BM FUEL PROBLEMS??
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snooky
<<It is not true to say that this is the same scenario as being comitted to your diversion following a go around, since the chances of both getting the diversion and then finding that airfield closed are very remote.>>
Would you like to explain your statement statistically.
Arriving at your alternate having used your diversion fuel to my mind equates to the same thing. The chances of making an approach with minimum fuel and being faced with sudden airfield closure, although unlikely, are similar I would suggest.
If you diverted to LTN, LGW, STN the chances of a blocked runway preventing you landing are greater than remaining at LHR.
I would also suggest that inbound to LHR, leaving the hold at OCK or BIG and getting down to the level of approach and reserve fuel only, would still give you a choice of LGW with similar track miles to touchdown. Similarly in the BNN hold LTN and in the LAM hold STN.
<<It is not true to say that this is the same scenario as being comitted to your diversion following a go around, since the chances of both getting the diversion and then finding that airfield closed are very remote.>>
Would you like to explain your statement statistically.
Arriving at your alternate having used your diversion fuel to my mind equates to the same thing. The chances of making an approach with minimum fuel and being faced with sudden airfield closure, although unlikely, are similar I would suggest.
If you diverted to LTN, LGW, STN the chances of a blocked runway preventing you landing are greater than remaining at LHR.
I would also suggest that inbound to LHR, leaving the hold at OCK or BIG and getting down to the level of approach and reserve fuel only, would still give you a choice of LGW with similar track miles to touchdown. Similarly in the BNN hold LTN and in the LAM hold STN.
Guest
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What is causing a little confusion here is that while 'contingency' is 5% of planned burn for jets (well always WAS!) and 10% for piston, some airlines, eg BA, have a modified 'contingency' of 5% or 15 minutes at 1500', whichever is the GREATER.
All very comfy on a short sector., but not so fat on an ATH or TLV..........
All very comfy on a short sector., but not so fat on an ATH or TLV..........
Guest
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Anyone ever told the captains the potential liability cost to the captain if he runs out of fuel and servives over central London?
A captain is legally liable to the extent of his worldwide wealth if he causes a death or damage to persons or property.Therefor a pilot maybe should not own any assets personally and have wealth in a trust.
Fuel rules will quickly change when the first airliner runs dry over London.
Some airlines east of Dover are unaware of the LHR 20 mins. They get Cfp fuel from the USA and generally the zero fuel weight passed has errors ( the wrong way ) sometimes as much as 4000 to 7000kgs.
When a passenger buys a ticket are they made aware you plans include having only 15 mins befor the engines quit after touch down?
Why not an extra 2 hours hold fuel?
These are civil passenger airline ( suposedly safe) operations not military war ops.
After a civil airliner runs dry over LHR the airline management will be sacked in the blink of an eye and fuel loads will change.
It is called Tomb stone flight safety.
Why make your Tomb stone befor your time?
If you want the comfort factor of extra fuel take it, but do not expect the managers to give you another 3 year contract of employment when yours expires,this is managerial pressure and their idea of CRM.
A captain must be prepared to walk or be sacked every time he takes a stand and insists upon his safety requirements being actioned and be prepared to live by these rules.
Today the stress and pressure on captains is getting higher and attempts are continuous to undermine the authority and status of the captain.
People not onboard the flight who seek to influence and minimise the fuel load to be carried are guilty of "Interference with the flight" and the "Captains authority".
Authority delegated to him by law of the state, as a Captain Peacock posted.
Questions, What or where is the state back up of its commanders? Has this back up ever been actioned?
Question,Why are the arrival fuel figures not recorded by the Caa at Lhr and reviewed with the same concern as the noise abatements and SID flight paths?
The fact is nobody is "Guarding the guards."
Today the state is not concerned about fuel loads over their capital city.
Another fact? I check the news every night to see if has happened,and say a prayer it never will.
Pray with me lads its all you have got left, nobody who can do anything about this is interested.
