Engine offs to the ground
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I learned to fly in Western Australia and within the 105 hour CPL syllabus at least 10 hours were throttle off landings to the ground.
The CFI would demonstrate at least 3 Engine Stopped at 1000 feet Landings at various stages of the training syllabus. This defiantly gave me a better understanding of the whole “scary” autorotation process and demonstrates that if you were unfortunate enough to suffer a real one, with a suitable landing site, it is possible to land the chopper (R22 in this case) with zero damage.
The CFI was not particulary keen on demonstrating the full engine stop landings, not because of the increased risk factor, but because of the lack of a cool down period before stopping the engine.
The Approved Testing Officer and the Chief Flying Instructor were of the opinion that as long as a student at the end of their training can enter auto, control the RRPM and airspeed, pick and make a landing site, flare at about the right height with the correct type of flare for the prevailing conditions, level the chopper at the right height and keep it straight with minimal drift and yaw on touchdown, that is sufficient for a flight test and keeping the pilot and any passengers alive in the event of a real one.
Hope this is of some assistance.
The CFI would demonstrate at least 3 Engine Stopped at 1000 feet Landings at various stages of the training syllabus. This defiantly gave me a better understanding of the whole “scary” autorotation process and demonstrates that if you were unfortunate enough to suffer a real one, with a suitable landing site, it is possible to land the chopper (R22 in this case) with zero damage.
The CFI was not particulary keen on demonstrating the full engine stop landings, not because of the increased risk factor, but because of the lack of a cool down period before stopping the engine.
The Approved Testing Officer and the Chief Flying Instructor were of the opinion that as long as a student at the end of their training can enter auto, control the RRPM and airspeed, pick and make a landing site, flare at about the right height with the correct type of flare for the prevailing conditions, level the chopper at the right height and keep it straight with minimal drift and yaw on touchdown, that is sufficient for a flight test and keeping the pilot and any passengers alive in the event of a real one.
Hope this is of some assistance.
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CF:
Perhaps I'm missing something, but nobody seems to have asked yet. Your original post says throttle not closed until leveling skids--are you saying you have power ON during "autorotation", or is it that you maintain a high idle while sprague clutch disengaged during autorotation?
I've not seen either usage described in texts. Is there a reference?
I have no problem with maintaining a high idle, of course, given the potential for an unsuspected carb-ice-dead-engine if the R22 tach reads below 55, ergo telling you nothing!
Perhaps I'm missing something, but nobody seems to have asked yet. Your original post says throttle not closed until leveling skids--are you saying you have power ON during "autorotation", or is it that you maintain a high idle while sprague clutch disengaged during autorotation?
I've not seen either usage described in texts. Is there a reference?
I have no problem with maintaining a high idle, of course, given the potential for an unsuspected carb-ice-dead-engine if the R22 tach reads below 55, ergo telling you nothing!
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PA42,
I am fairly sure that CF means that he does not put the twist grip into the detent position until late on in the EOL. I certainly do/did the same, as it allows recovery to a hover recovery until very late, if all the ducks were not lined up.
Unless the twist grip is turned and held into the detent, lifting the lever would activate the mechanical correlator. This would open the closed throttle valve in the carb and the engine would speed up and the needles "join".
I am fairly sure that CF means that he does not put the twist grip into the detent position until late on in the EOL. I certainly do/did the same, as it allows recovery to a hover recovery until very late, if all the ducks were not lined up.
Unless the twist grip is turned and held into the detent, lifting the lever would activate the mechanical correlator. This would open the closed throttle valve in the carb and the engine would speed up and the needles "join".
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Helinut,
You have hit the nail on the head.
I wonder how many others carry out this procedure. It gives you a much larger margin than closing the throttle (into the detent) at 300ft especially if your a novice.
Sounds like this guy got it wrong and he has probably been flying all his life. So what chance has a brand new PPL got to complete it sucessfully. And don't mean to be able to walk away.
