Curious 365 incident
Thread Starter
Curious 365 incident
I have just read the January CAA Ocurrence Report Digest and was struck by this Dauphin N3 report:
I'm curious by the notion that one would simply start up and continue as if nothing had happened - engines don't just flame out.
I'm curious that it was not assumed that 30 second power had been used - it would generally be accepted as being if an engine fails in a high power situation (such as taking off.)
Does the N3 have the Arriel 2C2, or the 2C1? If the latter then surely a module 3 and 4 change was required, or has the maintenance procedure been amended since its introduction - previously there was no cumulative 30 second power useage allowed, inspection or otherwise.
Strange how such events can hide innocuously amongst the "manifest in error by 20 kg" or "spurious chip warning" type reports, without further comment or remark.
Following a normal start and lift into hover, the nr2 engine flamed out during transition to forward flight. The a/c landed without incident and a visual inspection found no damage. Engines restarted and flight resumed with no recurrence.
However, later in the day, when starting the nr1 engine, the 30 second 'OEI Hi' light was observed flashing.
Subsequent engineering investigation, including full borescope inspection of the nr2 engine, found no defects or damage. The manufacturer was contacted about the 'OEI Hi' light and a NTO was issued
However, later in the day, when starting the nr1 engine, the 30 second 'OEI Hi' light was observed flashing.
Subsequent engineering investigation, including full borescope inspection of the nr2 engine, found no defects or damage. The manufacturer was contacted about the 'OEI Hi' light and a NTO was issued
I'm curious that it was not assumed that 30 second power had been used - it would generally be accepted as being if an engine fails in a high power situation (such as taking off.)
Does the N3 have the Arriel 2C2, or the 2C1? If the latter then surely a module 3 and 4 change was required, or has the maintenance procedure been amended since its introduction - previously there was no cumulative 30 second power useage allowed, inspection or otherwise.
Strange how such events can hide innocuously amongst the "manifest in error by 20 kg" or "spurious chip warning" type reports, without further comment or remark.
Strange how that happens- 
Just Joking but sometime it seems ---
Scenario A:
Before departure at high noon from an offshore platform - a burnt out nav light is observed - Mel consulted - log book entry made, ATC informed that the A/C will be operating with no Starboard Nav light - A/C RTB at low level with nil pax.
Pilots' reputation for steady nerve and adherence to SOP lauded in company news letter. Small brass plaque presented.
Scenario B:
On take off from platform @ CDP # 2 Engine explodes - ac flown successfully back to base.
Pilots' reputation suffers for - A) using 30 sec power on the #1 engine,
B) Scaring the passengers. C) Grounding the A/C by making the entry -" # 2 engine exploded - fire successfully extinguished with discharge of #2 Main and reserve fire ext. 30 Sec limits used on #1 engine. Pilot and co-pilot seats require deep cleaning."
Just Joking but sometime it seems ---
Scenario A:
Before departure at high noon from an offshore platform - a burnt out nav light is observed - Mel consulted - log book entry made, ATC informed that the A/C will be operating with no Starboard Nav light - A/C RTB at low level with nil pax.
Pilots' reputation for steady nerve and adherence to SOP lauded in company news letter. Small brass plaque presented.
Scenario B:
On take off from platform @ CDP # 2 Engine explodes - ac flown successfully back to base.
Pilots' reputation suffers for - A) using 30 sec power on the #1 engine,
B) Scaring the passengers. C) Grounding the A/C by making the entry -" # 2 engine exploded - fire successfully extinguished with discharge of #2 Main and reserve fire ext. 30 Sec limits used on #1 engine. Pilot and co-pilot seats require deep cleaning."
Thread Starter
My point was that this was not a 'scenario B' - it is reported as a flame out for no apparent reason during take off, after landing the engine was restarted and the day continued as if nothing happened.
I would have expected to see details in the report not along the lines of 'no broken aerials, tyres kicked and ok, so engine restarted and flight continued,' but describing maintenance fuel system checks, FADEC connections etc etc, then post maintenance checks carried out satisfactorily and aircraft returned to service. Plus some statement justifying how the continuing airworthiness process will keep future failures to an acceptable rate.
I would have expected to see details in the report not along the lines of 'no broken aerials, tyres kicked and ok, so engine restarted and flight continued,' but describing maintenance fuel system checks, FADEC connections etc etc, then post maintenance checks carried out satisfactorily and aircraft returned to service. Plus some statement justifying how the continuing airworthiness process will keep future failures to an acceptable rate.
