AS332L2 Ditching off Shetland: 23rd August 2013
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The photo in the BBC piece shows George Osborne in a Super Puma. The caption says 'George Osborne flew offshore ... .' Did he? So did he do a dunker?
They can take ATC staff, CAA inspectors etc without dunking them AFAIK
You can put people on an installation for a limited period without BOSIET, if you can justify it. For example, HSE Inspectors, AAIB Inspectors, Chancellors of the Exchequer....
Last edited by diginagain; 3rd Sep 2013 at 19:01.
Are we really just Bus Drivers who wear Poopy Suits to work?
If the perception is that pilot's equipment is insufficient, now might be an opportunity for change.
Last edited by diginagain; 3rd Sep 2013 at 19:35.
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I am surprised that the bus drivers over here in Canada don't ask for more safety features for themselves, such as HEED/HUEBA, immersion suits, I assume that they accept the risk more readily whether via their trust in their equipment and training, both military and civil, and just get on with it. For us passengers in the back we tend to expect the same safety standard levels and survivability that we have become accustomed to at our offshore installations. I can remember back to how different the safety culture offshore was back in 1991 in comparison to now, perhaps we need the same step change in culture for our offshore transportation systems. After all, there is a relatively long life left in this industry, so why not have the oil companies invest in it more by working with the equipment manufacturers to come up with a safer survival system design in the helos.
As far as air and the rest, opinions vary, and the issues of obstacles in the cockpit (to interfere with controls). Job no 1 needs getting done first.
Max,
I was of course being jokingly flippant with a point. Regardless of the conclusions from the latest NS accident, the Puma crash that started this string of 5 was blatant pilot error.
As to immersion suits with the latest still out, the suits would have done no good on the Cougar 92 or G-REDL and not needed (by luck) on the two Puma loss of oil pressure.
If two out of 5 is proven to be gross carelessness, something has to be done to make the crews take their responsibility more seriously.
The Sultan
I was of course being jokingly flippant with a point. Regardless of the conclusions from the latest NS accident, the Puma crash that started this string of 5 was blatant pilot error.
As to immersion suits with the latest still out, the suits would have done no good on the Cougar 92 or G-REDL and not needed (by luck) on the two Puma loss of oil pressure.
If two out of 5 is proven to be gross carelessness, something has to be done to make the crews take their responsibility more seriously.
The Sultan
Did a NUTEC Bosiet course a few years ago including rebreather.
A brilliant 2 day course that covers fire, smoke first aid HUET with rebreather ect. At the time they showed us HEEDS but course participants were not permitted to try it, due to legal/training/certification re medical issues with trainees breathing bottled air.
In respect to film crews onboard offshore Euro facilities, a non trained person must be accompanied 100% of the time with a Bosiet holder.
Mickjoebill
A brilliant 2 day course that covers fire, smoke first aid HUET with rebreather ect. At the time they showed us HEEDS but course participants were not permitted to try it, due to legal/training/certification re medical issues with trainees breathing bottled air.
You can put people on an installation for a limited period without BOSIET, if you can justify it. For example, HSE Inspectors, AAIB Inspectors, Chancellors of the Exchequer....
Mickjoebill
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If two out of 5 is proven to be gross carelessness, something has to be done to make the crews take their responsibility more seriously.
Sultan
That is a bit harsh. No NS pilot will fly an aircraft into/onto the sea as the result of "gross Carelessness". There is always a chain of events which lead up to such an event - the old Swiss Cheese theory.
I explained some of the chain of events, on the ETAP, ditching in post 1035.
I will amplify my thoughts on the chain of events.
1. The CAA allows any commercial pilot who has an IR to fly at night. The RAF, in my time, had a 28day currency requirement irrespective of
Experience or role
2. The currency requirement for night deck landings is 90 days so after your night line check - usually done as early in the "night flying" season as possible you could do just 2 night deck landings in the winter and still be current.
3. Crew change flights tend to be scheduled during the day, at least the departure from the rig as crews need time for onward transportation from Aberdeen. This limits the number of night deck landings that are available.
4. Crews are encouraged to do straight in approaches to rigs, so if the conditions are a bit out of the normal - as ETAP was - crews don't have the mindset to orbit the rig to assess conditions. The increased use of automatics also tends to make an orbit unusual.
5. There was no formalised SOP for night approaches. They relied on pilot experience and perhaps the method demonstrated by the TRI on line checks. After this accident a more formal approach was constructed and added to SOPs.
To get back to the ETAP accident we can see that there were several holes beginning to line up.
1. The CAA, I believe, didn't understand the possible difficulties in making night deck landings and allowed a "generous" currency requirement. The Commander had only done 12 night deck landings in the previous 90 days, not many.
2. The construction of a more formal night deck approach and landing SOP AFTER the event perhaps shows the company SOPs needed strengthening before the accident.
3. Automation is very good if used correctly but the pilot also has to have the skill to fly the a/c manually. This seems to be discouraged at the moment.
The conditions were very challenging that night, fog banks, no wind, dark night with only the one brightly lit rig ahead, which probably seemed to float in the air with its reflection on the surface of the flat calm sea.
So we had a crew that the CAA deemed to be current flying a challenging approach without a stringent company SOP to follow and having only flown 12 approaches in the last 90days. You can see how the Swiss cheese holes are beginning to line up. They "landed" on the water through a chain of events. Gross carelessness doesn't feature does it??
As I explained in my post 1035 I would have approached in a completely manner but I was very experienced in night deck landings doing hundred+/month in the winter.