AAIB Bulletin No: 8/2002 Ref: EW/G2002/06/10 Category: 2.3
Aircraft Type and Registration: Robinson R22 Beta, G-BOEW
No & Type of Engines: 1 Lycoming O-320-B2C piston engine
Year of Manufacture: 1988
Date & Time (UTC): 10 June 2002 at 1103 hrs
Location: Cranfield Airport, Bedfordshire
Type of Flight: Aerial Work (Training)
Persons on Board: Crew - 2 Passengers - None
Injuries: Crew - None Passengers – N/A
Nature of Damage: Tail boom severed and tail rotor drive shaft damaged
Commander's Licence: Airline Transport Pilot’s Licence (Helicopters)
Commander's Age: 65 years
Commander's Flying Experience: 11,778 hours (of which 543 were on type)
Last 90 days - 93 hours
Last 28 days - 24 hours
Information Source: Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot
The flying instructor was demonstrating a practice 'engine off' landing for a student. It was the seventh such landing that he had carried out that morning. During the run on, one main rotor blade struck the tail boom causing both the boom and tail rotor drive shaft to break.
The helicopter was landing on the grass helicopter strip, designated 22, heading into wind. The surface wind was reported as being from 230° at 24 kt. The initial ground contact was made on the port side skid on the right hand edge of the strip, which has a boundary marked with scraped earth that is slightly raised above the surrounding grass.
The pilot felt that the initial skid contact with this edge destabilised the run on and his subsequent attempted corrections led to large control inputs at a low main rotor speed.
The pilot commented that there were no cockpit indications to show that any damage had occurred, but he felt a slight vibration and a change of rotor noise following the event. The accident was observed by ATC who alerted the pilot and advised him to shut down.
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Published 8 August 2002
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You have hit the nail on the head.
I wonder how many others carry out this procedure. It gives you a much larger margin than closing the throttle (into the detent) at 300ft especially if your a novice.
Sounds like this guy got it wrong and he has probably been flying all his life. So what chance has a brand new PPL got to complete it sucessfully. And don't mean to be able to walk away.
AAIB Bulletin No: 8/2002 Ref: EW/G2002/06/10 Category: 2.3
Aircraft Type and Registration: Robinson R22 Beta, G-BOEW
No & Type of Engines: 1 Lycoming O-320-B2C piston engine
Year of Manufacture: 1988
Date & Time (UTC): 10 June 2002 at 1103 hrs
Location: Cranfield Airport, Bedfordshire
Type of Flight: Aerial Work (Training)
Persons on Board: Crew - 2 Passengers - None
Injuries: Crew - None Passengers – N/A
Nature of Damage: Tail boom severed and tail rotor drive shaft damaged
Commander's Licence: Airline Transport Pilot’s Licence (Helicopters)
Commander's Age: 65 years
Commander's Flying Experience: 11,778 hours (of which 543 were on type)
Last 90 days - 93 hours
Last 28 days - 24 hours
Information Source: Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot
The flying instructor was demonstrating a practice 'engine off' landing for a student. It was the seventh such landing that he had carried out that morning. During the run on, one main rotor blade struck the tail boom causing both the boom and tail rotor drive shaft to break.
The helicopter was landing on the grass helicopter strip, designated 22, heading into wind. The surface wind was reported as being from 230° at 24 kt. The initial ground contact was made on the port side skid on the right hand edge of the strip, which has a boundary marked with scraped earth that is slightly raised above the surrounding grass.
The pilot felt that the initial skid contact with this edge destabilised the run on and his subsequent attempted corrections led to large control inputs at a low main rotor speed.
The pilot commented that there were no cockpit indications to show that any damage had occurred, but he felt a slight vibration and a change of rotor noise following the event. The accident was observed by ATC who alerted the pilot and advised him to shut down.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Published 8 August 2002
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Join Date: Jul 2002
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Cyclic Flare: I expect you are not the only one who is at a heightened state of readiness on EOLs! Which in the case of the R22, is no bad thing; your 15kt wind min is not a bad idea either, though a student ought to be shown and practice in all conditions. In any event as it's a legal req. in the UK I'm sure noone is only doing power recoveries and passing a skill test.
