AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
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JJ;
Hopefully this one's back on topic.............
I'm not surprised at the relative inexperience of the crew. Too many of us in the industry knew Spotty Muldoon (last words on the CVR of their last big crash were his saying he was unhappy at what was going on) the rumours were out there and although I'm very happy for FNW to correct my thoughts/attitude, there seemed to be a very high rotation of experienced pilots through their Human Resources Dept.
On our fleet insurance, AOC/Private management the MINIMUM hours for an IFR P1 are 2 500, and even then every flight that pilot conducts has to be sanctioned by either me, or the head of training, or the accountable manager (our signatures approving actually have to be on his flight brief) until he reaches 3000 hours.
There has grown up around the IFR pilot an apparent aura of experience and knowledge. The IR is intended to allow you to fly IFR in controlled airspace, fly IFR airport to airport or to recover to an airport IFR when the weather craps out. It does NOT allow you to pull a towering take-off from a paddock with cloud on the ground and a viz in "tens of metres). it does NOT allow a pilot to fly an approach into a paddock in those conditions (I would love to know what the weather was like when they arrived)
One AOC in the UK has recently taken a kicking from the CAA because a pilot took off from an airfield in the UK with no approach aids, no IFR assistance in weather conditions well below what was either legal or sensible. His actions have caused the company both massive embarrassment and financial loss.
I used to fly off-shore (about 11 years of it) and became very accustomed to taking off into immediate instrument flight, but I learned those skills sitting next to some very experienced captains who showed me how and then talked me through how, until I got it right.
I have had the client in the back yelling about "What do you mean you won't land in my garden?!! I hired a F***ing IFR helicopter and pilot, I'll go back to White Knuckle Helicopters next time, they always get me in!" A long time ago I caved to that pressure and scared myself witless, now I'm old enough and ugly enough to argue the point, and if the client walks, so be it. I have also had the argument on behalf of other pilots, and expect to have it again, sadly, because as an industry we are crap at telling the punters exactly what an IFR helicopter/pilot combination is really capable of.
SND
Hopefully this one's back on topic.............
I'm not surprised at the relative inexperience of the crew. Too many of us in the industry knew Spotty Muldoon (last words on the CVR of their last big crash were his saying he was unhappy at what was going on) the rumours were out there and although I'm very happy for FNW to correct my thoughts/attitude, there seemed to be a very high rotation of experienced pilots through their Human Resources Dept.
On our fleet insurance, AOC/Private management the MINIMUM hours for an IFR P1 are 2 500, and even then every flight that pilot conducts has to be sanctioned by either me, or the head of training, or the accountable manager (our signatures approving actually have to be on his flight brief) until he reaches 3000 hours.
There has grown up around the IFR pilot an apparent aura of experience and knowledge. The IR is intended to allow you to fly IFR in controlled airspace, fly IFR airport to airport or to recover to an airport IFR when the weather craps out. It does NOT allow you to pull a towering take-off from a paddock with cloud on the ground and a viz in "tens of metres). it does NOT allow a pilot to fly an approach into a paddock in those conditions (I would love to know what the weather was like when they arrived)
One AOC in the UK has recently taken a kicking from the CAA because a pilot took off from an airfield in the UK with no approach aids, no IFR assistance in weather conditions well below what was either legal or sensible. His actions have caused the company both massive embarrassment and financial loss.
I used to fly off-shore (about 11 years of it) and became very accustomed to taking off into immediate instrument flight, but I learned those skills sitting next to some very experienced captains who showed me how and then talked me through how, until I got it right.
I have had the client in the back yelling about "What do you mean you won't land in my garden?!! I hired a F***ing IFR helicopter and pilot, I'll go back to White Knuckle Helicopters next time, they always get me in!" A long time ago I caved to that pressure and scared myself witless, now I'm old enough and ugly enough to argue the point, and if the client walks, so be it. I have also had the argument on behalf of other pilots, and expect to have it again, sadly, because as an industry we are crap at telling the punters exactly what an IFR helicopter/pilot combination is really capable of.