Do not let them kill you and be brave and be real captains (not dead ones) and put the fuel "you" want on.
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We will do the drill according to the amendments to the amendments I er think?
A captain is legally liable to the extent of his worldwide wealth if he causes a death or damage to persons or property.Therefor a pilot maybe should not own any assets personally and have wealth in a trust.
Fuel rules will quickly change when the first airliner runs dry over London.
Some airlines east of Dover are unaware of the LHR 20 mins. They get Cfp fuel from the USA and generally the zero fuel weight passed has errors ( the wrong way ) sometimes as much as 4000 to 7000kgs.
When a passenger buys a ticket are they made aware you plans include having only 15 mins befor the engines quit after touch down?
Why not an extra 2 hours hold fuel?
These are civil passenger airline ( suposedly safe) operations not military war ops.
After a civil airliner runs dry over LHR the airline management will be sacked in the blink of an eye and fuel loads will change.
It is called Tomb stone flight safety.
Why make your Tomb stone befor your time?
If you want the comfort factor of extra fuel take it, but do not expect the managers to give you another 3 year contract of employment when yours expires,this is managerial pressure and their idea of CRM.
A captain must be prepared to walk or be sacked every time he takes a stand and insists upon his safety requirements being actioned and be prepared to live by these rules.
Today the stress and pressure on captains is getting higher and attempts are continuous to undermine the authority and status of the captain.
People not onboard the flight who seek to influence and minimise the fuel load to be carried are guilty of "Interference with the flight" and the "Captains authority".
Authority delegated to him by law of the state, as a Captain Peacock posted.
Questions, What or where is the state back up of its commanders? Has this back up ever been actioned?
Question,Why are the arrival fuel figures not recorded by the Caa at Lhr and reviewed with the same concern as the noise abatements and SID flight paths?
The fact is nobody is "Guarding the guards."
Today the state is not concerned about fuel loads over their capital city.
Another fact? I check the news every night to see if has happened,and say a prayer it never will.
Pray with me lads its all you have got left, nobody who can do anything about this is interested.
Do not let them kill you and be brave and be real captains (not dead ones) and put the fuel "you" want on.
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We will do the drill according to the amendments to the amendments I er think?
Guest
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<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" size="2">After a civil airliner runs dry over LHR the airline management will be sacked in the blink of an eye and fuel loads will change.</font>
Some of same Captains who will adjust the Jetplan fuel down for underload and then pick a cruise level for a 25kg saving in predicted burn are those who will do a full 8nm ILS at a quiet airfield in CAVOK conditions. It's a laugh, innit?
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...proceeding below Decision Height with CAUTION...
Guest
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Yes!!
One really must try and laugh, after the body bags it really is all about the legal get out of jail bits.
We are both unlikely to run out of fuel as you seem positive and appear to know what you are doing, and I am retired.
Nowadays after a crash, if it is expensive enough, then the management will be also looked at and then replaced and their policies changed.An accident report is also to be avoided or heavily edited if possible.
I feel the insurance companies will eventually have a role to play in flight safety as the payouts start to really hurt. Presently they seem to have some influence in non performing company management in companies they have invested and wasted our money in.
Hope you have legal visual reference if proceeding below, even with caution!! Is that a legal get out??
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We will do the drill according to the amendments to the amendments I er think?
One really must try and laugh, after the body bags it really is all about the legal get out of jail bits.
We are both unlikely to run out of fuel as you seem positive and appear to know what you are doing, and I am retired.
Nowadays after a crash, if it is expensive enough, then the management will be also looked at and then replaced and their policies changed.An accident report is also to be avoided or heavily edited if possible.
I feel the insurance companies will eventually have a role to play in flight safety as the payouts start to really hurt. Presently they seem to have some influence in non performing company management in companies they have invested and wasted our money in.
Hope you have legal visual reference if proceeding below, even with caution!! Is that a legal get out??
