PHI Crash in Louisiana Jan 2009 - 8 Dead, 1 Injured
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FH-
On the 76C++, yes, the PCL's do need to come almost all the way back for idle. The engines govern on N1 (rather than N2) when you come out of fly. So, when you come back, you can slew the power back evenly.
BUT, given the lack of PCL friction in the C++ quadrant it is entirely feasible that anything that has enough energy to force the triggers over the little ramp and out of FLY, would knock them all the way back to idle.
BTW, the -76D will have low rotor warning, so I've heard.
On the 76C++, yes, the PCL's do need to come almost all the way back for idle. The engines govern on N1 (rather than N2) when you come out of fly. So, when you come back, you can slew the power back evenly.
BUT, given the lack of PCL friction in the C++ quadrant it is entirely feasible that anything that has enough energy to force the triggers over the little ramp and out of FLY, would knock them all the way back to idle.
BTW, the -76D will have low rotor warning, so I've heard.
HOSS, thanks for the explanation! I do get that the PCL's control N1. But the point I was going for was that as far as the MR is concerned, once the PCL's come out of "fly" to the point where the rotor is ungoverned it will bleed off just as if you pulled them all the way back to IDLE. Is that not correct? My thinking is that they don't have to come back very far for the rotor to sign off. My question is just how far that is?
Airplanes can modulate their thrust with the PCL's, but we can't. Or can we in a C++?
Airplanes can modulate their thrust with the PCL's, but we can't. Or can we in a C++?
Someone correct me if I am wrong....wasn't there a mention of a Vne of 109kts for the cast acrylic windscreens and the aircraft was in standard cruise configuration of 140 knots which would be based upon the glass wind screened configuration?
Who did the testing on these windscreens....the manufacturer, PHI, or Sikorsky?
What was the participation of the FAA in approving the STC? Did they fail to insist upon adequate testing? Did the FAA POI fail to identify the problem during his oversight of PHI?
Did the STC require a Flight Manual Section and thus the reduced Vne?
Does PHI have a modification to the OpSpecs for the plastic windscreen Vne?
Does PHI publish any information for Crew use that would educate them on the reduced Vne requirements?
Who did the testing on these windscreens....the manufacturer, PHI, or Sikorsky?
What was the participation of the FAA in approving the STC? Did they fail to insist upon adequate testing? Did the FAA POI fail to identify the problem during his oversight of PHI?
Did the STC require a Flight Manual Section and thus the reduced Vne?
Does PHI have a modification to the OpSpecs for the plastic windscreen Vne?
Does PHI publish any information for Crew use that would educate them on the reduced Vne requirements?
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There isn't a 109 knot Vne for the cast windscreens. Sikorsky released a letter about 1 1/2 weeks ago (6 week after the PHI accident) that said that the bird strike resistance of the cast acrylic (non-Sikorsky) windscreens could be considered the same as the Sikorsky acrylic and glass windscreens only if the cast acrylic equipped aircraft was flown at 109 knots or less.
The letter also said that the design standards for the aircraft type did not require bird strike resistance, but that Sikorsky had done it anyway as a product improvement to meet an unspecified international standard. Bird weight stated was 2 pounds but with no associated airspeed listed.
The letter also said that the design standards for the aircraft type did not require bird strike resistance, but that Sikorsky had done it anyway as a product improvement to meet an unspecified international standard. Bird weight stated was 2 pounds but with no associated airspeed listed.
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Here is on of many STC's for windshields and there is no Vne limit listed,
Supplemental Type Certificate
The STC pre dates the Sikorsky letter. Which is not a ammendment to the flight manual,
There is no Vne listed in any of the windshield replacement STC's for the S-76 or any other of the STC's for door or chin bubbles.
Just about every installed piece of equipment is a STCed item on the S-76
There is no FAA Ops Manual that has anything about windshields in it.
Plastic windshields are the norm for most of the helicopters flying in the world I do not see that changing.
Fatal Birdstrikes to aircraft are rare, plastic or glass windshields they will and have come thru both on a S-76.
Its more dangerous driving to work down here in the Bayou than flying offshore.
Supplemental Type Certificate
The STC pre dates the Sikorsky letter. Which is not a ammendment to the flight manual,
There is no Vne listed in any of the windshield replacement STC's for the S-76 or any other of the STC's for door or chin bubbles.
Just about every installed piece of equipment is a STCed item on the S-76
There is no FAA Ops Manual that has anything about windshields in it.
Plastic windshields are the norm for most of the helicopters flying in the world I do not see that changing.
Fatal Birdstrikes to aircraft are rare, plastic or glass windshields they will and have come thru both on a S-76.
Its more dangerous driving to work down here in the Bayou than flying offshore.