SND
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because as an industry we are crap at telling the punters exactly what an IFR helicopter/pilot combination is really capable of.
On two occasions I've had people who don't know any better tell me that helicopters are fitted with radar so the pilot can land in fields in cloud. One was an army captain, one an aircraft owner/employer. Both became angry at me for telling them that unfortunately wasn't the case and I couldn't do what they asked.
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Shy;
My favourite has always been "surely it comes to a hover at a couple of thousand feet and then descends vertically, after all that's what helicopters do!"
SND
My favourite has always been "surely it comes to a hover at a couple of thousand feet and then descends vertically, after all that's what helicopters do!"
SND
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Yes, unfortunately, that is another common misunderstanding of the capability of a helicopter.
A few years ago I had cause to write an article outlining what could and couldn't be done with the machine I was flying. The passengers / PAs had some totally false ideas.
Also other things such as:
"We need to fly three more passengers than we originally said, so you'll just have to put some more fuel in before you go".
"What do you mean the aircraft is still on maintenance? They've had it for a day already. Tell the garage we now need to fly it this afternoon and just to do the oil change for now; we'll have the rest done another day when we don't need to use it!"
(This was the aircraft annual inspection....)
A few years ago I had cause to write an article outlining what could and couldn't be done with the machine I was flying. The passengers / PAs had some totally false ideas.
Also other things such as:
"We need to fly three more passengers than we originally said, so you'll just have to put some more fuel in before you go".
"What do you mean the aircraft is still on maintenance? They've had it for a day already. Tell the garage we now need to fly it this afternoon and just to do the oil change for now; we'll have the rest done another day when we don't need to use it!"
(This was the aircraft annual inspection....)
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I find post 431 offensive. It reads as factual. You are correct, you didn't make a list, please consider this as a 100% apology.
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SND
I'm sure that not only are the hours important (you mention minimum 2500 hours for your insurance) but also how relevant are those hours? for example 2500 hours underslung or instructing may not be that relevant for an IFR operation! 2500 hours on say AS350 would be much more relevant than 2500 on R22, etc, etc.
This is why I previously asked, what was the previous experience of the Capt? No one on here seems to know.
If he had 2000 hours on IFR helis as a FO then that is quite different to if he had say 600 hours IFR heli time and the rest on a R22? Offshore and Onshore time both have advantages. If for example, he had carried out 100 offshore departures at night or 100 military IFR towering take-offs then it is likely that the departure would have been uneventful.
Uneventful, but not sensible, as a reject before CDP would probably not end well if no visual reference - and you could not be sure of meeting Rule 5 (3) (a)
If the Capt lacked the experience levels that one would normally have to be commanding this aircraft in this weather, perhaps the Operator may have some responsibility and duty of care and may well be considered negligent. There could be a case for the pilots families v the Operator.
So I think it is important to know the previous experience, single engine charter/ corporate, any military time, offshore, IFR heli time (not IFR time but time on an IFR heli so that there is sufficient experience to make decisions re IFR weather)
It seems that there is a fair amount of evidence that this Operator lacked a good safety culture.
I'm sure that not only are the hours important (you mention minimum 2500 hours for your insurance) but also how relevant are those hours? for example 2500 hours underslung or instructing may not be that relevant for an IFR operation! 2500 hours on say AS350 would be much more relevant than 2500 on R22, etc, etc.
This is why I previously asked, what was the previous experience of the Capt? No one on here seems to know.
If he had 2000 hours on IFR helis as a FO then that is quite different to if he had say 600 hours IFR heli time and the rest on a R22? Offshore and Onshore time both have advantages. If for example, he had carried out 100 offshore departures at night or 100 military IFR towering take-offs then it is likely that the departure would have been uneventful.