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We will do the drill according to the amendments to the amendments I er think?
Guest
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Once I was foolish enough to succumb to accepting min jet plan fuel!
Asked for gear at 2000 feet on the ILS with 2100kgs remaining on my 737-300 (this amount would be normal if on min fuel). Behold only two greens!!!!! Go-around flown then after checks, gear recycled - still two greens!
The F/O checked the nose gear and mains through the looking glass. Nose gear was OK but the main wheel glass was dirty or obscured. Fuel now 1300Kgs!!!!! Mayday declared and NITS to CC for emergency landing - no time for a fly by! Attempted to recycle one more time and behold 3 lovely green lights.
Immediate approach made and landed with 900Kgs.
Our arses were somewhat tight on that one!
My point should be obvious! More fuel and we needn't have rushed and would have had more time to be sure. If we didn't get our three greens then drastic action would have been necessary!
At least we wouldn't have burned though!!!
Never again!
Asked for gear at 2000 feet on the ILS with 2100kgs remaining on my 737-300 (this amount would be normal if on min fuel). Behold only two greens!!!!! Go-around flown then after checks, gear recycled - still two greens!
The F/O checked the nose gear and mains through the looking glass. Nose gear was OK but the main wheel glass was dirty or obscured. Fuel now 1300Kgs!!!!! Mayday declared and NITS to CC for emergency landing - no time for a fly by! Attempted to recycle one more time and behold 3 lovely green lights.
Immediate approach made and landed with 900Kgs.
Our arses were somewhat tight on that one!
My point should be obvious! More fuel and we needn't have rushed and would have had more time to be sure. If we didn't get our three greens then drastic action would have been necessary!
At least we wouldn't have burned though!!!
Never again!
Guest
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If I recall wasn't there an incident in Air 2Bob when a 757 landed at LGW with 1000 kgs and that was after a Cat 3b approach due to fog. I gather he got sacked. Bugger them--carry what you feel is right. If it all goes wrong, you won't get any support from the management.
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Jeta1 - you took the words out of my mouth.
All the theory (and practice) says that accidents are not just caused by one thing but a "series of events" - aka "the error chain" or "poor judgement chain".
I think the vast majority of aircraft commanders are sensible and assertive enough to take whatever fuel they deem is safe and sensible. On certain occasions this might be flight plan but, in my opinion, to plan to operate to busy places such as LHR on min fuel on a continual basis is courting disaster, eventually.
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All the theory (and practice) says that accidents are not just caused by one thing but a "series of events" - aka "the error chain" or "poor judgement chain".
I think the vast majority of aircraft commanders are sensible and assertive enough to take whatever fuel they deem is safe and sensible. On certain occasions this might be flight plan but, in my opinion, to plan to operate to busy places such as LHR on min fuel on a continual basis is courting disaster, eventually.
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jeta1
Pleased to hear that your rather unpleasant experience ended safely.
Had you taken holding fuel for the just in case event or diverted you could have been faced with the same problem and still had the same low fuel state. Indeed you may have held and then been on a CAT 3 approach and suffered an autopilot failure or two. The range of possibilities is endless and at some point a sensible judgement has to be made
What some seem to be saying here is 'lets take extra fuel every time just in case'. Whether we like it or not commercial considerations are important and one has to decide where to draw the line. I have said previously I take loads of extra when I feel I need it.
Nightflyer
Why was the A2B flight so short of fuel when it was foggy? Surely it was forecast and he should have taken extra.
Out of interest my company policy is that a flyby rarely achieves anything with unsafe gear indications.
Pleased to hear that your rather unpleasant experience ended safely.
Had you taken holding fuel for the just in case event or diverted you could have been faced with the same problem and still had the same low fuel state. Indeed you may have held and then been on a CAT 3 approach and suffered an autopilot failure or two. The range of possibilities is endless and at some point a sensible judgement has to be made
What some seem to be saying here is 'lets take extra fuel every time just in case'. Whether we like it or not commercial considerations are important and one has to decide where to draw the line. I have said previously I take loads of extra when I feel I need it.
