Super Puma down central North Sea Feb 2009
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NIMBOSTRATUS,
There is a statement issued by Bond which intimates that they know exactly what caused the accident. Someone has actually posted it on this forum. Read it and all will be much clearer as to why we are posting.
Also I feel that the crew that night were already 90% on the way to an accident, as are we all, given the current lack of regulation and procedures AND by recognising this as the case that crew gets my complete sympathy.
8 x CFIT(W) in last 2 decades (1 x not conclusive - the others are) Thats 16 flight crew all suckered into the same hole.
Surely the procedures employed need looking at. Who do you think will do it. Not the regulators, Not the management. It is us, the people who actually do the job that need to look inward at ourselves and the way we do IT.
If we can do it better -- lets FIX IT.
Wake up and smell the coffee - IT AINT GOOD.
There is a statement issued by Bond which intimates that they know exactly what caused the accident. Someone has actually posted it on this forum. Read it and all will be much clearer as to why we are posting.
Also I feel that the crew that night were already 90% on the way to an accident, as are we all, given the current lack of regulation and procedures AND by recognising this as the case that crew gets my complete sympathy.
8 x CFIT(W) in last 2 decades (1 x not conclusive - the others are) Thats 16 flight crew all suckered into the same hole.
Surely the procedures employed need looking at. Who do you think will do it. Not the regulators, Not the management. It is us, the people who actually do the job that need to look inward at ourselves and the way we do IT.
If we can do it better -- lets FIX IT.
Wake up and smell the coffee - IT AINT GOOD.
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I suspect information on this website and others proved very helpful in writing today's stories in the Daily Record and Aberdeen Press & Journal. I'm not posting the links as both name the Captain.
The Daily Record is pushing an angle on weather reporting based on an earlier 'exclusive'.
The P&J article is pretty much a summary of a post above by (and you have to laugth) reporter Shona Gossip.
The Daily Record is pushing an angle on weather reporting based on an earlier 'exclusive'.
The P&J article is pretty much a summary of a post above by (and you have to laugth) reporter Shona Gossip.
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Ec 225 auto-pilot
On this aircraft, doesn't really matter wether you're flying with ALT (baro-altitude) or Cruise height mode (using radalt).
If you keep coupling modes on, there is no way for you to go into terrain, as the aircraft wil not let you go. Even with only V/S down to the ground, the A/C will level-off at 80 ft.
Of course, if you decide to fly manually, you remove all the safety devices.
The reason why ALT mode is used rather than CRHT, is that the automatic go-around function is very different if your vertical reference is baralt or radalt.
With ALT mode, you go for a "Go Around", and climb to the moon.
With CRHT mode, you go for a "Trans Up", and climb to 300ft, unless you've specified something else.
Hope this helps
If you keep coupling modes on, there is no way for you to go into terrain, as the aircraft wil not let you go. Even with only V/S down to the ground, the A/C will level-off at 80 ft.
Of course, if you decide to fly manually, you remove all the safety devices.
The reason why ALT mode is used rather than CRHT, is that the automatic go-around function is very different if your vertical reference is baralt or radalt.
With ALT mode, you go for a "Go Around", and climb to the moon.
With CRHT mode, you go for a "Trans Up", and climb to 300ft, unless you've specified something else.
Hope this helps
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Apropos of nothing really, but night offshore shuttles have been going on in the Northern North Sea for well over 30 years now. When they started there were no coupled modes available and some were flown single pilot. Since then we have had the advent of modern new radars, 3 and 4 cue autopilots, much more powerful, sophisticated helicopters, CRM and many other supposed-advances. I say supposed, because I wonder if the number of CFIT(W) accidents has actually changed at all? If not, why not? Is it down to training? Are there still too many dinosaurs who don't want to know how to use new technology because "I've always done it this way"? I'm glad to see the advent of new technology, but even with pretty realistic simulators the re still seem to be too many old stick-in-the-muds who don't want us to use the equipment which our companies provide these days. The use of sophisticated equipment needs to be taught, understood and practiced otherwise it can be even more dangerous for the untaught, ignorant and unwary than no equipment at all.
