Obtaining accurate medical information on the casualty and the severity of the injury is often an issue, particularly when English is not the mother tongue of the crew. Often the fishing fleets in the Atlantic are not from home shores.

Which is why declining a task on the basis of sketchy information is a concern. Ideally - as in this case - a shore-based doctor can advise, or in the case of large cruise ships, a doctor is part of the crew. Lacking this, the advice of our own Paramedic is invaluable and helps in the decision making process.

It is ultimately the Commander's (often both pilots are Captains) responsibility to make the go/no go decision but I want to be happy that, either way, the other crew believe we are making the correct decision.

Even if this was the case the accident could have also happened if this was a training mission. I'm not sure this is the right path to pursue when trying to learn lessons from this tragedy. Flying (and thus training) less frequently under challenging conditions doesn't make the job less risky. Compared to other missions/training scenarios this one wasn't even particularly challenging/risky. That is what makes it so mysterious.
There will be more to learn from CVR/FDR.

Moot point.(Happy Now)....Might as well say if only the Aircraft wasn't serviceable. I wouldn't have taken off.
It was tasked and it happened, stay on track.
It's a SAR Heli

Re: questions around lack of NVG etc, there is a tender request in the EU Journal at present for third-party heli-SAR consultancy to the Irish Coastguard to liaise between them and CHC and to advise on matters of contractual adherence, future strategy, regulation, practices and equipment.

The CHC contract is currently at its mid-point so it makes sense to start looking forward to the next big supply tender. However I do wonder if it will move back from private sector to a more integrated state-provided package. The 2012 contract award was controversial at the time and will be no less so in five years.

Henra
I was not suggesting at all that the potentially unnecessary despatching of R166 was anything to do with the cause of the accident - which of course it wasn't. I raised the issue as a separate, though related, point. The reality is the no doubt generally excellent SAR services are funded by tax payers and as such need to continually look to provide best value for money. It is quite possible that investment in improved information communication with vessels might help this process - which in itself would protect the SAR industry. I can see that even unnecessary missions are still good training, but there is clearly a limit to how much of this is sensible.

Buzz66 - as above, you misunderstood my post.

https://twitter.com/patmcgrath/statu...51476543475712

https://www.rte.ie/news/regional/201...st-guard-mayo/

Heartbreaking.

RIP Captain Mark Duffy

Simply because the crash dynamics may have been more favourable to some than others. In car crashes some passengers come out unscathed, whilst others are fatally injured. Aircraft accidents are no different.

They will be using inflatable airbags to try to raise the wreckage to search for the remaining two crew members this morning.

I wonder why they just don't manually pop the floats and let it float to the surface by itself...probably a good technical reason why...I don't know.

Probably because the machine is spread over an area the size of a football field

Would the arming devices still be serviceable after prolonged submersion? Also you have no control over the lift at all, even if it works, I'd imagine it would pop up like a cork disturbing valuable evidence.

gulliBell

The reason that popping the floats won't work is that the aircraft is lying under 40 metres of water. The air pressure required to inflate a float at that depth is four times that at the surface, so the volume of gas required to just provide bouyancy at depth is four times greater that that required at the surface due to compression effects. The floats would burst on the way up in all likelyhood.

The standard method of recovery is to use open ended bags that are filled with just sufficient air to supply bouyancy. The volume of gas in the bags is adjusted by divers as the object is brought to the surface to strictly control the rate of ascent. An uncontrolled rise to the surface would be dangerous to personnel in the water, surface recovery vessels and risks further damaging or losing the object being recovered.

Bouyancy bags have been used for centuries as a way of recovering heavy valuable objects such as bronze cannon from the sea, so the methods are well understood even if they seem a bit low tech for the modern era of remotely controlled submarines.

Not sure they would inflate at that depth? (though I agree with your other points)

It's possible the bags went off as soon as the immersion switches were exposed to water if the system was armed. This is unlikely, but could explain spreading of the wreckage.

Assuming the bags are uninflated, the system is electrically actuated, and since it sounds like the circuit breaker panels in the cockpit are separated from the rest of the wreckage, the system would not function even if it was triggered.

The primary reason this wouldn't be entertained as a viable solution is because the floats are not designed to raise a broken airframe from under water, but are rather intended to keep an intact airframe (and it's occupants) safely on the surface. Raising anything from the bottom of the sea is a delicate and calculated exercise. Float bags are placed at key points to maintain the structure's orientation as it is raised, and are slowly inflated to control the rate of ascent. This prevents the structure from shifting and further disintegrating, which would risk losing important information that would aid the investigation, as well as making a big mess to clean up.

If we go full mythbusters on this idea, lets assume a perfectly good S92 is sitting in 40m of water with a fully functional emergency flotation system. The float bottles are serviced with a nitrogen and helium mix to around 2500PSIG. I don't know the exact number offhand, but I think the floats are around 5PSIG when fully inflated. So while the pressure at 40m is around 60psi, the bags might still inflate enough to raise the aircraft to the surface. Again, though, I think the weight of the QCA (rotorhead and MGB) would cause it to flip upside-down along the way.