Nightflyer
Why was the A2B flight so short of fuel when it was foggy? Surely it was forecast and he should have taken extra.
Out of interest my company policy is that a flyby rarely achieves anything with unsafe gear indications.
Guest
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M.Mouse - Good point, but I don't think anyone is suggesting going mad - sensible corrections to fuel are required. It is sensible is to always plan a sensible contingency, applying professional judgement, above jet plan fuel. When performance allows it an extra 30 minutes is a sensible figure, I would say . I am not saying go silly - just be prepared, as situations like the one I had do happen. 30 spare minutes would have shown that I had excercised my professional discretion and had been prepared for unplanned possibles!
Yep! Quite agree that a fly by is a waste of time, generally. The technically untrained eye of Tower folk (no disrespect Heathrow Director)would be unwise to risk saying that it looked ok when it turned out not to be. To get an engineer to the tower with a good pair of binos is a better idea. It is still very unlikely to be of any real help, especially if the gear is down but not locked. It could be used as a last resort to help reassure one that the wheels are at least pointing roughly in the right direction though!
One small point! I have rarely seen LOFT exercises practicising such emergencies on min fuel!
Yep! Quite agree that a fly by is a waste of time, generally. The technically untrained eye of Tower folk (no disrespect Heathrow Director)would be unwise to risk saying that it looked ok when it turned out not to be. To get an engineer to the tower with a good pair of binos is a better idea. It is still very unlikely to be of any real help, especially if the gear is down but not locked. It could be used as a last resort to help reassure one that the wheels are at least pointing roughly in the right direction though!
One small point! I have rarely seen LOFT exercises practicising such emergencies on min fuel!
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I have no sympathy with any airline who (allegedly) operates in this manner. I think the majority of UK ATCOs are well aware of the cost penalties of holding and fuel etc, but we have enough to worry about without the sort of crap that HD and his colleagues had to endure. Whilst we're not anything like as busy as the London airports, we do our best to give expeditious routings to operators, but a queue is a queue, and unless you call Pan or Mayday, you wont get to the front until it's your turn.
,
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LHR Director (who started this)
I have brought this subject up with some of the ATCOs who j/s with us - and they are usually surprised.
Our Fuel Policy is to try and carry Flight Plan, with usually 15mins hold above Div Fuel. If our "stats" show that the holding at this time / day are less than or equal to the 15mins, we are encouraged not to take extra. Hence the Policy is that most Flights into LHR should carry only the 15mins.
When we get to the hold, and find we have used some already, or the holding is greater, we get to a point where we would have to divert (not enough to go to LHR then divert). We can then "commit" to e.g. LHR, down to a level where we plan to land with 30mins @ 1500' (which is not far off a go-around [high fuel burn] and tight radar / visual circuit). Only when the "plan" shows not making this do the PANs start coming out!
Of course, what ATC do not know is how many aircraft in the hold have "committed". The first you may know is the "hint" the BM aircraft gave you. It may be all the aircraft in all the holds. (Maybe a one-off call to Director that we have now "committed" may help?)
Once you have committed, and then left the hold, were the tower to be evacuated, a runway blocked, or ATC to "instruct" a go-around and / or diversion, the aircraft is still commmitted to land at LHR, with or without clearance.
All fine, except that the example in our manual goes on to state that committing can be carried out allowing for plausible single ground or air failures, and implies that such a failure could reduce CAT 3A to CAT 2 i.e. we can commit to land in CAT 2! (Not that many would...)
It works for now, because quite a few aircraft are carrying extra, not everyone will have to commit etc. The "fun" will start on a day with not so good weather, long holds, and a sudden decrease in runways available. Of the 5 aircraft of finals, it might be that 3 or more are absolutely committed to land off that approach, or after a tight circuit...