In practice only a very brave soul would flutter down in a 22 arms folded in training or on test and in truth the odd tweak here or there to save that long walk back is almost de rigeur, especially as the throttle on Robbies is held in the detente. With respect to B206 or B47 then arms folded EOLs are possible and with a bit of wind ditto R44...although throwing £250k+ worth of machinery at the ground concentrates the mind, too
From my own experience the throttle can be popped in the detent at a fairly early stage in the descent -say 3-500'- so long as airspeed and RRPM are as desired and it's quite clear you'll land close to the intended touch down point (sometimes called a "gate"). That allows a bit more time to settle into the EOL without being too hurried at the bottom. As for R22 engine offs in the hover, well - yer pays yer money and yer takes yer chances...
I'm not helping am I?
In practice only a very brave soul would flutter down in a 22 arms folded in training or on test and in truth the odd tweak here or there to save that long walk back is almost de rigeur, especially as the throttle on Robbies is held in the detente. With respect to B206 or B47 then arms folded EOLs are possible and with a bit of wind ditto R44...although throwing £250k+ worth of machinery at the ground concentrates the mind, too
From my own experience the throttle can be popped in the detent at a fairly early stage in the descent -say 3-500'- so long as airspeed and RRPM are as desired and it's quite clear you'll land close to the intended touch down point (sometimes called a "gate"). That allows a bit more time to settle into the EOL without being too hurried at the bottom. As for R22 engine offs in the hover, well - yer pays yer money and yer takes yer chances...
I'm not helping am I?
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Robinson Safety Notice SN-27 of June 1994 is titled SURPRISE THROTTLE CHOPS CAN BE DEADLY and advises flying instructors how they should give a student a simulated power failure. It says:
"Never truly surprise the student. Tell him you are going to give him a simulated power failure a few minutes before, and when you roll off the throttle, loudly announce 'power failure'."
The instructor is also advised to plan to initiate recovery within one second, regardless of the student's reaction.
The safety notice came about because surprise throttle chops were killing people.
As to the rollover statistics off-airfield (Soggyboxers) that's deduction from long discussion with high-time pilots. The last for-real engine-off I heard about was the Puma in Oxfordshire last month. Full crew, supremely competent, and it rolled over. No reflection on the crew - that's just the shape of the earth.
As to doing as little damage as possible, yes, but don't make it an article of faith. If the helicopter's let you down, stuff the damned thing. Frank will make you another one.
Unfortunately, the ones we smash up were usually in perfectly good nick, and we break them practising the wrong end of the auto.
"Never truly surprise the student. Tell him you are going to give him a simulated power failure a few minutes before, and when you roll off the throttle, loudly announce 'power failure'."
The instructor is also advised to plan to initiate recovery within one second, regardless of the student's reaction.
The safety notice came about because surprise throttle chops were killing people.
As to the rollover statistics off-airfield (Soggyboxers) that's deduction from long discussion with high-time pilots. The last for-real engine-off I heard about was the Puma in Oxfordshire last month. Full crew, supremely competent, and it rolled over. No reflection on the crew - that's just the shape of the earth.
As to doing as little damage as possible, yes, but don't make it an article of faith. If the helicopter's let you down, stuff the damned thing. Frank will make you another one.
Unfortunately, the ones we smash up were usually in perfectly good nick, and we break them practising the wrong end of the auto.
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During my last LPC (R44). The examiner told me to reach up and feel the vibration on the compass.
I obviously used my left hand for this, and whilst I was "Feeling the vibration" he slowly rolled off the throttle.
I considered it a very worthwhile excercise.
I obviously used my left hand for this, and whilst I was "Feeling the vibration" he slowly rolled off the throttle.
I considered it a very worthwhile excercise.
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Now see what that dodgy Compass caused.........
Not being a whizz on the old 22, is there a directional verses yaw correlation interface???....most likely fed from the parrallel dual hydraulic systems. .
Touch the compass and yaw left......surely with this highly sofisticated piece of machinary there would be two redundant systems looking at this problem???...shock horror.
Why don't you learn on a turbine.........then the problem will not be one afterall..........TBF over 50,000 hours.......about 7-8 normal pilot lifetimes????.....or perhaps 5-6 of us??