As a matter of interest:
SASless on another thread asked me if Europe had a rule for visual flying that was equivalent to that in FARs. The quick answer is no, there is no equivalent rule; in that respect, FAR 135.207 is a superior text.
However, nothing is quite as simple as that. There are three threads running which are attempting to tease out one simple principle - what represents adequate visual cues for visual contact flying. In FAR 135.207 the objective is set but without a method of compliance. The term adequate visual cues is a combination of: the ability to fly the aircraft by using external cues (inversely proportional to aircraft stability); the ability to see and avoid obstacles; all conditioned by the ability of the pilot (innate skill, training and recency).
For a helicopter to be certificated to fly on instruments, it has to meet the stability requirements of Appendix B of Parts 27 or 29. This requirement is called up from Part 27/29.141(c)
Note that night is also included in the requirement for 'additional characteristics' but nowhere in the airworthiness code is to be found an equivalent appendix. This is dealt within the operational code of some States which require control augmentation - simplistically - by making a requirement for an autopilot with heading and height hold for flight at night.
In passing, it is worth mentioning that this problem is not only confined to night, we have seen a large number of accidents occurring in daylight when the visual cue environment degrades such that control is lost - the most prevalent being inadvertent entry into cloud. This loss of control is insidious (a word which perfectly describes the process)
Most understand that, as the visual cues diminish, it becomes progressively more difficult to maintain control without augmentation. In any case, because it is more difficult to control a helicopter without external visual cues, certification in appendix B is largely concerned with stability – i.e. making the 'mechanics of flying' easier (compare flying a Robinson R22 to an S76 in cloud and on instruments). This permits the (even single) pilot to undertake the other tasks that are associated with navigation and spatial awareness. For a fully automatic flight control system, almost all attention can be provided to the tasks of external scanning and/or navigating when the pilot is flying VFR.
The rules for VFR overwater flight referred to in an earlier post are an attempt at setting the conditions in an environment where visual surface light reference is largely absent. Without external light (in the form of moonlight and/or stars and/or a visible horizon), the pilot can still fly VFR if obstacles can be seen – i.e. because vessels are required to carry light sources. Even though not provided for this purpose, the weather radar has shown itself to be extremely useful for showing obstacles on the sea surface (within tolerable limits) and sight of such obstacles can be anticipated (and distances measured) and missed laterally even if their vertical extent is not known.
The fact is that most flights on the North Sea are conducted under IFR; the issue then is how the transition between IFR and VFR is mandated and managed. There are two alternatives: the pilot lets down from the en-route altitude/FL and, having descended visually below MSA, continues the flight VFR (more usually by day); or an instrument let-down procedure at the destination is utilised.
In order to facilitate an en-route let down, companies can have discrete instrument procedures permitting a descent through MSA to achieve VFR; to ensure that this does not leave the pilot exposed there are limits on the descent altitude - specified in the Operations Manual and accepted by the NAA. These limits are underpinned by a rule which specifies the minimum cloud base and visibility for VFR flight by day and by night.
The only practical instrument let down procedure available (at the moment) is the Airborne Radar Approach (ARA); this procedure is conditioned by the fact that the largest obstacle in the approach area is the destination to which the flight is being conducted. Whilst most instrument procedures rely upon a vertical clearance of obstacles in the approach and missed approach segment, because the pilot is heading towards a large object, the ARA has to rely upon lateral clearance (along an obstacle clear corridor and missed approach segment). In view of this constraint (and simplistically stated), in the latter part of the approach there are three distinct phases: the descent phase (which is in effect the cloud break); the level phase (where the pilot is clear of cloud and driving towards and beyond the MAPt); and the landing phase – this is no different from the point-in-space (PinS) procedures (defined in ICAO) which have ‘proceed visually’ or ‘proceed VFR’ as their final element.