NoD
I have brought this subject up with some of the ATCOs who j/s with us - and they are usually surprised.
Our Fuel Policy is to try and carry Flight Plan, with usually 15mins hold above Div Fuel. If our "stats" show that the holding at this time / day are less than or equal to the 15mins, we are encouraged not to take extra. Hence the Policy is that most Flights into LHR should carry only the 15mins.
When we get to the hold, and find we have used some already, or the holding is greater, we get to a point where we would have to divert (not enough to go to LHR then divert). We can then "commit" to e.g. LHR, down to a level where we plan to land with 30mins @ 1500' (which is not far off a go-around [high fuel burn] and tight radar / visual circuit). Only when the "plan" shows not making this do the PANs start coming out!
Of course, what ATC do not know is how many aircraft in the hold have "committed". The first you may know is the "hint" the BM aircraft gave you. It may be all the aircraft in all the holds. (Maybe a one-off call to Director that we have now "committed" may help?)
Once you have committed, and then left the hold, were the tower to be evacuated, a runway blocked, or ATC to "instruct" a go-around and / or diversion, the aircraft is still commmitted to land at LHR, with or without clearance.
All fine, except that the example in our manual goes on to state that committing can be carried out allowing for plausible single ground or air failures, and implies that such a failure could reduce CAT 3A to CAT 2 i.e. we can commit to land in CAT 2! (Not that many would...)
It works for now, because quite a few aircraft are carrying extra, not everyone will have to commit etc. The "fun" will start on a day with not so good weather, long holds, and a sudden decrease in runways available. Of the 5 aircraft of finals, it might be that 3 or more are absolutely committed to land off that approach, or after a tight circuit...
NoD
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NoD,
Only problem I can see is that if you all start telling us you're committed to landing at LHR because of your fuel state, we'd probably feel obliged to increase the spacing to make sure you get landing clearance.
Consequently the delays for those still in, or just arriving at, the stacks go up. More people tell us they're committed etc etc.
Bit of a Catch 22 that one.
WF.
Only problem I can see is that if you all start telling us you're committed to landing at LHR because of your fuel state, we'd probably feel obliged to increase the spacing to make sure you get landing clearance.
Consequently the delays for those still in, or just arriving at, the stacks go up. More people tell us they're committed etc etc.
Bit of a Catch 22 that one.
WF.
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M.Mouse
I cannot as you request explain my statement statistically, however perhaps I can make it a little clearer what I am trying to say.
Arriving at your diversion having used your diversion fuel does not equate to the same thing as using your diversion fuel as effectively contingency fuel. My reasoning is that when you arrive at your diversion this is a fairly unusual event, and therefore happens infrequently, so the chances of your diversion being closed having diverted are very small. Committing to land at Lhr gives you the same chance of it being closed (i.e. very remote) but because some people do this on a very regular basis the chance of someone getting caught out is very much higher.
In 20 years of operating to Lhr I have only seen it happen twice, but if it even only happens every 10 years, and many aircraft are committed someone will sooner or later get caught out, and this is unacceptable.
Good points about the tech. problem situation and the impact of a low fuel state.
I cannot as you request explain my statement statistically, however perhaps I can make it a little clearer what I am trying to say.
Arriving at your diversion having used your diversion fuel does not equate to the same thing as using your diversion fuel as effectively contingency fuel. My reasoning is that when you arrive at your diversion this is a fairly unusual event, and therefore happens infrequently, so the chances of your diversion being closed having diverted are very small. Committing to land at Lhr gives you the same chance of it being closed (i.e. very remote) but because some people do this on a very regular basis the chance of someone getting caught out is very much higher.
In 20 years of operating to Lhr I have only seen it happen twice, but if it even only happens every 10 years, and many aircraft are committed someone will sooner or later get caught out, and this is unacceptable.
Good points about the tech. problem situation and the impact of a low fuel state.
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This is a most interesting thread.