Not being a whizz on the old 22, is there a directional verses yaw correlation interface???....most likely fed from the parrallel dual hydraulic systems. .
Touch the compass and yaw left......surely with this highly sofisticated piece of machinary there would be two redundant systems looking at this problem???...shock horror.
Why don't you learn on a turbine.........then the problem will not be one afterall..........TBF over 50,000 hours.......about 7-8 normal pilot lifetimes????.....or perhaps 5-6 of us??
Last edited by Old Man Rotor; 6th Feb 2003 at 12:58.
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I've done about 700 or 800 hours of instruction in 22's and 44's (mostly 22's). This has included PPL, CPL, and recurrent training.
To teach entry and spot selection/accuracy:
-throttle chops at cruise in the training area, unannounced (eventually) and taken to a power recovery in the hover. The throttle was returned to 104% in the late flare, not the auto.
To teach the final few seconds:
-autos to a prepared surface (ie runway) with run-on in low wind conditions.
There has been the odd bumpy landing but I have never felt on the verge of rolling one over or losing a tailboom.
To teach entry and spot selection/accuracy:
-throttle chops at cruise in the training area, unannounced (eventually) and taken to a power recovery in the hover. The throttle was returned to 104% in the late flare, not the auto.
To teach the final few seconds:
-autos to a prepared surface (ie runway) with run-on in low wind conditions.
There has been the odd bumpy landing but I have never felt on the verge of rolling one over or losing a tailboom.
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And another costly Statistic...........
Just ask the Grade 1 Instructor that rolled a 22 into a heap the other day whilst demonstrating an Auto onto Moorabbin Airport Australia........maybe 800 acres of flat space.
It will cost that Company [Perhaps Australia's most respected Training Institution].......the loss of one machine....lost income....higher insurance....possible injuries........and for what.
Some preconceived view that this action which could have been more serious.........that may actually save a future potential situation from getting as bad!!!!......lets get real.
Glad I am not the Instructor, the owner, or the insurance company............
Just ask the Grade 1 Instructor that rolled a 22 into a heap the other day whilst demonstrating an Auto onto Moorabbin Airport Australia........maybe 800 acres of flat space.
It will cost that Company [Perhaps Australia's most respected Training Institution].......the loss of one machine....lost income....higher insurance....possible injuries........and for what.
Some preconceived view that this action which could have been more serious.........that may actually save a future potential situation from getting as bad!!!!......lets get real.
Glad I am not the Instructor, the owner, or the insurance company............
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on being part of the solution . . .
We seem to be in general agreement that rolling the heli into a ball is not good, nor fun. And that one of the ways it happens is what I'll call here the "powerless touchdown" (P.T.), since EOL obviously has many meanings to the many contributors.
Beyond saying powerless touchdown is dangerous and tricky, how about it we collect here on this thread a training aid: specifically,
A List of Major Avoidable Causes of Damage
in powerless touchdowns.
For instance: is touchdown on an unsuspected lumpy surface a major factor? Can we reduce damages by touching down only on spots we've walked out before going back up to commence auto?
Is failure to get skids properly level just prior to impact a common cause, or do almost no helicrunches result from poor skid-leveling-skills?
How many folks overdo the flare, trying for zero groundspeed, and find themselves with no cushion left? Or with no tail rotor left? How do we get the proper mix of speed-vs-alt-vs-RRPM firmly understood in safer maneuvers & ground training before we commit to a real P.T.?
One suspects that pilots prefer to practice in significant winds (10-20k?) for reduced ground travel, and that last-minute yaw-and-drift leads to rollover--how common is this as the cause-of-crunch? Where in the curriculum do we improve this sub-module of training before having to exercise it at end-of-auto?
And other questions. Post your own; be sure to provide real or imagined answers & statistics where possible.
One assumes that sharing a known explanation for previous accidents with the community will prevent at least one helicrunch, perhaps 10 or 20 helicrunches. Help the industry--share views on the Prevention as well as the Problem.