Because of the requirement for lateral avoidance, the procedure has to have either: an offset approach – which, using accurate guidance, takes the pilot a set distance from the target and provides a straight ahead missed approach (this is usually based upon fixed tracks); or the introduction of a divergent heading to ensure that the pilot tracks away from the target - with a turning missed approach from the MAPt; this procedure can be omni-directional and into wind. The length of the level segment should be from the OIP to the MAPt and from the MAPt to landing manoeuvre. The position of the OIP, the heading offset and the MAPt are all based upon margins of error which ensure that a late missed approach will still provide a probable miss distance of 400m from the target (depending of course on how wide the target is).
The procedure should be flown stabilised and the landing manoeuvre commenced only when sufficient references are available to permit the landing pilot to take control and perform the landing. From the previous passages you can see that there is a world of difference between visual sighting of the target and adequate cues to permit a visual contact flying and landing. This is most evident when flying to a single light source which is narrow – like a well-head platform - where, if the approach is flown without assistance (be it from another pilot on instruments or using the automatics), all sorts of twisting and turning of the target can be experienced.
The more assistance that can be made of the automatics (or the second pilot) in the level segment, the less the visual pilot has to fly the aircraft – concentrating instead on ensuring that it is positioned accurately for the landing manoeuvre. Regardless, at some point in these latter phases there has to be a decelerative manoeuvre – if the level phase is conducted at the minimum altitude (200ft by day and 300ft by night), and it is not windy, this decelerative manoeuvre will be whilst the aircraft is level.
At the point where the automatics have to be switched out, perhaps because of speed limitations, the visual pilot will have already decided that there are sufficient visual cues to perform the landing; if there are insufficient cues, or at any time in the level segment if the aircraft becomes unstable, a go-around should be flown. (This is not the missed approach of the ARA - which can only be initiated up to the MAPt.) Because this go-around is likely to take the pilot into reduced visual cues, it will have to be flown on instruments and in line with company procedures – hopefully it will not resemble a recovery from unusual attitudes which is a measure of desperation.
This last paragraph applies equally to approaches which are not instrument let down procedures. There is basically no difference between the last phases of an ARA and an approach which is conducted at night from shuttling (except that the lowest level phase in shuttling is 500ft).
Jim
SASless on another thread asked me if Europe had a rule for visual flying that was equivalent to that in FARs. The quick answer is no, there is no equivalent rule; in that respect, FAR 135.207 is a superior text.
However, nothing is quite as simple as that. There are three threads running which are attempting to tease out one simple principle - what represents adequate visual cues for visual contact flying. In FAR 135.207 the objective is set but without a method of compliance. The term adequate visual cues is a combination of: the ability to fly the aircraft by using external cues (inversely proportional to aircraft stability); the ability to see and avoid obstacles; all conditioned by the ability of the pilot (innate skill, training and recency).
For a helicopter to be certificated to fly on instruments, it has to meet the stability requirements of Appendix B of Parts 27 or 29. This requirement is called up from Part 27/29.141(c)
"Have any additional characteristics required for night or instrument operation, if certification for those kinds of operation is requested. Requirements for helicopter instrument flight are contained in appendix B"
In passing, it is worth mentioning that this problem is not only confined to night, we have seen a large number of accidents occurring in daylight when the visual cue environment degrades such that control is lost - the most prevalent being inadvertent entry into cloud. This loss of control is insidious (a word which perfectly describes the process)
Most understand that, as the visual cues diminish, it becomes progressively more difficult to maintain control without augmentation. In any case, because it is more difficult to control a helicopter without external visual cues, certification in appendix B is largely concerned with stability – i.e. making the 'mechanics of flying' easier (compare flying a Robinson R22 to an S76 in cloud and on instruments). This permits the (even single) pilot to undertake the other tasks that are associated with navigation and spatial awareness. For a fully automatic flight control system, almost all attention can be provided to the tasks of external scanning and/or navigating when the pilot is flying VFR.
The rules for VFR overwater flight referred to in an earlier post are an attempt at setting the conditions in an environment where visual surface light reference is largely absent. Without external light (in the form of moonlight and/or stars and/or a visible horizon), the pilot can still fly VFR if obstacles can be seen – i.e. because vessels are required to carry light sources. Even though not provided for this purpose, the weather radar has shown itself to be extremely useful for showing obstacles on the sea surface (within tolerable limits) and sight of such obstacles can be anticipated (and distances measured) and missed laterally even if their vertical extent is not known.