It seems to me (a complete novice at this game) that it encompasses so many disciplines, most, if not all of which make our job so rewarding and previously highly regarded.
We all (as far as I’m aware) have SOP’s, in varying degrees better or worse than others and most of us (one or two always slip through the net) have a brain (although the current CAA filtering system does not allow for THIS fact).
We are trained for the most part, to reasonably high standards and are encouraged to share our wealth of knowledge, ideas and thoughts with those around us (both inside and outside of) the aircraft. So it is fantastic that we have this medium with which to discuss the issues that we are faced with on a daily basis.
It is I think, both fortunate and unfortunate then, that those very same SOP’s that protect us usurp most of our abilities and although hinting at a measure of free thought, in the hands of the (equally?) well-trained lawyers will surely condemn us in our hour of need if we do not follow their “advice”.
Those of you who have managed to stay thus far with my ramblings are now treated (?) to my plagiarised wisdom.
KEEP IT SIMPLE, STUPID.
The “book” is clear in my outfit. It EVEN gives us a flow chart!! The choice isn’t really ours to make, given “System controls are in the normal configuration for the phase of flight prior to the initiation of a non-normal procedure”.
Why is it with so much emphasis on CRM,
HD says; “two BM aircraft indicated that they were effectively short of fuel”
Are they, aren’t they? This sounds like skirting the issue.
We are taught to communicate.
How many times has the comment between pilots been “where’s s/he sending us now”?
And how about from ATC “could you let us know before you slow down/speed up” (not personally, honest!)
Whilst I agree the over burdened airwaves could well do without more superfluous R/T a few well chosen words could enlighten both agents as to the train of thought and intentions of those concerned.
A wise old (80 something and still instructing) CFI told me what we all know; “The trick is in avoiding a situation where we need to use our skill to extricate ourselves from that situation”.
I don’t know if there is a right or wrong answer but we at least have the ability to discuss it and this must be good, if only so we have more experience to call on in our judgement and decision making processes.
In my company, as far as I am aware, nobody is “invited for tea and bickies” for carrying a “reasonable” extra.
P.S. I’m not a statistician but your comment Snooky about repeating an unlikely event I don’t think changes the odds of the event (tossing a coin is always a 50-50 chance no matter how many times you do it)
It seems to me (a complete novice at this game) that it encompasses so many disciplines, most, if not all of which make our job so rewarding and previously highly regarded.
We all (as far as I’m aware) have SOP’s, in varying degrees better or worse than others and most of us (one or two always slip through the net) have a brain (although the current CAA filtering system does not allow for THIS fact).
We are trained for the most part, to reasonably high standards and are encouraged to share our wealth of knowledge, ideas and thoughts with those around us (both inside and outside of) the aircraft. So it is fantastic that we have this medium with which to discuss the issues that we are faced with on a daily basis.
It is I think, both fortunate and unfortunate then, that those very same SOP’s that protect us usurp most of our abilities and although hinting at a measure of free thought, in the hands of the (equally?) well-trained lawyers will surely condemn us in our hour of need if we do not follow their “advice”.
Those of you who have managed to stay thus far with my ramblings are now treated (?) to my plagiarised wisdom.
KEEP IT SIMPLE, STUPID.
The “book” is clear in my outfit. It EVEN gives us a flow chart!! The choice isn’t really ours to make, given “System controls are in the normal configuration for the phase of flight prior to the initiation of a non-normal procedure”.
Why is it with so much emphasis on CRM,
HD says; “two BM aircraft indicated that they were effectively short of fuel”
Are they, aren’t they? This sounds like skirting the issue.
We are taught to communicate.
How many times has the comment between pilots been “where’s s/he sending us now”?
And how about from ATC “could you let us know before you slow down/speed up” (not personally, honest!)
Whilst I agree the over burdened airwaves could well do without more superfluous R/T a few well chosen words could enlighten both agents as to the train of thought and intentions of those concerned.