Actually, the total pressure at 40m depth would make a 5psi at surface only fill the floats to 27%, making the lifting force only 27% of the 'on surface floating force'.
As we can be sure that the floats don't work now, and that that way of lifting stuff in water would be a bad idea, its only a theoretical discussion. Nevertheless, could be nice to know, cause the same fenomena applies also to inflatable floating jackets and so on( not exactly 27%, but the principle)

Actually the float bottles are filled with just nitrogen and the bags are inflated to 3.5 psi.

For those who are not involved in SAR - here's how the tasking process works for us:


In Canada, at JRCC Halifax, the radio-medical consultations are (or were when I was a RCAF SMC there) routed to a contracted civilian Doctor in the provincial health care system who takes what information may be gleaned, often through a language barrier, and makes a decision whether the injury is worthy of a helo extraction.


The SMC then contacts (frequently conference calls) a RCAF Flight Surgeon who either concurs with the decision or not. The idea being that, unlike the civilian Doc, the RCAF Doc understands the risks associated with a helo hoist extraction and can therefore make an educated risk assessment. If the RCAF Doc concurs that a helo extraction is warranted then the helo crew is fully briefed with all details of the injury and tasked with the mission.


With the knowledge of the level of injury, the aircraft commander and crew then assesses the weather, aircraft, crew, mission and threats; they make a yea/nea decision and either spin up and go or make a plan for when they can go in the future - when the weather/range to vessel or whatever has changed (risk level, essentially) enough to make mission success most likely.


Did we have what I considered unwarranted missions? Definitely.


Am I a Doctor? No.


I have, however, had my hands on the controls and my guys on a hoist in risk/return situations that I would describe as...asymmetric. Maybe we should be hoisting more doctors from boats at night in sea state 5, 180NM out! :p


To my knowledge our EMS/lifeflight crews are not briefed on the details of the injury until they make the weather call to accept the mission, but I'm sure there is a Canuck air ambulance guy out there who can confirm that.


We almost always send a fixed wing top cover platform out with the rescue bird to provide eyes on in case of an accident as well as a comms platform. We use Hercs here (for the moment) and they will commonly orbit and drop flares to try to give a horizon for hoisting. It works sometimes.


I find the idea of the SARTech/Flight Engineer (hoist operator) having a say in the go/no go decision interesting but I think it would only work when you're on top the vessel with the door open, hook in hand and they can see what they are getting into. Even then I don't think it would work as it's been my experience that those guys will jump into lava to rescue someone.

Yes, as described by survivors from the Australian SF Blackhawk accident who, escaping at some depth and pulling the life jacket inflation tabs, experienced the shock of finding nothing happened and they had to swim to the surface!

I find it 'interesting' that you would NOT involve the Tech Crew in the go/no go decision making process. We call it CRM.

Previously when helicopters have ditched in the North Sea they have been recovered by a dive support vessel using its main crane or if close enough to a platform, the platforms crane has been used. It would usually be done in a single lift so I'm guessing the lift bags are being used to move the wreckage further away from Blackrock for the safety of the recovery vessel. Even though the water depth is 40 meters, the wreckage is only 60 meters from the rock which would be quite close, even for a vessel with 'dynamic positioning' such as the Grainneuaille -particularly in a lazy Atlantic swell.

Nitrogen OR Helium, the bottles generally come from the OEM filled with helium and is an option in the AMM (slightly different charge pressures apply) final bag pressure is dependant on temperature and gas type.

Same again - the Canadian SAR-techs are a different breed - as Viper 7 said they would dive into molten lava - it's just the way they operate.

Therefore, although he is part of the crew, his default position is to go regardless which makes his CRM input somewhat skewed and he is unlikely to be the 'voice of reason' that leads you to stand down.

Give me the experienced, professional voice of reason over a molten lava diver anyday.

Until your are looking up at the winchman.

My original reply was to a comment about the bottles being mixed nitrogen and helium.
Per the AMM:
HELIUM AND NITROGEN CANNOT BE MIXED IN THE SAME FLOTATION
BOTTLE. IF OPERATOR SWITCHES FROM HELIUM TO NITROGEN,
BOTTLE MUST BE COMPLETELY EVACUATED BEFORE BEING FILLED
WITH NITROGEN.
HELIUM CHARGED BOTTLES AND NITROGEN CHARGED BOTTLES CANNOT
BE INSTALLED ON THE SAME HELICOPTER, ALL FLOTATION
BOTTLES MUST BE FILLED WITH SAME INFLATION MEDIUM.

Bag operating pressure at standard day conditions is 3.5 psi but yes could vary due to atmospheric conditions. Just trying to be accurate not argumentative, too much of that on these sites already.

Listening to concerns of the whole crew will go a good way to avoiding that unhappy scenario. Commonly referred to as CRM or, to be more specific, SAR CRM.