Uneventful, but not sensible, as a reject before CDP would probably not end well if no visual reference - and you could not be sure of meeting Rule 5 (3) (a)
If the Capt lacked the experience levels that one would normally have to be commanding this aircraft in this weather, perhaps the Operator may have some responsibility and duty of care and may well be considered negligent. There could be a case for the pilots families v the Operator.
So I think it is important to know the previous experience, single engine charter/ corporate, any military time, offshore, IFR heli time (not IFR time but time on an IFR heli so that there is sufficient experience to make decisions re IFR weather)
It seems that there is a fair amount of evidence that this Operator lacked a good safety culture.
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Uneventful, but not sensible, as a reject before CDP would probably not end well if no visual reference - and you could not be sure of meeting Rule 5 (3) (a)
Exemptions from the low flying prohibitions
6 The exemptions from the low flying prohibitions are as follows:
(a) Landing and taking off
(i) Any aircraft shall be exempt from the low flying prohibitions in so far as it is
flying in accordance with normal aviation practice for the purpose of:
(aa) taking off from, landing at or practising approaches to landing at; or
(bb) checking navigational aids or procedures at,
a Government or licensed aerodrome.
(ii) Any aircraft shall be exempt from the 500 feet rule when landing and taking off in accordance with normal aviation practice or air-taxiing.
6 The exemptions from the low flying prohibitions are as follows:
(a) Landing and taking off
(i) Any aircraft shall be exempt from the low flying prohibitions in so far as it is
flying in accordance with normal aviation practice for the purpose of:
(aa) taking off from, landing at or practising approaches to landing at; or
(bb) checking navigational aids or procedures at,
a Government or licensed aerodrome.
(ii) Any aircraft shall be exempt from the 500 feet rule when landing and taking off in accordance with normal aviation practice or air-taxiing.
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shy torque
I'm referring just to 5(3)(a) and not 500ft rule
My understanding is that you are exempt from 5(3)(a)at a Government or licensed aerodrome .. taking off from a private site requires you to be able to land without causing danger to persons or property on the surface in the event of a power unit failure.
But in any case, my point is not intended to be a discussion about rules of the air, but rather the experience level of the crew.
I'm referring just to 5(3)(a) and not 500ft rule
My understanding is that you are exempt from 5(3)(a)at a Government or licensed aerodrome .. taking off from a private site requires you to be able to land without causing danger to persons or property on the surface in the event of a power unit failure.
But in any case, my point is not intended to be a discussion about rules of the air, but rather the experience level of the crew.
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If you prefer, here's the whole section, including 5(3)(a):
SECTION 3 LOW FLYING RULE
Low flying prohibitions
5 (1) Subject to paragraph (2), an aircraft shall comply with the low flying prohibitions in
paragraph (3) unless exempted by rule 6.
(2) If an aircraft is flying in circumstances such that more than one of the low flying
prohibitions apply, it shall fly at the greatest height required by any of the applicable
prohibitions.
(3) The low flying prohibitions are as follows:
(a) Failure of power unit
An aircraft shall not be flown below such height as would enable it to make an
emergency landing without causing danger to persons or property on the surface
in the event of a power unit failure.
(b) The 500 feet rule
Except with the written permission of the CAA, an aircraft shall not be flown
closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle or structure.
(c) The 1,000 feet rule
Except with the written permission of the CAA, an aircraft flying over a congested area of a city town or settlement shall not fly below a height of 1,000 feet above the highest fixed obstacle within a horizontal radius of 600 metres of the aircraft.
(d) The land clear rule
An aircraft flying over a congested area of a city, town or settlement shall not fly below such height as would permit the aircraft to land clear of the congested area in the event of a power unit failure.
Low flying prohibitions
5 (1) Subject to paragraph (2), an aircraft shall comply with the low flying prohibitions in
paragraph (3) unless exempted by rule 6.
(2) If an aircraft is flying in circumstances such that more than one of the low flying
prohibitions apply, it shall fly at the greatest height required by any of the applicable
prohibitions.