HF
If two out of 5 is proven to be gross carelessness, something has to be done to make the crews take their responsibility more seriously.
I explained some of the chain of events, on the ETAP, ditching in post 1035.
I will amplify my thoughts on the chain of events.
1. The CAA allows any commercial pilot who has an IR to fly at night. The RAF, in my time, had a 28day currency requirement irrespective of
Experience or role
2. The currency requirement for night deck landings is 90 days so after your night line check - usually done as early in the "night flying" season as possible you could do just 2 night deck landings in the winter and still be current.
3. Crew change flights tend to be scheduled during the day, at least the departure from the rig as crews need time for onward transportation from Aberdeen. This limits the number of night deck landings that are available.
4. Crews are encouraged to do straight in approaches to rigs, so if the conditions are a bit out of the normal - as ETAP was - crews don't have the mindset to orbit the rig to assess conditions. The increased use of automatics also tends to make an orbit unusual.
5. There was no formalised SOP for night approaches. They relied on pilot experience and perhaps the method demonstrated by the TRI on line checks. After this accident a more formal approach was constructed and added to SOPs.
To get back to the ETAP accident we can see that there were several holes beginning to line up.
1. The CAA, I believe, didn't understand the possible difficulties in making night deck landings and allowed a "generous" currency requirement. The Commander had only done 12 night deck landings in the previous 90 days, not many.
2. The construction of a more formal night deck approach and landing SOP AFTER the event perhaps shows the company SOPs needed strengthening before the accident.
3. Automation is very good if used correctly but the pilot also has to have the skill to fly the a/c manually. This seems to be discouraged at the moment.
The conditions were very challenging that night, fog banks, no wind, dark night with only the one brightly lit rig ahead, which probably seemed to float in the air with its reflection on the surface of the flat calm sea.
So we had a crew that the CAA deemed to be current flying a challenging approach without a stringent company SOP to follow and having only flown 12 approaches in the last 90days. You can see how the Swiss cheese holes are beginning to line up. They "landed" on the water through a chain of events. Gross carelessness doesn't feature does it??
As I explained in my post 1035 I would have approached in a completely manner but I was very experienced in night deck landings doing hundred+/month in the winter.
HF
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Originally Posted by SASless
They also have synthetic vision systems on it too.....would that not be nice to have as well on an offshore helicopter?
Having said that I would give the monocle a go if given the chance, I would LOVE an EC225 with a monocle provided I could select the information I wanted.
Some good out of the box, and shields down thinking mate
.Si
Mmmh, synthetic vision? - don't think so!
Synthetic vision a la optical enhancement /NVG (lower vid in JE's post) great for SAR in unlit scenarios. Hopeless for offshore with bright lights. Can't see through fog / cloud.
Synthetic vision a la terrain database (upper vid in JE's post) - shows you what was there when the database was compiled, not what is there now, therefore won't know about movable offshore installations /ships, new masts or wind turbines (erected since database compiled). The ultimate alluring trap!
Synthetic vision a la millimetre radar, probably quite good but hugely expensive and complex.
Synthetic vision a la optical enhancement /NVG (lower vid in JE's post) great for SAR in unlit scenarios. Hopeless for offshore with bright lights. Can't see through fog / cloud.
Synthetic vision a la terrain database (upper vid in JE's post) - shows you what was there when the database was compiled, not what is there now, therefore won't know about movable offshore installations /ships, new masts or wind turbines (erected since database compiled). The ultimate alluring trap!
Synthetic vision a la millimetre radar, probably quite good but hugely expensive and complex.
True, I was part of a test to see how they fared in an offshore environment many years ago. Granted it wasn't the highest end of systems, and it was found to be little more than a distraction and did not help at all. Some of the issues were buggy software, the image was too small to be of any real use, and was slightly out of line of sight, and it shook badly, and as mentioned, it didn't see through fog. There were no positives at all, but perhaps with new technology the idea might have a chance???
Last edited by Bladestrike; 4th Sep 2013 at 11:52.
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stupid question from stupid ATCO here
is a non precision approach (the likes of this fateful LOC/DME to 09) in rotary considerably higher workload than the equivalent flown in fixed wing, or are they pretty much the same thing?
is a non precision approach (the likes of this fateful LOC/DME to 09) in rotary considerably higher workload than the equivalent flown in fixed wing, or are they pretty much the same thing?
SD, pretty much the same thing, especially with appropriate use of even the limited automation on the L2. However, perhaps fewer clues when things start to go wrong such as no low airspeed warning (stall warning / stick shaker etc), and perhaps a little more complacency about low airspeed than our FW brothers.
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OT..and not as complex but is there a secret way to be able to 'quote' did have a scan of the FAQ's and it mentioned should be able to by using 'quick reply'
However I only see 'reply'...or maybe I should go back to specsavers
However I only see 'reply'...or maybe I should go back to specsavers
GJM doubtful, if they were low on fuel surely they would have mentioned it to ATC, and its rare for both engines to flame out simultaneously since they are fed from seperate tanks that will likely have different contents. As far as I am aware, they were not arriving at EGPB on a diversion, but as their destination having landed offshore. They should have had plenty of fuel to reach an alternate with reasonable weather.
quoting - a good question, the answer to which eludes me too!
quoting - a good question, the answer to which eludes me too!
GJM, the message transmitted on departure from the Borgsten Dolphin indicated that there was more than sufficient fuel onboard for the relatively short flight to Sumburgh.