====
By the way, who will be the first to advertise a rental/instructional special low rate on 20-30 consecutive powerless touchdowns USING A RUNOUT R22? If hull value is down to $35,000 just before airframe overhaul due, seems like THAT would be the ship to use; cut a special deal with the insurance company to concentrate all the school's autos in that ship. And create a brisk market for 2000-hour R22's, too!
(Personally, I don't practice powerless landings solo--it seems too much to me like cutting mixture on BOTH engines of AMEL for dead-stick practice. $160,000 risk for infinitesimal gain! Like buying Enron, or landing in White House front yard without flak vest.)
Beyond saying powerless touchdown is dangerous and tricky, how about it we collect here on this thread a training aid: specifically,
A List of Major Avoidable Causes of Damage
in powerless touchdowns.
For instance: is touchdown on an unsuspected lumpy surface a major factor? Can we reduce damages by touching down only on spots we've walked out before going back up to commence auto?
Is failure to get skids properly level just prior to impact a common cause, or do almost no helicrunches result from poor skid-leveling-skills?
How many folks overdo the flare, trying for zero groundspeed, and find themselves with no cushion left? Or with no tail rotor left? How do we get the proper mix of speed-vs-alt-vs-RRPM firmly understood in safer maneuvers & ground training before we commit to a real P.T.?
One suspects that pilots prefer to practice in significant winds (10-20k?) for reduced ground travel, and that last-minute yaw-and-drift leads to rollover--how common is this as the cause-of-crunch? Where in the curriculum do we improve this sub-module of training before having to exercise it at end-of-auto?
And other questions. Post your own; be sure to provide real or imagined answers & statistics where possible.
One assumes that sharing a known explanation for previous accidents with the community will prevent at least one helicrunch, perhaps 10 or 20 helicrunches. Help the industry--share views on the Prevention as well as the Problem.
====
By the way, who will be the first to advertise a rental/instructional special low rate on 20-30 consecutive powerless touchdowns USING A RUNOUT R22? If hull value is down to $35,000 just before airframe overhaul due, seems like THAT would be the ship to use; cut a special deal with the insurance company to concentrate all the school's autos in that ship. And create a brisk market for 2000-hour R22's, too!
(Personally, I don't practice powerless landings solo--it seems too much to me like cutting mixture on BOTH engines of AMEL for dead-stick practice. $160,000 risk for infinitesimal gain! Like buying Enron, or landing in White House front yard without flak vest.)
I believe a successful landing (one where the crew walk away) is the aim of the game. A professional helicopter pilot includes (as a priority) EOL's and TR problems in their inventory.
If a pilot can prove to themselves that they can survive an EOL/TR control malfunction, then they can get on with the task in hand much more confidently.
The trouble is...forced landings, not under power, are exceedingly difficult to perform successfully. there are so many variables:
wind direction
height
speed
type of landing surface
reaction time
Nr control
Day/Night
Adrenaline flow
I was trying to recall how many EOL's I've done. Probably well in excess of a 1000 (on singles). Unfortunately, less than 5% were unannounced! So it doesn't really provide you with an ideal perspective in doing one in anger. I found that EOL's were a culmination of honing helicopter skills to as close to perfection as you can get. There is NO room for error once it goes quiet!
Flying an unstable glider to a full stop is probably the most exhilarating experience one can ever go through in helo flying.
That was 8 years ago, and now I can't even spell ELO(I fly twins). I feel there is a gap in my inventory now, one that is forever bugging me. However I still think about my parameters whilst flying and wonder whether I could make that field down there, safely. It's not a comfortable feeling. I know people say the chance of an EOL in a twin is millions to one, but people also say, you're only as good as your last accident!!!
Perhaps, really, I miss that thrill as the cab hits the deck in a straight line, no drift, no excess speed, level...as you lower the lever and she comes to a halt with decaying Nr and you exhale deeply with a huge smile on your face
My advice to ALL single drivers, is: make sure your EOL skills are near the top of your inventory or you might not live to regret it
Besides, it's what flying is all about......................
[Fanstops also result from: contaminated fuel / blocked fuel filter(s) / disconnected air bleeds to metering valves / icing / heavy rain / fires / leaking oil pipes...to name but a few].