(3) The low flying prohibitions are as follows:
(a) Failure of power unit
An aircraft shall not be flown below such height as would enable it to make an
emergency landing without causing danger to persons or property on the surface
in the event of a power unit failure.
(b) The 500 feet rule
Except with the written permission of the CAA, an aircraft shall not be flown
closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle or structure.
(c) The 1,000 feet rule
Except with the written permission of the CAA, an aircraft flying over a congested area of a city town or settlement shall not fly below a height of 1,000 feet above the highest fixed obstacle within a horizontal radius of 600 metres of the aircraft.
(d) The land clear rule
An aircraft flying over a congested area of a city, town or settlement shall not fly below such height as would permit the aircraft to land clear of the congested area in the event of a power unit failure.
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shytorque
I didn't want a discussion re rules of the air, but if you insists.
I think you are missing the point that you are only exempted from 5(3)(a) by rule 6 at a Government or licensed aerodrome .. have a look at 6 (a)(i) again ..
This is quite important if you operate into private sites ...
I didn't want a discussion re rules of the air, but if you insists.
I think you are missing the point that you are only exempted from 5(3)(a) by rule 6 at a Government or licensed aerodrome .. have a look at 6 (a)(i) again ..
This is quite important if you operate into private sites ...
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shytorque
to give a practical example:
You're in a A109C at max weight on a summer days at a private site, on take off and landing you cannot cause danger to persons or property on the surface.
Therefore it's ok to damage the aircraft with a heavy reject on take-off provided you don't cause danger to property or persons - but it's not ok to crash into a car, lawnmower, fence, building, etc
At a government or licensed aerodrome this does not apply ...
Anyway, the point I was making, whether or not you agree with this interpretation of rule 5, is that a rejected take off in fog at night, without any visual reference is likely to not end well. However, the manoeuvre should be able to be carried out safety from a handling point of view provided an engine does not fail.
This is not an acceptable risk from my point of view, so why did not crew make this decision. Was it lack of experience? Was it pressure or perceived pressure from pax?
The experience of the crew, in particular the capt is an important factor.
to give a practical example:
You're in a A109C at max weight on a summer days at a private site, on take off and landing you cannot cause danger to persons or property on the surface.
Therefore it's ok to damage the aircraft with a heavy reject on take-off provided you don't cause danger to property or persons - but it's not ok to crash into a car, lawnmower, fence, building, etc
At a government or licensed aerodrome this does not apply ...
Anyway, the point I was making, whether or not you agree with this interpretation of rule 5, is that a rejected take off in fog at night, without any visual reference is likely to not end well. However, the manoeuvre should be able to be carried out safety from a handling point of view provided an engine does not fail.
This is not an acceptable risk from my point of view, so why did not crew make this decision. Was it lack of experience? Was it pressure or perceived pressure from pax?
The experience of the crew, in particular the capt is an important factor.
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G550
The crew would have made their decision to depart based on their assessment of the risk involved. Whatever view you have of the risk involved would not be something they would know - or probably even consider relevant if they did.
And furthermore, for what it's worth, I think the risk of one engine failing on this acft on the climb out would have been negligible - and far from the greatest risk of the manoeuvre. And even if one had failed, I suspect a reject landing could have been accomplished, albeit with damage to the acft, but not occupants or property.
The crew would have made their decision to depart based on their assessment of the risk involved. Whatever view you have of the risk involved would not be something they would know - or probably even consider relevant if they did.
And furthermore, for what it's worth, I think the risk of one engine failing on this acft on the climb out would have been negligible - and far from the greatest risk of the manoeuvre. And even if one had failed, I suspect a reject landing could have been accomplished, albeit with damage to the acft, but not occupants or property.
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The Engines did not fail.
There were no mechanical failures.
All this arguing about Rules, why not about argue about properly flying the machine?
Violating a Rule does not harm you but not flying the machine surely does.
