FAA & CAA disagree over B747 continued 3 engine flight

[BEagle]

Interestingly, I was discussing this incident with 3 extremely experienced ex-ba 744 captains on Tuesday. All agreed upon the course of action they would have taken - a diversion to New York.

Not one of them would have risked crossing the pond on 3.

But let's wait for the FAA v CAA outcome.

[Crash and Burn]

Do BA think they are God?

Which part of Article 63 do BA not understand... 'likely'... declaring a fuel shortage so close to an aerodrome without warning ATC prior to that point indicates to me that they were pushing their luck. Further, no doubt they flew close to Belfast International (EGAA), Glasgow International (EGPF) or Prestwick International (EGPK); Manchester is another 20 + minutes beyond any of these, a few more tons of fuel I think.

The forecast Wx they may have had in my opinion would not be sufficient to accurately calculate the fuel on arrival, especially when it is unlikely that ATC had any knowledge of the seriousness of the situation to give them any extra priority: so my opinion is strongly in line with the FAA. A few more errors at the wrong time, then what?

I will not be flying with BA again I do not like people thinking they are God and taking unnecessary risks with my life, the FAA have it right.

[Hand Solo]

Crash and Burn - sadly you are displaying your total ingorance of the 744 in your rather ill advised post. For a start, from Glasgow to Manchester is not 'a few more tons of fuel' in a 747. Given you are very shortly about to start your descent it is probably about 2 tons max, if that. Your comment about the accuracy of the weather forecasts is also rubbish. Never heard of Satcom or ACARS? That crew had the 18 hr forecast for LHR when they left LAX, tied in with the sig wx charts and many years of personal experience. Throughout the flight they had access to METARS for LHR updated every 30 minutes plus the latest TAFs as they were issued. I doubt there was another crew on the North Atlantic that night who were better informed of the weather situation not just at LHR but LGW,BHX,MAN,SNN,PIK,GLA and KEF, plus a few more on the western side of the pond.

For your benefit, let me explain the fuel system of the 744 in very simple terms. When you get to the closing stage of the flight, you have four engines being fed directly by four associated tanks, each balanced with around 3.5T of fuel. Each tank feeds its engine. With number 2 engine out then the number 2 tank can feed the remaining three engines. It was only very late in the flight that it began to appear that the number 2 tank possibly was not working as it should and maybe the fuel might become unavailable, a conclusion reached when the tank contents bgean to reduce at a lower rate than the other tanks (nb the tanks had been working normally for the previous ten hours). At that point the crew took immediate action to divert. Not four hours earlier when everything was under control. Not one hour later when it would transpire the the fuel was usuable at all. They diverted and declared the mayday when the new problem presented itself. Very sensible decision.

[Crash and Burn]

Hand Solo - Thanks for the detailed analysis of the B747 fuel system, however I am not debating how the fuel gets to the engines. As for ignorance, no doubt you are aware that Manchester is not a quiet, sleepy little hollow of an airport the second runway bears testament to the increase in movements and yet holding at Manchester is a common occurrence. It is this to which I draw your attention. Ask any Air Traffic Controller about the risk associated by declaring an emergency too late. I read that the aircraft was at 3000 feet when the declaration was made, which puts the aircraft about 10 mile final approximately. At this point there must have been aircraft ahead on the final approach and aircraft either departing or aircraft crossing for departure. In other words, the scenario presented to ATC was most likely more complicated than the crew may have considered. From what I understand, the crew asked for the approach to be sterile for their approach, but if this was made at 3000 feet, then in my opinion, this is a little late and did they full explain their fuel state to ATC - I think not.

Perhaps you could give me your opinion of the fuel on touch down after completing one visual circuit (close traffic for our American friends) if you had 5000 kgs ( 11,000 lbs) of fuel left, which is what I understand from other posts on this site.

My opinion relates to the number of other factors beyond the control of the crew, not the ability of the crew to get the aircraft down. As you have confirmed 2 tons, is colloquially a 'few tons' (4400 lbs) ask your self the same question, if you had to perform the same exercise at another airport slightly closer, would you not be happier? Why was Manchester so important?

[BusyB]

Another monday morning quarterback.
God, it must be great to know everything and be PERFECT.
You must be infallible C & B!

