What's the latest news of the V22 Osprey?
Wow, pretentious and disrespectful to those serving our government.
As to the Osprey program, a few years back (early 2000's IIRC) there was a pretty big story about a few of the officers in the Osprey program office, and I think a squadron CO, who were taken to task for taking serious liberties with facts.
I'll leave it at the following state of play:
The program and the aircraft have survived both the technical and political challenges facing the V-22.
So far.
I think the fact the copilot did not notice an engine failure (or "doesn't remember"), and all the information shows an out of envelope approach which might have worked if that damn ditch wasn't there says it all. If they had been in a Chinook or 53 their would have been more injured and killed,
The Sultan
The Sultan
If you read the full report, theres not a single shred of testimonial that there was anything wrong or abnormal with the aircraft itself that they could detect. No engine noises, no surging, no deceleration, smoke, pops, etc.
On the contrary, almost every single interviewee focused on how hot of an approach they were making. Even among experienced V22 guys.
But I am glad this thread (and Wired) has gone back to rehashing this closed 18 month old incident. True to form, journalists like David Axe and Bob Cox do their damndest to keep old bad news fresh in the public's eyes. Nothing new to report on the Osprey in the last year? Well, lets dig up that old dirt and toss it around again. We dont want anyone to start thinking things are making progress.
On the contrary, almost every single interviewee focused on how hot of an approach they were making. Even among experienced V22 guys.
But I am glad this thread (and Wired) has gone back to rehashing this closed 18 month old incident. True to form, journalists like David Axe and Bob Cox do their damndest to keep old bad news fresh in the public's eyes. Nothing new to report on the Osprey in the last year? Well, lets dig up that old dirt and toss it around again. We dont want anyone to start thinking things are making progress.
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Son of Osprey’ Could Replace All Army Copters
V-22 May Need New Engine (Updated)
UPDATE: "This shouldn’t come as a surprise," writes one Kiowa Warrior helicopter pilot.
The V-22 Osprey tiltrotor flown by the Marines and Air Force crashes or burns much more often than the military cares to admit. But that hasn’t stopped Osprey-maker Boeing from pitching a new tiltrotor for an ambitious Army program aimed at replacing almost everything the ground combat branch flies … with a single aircraft design.
That’s potentially thousands of new tiltrotors, which take off vertically like helicopters but fly fast like airplanes, thanks to their rotating engine nacelles — but which are also vulnerable to dangerous aerodynamic phenomena and, in the V-22’s case, have been plagued by engine problems.
By continuing to invest in the V-22, the Pentagon is doubling down on a risky bet. If Boeing’s “son of Osprey” gets the greenlight for the comprehensive Joint Multi-Role program, the military will be going all in. But a lot could change between now and 2025, when the first of the new rotorcraft is (loosely) scheduled to enter service. And there’s reason to believe a new tiltrotor could avoid the pitfalls of the Osprey’s design.
Boeing showed off some preliminary artwork of their Joint Multi-Role tiltrotor at an Army confab in Washington, D.C., last week. The art shows a small, sleek scout version and a larger cargo model. “Those images are nothing more than artist concepts and not necessarily associated with a specific design philosophy,” Boeing spokesman Chris Haddox told Danger Room. “The work is just getting underway.”
All the same, the Boeing concept shows apparent improvements over the V-22. Specifically, simpler wings and better rotors.
To fit aboard the Navy assault ships that carry Marines into battle, the V-22 had to have a wing that could fold back along the fuselage — at the cost of extra weight and complexity. The Osprey’s rotors also had to be smaller than ideal for a 25-ton aircraft, forcing the engines to work harder and run hotter.
Over the years, engineers have proposed solutions to this problem. Farhan Gandhi, an engineer at Penn State University, proposed a telescoping rotor blade that would automatically increase in length during a tiltrotor’s helicopter mode, increasing its lifting ability. One retired V-22 engineer told analyst Lee Gaillard that replacing the V-22’s three-blade rotor with a new, five-blade model (.pdf) would boost performance. In the end, Boeing opted for tweaks to the V-22’s software to squeeze every last bit of performance out of the existing design.
Boeing’s conceptual future tiltrotor seems to avoid these half-measures by incorporating bigger rotors from the outset on the scout model, and twin rotors — that is, two sets of blades on each nacelle — for the cargo version. An Army tiltrotor could probably also skip the folding wing mechanism, as seems to be the case in the artist’s renderings. The result could be a safer, better-performing tiltrotor than the troubled V-22.
That’s potentially thousands of new tiltrotors, which take off vertically like helicopters but fly fast like airplanes, thanks to their rotating engine nacelles — but which are also vulnerable to dangerous aerodynamic phenomena and, in the V-22’s case, have been plagued by engine problems.
By continuing to invest in the V-22, the Pentagon is doubling down on a risky bet. If Boeing’s “son of Osprey” gets the greenlight for the comprehensive Joint Multi-Role program, the military will be going all in. But a lot could change between now and 2025, when the first of the new rotorcraft is (loosely) scheduled to enter service. And there’s reason to believe a new tiltrotor could avoid the pitfalls of the Osprey’s design.
