PHI Crash in Louisiana Jan 2009 - 8 Dead, 1 Injured
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Some info
Guys, I can share some info with you. My reasons for releasing this info are only so that people with a REAL interest in this terrible event i.e people who fly and operate these helicopters every day, can understand a little about what happened - nothing more, nothing less
1. Weather at the base (Approximately 9 miles away from accident site)
was reported as winds 150 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 statue miles, with scattered clouds at 7,000 feet and a broken layer of clouds at 8,000 feet.
2. Aircraft was on a Company VFR Flight Plan.
3. No distress call was received.
4. No evidence of post accident fire.
5. Initial analysis at this date indicates that at the onset of the
event, the aircraft was:
A. Aircraft in cruise flight and cruise airspeed with auto pilot
engaged.
B. Data indicates a significant reduction in torque on both engines
and an increase in collective pitch followed by a rapid reduction in Nr (Rotor RPM).
C. Pitch and roll data becomes erratic prior to loss of all recording
system power.
D. The aircraft experienced apparent loss of control and impacted in a
marsh area.
Factual Information:
No evidence of an in-flight deployment of the aircraft’s emergency
flotation system or externally mounted life rafts.
Air Traffic Control historical radar information was reviewed. It did
not provide a return of aircraft information. Radar coverage of the
area is not provided to the surface.
Main Transmission is intact with no anomalies noted at this time.
Intermediate Gear Box is intact. With no anomalies noted at this time.
Tail Rotor Gear Box was found with damage; case is separated. Internal
gearing appear to be as designed.
Tail Rotor Hangar Bearings currently show no evidence of pre-impact
failure.
Main Rotor Bifilar shows no failure other than those related to impact
Main and Tail Rotor Blade tip caps show no failure other than those
related to impact.
On preliminary inspection, Engines show no obvious anomalies. As noted
in the Investigation Status below, they are being shipped for further
inspection.
To date, no eye witnesses have been located. A few individuals have
been located that "heard" something, but did not actually see the event.
Investigation Status:
Analysis continues on Cockpit Voice Recorder, Flight Data Recorder,
Vibration Monitoring Acquisition Unit, and Digital Engine Control Units.
Engines are being shipped for further examination.
Investigation Team is currently inspecting aircraft wreckage.
Hydraulic servos have been shipped for further analysis.
Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) actuators have been shipped for
further analysis.
1. Weather at the base (Approximately 9 miles away from accident site)
was reported as winds 150 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 statue miles, with scattered clouds at 7,000 feet and a broken layer of clouds at 8,000 feet.
2. Aircraft was on a Company VFR Flight Plan.
3. No distress call was received.
4. No evidence of post accident fire.
5. Initial analysis at this date indicates that at the onset of the
event, the aircraft was:
A. Aircraft in cruise flight and cruise airspeed with auto pilot
engaged.
B. Data indicates a significant reduction in torque on both engines
and an increase in collective pitch followed by a rapid reduction in Nr (Rotor RPM).
C. Pitch and roll data becomes erratic prior to loss of all recording
system power.
D. The aircraft experienced apparent loss of control and impacted in a
marsh area.
Factual Information:
No evidence of an in-flight deployment of the aircraft’s emergency
flotation system or externally mounted life rafts.
Air Traffic Control historical radar information was reviewed. It did
not provide a return of aircraft information. Radar coverage of the
area is not provided to the surface.
Main Transmission is intact with no anomalies noted at this time.
Intermediate Gear Box is intact. With no anomalies noted at this time.
Tail Rotor Gear Box was found with damage; case is separated. Internal
gearing appear to be as designed.
Tail Rotor Hangar Bearings currently show no evidence of pre-impact
failure.
Main Rotor Bifilar shows no failure other than those related to impact
Main and Tail Rotor Blade tip caps show no failure other than those
related to impact.
On preliminary inspection, Engines show no obvious anomalies. As noted
in the Investigation Status below, they are being shipped for further
inspection.
To date, no eye witnesses have been located. A few individuals have
been located that "heard" something, but did not actually see the event.
Investigation Status:
Analysis continues on Cockpit Voice Recorder, Flight Data Recorder,
Vibration Monitoring Acquisition Unit, and Digital Engine Control Units.
Engines are being shipped for further examination.
Investigation Team is currently inspecting aircraft wreckage.
Hydraulic servos have been shipped for further analysis.
Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) actuators have been shipped for
further analysis.
