch of the Brazilian Government and the Department of Justice and they will continue to push for the pilots accusation.
Of course, the federal judges are not under the executive branch control, including the Department of Justice.
So, what are the options for the pilots? Their attorneys have to appeal to a higher court. They did it once and they lost. Now they are trying another movement and they may succeed. I think they will say to the court that Brazil is part of international aggreements that descriminalize aeronautical accidents.
By the way, the Air Force has tried to legally block the criminal investigation arguing that Brazil is part of international aggreements that descriminalize aeronautical accidents. It did not succeed so far and it was ordered to give all the available data to the federal police and prosecutors.
One way of action to release the pilots is to put the Brazilian Air Force and the Department of Defense at the pilots side, to testify for their release in court.
Since I noticed most contributors know nothing about the Brazilian legal system, I hop I can help you.
I am an aeronautical engineer from Sao Jose dos Campos, where the Legacy was designed and made. I also have intense contact with lawyers since I run a real estate business here. I am sure I can explain many doubts regarding the Legacy pilots passports seizure and release.
From the date of the crash, the Air Force organ in charge of aircraft accidents investigation started to do its work. It follows ICAO guidelines and it is a technical investigation, not a criminal one.
At the same time, state police (Brazil has several states, as the US), state prosecutors, the federal police (the Brazilian FBI) branch in Mato Grosso state and federal prosecutors based in Mato Grosso state started their own criminal investigations and asked state and federal judges in Mato Grosso state to seize the pilots passports. Both judges issued the order to seize the passports while the criminal investigations are pending.
Some weeks later, the state judge asked a higher court about the criminal investigation jurisdiction. This court ruled that this is a federal investigation and the state authorities dropped the case.
So now there are 2 investigations: the technical one, carried out by the Air Force (under the Department of Defense) and a criminal one, carried out by the federal police and the federal prosecuters.
The federal police is an organ under the Department of Justice. In theory, they could be stopped by political pressure. In the other hand, the federal prosecutors have independence from the executive branch of the Brazilian Government and the Department of Justice and they will continue to push for the pilots accusation.
Of course, the federal judges are not under the executive branch control, including the Department of Justice.
So, what are the options for the pilots? Their attorneys have to appeal to a higher court. They did it once and they lost. Now they are trying another movement and they may succeed. I think they will say to the court that Brazil is part of international aggreements that descriminalize aeronautical accidents.
By the way, the Air Force has tried to legally block the criminal investigation arguing that Brazil is part of international aggreements that descriminalize aeronautical accidents. It did not succeed so far and it was ordered to give all the available data to the federal police and prosecutors.
One way of action to release the pilots is to put the Brazilian Air Force and the Department of Defense at the pilots side, to testify for their release in court.
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Spot on!
CT Yankee,
Your post is right on the money. I find it hard to believe that a professional pilot would do anything that would put the safety of his flight or the safety of others at risk knowingly.
Your post is right on the money. I find it hard to believe that a professional pilot would do anything that would put the safety of his flight or the safety of others at risk knowingly.
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Additional Info...
It was said here and elsewhere that only the LI pilots were "punished" so far and the traffic controllers passports were not seized.
The fact is that the traffic controllers are military, so they are not free to leave the country without permission.
In the eyes of the Brazilian justice they are being equally treated because they are all free to come and go inside the country (and it is a big country) and they are all not allowed to leave.
By the way, the traffic controllers were put on leave since the accident, they already hired lawyers and they blame the American pilots. The families already founded an association and it blames the pilots and the Union. I can remember a 1989 Varig accident over the Amazons where the pilots were sentenced to 4 years due to negligent behavior after 2 or more years of discussion...
In the present case, it is obvious that the ATC was incompetent, the control systems failed, the Legacy transponder failed and the pilots did not do their homework. They did not know the radio frequencies, they did not know the differences between Brazilian and FAA regulations regarding to loss of comm procedures and -- most of all -- they did not study the flight plan. If they studied the flight plan before they took off, they would know that the airway from Brasilia to Manaus has 2 ways and they would know that if they enter this airway in the wrong altitude they can hit something. That's the point, in the prosecutors point of view, that makes them chargeable of involuntary manslaughter.
The prosecutors will show this to the judge in 30 or 60 days and the pilots may be formally charged. I really don't know how the prosecutors will do, but the judge gave them much less time to reach a conclusion than it will take to the technical investigation to finish (10 months from the date of the crash).
The fact is that the traffic controllers are military, so they are not free to leave the country without permission.
In the eyes of the Brazilian justice they are being equally treated because they are all free to come and go inside the country (and it is a big country) and they are all not allowed to leave.
By the way, the traffic controllers were put on leave since the accident, they already hired lawyers and they blame the American pilots. The families already founded an association and it blames the pilots and the Union. I can remember a 1989 Varig accident over the Amazons where the pilots were sentenced to 4 years due to negligent behavior after 2 or more years of discussion...
In the present case, it is obvious that the ATC was incompetent, the control systems failed, the Legacy transponder failed and the pilots did not do their homework. They did not know the radio frequencies, they did not know the differences between Brazilian and FAA regulations regarding to loss of comm procedures and -- most of all -- they did not study the flight plan. If they studied the flight plan before they took off, they would know that the airway from Brasilia to Manaus has 2 ways and they would know that if they enter this airway in the wrong altitude they can hit something. That's the point, in the prosecutors point of view, that makes them chargeable of involuntary manslaughter.