If a pilot can prove to themselves that they can survive an EOL/TR control malfunction, then they can get on with the task in hand much more confidently.
The trouble is...forced landings, not under power, are exceedingly difficult to perform successfully. there are so many variables:
wind direction
height
speed
type of landing surface
reaction time
Nr control
Day/Night
Adrenaline flow
I was trying to recall how many EOL's I've done. Probably well in excess of a 1000 (on singles). Unfortunately, less than 5% were unannounced! So it doesn't really provide you with an ideal perspective in doing one in anger. I found that EOL's were a culmination of honing helicopter skills to as close to perfection as you can get. There is NO room for error once it goes quiet!
Flying an unstable glider to a full stop is probably the most exhilarating experience one can ever go through in helo flying.
That was 8 years ago, and now I can't even spell ELO(I fly twins). I feel there is a gap in my inventory now, one that is forever bugging me. However I still think about my parameters whilst flying and wonder whether I could make that field down there, safely. It's not a comfortable feeling. I know people say the chance of an EOL in a twin is millions to one, but people also say, you're only as good as your last accident!!!
Perhaps, really, I miss that thrill as the cab hits the deck in a straight line, no drift, no excess speed, level...as you lower the lever and she comes to a halt with decaying Nr and you exhale deeply with a huge smile on your face
My advice to ALL single drivers, is: make sure your EOL skills are near the top of your inventory or you might not live to regret it
Besides, it's what flying is all about......................
[Fanstops also result from: contaminated fuel / blocked fuel filter(s) / disconnected air bleeds to metering valves / icing / heavy rain / fires / leaking oil pipes...to name but a few].
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Just my opinion, - but the key to success with engine-off landings is preventing the engine from going off.
Let's talk about Robinsons, as they do more than half of all single-engine helicopter hours and more than 90 percent of private training.
I'll say it again - as far as I can ascertain, no R22 pilot who got into autorotation has ever been killed on landing, either in countries where EOLs are mandatory or elsewhere. They die because engines fail, and they don't react quickly enough.
Is it possible to genuinely teach students to react in time? I don't think so. Bearing in mind the strictures against surprise throttle chops, it's difficult even to demonstrate engine failure. Requiring a pilot to be sufficiently keyed up, every second of every minute of every flight, to react in time is also asking the impossible.
But it is also true to say that most engine failures in Robinsons are caused by carb icing.
Therefore, it is important that the student know that if they forget everything else they were told and shown, they remember carb heat. Stamp it on their foreheads, write it on the bubble in chinagraph, go bananas when they forget.
Being able to land blue-side-up engine-off is a virtual irrelevance. Shame to smash up so many good machines practising shutting the stable door, again and again and again.
Let's talk about Robinsons, as they do more than half of all single-engine helicopter hours and more than 90 percent of private training.
I'll say it again - as far as I can ascertain, no R22 pilot who got into autorotation has ever been killed on landing, either in countries where EOLs are mandatory or elsewhere. They die because engines fail, and they don't react quickly enough.
Is it possible to genuinely teach students to react in time? I don't think so. Bearing in mind the strictures against surprise throttle chops, it's difficult even to demonstrate engine failure. Requiring a pilot to be sufficiently keyed up, every second of every minute of every flight, to react in time is also asking the impossible.
But it is also true to say that most engine failures in Robinsons are caused by carb icing.
Therefore, it is important that the student know that if they forget everything else they were told and shown, they remember carb heat. Stamp it on their foreheads, write it on the bubble in chinagraph, go bananas when they forget.
Being able to land blue-side-up engine-off is a virtual irrelevance. Shame to smash up so many good machines practising shutting the stable door, again and again and again.
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I have to comment of the last post. If it is truly not possible to teach students to adequately enter the auto after a true surprise engine failure, then how do you account for anyone ever getting into the autos you state are always survivable?
I have worked with dozens of students and low-time new hire pilots and all have been able to get an R22 or R44 into the auto following a surprise 'throttle chop' or they were not considered to be ready for the flight test/job.