Frankly, whatever your good intentions, I find that less than helpful. Those of us who are professional pilots understand the rigour and detailed analysis involved in a proper investigation - be it by the NTSB, the AAIB, the operator or client, and do not expect answers overnight. We are not Fox reporters! Be assured that for all the reasons stated before, the cause of this accident WILL be ascertained and the results published.
Time for some to face reality!
I hate to be the one to upset someone's apple cart.....but there is a very successful business extant in the Gulf of Mexico oil related industry.
That being legal firms which specialize in taking on helicopter operators following helicopter crashes.
That is part of life in the oil patch in the GOM.
Lawyers know helicopter accidents are excellent sources of income.
A part breaks....the manufacturer pays.
An engineer or pilots makes a mistake...the operator pays.
Sometimes.....everybody pays!
Every time the insurance company or the defendant's lawyers will strike a deal.
It should come as no surprise to anyone a law suit should be filed following a fatal crash.
As to estranged wives....perhaps there is a couple of kids involved who will need supporting?
They were estranged....but still married....reckon there was no formal separation agreement in effect....thus still the wife and next of kin by law!
212man,
I disagree with you on this one. I do not see a post containing information of and by itself as being a bad thing. So long as the facts are credible and come from a reliable source and are presented as a summary or statement of facts without the author rumbling off down the trail "guessing" at causes then I have no objection.
In fact...discussion of the results of an on-going investigation serve as a vehicle for professionals to keep informed.
We can draw conclusions from information as it is presented but the final determination will as you rightly say....come from the official investigative report.
By the way.....Fox News...has been proven to be the more fair and balanced of our media outlets thus perhaps you should shift your barb to using CNN, MSNBC, NBC, or the decidedly crook CBS.
As I suggested, logical, professional, and unbiased reports and discussion are what we should seek both from those of us peeking through the knothole and the professional experts conducting the investigations.
That being legal firms which specialize in taking on helicopter operators following helicopter crashes.
That is part of life in the oil patch in the GOM.
Lawyers know helicopter accidents are excellent sources of income.
A part breaks....the manufacturer pays.
An engineer or pilots makes a mistake...the operator pays.
Sometimes.....everybody pays!
Every time the insurance company or the defendant's lawyers will strike a deal.
It should come as no surprise to anyone a law suit should be filed following a fatal crash.
As to estranged wives....perhaps there is a couple of kids involved who will need supporting?
They were estranged....but still married....reckon there was no formal separation agreement in effect....thus still the wife and next of kin by law!
212man,
I disagree with you on this one. I do not see a post containing information of and by itself as being a bad thing. So long as the facts are credible and come from a reliable source and are presented as a summary or statement of facts without the author rumbling off down the trail "guessing" at causes then I have no objection.
In fact...discussion of the results of an on-going investigation serve as a vehicle for professionals to keep informed.
We can draw conclusions from information as it is presented but the final determination will as you rightly say....come from the official investigative report.
By the way.....Fox News...has been proven to be the more fair and balanced of our media outlets thus perhaps you should shift your barb to using CNN, MSNBC, NBC, or the decidedly crook CBS.
As I suggested, logical, professional, and unbiased reports and discussion are what we should seek both from those of us peeking through the knothole and the professional experts conducting the investigations.
Last edited by SASless; 11th Jan 2009 at 12:57.
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212man
Your response is that of a company man
How long will Shell refuse to use the 76?
SASless
I agree that -
But is this actually from the on-going investigation? Who is CycColl [# posts 1]? Is CycColl a reliable source?
Your response is that of a company man
How long will Shell refuse to use the 76?
SASless
I agree that -
discussion of the results of an on-going investigation serve as a vehicle for professionals to keep informed
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With the C++, if george is flying 'two or three cue', and he notices a loss in altitude he will pull pitch in order to regain that altitude, regardless of RRPM. The 92 had a diferent system and should a loss of altitude be detected it will maintain RRPM.
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Old Skool,
Actually, if you're flying the S76C+/C++ in 2 cue it will use a cyclic pitch cue to maintain altitude. It's only if you're flying 3 cue e.g with ALT, AS and HDG engaged it will use collective pitch to maintain altitude and then once the limits of the SPZ 7600 are reached, you will get an AP warning as collective pitch is disconnected. Thus RRPM will be unaffected.
