SARH to go

[leopold bloom]

Listen up

In Greek mythology, Cassandra (Greek: Κασσάνδρα, "she who entangles men",[1] also known as Alexandra[2]) was the daughter of King Priam and Queen Hecuba of Troy. Her beauty caused Apollo to grant her the gift of prophecy. In an alternative version, she spent a night at Apollo's temple, at which time the temple snakes licked her ears clean so that she was able to hear the future. This is a recurring theme in Greek mythology, though sometimes it brings an ability to understand the language of animals rather than an ability to know the future.[3] However, when she did not return his love, Apollo placed a curse on her so that no one would ever believe her predictions. She is a figure both of the epic tradition and of tragedy, where her combination of deep understanding and powerlessness exemplify the tragic condition of humankind.

[[email protected]]

Leopold - I know you are a well educated man but I will be even more impressed if you knew that without googling it!

[lost horizon]

cassandra

Of course he knew that without googling it. Him and me was only chatting about that very subject over a pint at the Conference the other day.

Leo sez "that Crab , e's not a bad pilot but 'e's a right cassandra 'e is" and I says "oo yer right there Leo 'e always 'as been"

[sonas]

Digressing slightly, read earlier on this thread that Stornoway were jacking up a second aircraft due to recent flooding in Cumbria and the Scottish Borders. I've been checking AIS and have noticed that both Sumburgh and Stornoway haven't been out (working/training). Problems??
Just been a nosey blighter with nowt to do but watch the screen.
I know - very sad

[Rescue1]

Must be a problem with your AIS as Sumburgh's been out training/Jobs everyday if not twice a day.

[sonas]

Cheers. Been looking again and Sumburgh up. Like i said boredom well set in!

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

Cassandra

My knowledge of the above lady was limited to a prophet whose warnings went unheeded. Many thanks to Leopold for his erudite explanation!

[scottishbeefer]

Chiv past 310 jobs...

Minor point but Gannet have 3 cabs (one's coming out of zonals soon) but only 1 is ever declared, (771 fulfil their other committments then stand-up for SAR, out of 9 cabs) same as the rest of the SAR force - the seconds crew is dead as far as ARCC are concerned (although they're kept available for internal use, eg downbird - not stood down until ECT, no earlier then 1800, no later than 2200). If it was another Cockermouth scenario then they'd just have to ring around to generate another crew.

Get turned to Crab - only 310 jobs?

[[email protected]]

SB - it'll be a few more after last weekend but there is still another month to go.

Now I seem to remember in the early days of SARH when basing was being discussed, that the requirement was to be able to reach all high risk areas and most medium risk areas within 1 hour. The only way that makes any sense is for it to be 1 hour from receiving the call but it now seems that the MoD/Govt line is that it is 1 hour from take off which is very different.

Other emergency service response times are, as far as I know, taken from the time of the initial call so why should SAR helos be any different?

Is this a subtle moving of the goalposts to validate night-time closures or have MoD/govt just got it wrong?

[Clever Richard]

Crab,

This link ( http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/sar-hin...esentation.pdf ) is a presentation given by the SAR-H IPT a few years ago. Slide 29 is the one of interest and states reaching risk areas 1 hr from take-off. Not sure if the requirement has been massaged but it is worth following up.

Regards,

CD

[louisnewmark]

As one of my elders and betters once said to me, the wheels must be getting smaller because they’re going round more quickly. If I’m lucky this might prevent another long-winded and poorly-informed circular argument, but as this thread has reached p61 I doubt it!

The SAR-H response requirement was predicated largely on the only authoritative data source available at the time, which was the 2001 coverage report (sorry, can’t remember its full title) which was produced by a working group which included experienced RAF SAR personnel amongst others. This report was the first time that any national operational analysis had been carried out regarding UK SAR helicopter ops and took data from the years 1998, 1999 and 2000. One of the aspects that this report examined was the identification of risk areas in an attempt to focus the response more efficiently than the traditional drawing of day and night range circles around each base; another was to examine the response times that the 2001 SAR service provided to each of these risk areas.