A wise old (80 something and still instructing) CFI told me what we all know; “The trick is in avoiding a situation where we need to use our skill to extricate ourselves from that situation”.
I don’t know if there is a right or wrong answer but we at least have the ability to discuss it and this must be good, if only so we have more experience to call on in our judgement and decision making processes.
In my company, as far as I am aware, nobody is “invited for tea and bickies” for carrying a “reasonable” extra.
P.S. I’m not a statistician but your comment Snooky about repeating an unlikely event I don’t think changes the odds of the event (tossing a coin is always a 50-50 chance no matter how many times you do it)
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doggonetired
I agree that this is a great way to exchange views on topics like this.
I also agree about the odds not changing. My point was that whilst there is the same chance of finding a diversion closed after a go around as there is of the original destination closing, it is a situation which is seldom experienced and therefore the exposure to those odds is rare. Regularly committing to a particular airfield, as is very often the case carrying planned fuel with at most 15mins contingency into Lhr exposes the pilot far more often to the possibility of an airfield to which he/she is committed closing.
I seem to remember that some years ago the CAA issued a circular advising pilots operating inbound to Lhr and Lgw to carry at least an extra 20mins. fuel for unforseen holding in order to prevent the kind of events described by Heathrow Director.
I agree that this is a great way to exchange views on topics like this.
I also agree about the odds not changing. My point was that whilst there is the same chance of finding a diversion closed after a go around as there is of the original destination closing, it is a situation which is seldom experienced and therefore the exposure to those odds is rare. Regularly committing to a particular airfield, as is very often the case carrying planned fuel with at most 15mins contingency into Lhr exposes the pilot far more often to the possibility of an airfield to which he/she is committed closing.
I seem to remember that some years ago the CAA issued a circular advising pilots operating inbound to Lhr and Lgw to carry at least an extra 20mins. fuel for unforseen holding in order to prevent the kind of events described by Heathrow Director.
Guest
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doggonetired, I am not a statistician either and I think your comments may be right but I think what Snooky is getting at is that most of the time there isn't a problem but you only need to throw in some extra "random" event (such as an aircraft malfunction) and the potential for a catastrophe is much greater.
I accept that we cannot base everything that we do on the worst happening but, as a pilot, I do know (from hard experience) that when you are getting low on fuel one's ability to make rational reasoned decisions tends to decrease.
At a much more fundamental level we have to ask what the purpose of business is? If the answer to that question is just to maximise profit (for example by carrying less fuel and "saving" money) then we are surely ignoring the bigger picture. For example, what is the cost to the "nation" if passengers do not arrive at their chosen destination? Some might say, so what? But I would say that what goes around (pardon the pun!) comes around.
We need to take a much more "holistic" view - for example, it might be argued that if ATC is subject to more "stress" because of a couple of aircraft crying a bit low on fuel that they might be more prone to error and miss something else which is more important.
Finally, it concerns me as pilot (and a passenger) that many of us are constantly working in "overload" - we can do this "occasionally" when necessary but if it's every day, then eventually something will give and there will be a catastrophe.
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I accept that we cannot base everything that we do on the worst happening but, as a pilot, I do know (from hard experience) that when you are getting low on fuel one's ability to make rational reasoned decisions tends to decrease.
At a much more fundamental level we have to ask what the purpose of business is? If the answer to that question is just to maximise profit (for example by carrying less fuel and "saving" money) then we are surely ignoring the bigger picture. For example, what is the cost to the "nation" if passengers do not arrive at their chosen destination? Some might say, so what? But I would say that what goes around (pardon the pun!) comes around.
We need to take a much more "holistic" view - for example, it might be argued that if ATC is subject to more "stress" because of a couple of aircraft crying a bit low on fuel that they might be more prone to error and miss something else which is more important.
Finally, it concerns me as pilot (and a passenger) that many of us are constantly working in "overload" - we can do this "occasionally" when necessary but if it's every day, then eventually something will give and there will be a catastrophe.
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