Actually, if you're flying the S76C+/C++ in 2 cue it will use a cyclic pitch cue to maintain altitude. It's only if you're flying 3 cue e.g with ALT, AS and HDG engaged it will use collective pitch to maintain altitude and then once the limits of the SPZ 7600 are reached, you will get an AP warning as collective pitch is disconnected. Thus RRPM will be unaffected.
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You know it's been a while and i don't have the books with me, you are correct on 2 cue, but in 3 cue as power is lost the A/P will pull pitch regardless of RRPM to maintain the altitude set.
To be correct, the 'cue' figure is simply how many Flight Director Cues are selected, so you can be 2-cue or even 1-cue and still have the collective engaged (ALt + IAS, RALT) though colloquially the term 2-cue is used to denote no collective coupling. In the C+ (so I assume the same for the C++) the Sperry 7600 only limits on engine parameters (N1 and Tq) not Nr.
Why is this a topic for discussion? Is anyone seriously implying the AFCS had anything to do with this? The certification requirements for AFCSs are such that pilot intervention is assured before loss of control can result from it's action.
Zalt
no, not a company comment, simply that of a professional pilot who hates to see this kind of consumer culture "now now now" approach to a tragic accident, which will be investigated by appropriately qualified people in a meticulous and thorough manner. The information contained is almost certainly a breach of the company's confidentiality clauses within that individual's employment contract, and serves no useful purpose (weather was fine, aircraft was in the cruise, lost control and crashed - I think we kind of guessed all that!)
SASless,
I disagree - this information should come out as an interim statement from the NTSB. That way we know it to be credible (though I suspect it probably is) and not simply from someone whose ego is getting in the way of their ethics.
Why is this a topic for discussion? Is anyone seriously implying the AFCS had anything to do with this? The certification requirements for AFCSs are such that pilot intervention is assured before loss of control can result from it's action.
Zalt
no, not a company comment, simply that of a professional pilot who hates to see this kind of consumer culture "now now now" approach to a tragic accident, which will be investigated by appropriately qualified people in a meticulous and thorough manner. The information contained is almost certainly a breach of the company's confidentiality clauses within that individual's employment contract, and serves no useful purpose (weather was fine, aircraft was in the cruise, lost control and crashed - I think we kind of guessed all that!)
SASless,
I disagree - this information should come out as an interim statement from the NTSB. That way we know it to be credible (though I suspect it probably is) and not simply from someone whose ego is getting in the way of their ethics.
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212Man is right, this speculation has gotten way out of hand! One has to believe something very bad happened very quickly to cause this thing, and that small splash in the press photo shows something probably nowhere near controllable. Other than that, we must wait for the vast amount of data to know what happened.
Regarding the S76 family AP's. they will not suck the rpm way down, since the engine limits are monitored by the FD/AP, and the collective cue is limited by limit engine Temp or Torque. Since the Nr drops when the remaining engine exceeds those limits, the Nr will stabilize in a very comfortable place if an excessive OEI climbout is attempted.
Regarding the S76 family AP's. they will not suck the rpm way down, since the engine limits are monitored by the FD/AP, and the collective cue is limited by limit engine Temp or Torque. Since the Nr drops when the remaining engine exceeds those limits, the Nr will stabilize in a very comfortable place if an excessive OEI climbout is attempted.
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CycColl:
Thanks much for taking the time (and 'extending' yourself a bit I'm sure) to provide what appears to be some initial factual information.
I'm sure most of the 76 drivers greatly appreciate this cursory look into the event. Obviously no clear answers yet, but I know I appreciated the information before i hit the starter today, as did many of my colleagues
.
Cheers
Thanks much for taking the time (and 'extending' yourself a bit I'm sure) to provide what appears to be some initial factual information.
I'm sure most of the 76 drivers greatly appreciate this cursory look into the event. Obviously no clear answers yet, but I know I appreciated the information before i hit the starter today, as did many of my colleagues
.Cheers
I know I may get a flaming for this - but by way of an excuse, my point is a general one and not specifically related to this accident...
We have heard from various sources that the S76C++ autopilot will not pull the lever up so as to exceed an engine limit. Therefore my question is, if ALT is coupled on the collective and there is a double engine flameout, how would the AFCS handle it?
Software can be pretty dumb and perhaps it would see the aircraft descending, see that torque and N1 were pretty low, and raise the collective?
To be fair, even if it did this it would not be an airworthiness issue because with or without the AFCS trying to raise the collective, unless the pilot lowers it very quickly, rrpm will get too low to recover.