It’s also important to remember that this report, and its subsequent use for SAR-H, pre-dated the requirement for the MCA’s Interim SAR contract, far less its instigation, so the increased speeds of the S-92 and AW139 over the S-61N were not envisaged. The basing distribution, however, has remained unchanged since 2001.

In an attempt to reduce the impact of regionality (the old argument of whether the jobs are there because the SAR bases are, or whether the bases are situated in the right places for the jobs), the working group covered many disciplines including coastguard and mountain rescue and examined all the SAR ops that it considered could have used a helicopter. While this remains a flawed approach remember that it was the first time that any national SAR op analysis had been carried out, and it was therefore the best dataset available to the SAR-H project team at the time – a subjective ‘best guess’ simply wasn’t acceptable for a contract of this nature. The report divided the UK into boxes similar in concept to Georef system, then assigned a risk rating of Very High, High, Medium and Low to each box based on the analysis. It found that, in 2001, the UK SAR service was able to reach 100% of the Very High and High risk areas, and 75% of the Medium risk areas, within 1 hour of take-off (ie transit time). This 2001 capability directly informed the SAR-H requirement which matches the 100% / 75% data. I seem to remember that the SAR-H Project Team has continued to receive annual SAR stats from DASA for a similar purpose and, if the risk areas change significantly over the life of the contract (unlikely but possible) then the basic requirement will, at least in concept, drive appropriate amendments to the service. It’s just a shame that many of the major incidents since then (floods, train crashes etc) happen to have occurred in the ‘lower risk’ areas... Incidentally, the traditional still wind ‘range circles’ that used to be part of standard SAR PR presentations were always predicated on time from take-off, so this is nothing new.

I’m not aware of any goalposts having been moved in this respect since the publication of the report and its adoption as a requirement driver for SAR-H; that would need political approval from a very brave politician (seen many of those recently?), though it’s likely that the maximum possible ‘wriggle room’ may have been exploited within them! It’s also worth remembering that the SAR-H Project Team wouldn’t have “offered up cost savings” unless it was specifically directed to do so by the MOD and MCA as project owners; PTs don’t set policy, they just have to make their projects match it.

Be gentle, it's my first time.

Louis

[Bluenose 50]

Louis

A very well written, considered and rational post

The relevant part of the document you mention is available using the following link http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/2001_coverage_report-9.pdf

regards

Bluenose 50

[[email protected]]

Thanks Louis - that was what I was after. I remember the study being dissected at the SARF conference when it was first displayed since this was supposed to show how few SAR bases we needed, especially if you have a 150kt helicopter.

It would be interesting to see if the subsequent datasets from recent years show the same distribution of jobs - if so then closing Lossiemouth is the obvious answer!!!

Then get rid of Leconfield and Lee because Wattisham could cover those areas!! Or leave Lee and close Portland.

These ideas are clearly barking but based on the same data used to suggest Chiv and Boulmer go to 12 hours despite Chivenor being the 2nd busiest SAR flight and having more high and medium high risk areas in its patch than any other flight except Valley.

The use of the transit time as a marker ignores callout time which is 3 times longer at night and doesn't appear to be factored in.

The geographical argument that a SAR flight generates its own jobs is flawed - people get into trouble in the same areas because of the geography, not because there is a SAR flight there. Brawdy closed but their patch is still a medium high to high risk area!

[Tallsar]

Sometimes I think we revolve in circles agreeing about the same points but in different language.