The fact is that most flights on the North Sea are conducted under IFR; the issue then is how the transition between IFR and VFR is mandated and managed. There are two alternatives: the pilot lets down from the en-route altitude/FL and, having descended visually below MSA, continues the flight VFR (more usually by day); or an instrument let-down procedure at the destination is utilised.
In order to facilitate an en-route let down, companies can have discrete instrument procedures permitting a descent through MSA to achieve VFR; to ensure that this does not leave the pilot exposed there are limits on the descent altitude - specified in the Operations Manual and accepted by the NAA. These limits are underpinned by a rule which specifies the minimum cloud base and visibility for VFR flight by day and by night.
The only practical instrument let down procedure available (at the moment) is the Airborne Radar Approach (ARA); this procedure is conditioned by the fact that the largest obstacle in the approach area is the destination to which the flight is being conducted. Whilst most instrument procedures rely upon a vertical clearance of obstacles in the approach and missed approach segment, because the pilot is heading towards a large object, the ARA has to rely upon lateral clearance (along an obstacle clear corridor and missed approach segment). In view of this constraint (and simplistically stated), in the latter part of the approach there are three distinct phases: the descent phase (which is in effect the cloud break); the level phase (where the pilot is clear of cloud and driving towards and beyond the MAPt); and the landing phase – this is no different from the point-in-space (PinS) procedures (defined in ICAO) which have ‘proceed visually’ or ‘proceed VFR’ as their final element.
Because of the requirement for lateral avoidance, the procedure has to have either: an offset approach – which, using accurate guidance, takes the pilot a set distance from the target and provides a straight ahead missed approach (this is usually based upon fixed tracks); or the introduction of a divergent heading to ensure that the pilot tracks away from the target - with a turning missed approach from the MAPt; this procedure can be omni-directional and into wind. The length of the level segment should be from the OIP to the MAPt and from the MAPt to landing manoeuvre. The position of the OIP, the heading offset and the MAPt are all based upon margins of error which ensure that a late missed approach will still provide a probable miss distance of 400m from the target (depending of course on how wide the target is).
The procedure should be flown stabilised and the landing manoeuvre commenced only when sufficient references are available to permit the landing pilot to take control and perform the landing. From the previous passages you can see that there is a world of difference between visual sighting of the target and adequate cues to permit a visual contact flying and landing. This is most evident when flying to a single light source which is narrow – like a well-head platform - where, if the approach is flown without assistance (be it from another pilot on instruments or using the automatics), all sorts of twisting and turning of the target can be experienced.
The more assistance that can be made of the automatics (or the second pilot) in the level segment, the less the visual pilot has to fly the aircraft – concentrating instead on ensuring that it is positioned accurately for the landing manoeuvre. Regardless, at some point in these latter phases there has to be a decelerative manoeuvre – if the level phase is conducted at the minimum altitude (200ft by day and 300ft by night), and it is not windy, this decelerative manoeuvre will be whilst the aircraft is level.
At the point where the automatics have to be switched out, perhaps because of speed limitations, the visual pilot will have already decided that there are sufficient visual cues to perform the landing; if there are insufficient cues, or at any time in the level segment if the aircraft becomes unstable, a go-around should be flown. (This is not the missed approach of the ARA - which can only be initiated up to the MAPt.) Because this go-around is likely to take the pilot into reduced visual cues, it will have to be flown on instruments and in line with company procedures – hopefully it will not resemble a recovery from unusual attitudes which is a measure of desperation.
This last paragraph applies equally to approaches which are not instrument let down procedures. There is basically no difference between the last phases of an ARA and an approach which is conducted at night from shuttling (except that the lowest level phase in shuttling is 500ft).
Jim
Phone Wind
Don't forget, CFIT (W) occurred 30 years ago as well. There were 3 night CFIT accidents offshore between 1979 and 1982, resulting in the loss of 9 lives.