HC
We have heard from various sources that the S76C++ autopilot will not pull the lever up so as to exceed an engine limit. Therefore my question is, if ALT is coupled on the collective and there is a double engine flameout, how would the AFCS handle it?
Software can be pretty dumb and perhaps it would see the aircraft descending, see that torque and N1 were pretty low, and raise the collective?
To be fair, even if it did this it would not be an airworthiness issue because with or without the AFCS trying to raise the collective, unless the pilot lowers it very quickly, rrpm will get too low to recover.
HC
If you lose both engines on the C++ the flight director will decouple, because one of the AP has dropped off line, because you've lost one of the electrical busses.
To go down that road you'd have to be speculating that with horns going off in their ears and the caution panel lit up like a Christmas tree, both pilots would keep sitting there with their arms folded.
I think this lead is a dead end, but if it leads to an awareness that automation needs to be properly understood by the pilots, then it is not necessarily a bad thing on this thread.
Will any helicopter continue to fly coupled to the Flight Director with both engines flamed out? How about your 225 HC?
To go down that road you'd have to be speculating that with horns going off in their ears and the caution panel lit up like a Christmas tree, both pilots would keep sitting there with their arms folded.
I think this lead is a dead end, but if it leads to an awareness that automation needs to be properly understood by the pilots, then it is not necessarily a bad thing on this thread.
Will any helicopter continue to fly coupled to the Flight Director with both engines flamed out? How about your 225 HC?
Will any helicopter continue to fly coupled to the Flight Director with both engines flamed out? How about your 225 HC?
I'm sure most of the 76 drivers greatly appreciate this cursory look into the event. Obviously no clear answers yet, but I know I appreciated the information before i hit the starter today, as did many of my colleagues
212man,
That is a chance we all take on every flight.....every now and then one of our cabs suddenly and catastrophically destroys itself.
The Finnish report answered the question about that crash and I guess we all felt a bit warmer and fuzzier as a result.
Is the source and completeness of the information that will allow for that warm and cozy feeling?
I reckon we can fly around and keep our eyes open looking for indications we are going to have both engines suddenly and without warning develop zero torque on us....but what would one look for that would give you more than a flash to do something about it.
The more information we have the better.
Perhaps the quality of preflight checks has gone up....or the increased scrutiny upon engineering will be a positive thing.
I suggest knowing one of the cabs did come apart in the air for some as yet unknown reason....will in itself at least momentarily boost our awareness of the need to be vigilant day in....and day out.
Complacency in aviation kills people.
I do not accept the "wait and see" but do it in complete silence and darkness attitude held by some here. I believe in the waiting for the official report but until then the more I know about a fatal event the better.
That is a chance we all take on every flight.....every now and then one of our cabs suddenly and catastrophically destroys itself.
The Finnish report answered the question about that crash and I guess we all felt a bit warmer and fuzzier as a result.
Is the source and completeness of the information that will allow for that warm and cozy feeling?
I reckon we can fly around and keep our eyes open looking for indications we are going to have both engines suddenly and without warning develop zero torque on us....but what would one look for that would give you more than a flash to do something about it.
The more information we have the better.
Perhaps the quality of preflight checks has gone up....or the increased scrutiny upon engineering will be a positive thing.
I suggest knowing one of the cabs did come apart in the air for some as yet unknown reason....will in itself at least momentarily boost our awareness of the need to be vigilant day in....and day out.
Complacency in aviation kills people.
I do not accept the "wait and see" but do it in complete silence and darkness attitude held by some here. I believe in the waiting for the official report but until then the more I know about a fatal event the better.
malabo
As 212 says, there is no flight director in the 225. The AFCS is rrpm aware so I think it would try to lower the collective following the second engine flameout, however it certainly wouldn't be quick enough to save the day. Since the AFCS is all-dc and powered from the essential bus, it would not drop the coupling from any electrical supply reasons (and anyway the alternators are driven by the transmission, not by the engines).
Although you mention that the coupling would drop out, would there be a few seconds between the generators going off line and the bus couplers opening (therefore unpowering the FD coupling system)? -its 5 seconds on the Super Puma family aircraft. Sorry, I know nothing about an S76 electrical system.
The purpose of my post was not to start another EC vs Sikorsky argument (that argument was won a long time ago!) but just to point out the flaw in some of the previous posts - as you say, pilot's knowlege of how their automation behaves is sometimes limited to "normal ops" - and, if I am honest, to suggest a scenario that might explain an element of the alleged data CycColl posted.