Although it was a few days ago Crab, your reply to my (too) long previous post was not surpsing. I have never argued against the reality that there will be some local cases to a SAR flt where the helo is indispensable and the best form of rescue, despite the other agencies available. My point, if not discernable previously is that there is nothing sacrosanct about the local job you attended and a similar casualty that may be in the same predicament maybe say 80 miles away. Yes of course I am aware that Chiv picks up a deal of what Brawdy would have done previously - but as you well know - so do other rescue agencies to add to their extensive and busy call outs - and yes -all coastal areas of where there is much activity of any sort deserve the same level of response - 12 bases at 24 hr readiness doesn't achieve that and nor did 16 - so where do we go form here without busting the already depleted budget? Why should the local casualty to a SAR base deserve a speedier response than the one further away. The short answer is of course that they both in theory deserve the same level of response - but that will always be unattainable even with a much greater number of SAR bases. There will always be some genuine casualties that are at the extreme range for a particular base and suffer the consequences accordingly. Perhaps the requirement might have better served those future casualties by insisting on a more rapid response - ie a 5 minute standby rather than 15 mins - more than possible with a modern ac - but that trick was missed too. What is ceratin is that, in daylight (when there is most demand), with 12 bases and a modern 140kt ac (as opposed to the poor old SK struggling with the cruise guide bouncing off the stops) the majority of historic casualty locations will receive an on top helo not only in less that an hour but most in half the time of the present service. Because of the requirement for those 12 bases, the mutual cross cover could be argued as excessive in pure terms of meeting that 1 hour on top requirement, but in reality will ensure a much speedier and reliable service for the majority of future casualties. If that's not an improvement - I am at a loss. While it is irrefutable that if you are unfortunate to have an accident very close to one of the "downgraded" bases such as Chivenor at night, your rescue may be later than in previous times, it will still be well within the 1 hour prescribed on top time, and many others further away will reap the benefits of an overall faster service across the UK SRR.

As to whether any particular incident genuinely was a life saving occasion where the helo was indispenable - you set your own personal threshold, and only medical evidence can support the case one way or another. Emotion aside, I stand by my viewpoint on whether the majority of our present missions are truely life saving.

While as some of the more recent posts have shown, any analysis of the need is in itself flawed to a degree, the response in terms of the requirement can always be argued as flawed. The historic data and 2001 Review provide a good staring point and provide one means (that chosen by the SAR-H Customer) to measure the requirement for the SAR-H programme. The main requirement to cover all of the high risk areas within an hour, is by no means ideal particulary as it locks us in to hsitoric trends rather than giving scope for future changes of demand, and does not bare comparison with say the land ambulance golden hour approach. Nonetheless, any more stringent requirement would mean a larger number of bases than 12 and more standby ac - assessed as unaffordable given that the historic data shows an acceptable minimum risk of not having assets available if either the first standby has launched or there is a major surge or set of concurrent operations across the country. We can all project dire scenarios where there will be a need for more helos than we have now or under SAR-H - but the historic data shows that the requirement in all its detail will meet the need - assuming the chosen contractor delivers against it.

My "grand view" as you call it Crab is a better starting point for an effective and affordable national service than dwelling on how quickly you can rescue local casualties form any of the present 12 bases....and yes the statistics and detailed capability analysis using modern platforms show that from 9 bases at night the 1 hour requirement can be met. In reality there is a case for some of those 9 being elswewhere to be optimally effective but any chance of that was scuppered by this parochial argument that the actual locations of the presnt 12 are sacrosanct for political aquiesence. A clean sheet of paper may well have lead to some more radical approaches to basing with further improvements to on top times in the high risk areas and those of greatest concern to the UK "consumer". - sadly it is not to be..

Oh and as a brief finale - yes closing Lossiemouth has a lot of strength to it (assuming a suitable replacement location near the main area of demand was feasible) - a SAR base at Fort William or Oban - now there's a thought - and then maybe Prestwick could have been reduced too!


Cheers

[[email protected]]

Your points are well put Tallsar but I have heard them all before in the justification for SARH.

This process, which started as such a clean piece of paper that you couldn't even say the word 'helicopter' because the blue sky thinkers wanted to be able to consider things like balloons for chrissakes, has been compromised at every turn (inevitably, some might say). Whether for political aquiesence, as with the basing, or to allow more wriggle room for profit, as with the nightime closures, the whole process has lost integrity and focus with various interested parties all pulling in different directions.

I have no problem with the civilianisation of UKSAR - it is inevitable given the MoDs pathetic support of the milSAR and helicopter procurement overall - but the mechanism to select the future provider seems to be inexorably moving towards the cheapest solution rather than the best.

