As FH1100 correctly explains, the S-92 accident was down to a design choice to preserve design schedule:
SAC managed to convince the FAA guy (whose name we don't need to mention because everyone already knows who signed-off on it) that the ONLY possible source of a leak of transmission oil would be the lines leading to the oil cooler. Filter won't/can't leak...driveshaft inputs can't leak...the mast seal can't leak...the list goes on!
And the (unnamed) FAA guy said, "Yup, I agree!" But if they were using the S-92 design to justify that "extremely remote" crap, they had no historical base to draw from. If they (SAC) were using an industry-wide base for loss of transmission oil, they STILL were not on solid ground, because such things happen more than extremely remotely. (Admittedly they don't happen often, but "extremely remote" is a defined term.) SAC took the awkward wording of section 29.927(c)(1) and used it to their financial advantage.
So no, the S-92 does not IN FACT meet the requirements of FAR part-29 when it comes to the transmission. I would venture to say that there is no helicopter in existence that would qualify under that "extremely remote" clause. Why do we care? Because when you design an aircraft that's going to take LOTS of people out over some very inhospitable parts of the earth, then you are - and should be - held to a higher standard.
We know now that the S-92 transmission cannot withstand a complete loss of oil. Sikorsky admitted that their testing showed (and Cougar proved in the field) that you get "about" ten minutes of run time with no oil. This is undisputed. What's truly disturbing to me is that so few people seem to care.
To final announce such a u-change here to add emergency lube (
as should have been done in late 2002 even if it meant a delay to the certification) could be seen as tantamount to agreeing that the decisions made behind closed doors in the fall of 2002 were negligent.
On another thread SASless wrote
Government never wants to admit a mistake....even when it is patently clear to everyone involved.
That is a trait that is often shared by individuals & companies too. Yet product safety starts with management behaviour.
However, considering the unique acknowledgement in the TSB report of a certain Sikorsky Manager's postings on a certain 'social network' site on the S-92 loss of lube, and considering all the court cases are now over, perhaps we can see a frank admission on the very same site.
Though at least the Canadian DND are continuing to insist that Sikorsky's MHP has a full 30-minute capability, as per the requirements the S-92 failed to achieve.