Get back to 60 Knots at 35 feet and 90 Knots at 125 feet then a nose low attitude of 35 Degrees and a Rate of Descent of 2400 FPM that was increasing.
Ask yourselves how and why all that happened on a very foggy night with visibility said to be "Tens of Meters" .
Was that indicative of an appropriate Take Off Profile?
Does that suggest there may have been more Visibility and a thinner layer of Fog than is being considered by everyone?
Did that bit of Hovering clear out a small area of Fog and the Crew be able to see up?
There were no mechanical failures.
All this arguing about Rules, why not about argue about properly flying the machine?
Violating a Rule does not harm you but not flying the machine surely does.
Get back to 60 Knots at 35 feet and 90 Knots at 125 feet then a nose low attitude of 35 Degrees and a Rate of Descent of 2400 FPM that was increasing.
Ask yourselves how and why all that happened on a very foggy night with visibility said to be "Tens of Meters" .
Was that indicative of an appropriate Take Off Profile?
Does that suggest there may have been more Visibility and a thinner layer of Fog than is being considered by everyone?
Did that bit of Hovering clear out a small area of Fog and the Crew be able to see up?
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G550 driver
With genuine respect for your experience and skill (I'm 99% sure I've worked out who you are and, if I'm right, I've flown with you
) Rule 5 is a red herring IMHO and introduces an unnecessary complication.
FL
With genuine respect for your experience and skill (I'm 99% sure I've worked out who you are and, if I'm right, I've flown with you
) Rule 5 is a red herring IMHO and introduces an unnecessary complication. FL
Last edited by Flying Lawyer; 7th Apr 2014 at 01:30.
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FL
Yes, we do know each other. Although I agree to a great extent rule 5 may be a “red herring” but lets just suppose that night the crew told the owner that they cannot meet the “land without danger to property requirement in event of engine failure” and the flight was delayed until the morning. That would be relevant wouldn’t it? We would not be having this discussion.
Now I am not now saying this is the case, but it could be, or alternatively the crew may have given other justification why they could not depart that night. That is also relevant? So far in this thread we do not seem to have a conclusion whether this flight was legal or sensible considering the conditions.
So it may be worth considering if there are legal reasons why the flight could not depart, because if so, the crew could have used these reason for justifying why they could not depart.
Not only that, this could be useful for other crews placed in the same situation on another occasion that will no doubt occur sooner or later.
Unfortunately all private sites need to be assessed for many factors including, Is this a congested area? Can I land without danger to persons and property on the ground in the event of a power failure? etc, etc. This is always relevant to me in case I am brought in front of a Judge.
When you tell an owner you cannot depart it always helps if you can back up your decision making. If you give an owner a good reason that they understand, you tend to get a better reaction than if you just say I don’t feel comfortable or you just cannot.
For example, one dark and foggy night a pilot who worked for one of my previous owners said he did not want to depart because he did not feel happy. This owner persuaded him to depart by taking the piss out of him in front of the other pax by saying ‘are you scared of the dark, what’s the matter with you, do you want to borrow my torch, etc, etc. The pilot was reminded of the story for months afterwards by the owner who took great delight in recounting the story again and again. Then on another occasion the pilot departed when he should not have, under pressure again because he could not clearly justify his reasons and they all had a near death experience!
My experience with the owner was entirely different. When I explained why we could not depart giving a good reason, the discussion was over and the decision was accepted.
So for example one could say "our departure this evening requires a TDP of 200ft due to the trees and obstacles and if we have an engine failure just prior to TDP, we would not be able to see sufficiently to avoid damage to property on the ground and we could end up damaging the aircraft or even you. This does not comply with rules of the air and so we need to delay until xxxx”
Now that may or may not apply to this site, but it is certainly a factor to consider in the decision making process regarding whether to depart or not, and may possibly have been a reason to give to the owner this night. I don’t know, but I would not rule it out entirely as a red herring. What TDP should have been used? Could one reject just prior to TDP with danger to property on surface? These issues have not been discussed and may well be relevant., but also there may be other justifications for not departing. Alternatively, perhaps it was perfectly ok to depart?