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I read this one and was VERY surprised at the pilot's actions. A flame out like this would have had me calling ECUK and chatting to the engineers, not re-starting and having another go without at least checking.
212man,
How about an incident where a fuel low warning light comes on shortly after takeoff.....pilot aborts the flight....returns to the takeoff location....idles the engines back....consults the checklists....thumbs through the screen displays....the light goes out.....does not call the engineers over to the aircraft.....then throttles up....departs again....and gets the fuel low light again...continues on.....has a loss of pressure followed by a flame out....takes a long time to lower the collective and cooks an engine.
Sound like a sound practice?
How about an incident where a fuel low warning light comes on shortly after takeoff.....pilot aborts the flight....returns to the takeoff location....idles the engines back....consults the checklists....thumbs through the screen displays....the light goes out.....does not call the engineers over to the aircraft.....then throttles up....departs again....and gets the fuel low light again...continues on.....has a loss of pressure followed by a flame out....takes a long time to lower the collective and cooks an engine.
Sound like a sound practice?
Thread Starter
No it doesn't - next question please. Your point was?
Btw whatever the wrongs or rights of the crew decision in that incident, it was caused by a DOUBLE jet pump blockage in one fuel tank group. The theory took a long time to prove. Doesn't alter the nature of the incident in the thread topic though.
Btw whatever the wrongs or rights of the crew decision in that incident, it was caused by a DOUBLE jet pump blockage in one fuel tank group. The theory took a long time to prove. Doesn't alter the nature of the incident in the thread topic though.
Continued flight after a precautionary landing without seeking engineering input....same as in the incident in discussion springs to mind.
Let's dig up a lot of these and compare them.....perhaps there are some lessons to be learned.
Let's dig up a lot of these and compare them.....perhaps there are some lessons to be learned.
Thread Starter
so you never flew a 212 with a conflicting fuel quantity indication and fuel low caution? Rest assured, when the crew you refer to had their flame out, that aircraft was pulled apart after landing trying to find an answer. There is little or no similarity to the thread topic other than you taking cheap shots at a certain BHL manager you openly dislike.
If anything, I started this thread for the benefit of the CAA individuals who administer this process to point out - "what's that all about?". They were quite happy in a previous report digest to hammer pax carrying emergency PLBs on North Sea flights, so the response to this report seems a tad lame. Call me old fashioned!
If anything, I started this thread for the benefit of the CAA individuals who administer this process to point out - "what's that all about?". They were quite happy in a previous report digest to hammer pax carrying emergency PLBs on North Sea flights, so the response to this report seems a tad lame. Call me old fashioned!
Actually.....never did fly a 212 with that situation. Did fly some without a fuel quantity indicator at all.
I simply see a similarity in the two incidents.
As you suggest, the CAA or other authority should read these things and see other issues that beg questioning by what is said about the occurrence. I read many incident reports from Bristow that I found begged a second and different look beyond the issue that generated the report.
The practice I was questioning was encountering a mechanical problem, landing at a maintenance base, then departing again without consulting the engineers.
Thus, I submit even "professional" operators sometimes have incidents that fall within the scope of your concern as voiced in the start of this thread.
I did not name the crew, the operator, the aircraft type, country of occurrence, or the year it happened, and consider my comment to be as generic as one can be, so I fail to see how you can construe my post to be slanging off a particular person.
Funny how you think you know what I was thinking when I brought that up...I did not know you were clairvoyant.
I simply see a similarity in the two incidents.
As you suggest, the CAA or other authority should read these things and see other issues that beg questioning by what is said about the occurrence. I read many incident reports from Bristow that I found begged a second and different look beyond the issue that generated the report.
The practice I was questioning was encountering a mechanical problem, landing at a maintenance base, then departing again without consulting the engineers.
Thus, I submit even "professional" operators sometimes have incidents that fall within the scope of your concern as voiced in the start of this thread.
I did not name the crew, the operator, the aircraft type, country of occurrence, or the year it happened, and consider my comment to be as generic as one can be, so I fail to see how you can construe my post to be slanging off a particular person.
Funny how you think you know what I was thinking when I brought that up...I did not know you were clairvoyant.
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It does appear a mite odd... N3s are equipped with the 2C2C (a pair of them, actually).