A recent conversation with a PHI Captain confirmed no mention was made to the pilots re a reduced Vne for plastic wind screens.
That Captain also stated the real motivation for replacing the glass wind screens was not weight but rather costs. The Glass screens were prone to cracking if nicked by FOD kicked up by rotor wash.
Also a quick google visit shows a Red Tailed Hawk weighs from just below two pounds up to almost four pounds. That would on the order of almost twice the testing parameters used by Sikorsky.
Anyone care to calculate the impact force of four pounds at 140 knots?
Also heard is PHI is rapidly replacing plastic with glass for some reason.
One passenger's family has filed suit against PHI and I hear (rumour only at this point) one of the pilot's families have also filed suit against PHI.
That Captain also stated the real motivation for replacing the glass wind screens was not weight but rather costs. The Glass screens were prone to cracking if nicked by FOD kicked up by rotor wash.
Also a quick google visit shows a Red Tailed Hawk weighs from just below two pounds up to almost four pounds. That would on the order of almost twice the testing parameters used by Sikorsky.
Anyone care to calculate the impact force of four pounds at 140 knots?
Also heard is PHI is rapidly replacing plastic with glass for some reason.
One passenger's family has filed suit against PHI and I hear (rumour only at this point) one of the pilot's families have also filed suit against PHI.
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14 Cfr 29.631
Sec. 29.631
[Bird strike.]
[The rotorcraft must be designated to ensure capability of continued safe flight and landing (for Category A) or safe landing (for Category B) after impact with a 2.2-lb (1.0 kg) bird when the velocity of the rotorcraft (relative to the bird along the flight path of the rotorcraft) is equal to VNE or VH (whichever is the lesser) at altitudes up to 8,000 feet. Compliance must be shown by tests or by analysis based on tests carried out on sufficiently representative structures of similar design.]
Amdt. 29-40, Eff. 8/8/96
*****
Unfortunately, the S-76 is only designed to amendment 29-11 and parts of 29-12, 13, 24, 26 & 30. So while Sikorsky claimed design compliance with 29.631 above, it would not have been a requirement for STCed windscreens.
[Bird strike.]
[The rotorcraft must be designated to ensure capability of continued safe flight and landing (for Category A) or safe landing (for Category B) after impact with a 2.2-lb (1.0 kg) bird when the velocity of the rotorcraft (relative to the bird along the flight path of the rotorcraft) is equal to VNE or VH (whichever is the lesser) at altitudes up to 8,000 feet. Compliance must be shown by tests or by analysis based on tests carried out on sufficiently representative structures of similar design.]
Amdt. 29-40, Eff. 8/8/96
*****
Unfortunately, the S-76 is only designed to amendment 29-11 and parts of 29-12, 13, 24, 26 & 30. So while Sikorsky claimed design compliance with 29.631 above, it would not have been a requirement for STCed windscreens.
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The Lawsuit Summary concerning PHI-748P
Suit#1 – vs. PHI - There is a wrongful death suit filed in a Terrebonne Parish state court on behalf of Britain Boudreaux, passenger, accuses Lafayette-based PHI Inc. of negligence. This one was filed within 7 days of the accident.
Suit#2 - vs. PHI - The suit, filed by the wife of 35-year-old Jorey Anthony Rivero Sr., of Bridge City, who worked for MMR Offshore Services, was faxed Thursday to the Terrebonne Clerk of Court’s Office. Lawyers for Toni Rivero, his widow, allege Petroleum Helicopters Inc., of Lafayette, is liable for the fatal crash.
****Both lawsuits claim the company is responsible under the legal doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur,” Latin for “the thing speaks for itself,” which in this case means that the deaths of the passengers in the crash could not have occurred unless the company was negligent in some way, lawyers contend.
Suit #3 – vs. Sikorsky - PHI Pilot Thomas Ballenger’s (PIC on flight), widow has filed suit against Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. Her suit is blaming the accident on the “defective condition” of the chopper. Greg Allen, lawyer for Ballenger, said the noise reported by investigators points to "some form of catastrophic failure" before the crash, even if the engines didn't fail. He said "other components" that could have caused the noise and the crash still haven't been ruled out. "The complaint alleges the crash resulted as a direct and proximate result of defective conditions existing in the S-76C++ helicopter," a press release from the law firm states.
Suit#2 - vs. PHI - The suit, filed by the wife of 35-year-old Jorey Anthony Rivero Sr., of Bridge City, who worked for MMR Offshore Services, was faxed Thursday to the Terrebonne Clerk of Court’s Office. Lawyers for Toni Rivero, his widow, allege Petroleum Helicopters Inc., of Lafayette, is liable for the fatal crash.