Boeing showed off some preliminary artwork of their Joint Multi-Role tiltrotor at an Army confab in Washington, D.C., last week. The art shows a small, sleek scout version and a larger cargo model. “Those images are nothing more than artist concepts and not necessarily associated with a specific design philosophy,” Boeing spokesman Chris Haddox told Danger Room. “The work is just getting underway.”
All the same, the Boeing concept shows apparent improvements over the V-22. Specifically, simpler wings and better rotors.
To fit aboard the Navy assault ships that carry Marines into battle, the V-22 had to have a wing that could fold back along the fuselage — at the cost of extra weight and complexity. The Osprey’s rotors also had to be smaller than ideal for a 25-ton aircraft, forcing the engines to work harder and run hotter.
Over the years, engineers have proposed solutions to this problem. Farhan Gandhi, an engineer at Penn State University, proposed a telescoping rotor blade that would automatically increase in length during a tiltrotor’s helicopter mode, increasing its lifting ability. One retired V-22 engineer told analyst Lee Gaillard that replacing the V-22’s three-blade rotor with a new, five-blade model (.pdf) would boost performance. In the end, Boeing opted for tweaks to the V-22’s software to squeeze every last bit of performance out of the existing design.
Boeing’s conceptual future tiltrotor seems to avoid these half-measures by incorporating bigger rotors from the outset on the scout model, and twin rotors — that is, two sets of blades on each nacelle — for the cargo version. An Army tiltrotor could probably also skip the folding wing mechanism, as seems to be the case in the artist’s renderings. The result could be a safer, better-performing tiltrotor than the troubled V-22.
V-22 May Need New Engine (Updated)
- [*]
Marine Col. M. D. Mulhern told reporters that, although the dual engines in the tilt-rotor aircraft perform well, they are not lasting as long as the Marine Corps expected under a 1998 agreement with Rolls-Royce.
"Now, as we are operating the airplanes, the engines aren’t lasting as long as we would like or as long as they would like," Mulhern said at a briefing during an exposition sponsored by the Navy League.
Muller said the Marine Corps is working with the manufacturer but also plans "to cast a wide net to see what’s available," acknowledging that rebidding the engine is a possible option. "We have some long-term issues with Rolls-Royce that we need to work out," he said.
A new engine? It’s not clear yet what the full implications of this will be, but reporters who attended the briefing and have covered the troubled tiltrotor for a long time described the announcement as jaw-dropping. While the engine wear isn’t related to Iraq’s harsh environment, according to the Marine Corps, the news takes the winds out of much hoped for good PR. The aircraft’s deployment to Iraq was supposed to demonstrate that all of the cost overruns, schedule delays and accidents were worth it in terms of the capabilities the V-22 provides. "Now, as we are operating the airplanes, the engines aren’t lasting as long as we would like or as long as they would like," Mulhern said at a briefing during an exposition sponsored by the Navy League.
Muller said the Marine Corps is working with the manufacturer but also plans "to cast a wide net to see what’s available," acknowledging that rebidding the engine is a possible option. "We have some long-term issues with Rolls-Royce that we need to work out," he said.
UPDATE: "This shouldn’t come as a surprise," writes one Kiowa Warrior helicopter pilot.
The Rolls Royce 250-C30R/3 on the OH-58D had wear problems too. When my unit deployed 16 aircraft to NTC [the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin] from Colorado Springs in June 2002 (a regularly scheduled rotation, but with a heavy emphasis on preparing for Iraq) we replaced several engines – I want to say six. This was mainly due to wear on the compressor from the poorly filtered airflow. Until around 2002, the 58D
did not have what you would think of as an air filter – it used a
"particle separator" that kept big chunks out, but let a lot of smaller particles in.
The compressor blades were being damaged, and it was impacting the engine performance. At the time we were experimenting with filters -
including panty hose. Prior to deployment to Iraq, we fielded a much more robust filter system, using petroleum coated filter elements similar to a cars air filter. The new filters improved performance, and greatly reduced the wear and tear on the engine compressors. I can’t speak to the exact nature of the Osprey’s problems, but I think the issue is likely due to a less robust filtering system, and extended operations in the sandy/dusty environments in Iraq. I would think that the Osprey’s engine air filtering system was designed for the
"occasional" sand/dust landing, but meant to live on tarmac. Now they’re living like the Army and Marines live…in the dirt.
Contrary to some perception… we frequently operated in sandy and dusty LZs [landing zones] at our training areas, and it got even worse at the deserts of NTC. Long term wear caught up with us, and the result was a lot of engine replacements. Our OPTEMPO [operational tempo] in Iraq was pretty high – I think we flew roughly a (garrison) years worth of flight hours in a couple of months in Iraq, so it’s possible that it’s a
"normal" amount of wear and tear is catching up with with V-22 engines.
did not have what you would think of as an air filter – it used a
"particle separator" that kept big chunks out, but let a lot of smaller particles in.