However, it doesn't say who conducted the visual inspection on the engine in the initial posting, there's very little a pilot can look at other than harrumphing at the intake, exhaust, fluids on the deck, and tug knowingly on wiring harnesses and the odd fluid line. It also doesn't say where they were when it happened, nor the type of landing. Maybe they were at a remote site, contacted engineering who told them to do a visual. Were it me, I would have been suspicious of the DECU or something else related to fuel control as a cause of initial flameout. The point is that based solely upon the information in the initial posting, none of us really know what, if any, engineering input was given after the initial flameout.
As far as flying characteristics, depending upon the loading, the takeoff/landing environment, and numerous other factors, the N3 isn't particularly challenging to put down without exceeding an engine limit as long as you're flying on profile, but that's not to say it can't or doesn't happen.
It does strike me as peculiar that they restarted both engines once with no exceedance indications, flew it around (apparently) and then had an exceedance on the subsequent start.
Beats me... I choose response e) problem can not be solved with the information given.
However, it doesn't say who conducted the visual inspection on the engine in the initial posting, there's very little a pilot can look at other than harrumphing at the intake, exhaust, fluids on the deck, and tug knowingly on wiring harnesses and the odd fluid line. It also doesn't say where they were when it happened, nor the type of landing. Maybe they were at a remote site, contacted engineering who told them to do a visual. Were it me, I would have been suspicious of the DECU or something else related to fuel control as a cause of initial flameout. The point is that based solely upon the information in the initial posting, none of us really know what, if any, engineering input was given after the initial flameout.
As far as flying characteristics, depending upon the loading, the takeoff/landing environment, and numerous other factors, the N3 isn't particularly challenging to put down without exceeding an engine limit as long as you're flying on profile, but that's not to say it can't or doesn't happen.
It does strike me as peculiar that they restarted both engines once with no exceedance indications, flew it around (apparently) and then had an exceedance on the subsequent start.
Beats me... I choose response e) problem can not be solved with the information given.
I think I would have had all the water drains open for samples.
Which reminds me of an American rig on the blower to Schreiner ops Rotterdam requesting permission to send in some samples on the next flight.
Schreiner ops reply was that was fine as long as they were all dead!!!!!!
Bemused silence from the rig. (Dutch for sample being monster).
As the late Frankie Howerd would have said
NO, Oh well please yourselves
Which reminds me of an American rig on the blower to Schreiner ops Rotterdam requesting permission to send in some samples on the next flight.
Schreiner ops reply was that was fine as long as they were all dead!!!!!!
Bemused silence from the rig. (Dutch for sample being monster).
As the late Frankie Howerd would have said
NO, Oh well please yourselves
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um...lifting,
I think you're getting a little confused. The 365N2 is equipped with 2 Arriel 1C2s, but the 365N3 is equipped with 2 Arriel 2Cs. I think the only Eurocopter Dauphin family member (sort of anyway) with the Arriel 2C2 is the latest EC155B1. This like the similar Arriel 2S2 engines in the S76C++ also permits up to 15 seconds of operation in the 30 second power range without the need to visit a factory engine shop.
I think you're getting a little confused. The 365N2 is equipped with 2 Arriel 1C2s, but the 365N3 is equipped with 2 Arriel 2Cs. I think the only Eurocopter Dauphin family member (sort of anyway) with the Arriel 2C2 is the latest EC155B1. This like the similar Arriel 2S2 engines in the S76C++ also permits up to 15 seconds of operation in the 30 second power range without the need to visit a factory engine shop.
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MamaPut-
I stand corrected. If I hadn't bothered to look in my RFM, I probably would have gotten it correct, but I transcribed incorrectly. I very nearly never trust myself to get engine designations correct.
The cobbled-together USCG HH-65C is sort of like a N3 and sort of like a EC155. It has 2C2-CG (whatever that means) engines and a four-bladed main head, but to my knowledge, still has the 11-bladed tail rotor (haven't seen one lately).
I stand corrected. If I hadn't bothered to look in my RFM, I probably would have gotten it correct, but I transcribed incorrectly. I very nearly never trust myself to get engine designations correct.
The cobbled-together USCG HH-65C is sort of like a N3 and sort of like a EC155. It has 2C2-CG (whatever that means) engines and a four-bladed main head, but to my knowledge, still has the 11-bladed tail rotor (haven't seen one lately).
Scenario A
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"I would bollock pilot for mis-reading MEL possibly - nav lights not required at high noon? Anti-coll will suffice. Well, in my humble MEL ...."
GEEZ GUYS - It was a joke and was prompted by 212man's comment - excuse me for forgetting how serious these forums are.