I noticed in the PB AAIB special accident report there was mention of the low flying rules, so if there are breaches of any regulations, it is likely they will appear in the final report for G-LBAL.
However FL, in my last post I did say "But in any case, my point is not intended to be a discussion about rules of the air, but rather the experience level of the crew."
I wanted to focus on experience levels as this is quite a long thread and the issue of experience seems relevant and has not been discussed.
The Captains total hours seem a little on the low side for the type of operation, so the relevance of those hours is important.
Many Operators consider the previous experience of a pilot for determining the suitability and minimum experience level for command. I would be interested to know the previous experience of the Captain to see if this meets normal industry criteria.
Experience does affect the handling ability and perhaps more importantly the decision making process and is a factor to consider in my view. For example a 20,000 hour North Sea Commander may not make the best AS350 charter pilot and vice-versa. If the Operator designated the Capt as P1 with insufficient experience then the Operator may well be negligent.
Unfortunately I know several Owners/ private Operators with Superman complexes, who think they are invincible. Many are used to taking risks in their business world and so become accustomed to risk and accept risk in their aviation departments. I have known several Owners who intentionally and wilfully break all manners of aviation law and common sense and guess what - they all get away with it most of the time.
If there is negligence on the part of the Operator, and for avoidance of doubt, I have no reason to say there is in this case, but if there is, then awarding of damages may well be a deterrent to prevent future negligence.
Rotorspeed
Yes the risk is negligible, and I agree with you - but 5(3)(a) does require you account for engine failure.
Yes, we do know each other. Although I agree to a great extent rule 5 may be a “red herring” but lets just suppose that night the crew told the owner that they cannot meet the “land without danger to property requirement in event of engine failure” and the flight was delayed until the morning. That would be relevant wouldn’t it? We would not be having this discussion.
Now I am not now saying this is the case, but it could be, or alternatively the crew may have given other justification why they could not depart that night. That is also relevant? So far in this thread we do not seem to have a conclusion whether this flight was legal or sensible considering the conditions.
So it may be worth considering if there are legal reasons why the flight could not depart, because if so, the crew could have used these reason for justifying why they could not depart.
Not only that, this could be useful for other crews placed in the same situation on another occasion that will no doubt occur sooner or later.
Unfortunately all private sites need to be assessed for many factors including, Is this a congested area? Can I land without danger to persons and property on the ground in the event of a power failure? etc, etc. This is always relevant to me in case I am brought in front of a Judge.
When you tell an owner you cannot depart it always helps if you can back up your decision making. If you give an owner a good reason that they understand, you tend to get a better reaction than if you just say I don’t feel comfortable or you just cannot.
For example, one dark and foggy night a pilot who worked for one of my previous owners said he did not want to depart because he did not feel happy. This owner persuaded him to depart by taking the piss out of him in front of the other pax by saying ‘are you scared of the dark, what’s the matter with you, do you want to borrow my torch, etc, etc. The pilot was reminded of the story for months afterwards by the owner who took great delight in recounting the story again and again. Then on another occasion the pilot departed when he should not have, under pressure again because he could not clearly justify his reasons and they all had a near death experience!
My experience with the owner was entirely different. When I explained why we could not depart giving a good reason, the discussion was over and the decision was accepted.
So for example one could say "our departure this evening requires a TDP of 200ft due to the trees and obstacles and if we have an engine failure just prior to TDP, we would not be able to see sufficiently to avoid damage to property on the ground and we could end up damaging the aircraft or even you. This does not comply with rules of the air and so we need to delay until xxxx”
Now that may or may not apply to this site, but it is certainly a factor to consider in the decision making process regarding whether to depart or not, and may possibly have been a reason to give to the owner this night. I don’t know, but I would not rule it out entirely as a red herring. What TDP should have been used? Could one reject just prior to TDP with danger to property on surface? These issues have not been discussed and may well be relevant., but also there may be other justifications for not departing. Alternatively, perhaps it was perfectly ok to depart?
