PHI Crash in Louisiana Jan 2009 - 8 Dead, 1 Injured
From a Sikorsky Press Release yesterday telling of PHI's 60th year of operation and telling of the long association of Sikorsky and PHI. Mentioned the PHI Fleet has 43 S-76's and 10 S-92's.
Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., based in Stratford, Conn., is a world leader in helicopter design, manufacture, and service. The company's long commitment to safety and innovation is reflected in its mission statement: "We pioneer flight solutions that bring people home everywhere ... every timeTM." United Technologies Corp., based in Hartford, Conn., provides a broad range of high-technology products and support services to the aerospace and building systems industries.
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Sikorsky have a system that has been developed to bring the FDR up to EASA standards. It has I believe been FAA approved and the EASA approval is under way.
They are using three cameras in the glare shield.
They are using three cameras in the glare shield.
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The Sikorsky system is a fudge that only makes up for the fact the C++ FDR does not meet the JAR-OPS 3 requirements - they only realised there was a requirement after the first aircraft went to the UK.
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Shell Management said, "....the C++ FDR does not meet the JAR-OPS 3 requirements - they only realised there was a requirement after the first aircraft went to the UK."
Isn't that a self-serving piece of drivel, if you truly are a part os "Shell management"? You speak as if the aircraft made itself and flew to Europe, snuck into service and was then discovered to be sub-standard!
Was that aircraft bought, paid for, specified, built, delivered and introduced to service by operating dolts who opened the box in Europe, to discover it was wrongly built? Or did everyone in the chain allow a grand fathered design into service? Please do not tell me that a 332L has a compliant system and a new C++ does not!
Isn't that a self-serving piece of drivel, if you truly are a part os "Shell management"? You speak as if the aircraft made itself and flew to Europe, snuck into service and was then discovered to be sub-standard!
Was that aircraft bought, paid for, specified, built, delivered and introduced to service by operating dolts who opened the box in Europe, to discover it was wrongly built? Or did everyone in the chain allow a grand fathered design into service? Please do not tell me that a 332L has a compliant system and a new C++ does not!
Who spec'd the aircraft?
Last time I checked the guy who writes the check spells out how he wants the aircraft equipped and what avionics/electronic systems are to be installed.
Of course with the changes going on with CAA, JARs, and now EASA....why ever should there be any confusion?
Last time I checked the guy who writes the check spells out how he wants the aircraft equipped and what avionics/electronic systems are to be installed.
Of course with the changes going on with CAA, JARs, and now EASA....why ever should there be any confusion?
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Gentleman
I think you will find compliance with the regulations fairly high in most contracts. But reading the appropriate local regulations rather than assuming the FAA knows best does help achieve compliance.
In the case of the Amelia 76 assuming the FAA regs are sufficient is also rather relavent. Think on.
And noodles - yes it does as does the EC155B1s serving Shell in the SNS.
I think you will find compliance with the regulations fairly high in most contracts. But reading the appropriate local regulations rather than assuming the FAA knows best does help achieve compliance.
In the case of the Amelia 76 assuming the FAA regs are sufficient is also rather relavent. Think on.
And noodles - yes it does as does the EC155B1s serving Shell in the SNS.
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Its all great reading but when put up againist the reality of some companies that take 4-6 months to repairs their AWOS machines on one hand, then complain about the reduced loads for additional fuel because thier WX machines are out. I doubt they could read or understand JAR-OPS
Others have helipads so poorly located that a performance 1 helicopter requirements would only be met on about 20% of the landings due to adverse winds or multiple obstructions . And they are not stopping the 80% of flights that are not able to have performance 1 .
Or the best one I have seen in a long time is Its a storm evacuation so all the "safety" rules are "waived"
So with companies like that its pretty easy that they can not keep all track of what they want againist what they are actually doing. When they write out specs.
Others have helipads so poorly located that a performance 1 helicopter requirements would only be met on about 20% of the landings due to adverse winds or multiple obstructions . And they are not stopping the 80% of flights that are not able to have performance 1 .
Or the best one I have seen in a long time is Its a storm evacuation so all the "safety" rules are "waived"
So with companies like that its pretty easy that they can not keep all track of what they want againist what they are actually doing. When they write out specs.
The Sikorsky system is a fudge that only makes up for the fact the C++ FDR does not meet the JAR-OPS 3 requirements - they only realised there was a requirement after the first aircraft went to the UK.
I’m not aware of any platform manufacturer that builds CVR’s or FDR’s, so a vender unit that meets current airworthiness requirements is offered as a baseline or customer option. OPS regulations change over time, so what is good today might not necessarily be good tomorrow.
As has been suggested on this thread, there is a fix currently installed, although I believe the STC is still awaiting approval pending final tweaks?
The amendment date of JAR-OPS 3 that included the required parameters was Amendment 3 effective on April 4th 2004. At this time the parameters moved from being in guidance to being part of the rule.
Perhaps this problem occurred because the aircraft was spec'ed in the US when it was intended, eventually, to go on to the UK register.