****Both lawsuits claim the company is responsible under the legal doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur,” Latin for “the thing speaks for itself,” which in this case means that the deaths of the passengers in the crash could not have occurred unless the company was negligent in some way, lawyers contend.
Suit #3 – vs. Sikorsky - PHI Pilot Thomas Ballenger’s (PIC on flight), widow has filed suit against Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. Her suit is blaming the accident on the “defective condition” of the chopper. Greg Allen, lawyer for Ballenger, said the noise reported by investigators points to "some form of catastrophic failure" before the crash, even if the engines didn't fail. He said "other components" that could have caused the noise and the crash still haven't been ruled out. "The complaint alleges the crash resulted as a direct and proximate result of defective conditions existing in the S-76C++ helicopter," a press release from the law firm states.
Last edited by buckeem; 24th Feb 2009 at 18:16. Reason: corrected spelling
Sooooooo.....if no requirement to show compliance with the original design criteria for plastic wind screens or any other STC'd component....who totes the bucket now?
Just how could the FAA approve an STC for a wind screen and NOT require proof it meets the same standard as the item it is replacing?
Did Sikorsky know of this problem before they issued their letter suggesting restricted airspeeds and NOT pass that bit of knowledge along to its customers?
Under the concept of "burden of knowledge" would they not be compelled legally to have done so?
If PHI installed the plastic wind screens knowing they had not been tested or had not been proven to be as strong as the glass screens they replaced, or were aware of the need to restrict the airspeed prior to the accident....what liability do they hold now?
Just how could the FAA approve an STC for a wind screen and NOT require proof it meets the same standard as the item it is replacing?
Did Sikorsky know of this problem before they issued their letter suggesting restricted airspeeds and NOT pass that bit of knowledge along to its customers?
Under the concept of "burden of knowledge" would they not be compelled legally to have done so?
If PHI installed the plastic wind screens knowing they had not been tested or had not been proven to be as strong as the glass screens they replaced, or were aware of the need to restrict the airspeed prior to the accident....what liability do they hold now?
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Weight is also a reason for fitting the acrylic screens.
The screens weigh less than the glass and then the AC generator becomes redundant because of not requiring it to heat the screens. A 3rd inverter can be fitted as electrical backup if desired.
Total wieght saving in the region of 50-ish lbs. Not a lot but it helps in hot conditions.
The screens weigh less than the glass and then the AC generator becomes redundant because of not requiring it to heat the screens. A 3rd inverter can be fitted as electrical backup if desired.
Total wieght saving in the region of 50-ish lbs. Not a lot but it helps in hot conditions.
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SASless - you're confusing design intent with design criteria. Just because Sikorsky designed their S-76 windscreens for bird strike resistance doesn't mean that the bird strike criteria applied to the S-76. That criteria had not been accepted in the US when the S-76 was designed and certificated.
My '65 Mustang did not have rear seat seatbelts. They weren't required when the car was delivered. The fact that they were required in later model years did not mean that Ford had to retroactively install them in their '65 models.
Proving that PHI knew that the cast acrylic windscreens did not meet the design criteria that the S-76 was NOT required to comply with and get a judgement against them for installing an FAA approved part is a stretch. The cast acrylic windscreens were allowed by the regulator. PHI won't be held to a higher standard than the FAA.
A better question, and one for another thread, is why critical design criteria are not applied retroactively to earlier designs.
My '65 Mustang did not have rear seat seatbelts. They weren't required when the car was delivered. The fact that they were required in later model years did not mean that Ford had to retroactively install them in their '65 models.
Proving that PHI knew that the cast acrylic windscreens did not meet the design criteria that the S-76 was NOT required to comply with and get a judgement against them for installing an FAA approved part is a stretch. The cast acrylic windscreens were allowed by the regulator. PHI won't be held to a higher standard than the FAA.
A better question, and one for another thread, is why critical design criteria are not applied retroactively to earlier designs.
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It is safe to say that NO civil helicopter is stronger than the S76 in terms of bird strike safety, except the S92, the EC225 and the AW-139, the only civil helos to meet the new bird strike standard.
Ask not for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for all of us who fly older, grandfathered machines. And it is not just windshields that are vulnerable, the drive shaft covers, blades, engines, and controls.
The same can be said of crashworthy fuselages, fuel tanks, turbine burst protection, flaw tolerant structure (note that the S92 and AW139 fully meet the new FAR/JAR, the EC225 meets selected paragraphs only).
It would be good for ppruners to learn the certification rules for their helicopter, and for the machines they are looking to buy, and seek machines that have the highest level of protection available.
Ask not for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for all of us who fly older, grandfathered machines. And it is not just windshields that are vulnerable, the drive shaft covers, blades, engines, and controls.