I noticed in the PB AAIB special accident report there was mention of the low flying rules, so if there are breaches of any regulations, it is likely they will appear in the final report for G-LBAL.
However FL, in my last post I did say "But in any case, my point is not intended to be a discussion about rules of the air, but rather the experience level of the crew."
I wanted to focus on experience levels as this is quite a long thread and the issue of experience seems relevant and has not been discussed.
The Captains total hours seem a little on the low side for the type of operation, so the relevance of those hours is important.
Many Operators consider the previous experience of a pilot for determining the suitability and minimum experience level for command. I would be interested to know the previous experience of the Captain to see if this meets normal industry criteria.
Experience does affect the handling ability and perhaps more importantly the decision making process and is a factor to consider in my view. For example a 20,000 hour North Sea Commander may not make the best AS350 charter pilot and vice-versa. If the Operator designated the Capt as P1 with insufficient experience then the Operator may well be negligent.
Unfortunately I know several Owners/ private Operators with Superman complexes, who think they are invincible. Many are used to taking risks in their business world and so become accustomed to risk and accept risk in their aviation departments. I have known several Owners who intentionally and wilfully break all manners of aviation law and common sense and guess what - they all get away with it most of the time.
If there is negligence on the part of the Operator, and for avoidance of doubt, I have no reason to say there is in this case, but if there is, then awarding of damages may well be a deterrent to prevent future negligence.
Rotorspeed
Yes the risk is negligible, and I agree with you - but 5(3)(a) does require you account for engine failure.
Last edited by G550 driver; 7th Apr 2014 at 07:00.
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G550
Yes but Rule 5(3)(a) relates to en route flying, not taking off and landing, does it not? And you are talking about the take off phase.
Otherwise how do you think a single could ever legally make a confined area approach or take off?
Yes but Rule 5(3)(a) relates to en route flying, not taking off and landing, does it not? And you are talking about the take off phase.
Otherwise how do you think a single could ever legally make a confined area approach or take off?
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Rotorspeed
5(3)(a) does not say it only relates to en-route flying
Either at a training aerodrome, at a government or licenced aerodrome where you are exempt or with a CAA exemption
Otherwise you will of course make sure your approach and departure route into the confined area allow you to meet 5(3)(a) ..
If you would like more info, PM me your number and I'll call you. Alternatively call CAA GA dept, Training Standards, your FOI or legal department ...
may I politely suggest we move back to the issue ....
Yes but Rule 5(3)(a) relates to en route flying, not taking off and landing, does it not? And you are talking about the take off phase.
Otherwise how do you think a single could ever legally make a confined area approach or take off?
Otherwise you will of course make sure your approach and departure route into the confined area allow you to meet 5(3)(a) ..
If you would like more info, PM me your number and I'll call you. Alternatively call CAA GA dept, Training Standards, your FOI or legal department ...
may I politely suggest we move back to the issue ....
Join Date: Feb 2001
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G550
But under Rule 6(a)(ii) dealing with exemptions to Rule 5 low flying regulations it says landing and taking off in accordance with normal aviation practice is exempt. So unless one wants to start getting pedantic about what constitutes "normal aviation practice" surely that leaves Rule 5(3)(a) to be basically applying to en route flying? Or have I got it wrong? I don't claim to know the rule book backwards!
But under Rule 6(a)(ii) dealing with exemptions to Rule 5 low flying regulations it says landing and taking off in accordance with normal aviation practice is exempt. So unless one wants to start getting pedantic about what constitutes "normal aviation practice" surely that leaves Rule 5(3)(a) to be basically applying to en route flying? Or have I got it wrong? I don't claim to know the rule book backwards!