There wasn't another similar accident until Cormorant Alpha in 1992, then again, a welcome break from such happenings until 2006, since which time we've had another 3 !
What is causing these spate of accidents is difficult to say. It may go hand in hand with an increase in night flying, but I have no statistics for the amount of night flying conducted year on year. We flew a lot in the early 80's as the North Sea was built up, then flying sectors generally peaked in about 1990's. While generally quiet (compared to the 70's and 80's) we are stretching the aircraft out to longer days now. It is true to say that there haven't been many CFIT(W) accidents in daylight. None really, although one occurred at early dawn in poor viz.
New technology will get you in close but you've still got to manually take over to land and that is where pretty much all of these accidents have occurred. There is a lot of talk with this Etap accident regarding ARA's and the weather at the time - From what I read however, it seems the crew were pretty much visual with the landing area the whole time. Nothing went particularly wrong with the approach, but it was that last minute, from approach to landing, from an instrument biased approach to a visual manoeuver to land that went awry - And that is something that will always be there to bite us.
There wasn't another similar accident until Cormorant Alpha in 1992, then again, a welcome break from such happenings until 2006, since which time we've had another 3 !
What is causing these spate of accidents is difficult to say. It may go hand in hand with an increase in night flying, but I have no statistics for the amount of night flying conducted year on year. We flew a lot in the early 80's as the North Sea was built up, then flying sectors generally peaked in about 1990's. While generally quiet (compared to the 70's and 80's) we are stretching the aircraft out to longer days now. It is true to say that there haven't been many CFIT(W) accidents in daylight. None really, although one occurred at early dawn in poor viz.
New technology will get you in close but you've still got to manually take over to land and that is where pretty much all of these accidents have occurred. There is a lot of talk with this Etap accident regarding ARA's and the weather at the time - From what I read however, it seems the crew were pretty much visual with the landing area the whole time. Nothing went particularly wrong with the approach, but it was that last minute, from approach to landing, from an instrument biased approach to a visual manoeuver to land that went awry - And that is something that will always be there to bite us.
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Special 25
Don't forget the Scilly's S61 crash in 83...not offshore oil but offshore crew on detachment..CFIT into the sea in poor vis. 20 killed.
Totally agree. That's why it's the final hands on visual ref. part that we all need to be practised in.
Don't forget the Scilly's S61 crash in 83...not offshore oil but offshore crew on detachment..CFIT into the sea in poor vis. 20 killed.
Nothing went particularly wrong with the approach, but it was that last minute, from approach to landing, from an instrument biased approach to a visual manoeuver to land that went awry - And that is something that will always be there to bite us.
There wasn't another similar accident until Cormorant Alpha in 1992, then again, a welcome break from such happenings until 2006, since which time we've had another 3
Yes agreed - My figures are really just about UK Offshore work.
If you look just last year there were two accidents in the Arabian Gulf, one a 212, the other a AB139, both at night (OK, some unusual circumstances for one, but the other, an experienced pilot trying to take off from a typical deck at night and I believe (although I haven't read an official report) drifting backwards clipping the tail.
Then there is the EMS world in America which is just reviewing ops at night following a whole string of accidents, and under pressure from Insurance companies (amongst others), who have had to make such a ridiculous amount of pay-outs. I accept Night EMS is not the same as offshore night.
My only point is, there is a problem here - Little doubt of that. The question is, can we resolve this issue with training, legislation and equipment ? Following Morecombe Bay, I think some would have argued yes, but Etap was a well trained crew, in the very latest aircraft, to one of the largest platforms in the North Sea, with the very best deck lighting.
You draw your own conclusions ............
If you look just last year there were two accidents in the Arabian Gulf, one a 212, the other a AB139, both at night (OK, some unusual circumstances for one, but the other, an experienced pilot trying to take off from a typical deck at night and I believe (although I haven't read an official report) drifting backwards clipping the tail.
Then there is the EMS world in America which is just reviewing ops at night following a whole string of accidents, and under pressure from Insurance companies (amongst others), who have had to make such a ridiculous amount of pay-outs. I accept Night EMS is not the same as offshore night.