[Hand Solo]

Indeed Manchester is not a sleepy hollow, but nor does it handle anything like the level of traffic that LHR, LGW, LAX, JFK or other airfields familiar to BA pilots. I have been to Manchester many many times and could count on the fingers of one hand how often I've held, which compares rather favourably to the 90% chance of holding at LHR. I don't recall the exact details of whether a PAN call was made earlier, but sometimes events conspire to prevent one from doing so. It is a fairly regular occurence at LHR for an aircraft to be fine for fuel on the approach but need to declare a PAN or MAYDAY immediately in the event of a go around. Good airmanship dictates you advise them of that fact as early as possible but ATC seem to handle it just fine. As you are aware, there is no fuel priority procedure in the UK and the CAA would no doubt take a dim view if people started shouting PAN then landing with full reserves plus some on a regular basis. This aircraft landed with 5 tons. A typical reserve figure for the 744 is 4.5 tonnes. Technically the aircraft did not need to declare an emergency at all. The cause for concern was late uncertainty as to whether 3 tonnes of that fuel was usable or not. As it happens it was. 5 tonnes - not an emergency. 2 tonnes - very much an emergency. The declaration of a MAYDAY due to fuel state should leave ATC in no doubt as to the severity of the fuel state. Should it not, the request for a sterile runway represents the backstop. Manchester really isn't that hard a place to create a sterile runway and I have no doubt the ATC staff were able to do such rapidly and with much more spare capacity than an over-tired crew contemplating a three engine go around with potentially just two tonnes of usable fuel.

As to the question of would I prefer to perform the same procedure at another airfield with more fuel, yes of course. Perhaps St Johns? Or Keflavik? The aircraft went to Manchester because everything indicated it would get there satisfactorily. If it could only get to Glasgow then they'd have gone there. If they couldn't make it across the pond then they'd probably have gone to New York. The point is that until they were past these airfields there was no indication that continuing to Manchester would present any problems. BA is a commercial organisation and getting to the aircraft as close to London is a consideration once all other factors are considered which is probably why they elected to go to MAN instead of GLA at the planning stage. There is also the consideration that Manchester has two usable runways so that in the event of one being blocked on final approach with critical fuel a switch can be carried out relatively quickly and easily.

[L337]

C&B

Your post typifies the poorly informed self opinionated non aviator that sometimes posts here.

Even when a professional pilot trys to explain some of the complexities you don't want to listen.

L337

[Crash and Burn]

Hand Solo - Interesting although you have not answered my questions and you also make assumptions.

Assumption: ATC can make the runway sterile quickly... I put it to you, if you were the aircraft ahead and you heard the aircraft behind stating a requirement for a sterile runway, which would obviously mean that you would be required by ATC to execute a missed approach; I am sure your opinion would be that the crew behind 'pressed on', left the decision rather late and should have landed earlier (elsewhere) - so I believe you to have a unrealistic bias. If you work for BA, I commend you for your locality! Further, I mentioned 'holding' and the second runway to illustrate the level of traffic at Manchester. You have clearly mentioned your opinion on the traffic at Manchester and that if you were flying an aircraft in a similar situation that you would assume the traffic to be insignificant to have any effect on the outcome. In addition and prior to this point unless the FMC was programmed with the forecast winds (if this were possible with the version of software installed), the estimated fuel on arrival would be based on the actual wind at the time of calculation. Whilst forecasts are normally very accurate, in my experience I have seen some significant differences from that forecasted. I feel very uneasy about assumptions that can have such significant knock-on effects.

As for landing with 5 tons of fuel onboard without declaring an emergency, I cannot believe you would keep this a secret, I cannot imagine what you are saying is SOP. Plus you haven't answered my question. How much fuel would be left in the tanks after a missed approach into a visual circuit? The reason why I think this is important is obvious - what about a second chance if something should go wrong.

You accused me of being ignorant so I have another question for you. It takes a considerable length of time to get into a command position with any long haul operator, which means an incredible wealth of experience. If you have a choice of landing without making a fuss or pressing on and ignore at least what would be my concerns (outlined above), would you label yourself ignorant or arrogant? In my opinion and I do not consider myself as a gambling man; I don’t like the idea of having just one chance left and keeping it a secret for that long, I would not like the finger to be pointed at me asking ‘why did I pass suitable aerodromes and leave yourself with just one chance’ – was it really that necessary?

You mentioned Manchester has two runways and this was an important factor; so does Belfast International which if you answer the question above, you might discover enough fuel for a second chance, if not… I get that uneasy feeling again, why bother pushing it another night stop in Chicago or Toronto (adjacent to the great circle track) would not be that bad – finances don’t come into it.

As a passenger I appreciate a good service but much more than that… I think you can figure out the rest!

This forum is for bouncing opinions around, the job of determining the merits of individual actions is for the courts and it sounds like, the FAA will want their day. The fact is everything worked out fine, I wonder though if they had the chance of doing it all again, would they do the same thing?

Any change in policy will speak volumes.

L337, I am a professional Pilot but if you are alluding to a lack of appreciation on my part on the complexities of a B744, you could not be further from the truth. In simple terms, if you drive down a motorway with little in the way of fuel, you run the risk of not getting to your destination. No matter how anyone dresses up the complexities of the scenario, the same analogy applies. However, if you saying that I don’t take unnecessary risks, well that would be me. Have a look at the Air Navigation Order 2000:

Endangering safety of an aircraft
63 A person shall not recklessly or negligently act in a manner likely to endanger an aircraft, or any person therein.