It is true that carb ice and distractions from the aviating part of the job are large dangers for pilots of these types but that doesn't mean proper response isn't possible.
In regards to discussion further up the list, I have always performed autos to touchdown only on surfaces that have been inspected by myself and that I deem as minimal risk to the aircraft. Surprise practice engine failures off airfield and in areas I haven't surveyed are always taken to the hover power recovery to minimize risk. We also strived to avoid being predictable. Your student should NOT be able to anticipate when the engine will 'quit' on a training flight. These off-airfield autos were performed to teach just what was discussed above by Tain't Natural, a good entry to a stabilized auto that reaches a good landing spot. This is a survivable auto.
If I really thought that an engine failure was a guaranteed death sentence for these pilots then I would have a very hard time sleeping at night.
For myself, I had a student test my ability to enter an auto in an R22. While talking with my hands in the cockpit she had a small mental blunder and rolled off the throttle while in a max t/o power climb through a little over 1000'. As I heard the engine die I took control, entered the auto and was heading for a field. It wasn't until about halfway down that I noticed the engine idling (the horn covered the noise for a few seconds) and rolled up throttle to fly away. I was surprised but I was happy to learn that I would get the pole down.
I have worked with dozens of students and low-time new hire pilots and all have been able to get an R22 or R44 into the auto following a surprise 'throttle chop' or they were not considered to be ready for the flight test/job.
It is true that carb ice and distractions from the aviating part of the job are large dangers for pilots of these types but that doesn't mean proper response isn't possible.
In regards to discussion further up the list, I have always performed autos to touchdown only on surfaces that have been inspected by myself and that I deem as minimal risk to the aircraft. Surprise practice engine failures off airfield and in areas I haven't surveyed are always taken to the hover power recovery to minimize risk. We also strived to avoid being predictable. Your student should NOT be able to anticipate when the engine will 'quit' on a training flight. These off-airfield autos were performed to teach just what was discussed above by Tain't Natural, a good entry to a stabilized auto that reaches a good landing spot. This is a survivable auto.
If I really thought that an engine failure was a guaranteed death sentence for these pilots then I would have a very hard time sleeping at night.
For myself, I had a student test my ability to enter an auto in an R22. While talking with my hands in the cockpit she had a small mental blunder and rolled off the throttle while in a max t/o power climb through a little over 1000'. As I heard the engine die I took control, entered the auto and was heading for a field. It wasn't until about halfway down that I noticed the engine idling (the horn covered the noise for a few seconds) and rolled up throttle to fly away. I was surprised but I was happy to learn that I would get the pole down.
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T.c. &1000 P.T.'s! Q: Without Damage??
For Thomas coupling: you state "I was trying to recall how many EOL's I've done. Probably well in excess of a 1000 (on singles)."
Sounds hopeful--you're still with us, alive and well!?
Are all those helicopters also well? That is, was that 1000 without damaging any of the ships? (Be honest, now!)
AND are we safe to consider all of those were truly powerless touchdowns, in the sense that the needles were not synchronized before touchdown??
If both are true, then evidently the maneuver CAN be quite safe if carefully done in benign terrain (one wonders, after all the accident rumors), AND we are further impelled to improve training so the low-time guys can be as successful.
To what three major ingredients would you attribute your apparently accident-free 1000 P.T.'s? Share the secret, while we're all still alive!
(Especially needful, since there have been so far no substantive contributions to my proposed 'list of avoidable damage causes' of a few days ago.)
Sounds hopeful--you're still with us, alive and well!?
Are all those helicopters also well? That is, was that 1000 without damaging any of the ships? (Be honest, now!)
AND are we safe to consider all of those were truly powerless touchdowns, in the sense that the needles were not synchronized before touchdown??
If both are true, then evidently the maneuver CAN be quite safe if carefully done in benign terrain (one wonders, after all the accident rumors), AND we are further impelled to improve training so the low-time guys can be as successful.
To what three major ingredients would you attribute your apparently accident-free 1000 P.T.'s? Share the secret, while we're all still alive!