You mention pilots sitting with arms folded, I am not suggesting that but as a trainer I see pilots flying OEI on checks with hands nowhere near the collective. Twin-engine pilots don't have the same mentality as single-engine pilots - the latter will dump the lever at first sign of trouble, the former will spend time analysing the situation before doing anything. With a simultaneous flameout of both engines, maybe you don't have that time...
HC
As 212 says, there is no flight director in the 225. The AFCS is rrpm aware so I think it would try to lower the collective following the second engine flameout, however it certainly wouldn't be quick enough to save the day. Since the AFCS is all-dc and powered from the essential bus, it would not drop the coupling from any electrical supply reasons (and anyway the alternators are driven by the transmission, not by the engines).
Although you mention that the coupling would drop out, would there be a few seconds between the generators going off line and the bus couplers opening (therefore unpowering the FD coupling system)? -its 5 seconds on the Super Puma family aircraft. Sorry, I know nothing about an S76 electrical system.
The purpose of my post was not to start another EC vs Sikorsky argument (that argument was won a long time ago!) but just to point out the flaw in some of the previous posts - as you say, pilot's knowlege of how their automation behaves is sometimes limited to "normal ops" - and, if I am honest, to suggest a scenario that might explain an element of the alleged data CycColl posted.
You mention pilots sitting with arms folded, I am not suggesting that but as a trainer I see pilots flying OEI on checks with hands nowhere near the collective. Twin-engine pilots don't have the same mentality as single-engine pilots - the latter will dump the lever at first sign of trouble, the former will spend time analysing the situation before doing anything. With a simultaneous flameout of both engines, maybe you don't have that time...
HC
Flameout?
Who said anything about a double-engine flameout? All CycColl reported was a "significant reduction in torque of both engines." Maybe the engines just went to IDLE? If the engines did not completely flame-out, then all the electrical stuff could have (would have?) stayed online. Would the autopilot even have disengaged? How quickly would the first indication (light or horn) come on, and what would the RRPM be at that point?
So. The Big Question: Is there any way that the FADEC in the C++ can command *both* engines to come offline, say to IDLE, at the same time? Is there a single-point failure mode that could allow this?
Think of this bizarre situation: Both engines begin a decel to IDLE and the autopilot commands the collective UP! You, Mr. PIC are sitting there going, "WTF?!"
Heli-Comparator is quite right about one thing - pilots of larger helicopters are reluctant to do anything quickly or abruptly. And, if what some people are saying is true about how quickly an S-76 will bleed rotor rpm, the corrective action to such a "crazy" scenario would need to be both quick and abrupt: Ergo, significant (abrupt?) nose up cyclic input to get the disk up and loaded, and right-now! down on the pole. You'd have...what...a couple of seconds to make that happen?
One-thousand-one, one-thousand-two.
Too late! While you were sitting there trying to figure out what was going on, the RRPM just went away.
I can understand people not wanting to speculate about this accident. But for pilots who fly these aircraft with all the new technology, you have to wonder if there are hidden failure modes that are still to be discovered.
An S-76 pilot on another forum described it as, "edge of the seat stuff." And it's an apt description. For if something in a helicopter can fail in such a way that it causes *both* FADECs to bring the engines offline, while at the same time the autopilot is in a mode that would cause it to command the collective to come *up* in response to a loss of altitude, this is some serious sh*t. Because I'm not sure that even I, the super-pilot skygod that I am, would be quick and sharp enough to handle that one.
Are you?
One-thousand-one, one-thousand-two, one-thousand-three. Did you interpret all of the indications properly and do the right thing? (I gave you an extra second there because I'm generous.)
So. The Big Question: Is there any way that the FADEC in the C++ can command *both* engines to come offline, say to IDLE, at the same time? Is there a single-point failure mode that could allow this?
Think of this bizarre situation: Both engines begin a decel to IDLE and the autopilot commands the collective UP! You, Mr. PIC are sitting there going, "WTF?!"
Heli-Comparator is quite right about one thing - pilots of larger helicopters are reluctant to do anything quickly or abruptly. And, if what some people are saying is true about how quickly an S-76 will bleed rotor rpm, the corrective action to such a "crazy" scenario would need to be both quick and abrupt: Ergo, significant (abrupt?) nose up cyclic input to get the disk up and loaded, and right-now! down on the pole. You'd have...what...a couple of seconds to make that happen?