Jim
Perhaps this problem occurred because the aircraft was spec'ed in the US when it was intended, eventually, to go on to the UK register.
Jim
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So the cameras on the S76 are just being approved in 2009,
the rule was effective 2004 (before Copterliner) and
JimL please help me, the rule making started in 200x
Sound to me like the Type Certificate holder took their eye off the ball and missed something that would be a rule in a relatively large operating environment.
It also sounds to me like JAR-OPS 3 is enforced by toothless tigers.
the rule was effective 2004 (before Copterliner) and
JimL please help me, the rule making started in 200x
Sound to me like the Type Certificate holder took their eye off the ball and missed something that would be a rule in a relatively large operating environment.
It also sounds to me like JAR-OPS 3 is enforced by toothless tigers.
Zalt,
The work started on the revision and the change of status from guidance to rule about 2001 - manufacturers were on the committee which had oversight of the work.
Rather more complicated than it appears. The changeover to the glass cockpit required an interface and/or a bus that could make the parameters available.
Retrofitting, once the problem was brought to light, would have been an expensive proposition for what is to be a discontinued range and, where, for other than the JAA (the USA for example) no FDR was required (and if fitted would not have to meet the latest ICAO/JAR requirements).
Better then that the cameras provided recording of the flight instrument displays - particularly as they would also be of a type that could meet the (relatively new) ED112 requirements. A good solution all round.
Yes, the TCH holder took their eye off the ball - mostly because they lost their regulatory expert (committee member) to 'health issues'. Once the discrepancy had come to light (and it is not clear that there was any 'agenda') all had to work together to provide a solution in the shortest time possible. This involved the sourcing of relatively new equipment and trialling it to ensure it met the ED112 Standards.
All who have been involved in these types of issues know that it is better to all work to a common solution than to dig their heels in and ground aircraft.
Toothles tigers - probably not in this case.
Jim
The work started on the revision and the change of status from guidance to rule about 2001 - manufacturers were on the committee which had oversight of the work.
Rather more complicated than it appears. The changeover to the glass cockpit required an interface and/or a bus that could make the parameters available.
Retrofitting, once the problem was brought to light, would have been an expensive proposition for what is to be a discontinued range and, where, for other than the JAA (the USA for example) no FDR was required (and if fitted would not have to meet the latest ICAO/JAR requirements).
Better then that the cameras provided recording of the flight instrument displays - particularly as they would also be of a type that could meet the (relatively new) ED112 requirements. A good solution all round.
Yes, the TCH holder took their eye off the ball - mostly because they lost their regulatory expert (committee member) to 'health issues'. Once the discrepancy had come to light (and it is not clear that there was any 'agenda') all had to work together to provide a solution in the shortest time possible. This involved the sourcing of relatively new equipment and trialling it to ensure it met the ED112 Standards.
All who have been involved in these types of issues know that it is better to all work to a common solution than to dig their heels in and ground aircraft.
Toothles tigers - probably not in this case.
Jim
I have head them called a lot of things but Toothless Tigers....never!
"Tigers".....isn't that a Bristow Trade Mark!
"Tigers".....isn't that a Bristow Trade Mark!
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yes
but to put teeth into just the basic of safety standards we are proposing the
Pilot Distraction Penalty Clause
Any distraction from the pilot from concentrating on just safely flying the helicopter has the following fines.
The rigs AWOS weather is OTC fine.
$1,000 fine, pilots gets $100 dollars each, Duty time is reduced by 1 hour
Your walking out the helicoter and the dispatcher runs out with a "Just One More" box, passenger,leg to your manifast.
$1,000 fine pilot gets $100 and duty day is reduced by another hour
Your fly out and try to make your 20 min call you make 14 calls, sat messages, your dispatch make several calls.
$1,000 fine pilots gets another $100 and another reduction of duty day.
You call at 5 mins and they are still not ready. Not like this flight has been schedualed for two days.
1,000, 100 another hour off
You find the wind is adverse not allowing a performance 1 or PC2 approach
another 1,000 100 and hour
you land and you have to pump your own fuel
another 1,000 100 and hour
Another manifest change distraction on the inbound
another 1,00 100 and hour
you fly back onshore. Your out of duty time fill out the report for the $7,000 in fines collect your additional $700 for the day and head home.
Intill the basic of safey distractions in communications, changing dutys from pilot, line service, manifest changes , are addressed with penalities having higher tech FDR's does not keep helicopters out of the water,marsh or dirt.
but to put teeth into just the basic of safety standards we are proposing the
Pilot Distraction Penalty Clause
Any distraction from the pilot from concentrating on just safely flying the helicopter has the following fines.
The rigs AWOS weather is OTC fine.
$1,000 fine, pilots gets $100 dollars each, Duty time is reduced by 1 hour
Your walking out the helicoter and the dispatcher runs out with a "Just One More" box, passenger,leg to your manifast.
$1,000 fine pilot gets $100 and duty day is reduced by another hour
Your fly out and try to make your 20 min call you make 14 calls, sat messages, your dispatch make several calls.