Air ambulances came into being because land ambulances struggled to meet the clinically desireable 'golden hour' and Devon is well served during daylight by 2 of them. At night, that golden hour ceases to exist if you close Chivenor and the use of '1 hour after take off' as a measure of proposed efficiencies with faster helicopters conveniently ignores the RS45 at night which would mean 1 hour 15 from call to overhead Chiv for Culdrose and 1 hour 40 for Valley. How is this an improvement???

I repeat my belief that SAR should not be provided on a 'for profit' basis because, as we have seen from the banking crisis, once money is involved, anything can be justified by the need to make profit and all integrity is lost.

From Bluenose's linked document

The group therefore agreed that the prime objective for a SAR helicopter was to reach a survivor or survivors within any part of the UKSRR as quickly and safely as possible.

This is where I strongly disagree with the group

The group decided that the variations in equipment and clothing of potential SAR survivors and the variations in temperature and conditions in and near the UK throughout the year was so great that average survival times for land and for the sea had little or no meaning. Furthermore, any injury sustained could significantly reduce a survivor’s survival time. The group agreed that the most practical and meaningful method of determining helicopter coverage and helicopter basing was to consider the time taken from take off to reaching the survivor, assuming that the survivor can be found immediately without the need for search. The group decided that the time taken to reach a survivor from take off should be 1 hour.

The first compromise between rescuing the casualty as quickly as possible and creating a management tool to determine basing - always an easy compromise to reach when you are warm, dry and uninjured in your committee room.

I know we can't have more SAR bases but having fewer (at night) is not providing the same level of cover and service.

Last paragraph in the document

Therefore, there should be a SAR helicopter available ‘on-state’ at each SAR base for 98% of the base’s declared SAR operating time; usually 24 hours per day throughout the year. In addition, to cater for concurrent SAR tasks and to provide a surge capacity for large disasters, a second helicopter and crew should be available at certain military SAR bases.

So where is that in the SAR H blueprint???

[brumbrumgirl]

no suitable winchman available from traditional sources!

I am new to this forum, but I know for a fact that there was an extremely professional aviator, winchman and qualified paramedic, who has over 500 SAR rescues under his belt and over 6000 Flying hours on SH, available for this post, It would appear that there is definitely a commercial aspect to the appointment of Paramedics in professional aviator posts. Was this post advertised properly and were interviews held or was the paramedic handpicked to suit the company hiring?

[jonnyloove]

CHC Winchman

Well I think the civil winchman was selected for Sumburgh base. I know off 2 Ex aircrewmen (1 RAF 1 Army) both paramedic register who applied to chc online and phone Aberdeen H.R. I did even get a polite Fook off.
The senior crewman is a weird one and arrogant anyway.
I would say that its being driven as a cheap way to get paramedics to fill slots the cheap way.
Best off luck to them anyway.

[500e]

So 140 Kts 70 kts headwind were would I prefer a launch from, Chivnor or around Southampton? I am ( have been) in the water between Lands End and the Scilly,
Time in water is critical in winter especially in winter!! you know the time prevailing Westerlies gusting 60 + knots sea state 1.5 mtrs + water temp low, how long will you survive? that extra 10 min could be the difference.
If there is a profit in this contract why should a shareholder or CEO profit the money should be ploughed back into the service to improve the cover.
I still presume Crab and like will be training for rescue the same as before as the military will still require a SAR service, so we the tax payers will be paying twice.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

the majority of historic casualty locations will receive an on top helo not only in less that an hour but most in half the time of the present service

(my italics)

Tallsar,

Sorry if I'm being thick (maths never being my strong suit!), but how do you arrive at this conclusion? 140 kts isn't twice the speed of a Sea King - in fact it's barely 20% faster.

And of course you're right that

all coastal areas of where there is much activity of any sort deserve the same level of response - 12 bases at 24 hr readiness doesn't achieve that and nor did 16

...but 16 was better than 12, and 12 is better than 9! This is the kind of logic which leads to the suggestion of having one SAR base near Derby with half a dozen or so Ospreys...

TOTD

[Bluenose 50]

500e

Errr - if you were in the water between Lands End and the Scillies your nearest friendly SAR Flight would of course be Culdrose who I am led to believe will continue to operate 24h post 2012