(Especially needful, since there have been so far no substantive contributions to my proposed 'list of avoidable damage causes' of a few days ago.)
During the 60's-70's....fledgling US Army helicopter pilots did EOL's as a simple matter of course. I can recall some flight periods that were devoted to nothing else....one right after another and another and another....until they became second nature. The engine remained at idle throughout the maneuver from the time the throttle was rolled off until it was rolled up again during a before takeoff check for the next circuit. There were contests (very informal and most unapproved) to see who could slide the longest distance...who could land closer to a predetermined spot...who could hold the bird at a hover without engine power the longest.....all of which taught one the ability of the UH-1 (Bell 204/205) to perform in autorotation.
Autorotatations were stressed because of the very strong likelihood you would be doing some in anger within the next year while flying combat in Vietnam. FOD, in the form of 7.62 - 14.7mm lead pellets was a very common happening there....in addition to the normal rate of engine failures. It is reported that at one time, there were over 7,000 helicopters operational in Vietnam.
Autorotatations were stressed because of the very strong likelihood you would be doing some in anger within the next year while flying combat in Vietnam. FOD, in the form of 7.62 - 14.7mm lead pellets was a very common happening there....in addition to the normal rate of engine failures. It is reported that at one time, there were over 7,000 helicopters operational in Vietnam.
PA42: I really wasn't intending to boast with that figure. I'm sure several of my colleagues in the mil have clocked up similar as instructors on the basic training units (Gazelles)(Wasp(Scout)!)
As SAS stated, we would spend hours a day at that stage in their course, doing real EOL's (no engine running at all). All perfectly normal. However, as I said surprise EOL's were few and far between. We would let them judge the entrance position from 1000' initially, into wind, modify the glide (with power if necessary-to make the spot), then chop the throttle completely.
I never looked in to "match any needles" I'm afraid!! too busy looking outside!
Eventually we'd practice downwind(180, offset)/range(bleed the Nr down)/low speed(from 30kts,high power)/min speed(going backwards to start with before converting to fwd speed, and finally an unannounced EOL from the overhead at height using all of the above.
The incidences of damage were remarkably small. In fact In all my years as an instructor I can only think of a handful of 'bumps' where either the bottom of the fenestron scraped the deck causing the sacrificial flange to crack, or the skids digging in too deep at the end of the run on causing the adf aerials to head butt the ground!!
My worse experience was of a student who froze with panic on the collective when I wanted to slow the bottom of the descent - we overran the landing zone and skidded along the runway!!
I wonder if the mil still do EOL's???????
As SAS stated, we would spend hours a day at that stage in their course, doing real EOL's (no engine running at all). All perfectly normal. However, as I said surprise EOL's were few and far between. We would let them judge the entrance position from 1000' initially, into wind, modify the glide (with power if necessary-to make the spot), then chop the throttle completely.
I never looked in to "match any needles" I'm afraid!! too busy looking outside!
Eventually we'd practice downwind(180, offset)/range(bleed the Nr down)/low speed(from 30kts,high power)/min speed(going backwards to start with before converting to fwd speed, and finally an unannounced EOL from the overhead at height using all of the above.
The incidences of damage were remarkably small. In fact In all my years as an instructor I can only think of a handful of 'bumps' where either the bottom of the fenestron scraped the deck causing the sacrificial flange to crack, or the skids digging in too deep at the end of the run on causing the adf aerials to head butt the ground!!
My worse experience was of a student who froze with panic on the collective when I wanted to slow the bottom of the descent - we overran the landing zone and skidded along the runway!!
I wonder if the mil still do EOL's???????
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TC....................I have to agree with you. I too have done countless numbers of EOL's in Gazelles, Bell 47 and Scout without so much as bending or cracking a skid or a frangeable tail. Sure students try to kill you every flight, but, with experience you get to know what they are going to do and when.
I dont agree with teaching EOL's to an exact spot, thats asking too much of a student, but as a pure test of skill for an experienced pilot, its unbeatable.
I dont agree with teaching EOL's to an exact spot, thats asking too much of a student, but as a pure test of skill for an experienced pilot, its unbeatable.