$1,000 fine pilots gets another $100 and another reduction of duty day.
You call at 5 mins and they are still not ready. Not like this flight has been schedualed for two days.
1,000, 100 another hour off
You find the wind is adverse not allowing a performance 1 or PC2 approach
another 1,000 100 and hour
you land and you have to pump your own fuel
another 1,000 100 and hour
Another manifest change distraction on the inbound
another 1,00 100 and hour
you fly back onshore. Your out of duty time fill out the report for the $7,000 in fines collect your additional $700 for the day and head home.
Intill the basic of safey distractions in communications, changing dutys from pilot, line service, manifest changes , are addressed with penalities having higher tech FDR's does not keep helicopters out of the water,marsh or dirt.
How many times has PHI had a bird strike on the 76 that resulted in an engine or both engines to be knocked off line? Is this the first occurrence?
How about Air Log....do they use the cast or stretched acrylic wind screens as does PHI?
Has Air Log had any bird strikes on their 76's that had similar damage?
Bristow have any on their 76's?
Would Sikorsky have any data generated by the various operators that would answer those kinds of questions?
Another thought.....why did it take so long to find any bird remains on the aircraft? I would think there would be lots of feathers and other residue to be seen or was the aircraft in such a state that was not possible?
How about Air Log....do they use the cast or stretched acrylic wind screens as does PHI?
Has Air Log had any bird strikes on their 76's that had similar damage?
Bristow have any on their 76's?
Would Sikorsky have any data generated by the various operators that would answer those kinds of questions?
Another thought.....why did it take so long to find any bird remains on the aircraft? I would think there would be lots of feathers and other residue to be seen or was the aircraft in such a state that was not possible?
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How many times has PHI had a bird strike on the 76 that resulted in an engine or both engines to be knocked off line? Is this the first occurrence?
How about Air Log....do they use the cast or stretched acrylic wind screens as does PHI?
Has Air Log had any bird strikes on their 76's that had similar damage?
Bristow have any on their 76's?
Has Air Log had any bird strikes on their 76's that had similar damage?
Bristow have any on their 76's?
Another thought.....why did it take so long to find any bird remains on the aircraft? I would think there would be lots of feathers and other residue to be seen or was the aircraft in such a state that was not possible?
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beyond compliance.........
(Apologies to Flight International for stealing their editors headline)
Seems to me that as a global industry we are never going to make any real progress until we take our heads our of our collective backsides and stop tracking the Lowest Common Denominator.
Using the regulations as the best guide to how we should go to work would see the demise of ABS, Stability Control Systems, Traction Control Systems etc in the motor industry none of which are mandatory but many of us would not put our precious family in a vehicle that did not have at least one of them.
If we used 'Best Practice' as a guide and stopped slavishly adopting a minimalist approach then we might make some progress. We put so much blame on the regulators but simultaneously claim to be professionals.
Parochialism - by anyone, but particularly in the US (FAA), makes us look unprofessional, uneducated, not willing to learn from others and totally focussed on short term gain over long term reputation. The quote from PHI's publicity material doesn't look so well informed when you realise that this company, a world player, DID NOT seek out the best practice in this case.
Remember the big difference between the UK CAA (hitherto a major player in the development of JAROPS) and other regulators (FAA??) is that the CAA can be sued for 'negligent regulation', so everytime there is a serious accident or incident they MUST consider additional regulations or changes to current regulations lest it happens again and leaves them open to legal action.
We are now a mature and global industry with enough accident data to know how our world works and what makes its people tick so surely can begin to act like grown-ups and take a lesson from the bloody bankers that 'short-term' gain can lead to long term pain.
G.
Seems to me that as a global industry we are never going to make any real progress until we take our heads our of our collective backsides and stop tracking the Lowest Common Denominator.
Using the regulations as the best guide to how we should go to work would see the demise of ABS, Stability Control Systems, Traction Control Systems etc in the motor industry none of which are mandatory but many of us would not put our precious family in a vehicle that did not have at least one of them.
If we used 'Best Practice' as a guide and stopped slavishly adopting a minimalist approach then we might make some progress. We put so much blame on the regulators but simultaneously claim to be professionals.
Parochialism - by anyone, but particularly in the US (FAA), makes us look unprofessional, uneducated, not willing to learn from others and totally focussed on short term gain over long term reputation. The quote from PHI's publicity material doesn't look so well informed when you realise that this company, a world player, DID NOT seek out the best practice in this case.
Remember the big difference between the UK CAA (hitherto a major player in the development of JAROPS) and other regulators (FAA??) is that the CAA can be sued for 'negligent regulation', so everytime there is a serious accident or incident they MUST consider additional regulations or changes to current regulations lest it happens again and leaves them open to legal action.
We are now a mature and global industry with enough accident data to know how our world works and what makes its people tick so surely can begin to act like grown-ups and take a lesson from the bloody bankers that 'short-term' gain can lead to long term pain.
G.