No doubt if it was cheap and easy we would have it.
How much more air would be required to achieve lift off at a given depth? Is it as simple as another bottle or same bottle design under more pressure? As life vest rises to the surface and water pressure reduces, a relief valve could release air pressure?
Too hard? Too expensive?

Mickjoebill

Viper 7, the Canada EMS outfit that I have dealings with have a policy of the drivers not knowing the condition of the patient after pickup.

Dispatch will tell them what the callout is (car v truck and first responder assessment for instance), but once the patient is onboard, there is no communication of the patients condition with those driving so as to to prevent "get there fast or they die" from influencing crew decisions that may compromise safety.

Don't know if that is standard in Canadian EMS ops, but that is how they work. Those up front fly from A to B as per SOP's. Those in back care for the patient.

http://nlb.g2b.info/docs/GLA_Helicopter_Services_2015_-_CIL_Landing_Site_Register.pdf

Relevant pages 16 and 24,
Protocol for Irish lights Helicopters landing at Blackrock and Blacksod

Nooby,

Really? So when the Neo-Nate Team trundles out an Isolette.....the Flight Crew cannot tweak to it being a Preemie?

I have operated in both regimes...."Tell and Don't Tell! but the end result is you know pretty much what is going on.

That is where the Pilot(s) have to make business decisions....purely professional decisions based upon the information at hand that enter into that decision such as Weather, current and forecast, whether other operations have rejected the call, and so forth and so on.

Condition of the Patient and the possible outcome of Helicopter EMS intervention received or denied, has nothing to do with that decision.

Pilots (and Crew) have to accept that People die every day in this World and before the advent of Helicopters....rode in ground ambulances....and lived or died as it happened.

We set professional limits for a reason.....and we should use our preset Matrix to determine if we go....or don't go based upon those criteria. That is what makes us Professionals.

That doesn't mean we are heartless......and it doesn't mean we sometimes have regrets or second thoughts....but when you make the decision in that professional manner you know you did so correctly.

I shall pose a rhetorical question that calls for no posted answer.

Losing the Tip of a finger....and being in pain by itself is generally not life threatening.

What if the Crew of 116 and 118 had decided to wait till Daylight to make the flight....and in the mean while the Trawler had headed towards shore. How might this have turned out?

SAS, as you'll see in my comment, the crew know what they are picking up, just not the extent of injuries or condition of the patient.

Not all Premies in Isolettes are in critical condition, some are being transferred to a better facility or one closer to family location.

Once onboard, there is no communication between front and back with regard to the condition of the patient.

That is just how they do it at this particular outfit.

Sorry about the thread drift.

In the mean time, septicaemia - which I read somewhere was the reason for the consulted Doc's nod to an airlift - gets an Eight hour headstart...

Given the now ubiquitous litigious culture, what Doc isn't going to call worst case scenario?

That's a pretty cynical comment.

This issue of crews having some information on the patient's condition and possibly being influenced to "push the limits" misses the point. All aviation is a risk v gain decision & SAR / EMS is often at the extremis of those decisions. Higher risks & higher gains. As someone who has done a fair bit of both, I believe that I (we) can only make an informed decision when I have all of the relevant information. I don't need to know every clinical detail anymore than the tasking agency needs to know all of the operational aspects, but without some information I only have half of the equation. What is required though, is the culture of being able to maintain a professional decision making process, regardless of the emotive, "this 2 year old child will die if you don't go" influence. I have made "no-go" decisions and people have perished as I'm sure many here will have had to. I have also made plenty of "go" decisions that have pushed myself and my crew close to the limits & people have been saved.
Accidents will happen & when they do, it is right & proper that we analyse what could have been done better, but we should be doing that anyway. The argument that R118 & R116 shouldn't have been tasked for an injury that may or may not have been life-threatening misses the point. It could be argued that this accident would still have occurred if the mission was to save a boatload of cute children. Let's focus on the cause of this tragic accident and work on ways to mitigate those risks that are inherent in our line of work.
I will say it one last time .... in my opinion, NVD's are a "must" technology for this type of work. Having done plenty with & plenty without, I wouldn't want to go back to doing what the crew of R116 were doing without the aid of NVD.

Well, the IAA and operator disagree with all of you. No NVD, yet a cloud break at night at a rocky shoreline and driving in the dark at a few hundred feet looking for a helipad was risk-assessed as acceptable even for a routine refuelling stop. NVD was not specified in the contract and the successful bidder was under no obligation at his own financial burden to provide it. If the next contract has NVD then I'm sure the successful bidder will provide them and the appropriate procedures to match.

Thankfully, the IAA has the experience of the UK AAIB assisting it, so no doubt the root causes will be found in due course. As in the Sumburgh accident, I'd be interested in how the procedures utilized the installed equipment, the automation and training to ensure a safe operation, including when to reject and return to base. Has the operator changed any procedures in the interim, or are they waiting for an official IAA/AAIB report?