The debate is not the bias we as Pilots have on the actual events but what unforeseen events could have interfered with the successful outcome and were the actions taken reasonable to insure an entirely safe outcome.

I cannot speak on behalf of the FAA, but I suspect their thinking, which I think is reasonable; how did the PIC know that everything would work out given that he would most likely have only one chance to secure a safe landing at Manchester. I think if, or most likely when the FAA get to question him, his answer will not be entirely convincing, at best he can say it was unlikely that something would interfere, but he could not be sure. At this point it for the judge to decide if this is a reasonable aviation practice bearing in mind other options existed many hours before. Part 121 is black and white and very similar to our ANO, I don't understand why the CAA are not jumping up and down, after all they are responsible for aviation practices within the UK.

BusyB – Thanks for your input, but your comment indicates a distinct lack of understanding of the debate, perhaps you could reiterate your stance in some detail. Do you accept unnecessary risks as routine as your comment appears to be a little caviller; I would like to understand your logic on the concept of danger?

[flash8]

C&B hit the nail right on the head. A very succint post in many ways I might add.

I can't believe some on this thread (BA aircrew?) seem biased to the point of incredulity. Actually I can believe it.


>The debate is not the bias we as Pilots have on the actual events but what unforeseen events could have interfered with the successful outcome and were the actions taken reasonable to insure an entirely safe outcome.

[flt_lt_w_mitty]

Way back (P25 of the original thread) I said I did not have a major issue with the decision to continue. Leaving aside the FAA/CAA ding-dong, it was NOT unsafe, but I DO think it was unwise. Just 'cos the book says you CAN does not mean you MUST. I don't think our dispatch would have allowed it to happen, mind you, but if it had, the Captain would have been with me asap 'helping' me with his report!

This particular question I posed has not been addressed by anyone, in BA or outside:

"2) At some point, it became apparent that the aircraft was short of fuel for its planned destination, LHR. It subsequently became 'short of fuel' for its diversion airfield, MAN, such that a go-round was not possible, and there appeared to be some fuel in the tanks which was not 'easily useable'.


The question is, how and when did this happen? For a MAYDAY to be declared, following a PAN, things must have gone bad fairly quickly, otherwise a MAYDAY would have gone out first. Was the fuel shortage 'unknown' earlier due to -

a failure in the Boeing information system,

in the BA training system,

in the aircraft systems themselves, or

in the crew's lack of understanding of the aircraft system?"



I'm going to crank up the fun and ask -

3) Was the Captain one of those 'BA wonders' I have heard about with a foot in the management career chain?
4) Was the decision to continue unanimous on the flight deck (heavy crew and all)?

[Captain Airclues]

Perhaps you could give me your opinion of the fuel on touchdown after completing one visual circuit

A 744 will use about 1200kg during a visual circuit. This flight actually had 5700kg when it arrived on the gate so probably about 6000kg on landing. It would therefore have had about 4800kg after a circuit. The minimum reserve at this weight would have been about 4300kg.
As was explained on the other thread the crew declared a Mayday because they mistakenly thought, at the last minute, that some of the fuel in #2 tank might have been unusable, which was not actually the case. Diagrams of the fuel system explaining this are on the other thread.
If we are to learn something from this then perhaps we should look at our simulator training. At present an outboard engine is always failed as this is the most difficult to handle and so the crews are well practiced in balancing the fuel after an outboard failure. Perhaps we need to practice inboard failures, with the subsequent fuel balancing, as well.

Airclues

[Crash and Burn]

Flash 8,

Thanks, once people understand the point they see and can identify with the actual threat. My concern is that companies see this and adopt it as SOP in the ignorance that ATC will resolve everything if things go bad, then blame them if it does not. There comes a point in time, when you run out of luck and/or ability then wish you where already on the ground.

As a professional pilot and ex-civil controller (hi guys), I see both sides of the fence. I imagine controllers are thinking, you have an FMC, it tells you that you have ‘X’ amount of fuel and that you will have ‘x’ on arrival. ‘x’ equals one chance to land. The question then becomes how long did you know this for? …. Sorry, did you say ‘H’ hours?… Would you not say you are a little slow to make a decision and have you heard of two tiny little places called Greenland and Iceland (apologises to the inhabitants, I use the terms ‘tiny little’ in the ironic form, no insult intended)?

It sounds like the (US) FAA is the only one willing to speak their mind, perhaps Canada, Greenland, Iceland, possibly Ireland (I wouldn’t want them left out – sometimes they speak the most sense) and the UK should speak up.

It should not be a witch-hunt, merely to say, 'nope not a good idea go here instead because it is the law'. Studies into ‘Human Factors’ clearly indicate something that we already know and that is, we make mistakes, accept it and move on.