The prosecutors will show this to the judge in 30 or 60 days and the pilots may be formally charged. I really don't know how the prosecutors will do, but the judge gave them much less time to reach a conclusion than it will take to the technical investigation to finish (10 months from the date of the crash).
I'm in one of those moods
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The clues were provided pages ago….. why wont some of you people think before typing!
…. The first lesson here (as has been demonstrated time after time post accident and incident) .. is that NO official or connected individual (including politicians and agency representatives) should make ANY speculative comment UNTIL firm discovery of facts are made (FDR/CVR/RADAR etc) and are known! …. Whoever that agency buffoon was that said (in the days after the accident) the Legacy was changing altitude before the collision (obviously only looked at the vertical Primary data return jumping all over the place) … had they done the appropriate and professional thing from the outset and waited until FDR and CVR data confirmed or debunked that assumption the two Legacy pilots would likely already be at home … where they should have been immediately it was apparent (FDR/CVR) they had not done anything other than that which would be reasonably expected, irrespective of TXPDR/COMM management!
The basic premise here being that a system that is ‘potentially’ prone to deactivation/standby/mismanagement caused by a crew attempting to ‘indent’ is quite probably not the best design ergonomically in the first place! .. is that the crews fault? … in any event, it is only one possible factor and surely not a sufficient cause to hold them in Brazil!
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…. Regarding ATS, the clues have already been posted here …. consider these hypothetical’s:-
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- Regular comm.’s black spots
- Regular Radar (SSR and/or Prim) short term outages
- Less than optimum staff resources
- New equipment and procedures
- A data label (visible to both sectors) that is showing something like ???_360 for some time
- Cross sector silent coordination (electronic data handover … no voice)
.
.. and then add factors such as:-
.
- Normalised deviation
- A shift change
- Fatigue
.
… some, none or all may in the end have played a part in this tragedy (I do not know yet .. do any of you?), and yet people post things like
….the differences between ICAO and US practices may or may not be relevant to crew mindset and this accident! … from what I have read it is by no means an attempt to ‘protect’ anyone, rather examine why those rules did not save the day (along with TXPDR/TCAS, ATS, and Avionics)!
.
.. have any of you looked at aircraft systems and thought:- why is it doing that? or did I hear that? or I didn’t input that? ….. have any of you realised something AFTER the FACT? … stones and glass houses!!
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….. the penchant for individual blame is ill-informed and despicable!
….self serving .. really … I would have thought your safety was their prime concern ….. Bloody hell, 12 Controllers (if what has been posted here is correct) are under the pump with this investigation, are you or your colleagues satisfied they are not distracted or otherwise affected by this? … do you want them separating you at the moment? …. Ho do you suppose the Brazilians pluck that many controllers out of thin air to fill in and maintain the service? .. it is not rocket science! … your veiled accusation of industrial rather than safety being the driver for traffic metering is a puerile insult …. who dictates resource levels? … coalface ATC’s or Management??
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I repeat, Air Traffic Controllers and Pilots are not in the business of making negligent mistakes! … unless and until it can be established that the ATS system did not inadvertently lead the ATC staff into believing (potentially misleading visual queues or the like) that separation existed when clearly it did not, then any accusatory comment is nothing more than emotive rubbish!
… absolutely agreed! …. People are rightly up in arms about the Legacy crew’s predicament …. have a thought though for the Brazilian ATC’s who could individually, (by ill-informed comment here and elsewhere) wrongly face the wrath of grieving countrymen and women!! .. who is in greater potential danger??? 
…. and the worlds ATC professionals have similar empathy and concern for the coalface ATC’s involved! 
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.. isn’t it heartening to see members of our two professions .. seemingly wanting to hang the other!
.
…. Neanderthals!!!
I find it hard to believe that this is a professional pilot's forum and most seem to accept that two of our fellow professional colleagues are be held against their will
The basic premise here being that a system that is ‘potentially’ prone to deactivation/standby/mismanagement caused by a crew attempting to ‘indent’ is quite probably not the best design ergonomically in the first place! .. is that the crews fault? … in any event, it is only one possible factor and surely not a sufficient cause to hold them in Brazil!
.
…. Regarding ATS, the clues have already been posted here …. consider these hypothetical’s:-
.
- Regular comm.’s black spots
- Regular Radar (SSR and/or Prim) short term outages
- Less than optimum staff resources
- New equipment and procedures
- A data label (visible to both sectors) that is showing something like ???_360 for some time
- Cross sector silent coordination (electronic data handover … no voice)
.
.. and then add factors such as:-
.
- Normalised deviation
- A shift change
- Fatigue
.
… some, none or all may in the end have played a part in this tragedy (I do not know yet .. do any of you?), and yet people post things like
.. and the ICAO rules to protect the incompetence of the local ATC,
.
.. have any of you looked at aircraft systems and thought:- why is it doing that? or did I hear that? or I didn’t input that? ….. have any of you realised something AFTER the FACT? … stones and glass houses!!
.
….. the penchant for individual blame is ill-informed and despicable!
the self serving ATC job actions speak well for their incompetence
.
I repeat, Air Traffic Controllers and Pilots are not in the business of making negligent mistakes! … unless and until it can be established that the ATS system did not inadvertently lead the ATC staff into believing (potentially misleading visual queues or the like) that separation existed when clearly it did not, then any accusatory comment is nothing more than emotive rubbish!
Those two fellow professionals that are incarcerated by Brazilain politicians need our support!!
The world's pilot professionals should feel threatened by the actions of Brazilian politicians!
.
.. isn’t it heartening to see members of our two professions .. seemingly wanting to hang the other!
.
…. Neanderthals!!!