My only point is, there is a problem here - Little doubt of that. The question is, can we resolve this issue with training, legislation and equipment ? Following Morecombe Bay, I think some would have argued yes, but Etap was a well trained crew, in the very latest aircraft, to one of the largest platforms in the North Sea, with the very best deck lighting.
You draw your own conclusions ............
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Jigsaw
Any news on the actual rescue?some one said the time between going down and the Jigsaw craft getting to them was a long time,also the ARRC?.
Anyone got any news on that?.
CRUD12001
Anyone got any news on that?.
CRUD12001
I am led to believe that a mainland SAR crew would probably have taken less time to effect a rescue than did the Jigsaw but I don't know how much night training they do for the job and it is better to take a little time rather than end up in the water alongside them.
A point of C2 was highlighted since the rig acted as On Scene Commander which rather put the Nimrod's crews noses out of joint - a good learning point for them since civilians don't have to adhere to military SOPs.
A point of C2 was highlighted since the rig acted as On Scene Commander which rather put the Nimrod's crews noses out of joint - a good learning point for them since civilians don't have to adhere to military SOPs.
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I wonder how people have had a 'moment' offshore at night, where something happened which went unreported. This could be anything from a momentary loss of height / speed which was picked up by the 2nd crew, or a botched landing leading to a go-around.
If we had an amnesty on that, I wonder how many 'events' there would be.
If we had an amnesty on that, I wonder how many 'events' there would be.
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There shouldn't be a need for an amnesty on such reports if the company reporting culture is correct. As part of a properly managed SMS, pilots should feel "comfortable" enough to report any "near misses" or transgressions without fear of recrimination. It is by studying such reports and reviewing the circumstance by which the situation arose that procedures and policies can be developed/amended to improve the safety of operations.
Pilots should be encouraged to report situations where they felt less than comfortable whilst flying in accordance with whatever company or regulatory procedures were in force at the time.
As DeltaNg has said, I wonder how many of us have had a "moment" whilst flying at any time, particularly when offshore at night. If these "moments" are recorded, I'm sure that a theme would soon emerge which would then help to develop appropriate changes to prevent the "moments" becoming nightmares!
Pilots should be encouraged to report situations where they felt less than comfortable whilst flying in accordance with whatever company or regulatory procedures were in force at the time.
As DeltaNg has said, I wonder how many of us have had a "moment" whilst flying at any time, particularly when offshore at night. If these "moments" are recorded, I'm sure that a theme would soon emerge which would then help to develop appropriate changes to prevent the "moments" becoming nightmares!
Crab,
Two things you seem to always mention....
Civvies take longer on the job than the RAF.
What kind of training do the Civvies do for .......name any task in discussion.
If the Civvie aircraft is on site and the Civvie Rescue craft are on site and the Civvie Scene Commander is comfortable with the situation.....that being all hands accounted for and SAR units in physical contact with all the victims then why the Out of Joint noses?
If the search was on-going....the victims had not been found....RAF/RN SAR units were being introduced into the search then perhaps the RAF Nimrod would be the better choice.
Was that the case here?
Two things you seem to always mention....
Civvies take longer on the job than the RAF.
What kind of training do the Civvies do for .......name any task in discussion.
If the Civvie aircraft is on site and the Civvie Rescue craft are on site and the Civvie Scene Commander is comfortable with the situation.....that being all hands accounted for and SAR units in physical contact with all the victims then why the Out of Joint noses?
If the search was on-going....the victims had not been found....RAF/RN SAR units were being introduced into the search then perhaps the RAF Nimrod would be the better choice.
Was that the case here?
Sasless - crud12001 was the one who raised the time to rescue issue - I was just suggesting a possible reason for it.
As I said, I don't know how much night wet winch training the jigsaw crews do - it might be lot, it might not but it could have had a bearing on the time to rescue.