If this sort of culture were allowed to continue, I would rather fly with westbound with a North American carrier.

Captain Airclues - Thanks for the information, I didn't see the other thread. The reason why I mention one visual ciruit is becasue it is the minimim anyone could get away with for a second chance, in other words something that ATC can resolve extremely quickly and that weather allowed a visual circuit. I think this is a lot to hope for so many hours in advance if the wind were different if the actual Wx were different to the forecast Wx, ATC vectored them wide or slow them down in the absense of a declaration etc. Whilst they could have responded accordingly, was it necessary. I am sure you would agree.

[BusyB]

C & B,

I seen no reason to further justify the crews actions which were obviously taken with all the information they could get. I would point out that this insistence on criticising their going into MAN, a 2 runway airport, is absurd considering the choice of nearby fields (Liverpool, Birmingham) they had in the event of Manchester becoming unsuitable at a late stage of their descent.

These threads have disgorged an enormous amount of factual information that clearly justifies the actions taken and possible alternatives. What we're down to now is merely personal opinions of what individuals might have done in these circumstances. Everyone is entitled to this but I feel that accusing the crew of any error because you would do it differently is well over the top.

To simplify, its like criticising somebody for having a different favourite colour!

[Crash and Burn]

Busy B

Your contingency does not deal with fire cover between the period of the distress call and the time the aircraft had to land on the second runway at Manchester, if an incident occurred on the first runway - Two many eggs in one basket I think.

Incidentally your first comment directed toward me was aggressive and you now appear to be pointing the finger at me for voicing my opinion which is clearly different to yours - Hypocritical, comes to mind.

Don't take things so seriously, in the words of M.Winner "it is only an" opinion.

[cargo boy]

Oh no! Who pulled another pedant out of the hat? Now we have Mr Crash & Burn, professional pilot but very obviously NOT experienced with either the B744 OR obviously LONG HAUL (notice I didn't mention ETOPS) operations giving us the full wisdom of his opinion and then when it is disputed or more likely ignored (except for the few who also have very little real understanding of B744 long haul ops but feel the need to get their "hear hear" in) we get him going on and on and on and on and on... with the usual scenario of the 'less well informed' about winds and the FMC, weather forecasts, choice of alternates and whatever else pops into his non-B744 world. Fer gawds sake, are you really a professional pilot or just a PC Simmer trying to kid us with a few key words? That's what it sounds like!

So you won't ever fly BA again! Good riddance and it will give another one of us trying for a standby that bit of an extra chance to get on. Duh! It's one thing voicing your opinion but then it gets quite pathetic when you repeatedly try to justify your weak argument, ad nauseum, with irrelevant tidbits of useless facts. Please read the post about the difference between 'probability' and 'possibility'. The way you are going on it is becoming quite apparent that you are a windbag with very little real knowledge about what you spout. Give us a break, please!

Cargo Boy
B747-400
Long Haul

[BusyB]

C & B,

I don't have any problems with peoples opinions of what they would have done in similar circumstances.

Comments like "pushing their luck" and "I do not like people thinking they are God" are judgemental on the crew in an incident that the crew coped with successfully.

Finally, as far as I'm concerned, good luck with M. Winners insurance company if you're going to insure a B744 with them!

[Irish Steve]

If we are to learn something from this then perhaps we should look at our simulator training.

I have heard rumours on the grape vine that it's already happened, and that fuel management has become a higher priority item in the sim sessions over the last few weeks.

When I look at what ACTUALLY happened here, and what has happened in recent weeks with other carriers, I have to wonder why those carriers are not being castigated to the same extent that is happening here.

We've seen that the Dutch have now banned Phuket & Onur Air, and the CAA in the UK have also acted against Phuket.

That suggests that there are operations and incidents out there that are a lot more controversial and unacceptable than this event.

I don't see 20 & 30 page threads about other carriers, and it's clear that they are far more seriously in trouble, and the issues do relate directly to flight safety.

Please people, can we move on?

[Techman]

I don't see 20 & 30 page threads about other carriers

Of course not! They are not BA.

[lomapaseo]

I still don't see any facts that the FAA has truly rulled that the crew excersized faulty judgement in this case and therfore don't understand the paraochial alignment between cheers for the FAA and the crew did nothing wrong

The FAA seems to be just excersising their perogative to examine the crews actions, hopefully impartailly.

As I have said before, the issue is not this crews individual decisons but more likely the unanticipated pervasiveness of one or more operators choosing decisions statistically out of line with the assumptions behind the rule.

I'm not aware that the FAA or the CAA have talked this out and issued an opinion so I am inclined to ignore the 2nd guessing so prevalent in this thread

[L337]

C & B

A professional Pilot.

You fooled me.

L337