The same can be said of crashworthy fuselages, fuel tanks, turbine burst protection, flaw tolerant structure (note that the S92 and AW139 fully meet the new FAR/JAR, the EC225 meets selected paragraphs only).
It would be good for ppruners to learn the certification rules for their helicopter, and for the machines they are looking to buy, and seek machines that have the highest level of protection available.
S76 certification
What has been posted so far is mostly correct. The original S76 bird strike certification with the glass windshields was to BCAR (British) requirements that existed way back when. At the time FAR's did not require any bird strike capability of the windshield.
Subsequently stretched acrylic windshields were also STC'd and certified against the BCAR requirements, however it was found that the cast acrylic ones did not meet this certification standard.
This is where the Sikorsky 109 knot Vne comes into play. They have stated that to "meet an equivalent level of safety with cast acrylic windshields then a 109 knot Vne should be applied". Note the words "equivalent level of safety". As the FAR certification standard that applies to any S76 does not require this "level of safety" then the operator need not apply the speed limitation.
It's going to be interesting for the lawyers
Subsequently stretched acrylic windshields were also STC'd and certified against the BCAR requirements, however it was found that the cast acrylic ones did not meet this certification standard.
This is where the Sikorsky 109 knot Vne comes into play. They have stated that to "meet an equivalent level of safety with cast acrylic windshields then a 109 knot Vne should be applied". Note the words "equivalent level of safety". As the FAR certification standard that applies to any S76 does not require this "level of safety" then the operator need not apply the speed limitation.
It's going to be interesting for the lawyers
Last edited by Variable Load; 25th Feb 2009 at 12:47.
it was found that the cast acrylic ones did not meet this certification standard.
Was it the cast wind screen maker?
Who first went on record stating that?
When was that information made public or transmitted to the FAA, Sikorsky, and the operators?
Upon learning of this problem with meeting the "certification standard"....what did the FAA, Sikorsky, and operators do?
If PHI knew of this situation and installed a component known to fall short of the safety standard in place at the time....where does that leave them re liability?
I should have gone to law school after getting my helicopter ratings....and moved to Lafayette and gotten rich off the helicopter industry. It does seem to be a lucrative profession. (Suing helicopter operators....not flying for them!)
SASless, I wish I knew the answers to your questions. Me thinks being an expert witness could also be profitable 
Maybe the FAA should be the ones asked to be accountable, as their standards had been proven to be lacking when other regulators had recognised the deficiencies?
However we are discussing a relatively new airframe here, not a 30 year old S76A. PHI must have some liability as well, assuming they knew about the lack of birdstrike protection!!??
Maybe the FAA should be the ones asked to be accountable, as their standards had been proven to be lacking when other regulators had recognised the deficiencies?
However we are discussing a relatively new airframe here, not a 30 year old S76A. PHI must have some liability as well, assuming they knew about the lack of birdstrike protection!!??
If it was the OEM glass wind screen perhaps but it was an after market STC'd item thus I can see an out for Sikorsky in that regard. That being said, if Sikorsky knew of the problem and did not issue a letter pointing it out to the operators (as they did after the accident) then I can see a problem for them in that regard.
A collateral issue for PHI if examined closely by an attorney for the plaintiffs is the hard nosed...take it or leave management attitude that prevailed/prevails at PHI. Common talk amongst the pilots has long been the quickest way to find yourself looking for a job is to make any kind of noise that challenges the way business is done. No matter what PHI management wants to say about that, it is bound to carry over to the safety program and safety environment within the operation.
Where the dollar is King....safety will always be a Serf.
A collateral issue for PHI if examined closely by an attorney for the plaintiffs is the hard nosed...take it or leave management attitude that prevailed/prevails at PHI. Common talk amongst the pilots has long been the quickest way to find yourself looking for a job is to make any kind of noise that challenges the way business is done. No matter what PHI management wants to say about that, it is bound to carry over to the safety program and safety environment within the operation.
Where the dollar is King....safety will always be a Serf.
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SASless,
According to the AOL the difference is in the manufacturing process, where the cast screen is a piece of material that is heated and formed between 2 moulds to shape it whereas the stretched one was a thicker piece that was heated and stretched over a form to shape. Apparently the stretching imparts a sort of "pre-stressed" strength to the screen that makes it comparatively strong like the glass composite screens.
According to the AOL the difference is in the manufacturing process, where the cast screen is a piece of material that is heated and formed between 2 moulds to shape it whereas the stretched one was a thicker piece that was heated and stretched over a form to shape. Apparently the stretching imparts a sort of "pre-stressed" strength to the screen that makes it comparatively strong like the glass composite screens.