Sometimes I think we revolve in circles agreeing about the same points but in different language.
Although it was a few days ago Crab, your reply to my (too) long previous post was not surpsing. I have never argued against the reality that there will be some local cases to a SAR flt where the helo is indispensable and the best form of rescue, despite the other agencies available. My point, if not discernable previously is that there is nothing sacrosanct about the local job you attended and a similar casualty that may be in the same predicament maybe say 80 miles away. Yes of course I am aware that Chiv picks up a deal of what Brawdy would have done previously - but as you well know - so do other rescue agencies to add to their extensive and busy call outs - and yes -all coastal areas of where there is much activity of any sort deserve the same level of response - 12 bases at 24 hr readiness doesn't achieve that and nor did 16 - so where do we go form here without busting the already depleted budget? Why should the local casualty to a SAR base deserve a speedier response than the one further away. The short answer is of course that they both in theory deserve the same level of response - but that will always be unattainable even with a much greater number of SAR bases. There will always be some genuine casualties that are at the extreme range for a particular base and suffer the consequences accordingly. Perhaps the requirement might have better served those future casualties by insisting on a more rapid response - ie a 5 minute standby rather than 15 mins - more than possible with a modern ac - but that trick was missed too. What is ceratin is that, in daylight (when there is most demand), with 12 bases and a modern 140kt ac (as opposed to the poor old SK struggling with the cruise guide bouncing off the stops) the majority of historic casualty locations will receive an on top helo not only in less that an hour but most in half the time of the present service. Because of the requirement for those 12 bases, the mutual cross cover could be argued as excessive in pure terms of meeting that 1 hour on top requirement, but in reality will ensure a much speedier and reliable service for the majority of future casualties. If that's not an improvement - I am at a loss. While it is irrefutable that if you are unfortunate to have an accident very close to one of the "downgraded" bases such as Chivenor at night, your rescue may be later than in previous times, it will still be well within the 1 hour prescribed on top time, and many others further away will reap the benefits of an overall faster service across the UK SRR.
As to whether any particular incident genuinely was a life saving occasion where the helo was indispenable - you set your own personal threshold, and only medical evidence can support the case one way or another. Emotion aside, I stand by my viewpoint on whether the majority of our present missions are truely life saving.
While as some of the more recent posts have shown, any analysis of the need is in itself flawed to a degree, the response in terms of the requirement can always be argued as flawed. The historic data and 2001 Review provide a good staring point and provide one means (that chosen by the SAR-H Customer) to measure the requirement for the SAR-H programme. The main requirement to cover all of the high risk areas within an hour, is by no means ideal particulary as it locks us in to hsitoric trends rather than giving scope for future changes of demand, and does not bare comparison with say the land ambulance golden hour approach. Nonetheless, any more stringent requirement would mean a larger number of bases than 12 and more standby ac - assessed as unaffordable given that the historic data shows an acceptable minimum risk of not having assets available if either the first standby has launched or there is a major surge or set of concurrent operations across the country. We can all project dire scenarios where there will be a need for more helos than we have now or under SAR-H - but the historic data shows that the requirement in all its detail will meet the need - assuming the chosen contractor delivers against it.
My "grand view" as you call it Crab is a better starting point for an effective and affordable national service than dwelling on how quickly you can rescue local casualties form any of the present 12 bases....and yes the statistics and detailed capability analysis using modern platforms show that from 9 bases at night the 1 hour requirement can be met. In reality there is a case for some of those 9 being elswewhere to be optimally effective but any chance of that was scuppered by this parochial argument that the actual locations of the presnt 12 are sacrosanct for political aquiesence. A clean sheet of paper may well have lead to some more radical approaches to basing with further improvements to on top times in the high risk areas and those of greatest concern to the UK "consumer". - sadly it is not to be..
Oh and as a brief finale - yes closing Lossiemouth has a lot of strength to it (assuming a suitable replacement location near the main area of demand was feasible) - a SAR base at Fort William or Oban - now there's a thought - and then maybe Prestwick could have been reduced too!
Cheers