The Nimrod is usually deployed to act as On Scene Commander but since the crash occurred within 500m of the rig who were visual with it, they (the rig)took the responsibility (and quite rightly so). I just mentioned it because it highlights a disconnect between mil and civvie thinking, even though we should all be guided by the IAMSAR manual.
As I said, I don't know how much night wet winch training the jigsaw crews do - it might be lot, it might not but it could have had a bearing on the time to rescue.
The Nimrod is usually deployed to act as On Scene Commander but since the crash occurred within 500m of the rig who were visual with it, they (the rig)took the responsibility (and quite rightly so). I just mentioned it because it highlights a disconnect between mil and civvie thinking, even though we should all be guided by the IAMSAR manual.
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DeltaNg;
I certainly have. Offshore based at the end of the last century, For 5 days the wind had been constant and we were always shuttling between the same 4 platforms. My approach, my colleague just happened to mention that I always made the same approach, same gate, speed etc. Coming alongside the deck to transition sideways and down when we got a 100ft warning. It was a low deck, but not that low and we weren't on the deck when the warning went off. We went round despite having good visual (viz about 3k in heavy rain, 30kt at night) Neither of us know what caused it, but it shook us both rigid. Aircraft a 332.
Similar aircraft 6 months later. Other pilot handling we took off and he descended fast. I took it and I reckon we missed the sea by 30'. He had become mesmerised by the lights of a different platform. Pitch black, no horizon, the rig appeared to him to move down the screen which made him think he was climbing, in fact we were descending at an increasing nose up attitude. He had little OS night experience and tried to use the external clues rather than the instruments.
Shook us both. At his suggestion we went to training and they were great. It was a new gotcha and they helped us to understand it and sent him back on his way with a good lesson learned.
Anyone remember the 214 off the Petrojarl. It was after that we had to fly a departure on instrument rating renewals which involved recovery from rearward flight. Bloody hard the first time, but an interesting exercise.
I certainly have. Offshore based at the end of the last century, For 5 days the wind had been constant and we were always shuttling between the same 4 platforms. My approach, my colleague just happened to mention that I always made the same approach, same gate, speed etc. Coming alongside the deck to transition sideways and down when we got a 100ft warning. It was a low deck, but not that low and we weren't on the deck when the warning went off. We went round despite having good visual (viz about 3k in heavy rain, 30kt at night) Neither of us know what caused it, but it shook us both rigid. Aircraft a 332.
Similar aircraft 6 months later. Other pilot handling we took off and he descended fast. I took it and I reckon we missed the sea by 30'. He had become mesmerised by the lights of a different platform. Pitch black, no horizon, the rig appeared to him to move down the screen which made him think he was climbing, in fact we were descending at an increasing nose up attitude. He had little OS night experience and tried to use the external clues rather than the instruments.
Shook us both. At his suggestion we went to training and they were great. It was a new gotcha and they helped us to understand it and sent him back on his way with a good lesson learned.
Anyone remember the 214 off the Petrojarl. It was after that we had to fly a departure on instrument rating renewals which involved recovery from rearward flight. Bloody hard the first time, but an interesting exercise.
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I don't know the actual time from the Puma's impact with the sea to the Jigsaw a/c being overhead but I would estimate an hour. The a/c is based on the Miller Platform to the North of ETAP about 45-50mins flying time away.
The fast rescue boat involved is based on a supply boat sized mother ship which patrols in an area specified by a computer program which takes into account wind, tide and sea state. It would not normally be beside ETAP. There is no rescue craft based on ETAP so rescue by boat could also take 1hr plus so crew and passengers have to be dressed properly to survive 1 hr plus in the N Sea in Winter.
In this case they were very lucky to be able to get into the liferafts and not end up in the sea for 1hr plus.
The fast rescue boat involved is based on a supply boat sized mother ship which patrols in an area specified by a computer program which takes into account wind, tide and sea state. It would not normally be beside ETAP. There is no rescue craft based on ETAP so rescue by boat could also take 1hr plus so crew and passengers have to be dressed properly to survive 1 hr plus in the N Sea in Winter.
In this case they were very lucky to be able to get into the liferafts and not end up in the sea for 1hr plus.