One-thousand-one, one-thousand-two.
Too late! While you were sitting there trying to figure out what was going on, the RRPM just went away.
I can understand people not wanting to speculate about this accident. But for pilots who fly these aircraft with all the new technology, you have to wonder if there are hidden failure modes that are still to be discovered.
An S-76 pilot on another forum described it as, "edge of the seat stuff." And it's an apt description. For if something in a helicopter can fail in such a way that it causes *both* FADECs to bring the engines offline, while at the same time the autopilot is in a mode that would cause it to command the collective to come *up* in response to a loss of altitude, this is some serious sh*t. Because I'm not sure that even I, the super-pilot skygod that I am, would be quick and sharp enough to handle that one.
Are you?
One-thousand-one, one-thousand-two, one-thousand-three. Did you interpret all of the indications properly and do the right thing? (I gave you an extra second there because I'm generous.)
212man, HC, FH-100,Zalt.....funny thing how we are now discussing possible scenario's that modern avioinics might be able to be our undoing....and as I see it....stemming directly from Cylcol's post with some data about the PHI crash.
Does this discussion we are having not prove the point that professional pilots benefit from receipt of information about crashes?
It is going to be very hard for you to say we would be having this discussion absent that post.
HC...that argument was not won....best I saw it was a tie. But...that is your story...stick to it. The winner of that argument will be won in the market place and not here at pprune.
Does this discussion we are having not prove the point that professional pilots benefit from receipt of information about crashes?
It is going to be very hard for you to say we would be having this discussion absent that post.
HC...that argument was not won....best I saw it was a tie. But...that is your story...stick to it. The winner of that argument will be won in the market place and not here at pprune.
SAS I was in no way shape or form suggesting automation was a causal factor - I'm merely answering questions directly. The C++ is hardly cutting edge technology- let's give this mysterious double FADEC throttle back phenomenon mumbo jumbo a break, eh?
Want to drift the thread back to CPI's and TorqueStripes comment of never an inadvertent deployment? Seem a few have not been on the aircraft on RTB in 212man's turf (third-hand rumors and innuendo, both S92 and S76). The really bizarre thing is that they have never been found!!! You have to appreciate the irony of a Crash Position Indicator that deploys but is never found! Give me a PLB with a built in GPS anyday.
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I quite agree with SASless: in my company we are discussing possible causes a lot. The result of our talks might not be the reason for the crash the discussion started with, but definitely raises awareness and activates the thought process of everybody involved. It is a learning experience especially for the less-experienced (like myself), but like HeliComparator rightfully said; a lot of older/experienced colleagues might just be a little too laid back at times (and the younger guys just might not know better).
I also agree that blaming and unpreventable, catastrophic failure doesn't help anybody.
An example my boss (long time helicopter and f/w driver - very experienced in the S-76 as well) gave me yesterday:
What happens if both AFCS/SAS go offline/fail during high power cruise?
- due to the elevated T/R, the aircraft will snap into a roll; the unaware pilot will try to correct with opposite cyclic input, rolling the helicopter back through the other side into an upside down nose dive.
- the corrective action for the initial roll would be full left pedal followed by slowing down the aircraft to reduce torque and restore a somewhat flyable helicopter.
My boss said, that he failed the Heliflight e.g. on a few very seasoned guys and due to the fact that it was never taught in the sim almost all of them did not see the T/R as the cause for the roll and would have rolled it straight into the ground.
The above seemed to be a likely explanation, but doesn't go well with the apparent loss of torque/system power CycColl quoted.
I also agree that blaming and unpreventable, catastrophic failure doesn't help anybody.
An example my boss (long time helicopter and f/w driver - very experienced in the S-76 as well) gave me yesterday:
What happens if both AFCS/SAS go offline/fail during high power cruise?
- due to the elevated T/R, the aircraft will snap into a roll; the unaware pilot will try to correct with opposite cyclic input, rolling the helicopter back through the other side into an upside down nose dive.
- the corrective action for the initial roll would be full left pedal followed by slowing down the aircraft to reduce torque and restore a somewhat flyable helicopter.
My boss said, that he failed the Heliflight e.g. on a few very seasoned guys and due to the fact that it was never taught in the sim almost all of them did not see the T/R as the cause for the roll and would have rolled it straight into the ground.
The above seemed to be a likely explanation, but doesn't go well with the apparent loss of torque/system power CycColl quoted.