"Strange how such events can hide innocuously amongst the "manifest in error by 20 kg" or "spurious chip warning" type reports, without further comment or remark. "
FYI in Malaysia - serviceable nav lights are required at all times. I kid you not.
Oh well - back to the half filled stadium of reality.
No more jokes I promise. (until the next time )
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"I would bollock pilot for mis-reading MEL possibly - nav lights not required at high noon? Anti-coll will suffice. Well, in my humble MEL ...."
GEEZ GUYS - It was a joke and was prompted by 212man's comment - excuse me for forgetting how serious these forums are.
"Strange how such events can hide innocuously amongst the "manifest in error by 20 kg" or "spurious chip warning" type reports, without further comment or remark. "
FYI in Malaysia - serviceable nav lights are required at all times. I kid you not.
Oh well - back to the half filled stadium of reality.
No more jokes I promise. (until the next time )
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212man, you're lucky it got any mention at all. In Aussie, an engine failure at CDP on a rig take off gets no public mention in the authorities reporting at all.
AS Copied from the CANADIAN AIM
“reportable aviation incident” means an incident resulting
directly from the operation of an airplane having a maximum
certificated takeoff weight greater than 5 700 kg, or from
the operation of a rotorcraft having a maximum certificated
takeoff weight greater than 2 250 kg, where
(a) an engine fails or is shut down as a precautionary
measure;
(b) a transmission gearbox malfunction occurs;
(c) smoke or fire occurs;
(d) difficulties in controlling the aircraft are encountered
owing to any aircraft system malfunction, weather
phenomena, wake turbulence, uncontrolled vibrations or
operations outside the flight envelope;
(e) the aircraft fails to remain within the intended landing
or takeoff area, lands with all or part of the landing gear
retracted or drags a wing tip, an engine pod or any other
part of the aircraft;
(f) any crew member whose duties are directly related to the
safe operation of the aircraft is unable to perform the crew
member’s duties as a result of a physical incapacitation
that poses a threat to the safety of any person, property or
the environment;
(g) depressurization occurs that necessitates an
emergency descent;
(h) a fuel shortage occurs that necessitates a diversion or
requires approach and landing priority at the destination
of the aircraft;
(i) the aircraft is refuelled with the incorrect type of fuel or
contaminated fuel;
(j) a collision, a risk of collision or a loss of
separation occurs;
(k) a crew member declares an emergency or indicates any
degree of emergency that requires priority handling by an
air traffic control unit or the standing by of emergency
response services;
(l) a slung load is released unintentionally or as a precautionary
or emergency measure from the aircraft; or
(m) any dangerous goods are released in or from the aircraft.
Our Company "reportable incident" list is even longer.
“reportable aviation incident” means an incident resulting
directly from the operation of an airplane having a maximum
certificated takeoff weight greater than 5 700 kg, or from
the operation of a rotorcraft having a maximum certificated
takeoff weight greater than 2 250 kg, where
(a) an engine fails or is shut down as a precautionary
measure;
(b) a transmission gearbox malfunction occurs;
(c) smoke or fire occurs;
(d) difficulties in controlling the aircraft are encountered
owing to any aircraft system malfunction, weather
phenomena, wake turbulence, uncontrolled vibrations or
operations outside the flight envelope;
(e) the aircraft fails to remain within the intended landing
or takeoff area, lands with all or part of the landing gear
retracted or drags a wing tip, an engine pod or any other
part of the aircraft;
(f) any crew member whose duties are directly related to the
safe operation of the aircraft is unable to perform the crew
member’s duties as a result of a physical incapacitation
that poses a threat to the safety of any person, property or
the environment;
(g) depressurization occurs that necessitates an
emergency descent;
(h) a fuel shortage occurs that necessitates a diversion or
requires approach and landing priority at the destination
of the aircraft;
(i) the aircraft is refuelled with the incorrect type of fuel or
contaminated fuel;
(j) a collision, a risk of collision or a loss of
separation occurs;
(k) a crew member declares an emergency or indicates any
degree of emergency that requires priority handling by an
air traffic control unit or the standing by of emergency
response services;
(l) a slung load is released unintentionally or as a precautionary
or emergency measure from the aircraft; or
(m) any dangerous goods are released in or from the aircraft.
Our Company "reportable incident" list is even longer.
(h) a fuel shortage occurs that necessitates a diversion or
requires approach and landing priority at the destination
of the aircraft;
requires approach and landing priority at the destination
of the aircraft;