The compressor blades were being damaged, and it was impacting the engine performance. At the time we were experimenting with filters -
including panty hose. Prior to deployment to Iraq, we fielded a much more robust filter system, using petroleum coated filter elements similar to a cars air filter. The new filters improved performance, and greatly reduced the wear and tear on the engine compressors. I can’t speak to the exact nature of the Osprey’s problems, but I think the issue is likely due to a less robust filtering system, and extended operations in the sandy/dusty environments in Iraq. I would think that the Osprey’s engine air filtering system was designed for the
"occasional" sand/dust landing, but meant to live on tarmac. Now they’re living like the Army and Marines live…in the dirt.
Contrary to some perception… we frequently operated in sandy and dusty LZs [landing zones] at our training areas, and it got even worse at the deserts of NTC. Long term wear caught up with us, and the result was a lot of engine replacements. Our OPTEMPO [operational tempo] in Iraq was pretty high – I think we flew roughly a (garrison) years worth of flight hours in a couple of months in Iraq, so it’s possible that it’s a
"normal" amount of wear and tear is catching up with with V-22 engines.
all the information shows an out of envelope approach which might have worked if that damn ditch wasn't there says it all. If they had been in a Chinook or 53 their would have been more injured and killed,
Crashing.....which I define as an unplanned touching down at excessive speed, excessive sink rate, and out of control is not going to work out anytime.
No matter the actual cause...once you arrive high, fast, steep,heavy....outside the operating envelope of the aircraft....and insufficient power to prevent the premature contact with the ground...aircraft crash, people get injured and killed.
Now how do you reckon more people would have been injured or killed if it had been a 53 or Chinook?
They carry more people....but are sure a lot easier to fly, transitions from forward flight to a hover is much more straight forward....or is this just your usual bash helicopters mindset whenever possible line of crap talk Sultan?
Throw out some facts, figures, data, research that supports your dumbass comment!
Well, theres the survivability aspect here. Yes you can crash land, with a robust airframe that can absorb impacts from a overspeed run-on landing, but when a nosewheel catches a wadi and causes the airframe to cartwheel, thats unarguably a worse situation, is it not?
Cant compare to 53/47, apples to oranges in envelope, though if you were to throw either of those two airframes at the ground at the approach speed of the crash, they probably would not have stayed intact as well as the V22 (before the wadi) with its composite structure. They were not designed with this in mind, however.
Cant compare to 53/47, apples to oranges in envelope, though if you were to throw either of those two airframes at the ground at the approach speed of the crash, they probably would not have stayed intact as well as the V22 (before the wadi) with its composite structure. They were not designed with this in mind, however.
Dan: interesting to see that Axe grinder has a mouthpiece here on the PPRuNe boards. I think he's drinking and writing pure moonshine.
U.S. Army is on track to buy some hundreds more UH-60M Black Hawks. Don't see Osprey, or a small version of it, in their Air Order of Battle any time soon. Spending for new systems is retracting, not growing, under the Five year forecast, and I suspect it is more austere in the out years beyond that. However, actually functional crystal balls are in very, very short supply. Mr Axe does not own one such. I don't either.
Engines: check out the F-14 and its history with engines. That program also had to play catch up after the engine originally procured showed a few flaws in the fleet.
"Doesn't perform as expected per the 1998 expectation" is a pretty weak data point for criticism, when one considers aircraft systems development. That said, I am glad to see Admiral Mullen's point on looking to see if something better is available. If they can, replacement through attrition can be programmed in, as with other aircraft programs over the years. I wish him luck, see funding environment I mentioned above.
You might be aware that the original T-700's that the Blackhawk came with aren't the current configuration. Oh, the Scandal!
Also, the Navy bought a different T-700 than the Army did.
OH, the scandal!
The Acquisition system is utterly broken.
Sorry, the sarcasm just kept leaping at my keyboard.
U.S. Army is on track to buy some hundreds more UH-60M Black Hawks. Don't see Osprey, or a small version of it, in their Air Order of Battle any time soon. Spending for new systems is retracting, not growing, under the Five year forecast, and I suspect it is more austere in the out years beyond that. However, actually functional crystal balls are in very, very short supply. Mr Axe does not own one such. I don't either.
Engines: check out the F-14 and its history with engines. That program also had to play catch up after the engine originally procured showed a few flaws in the fleet.
"Doesn't perform as expected per the 1998 expectation" is a pretty weak data point for criticism, when one considers aircraft systems development. That said, I am glad to see Admiral Mullen's point on looking to see if something better is available. If they can, replacement through attrition can be programmed in, as with other aircraft programs over the years. I wish him luck, see funding environment I mentioned above.
You might be aware that the original T-700's that the Blackhawk came with aren't the current configuration. Oh, the Scandal!
Also, the Navy bought a different T-700 than the Army did.
OH, the scandal!
The Acquisition system is utterly broken.
Sorry, the sarcasm just kept leaping at my keyboard.
Out of Envelope Approach
Originally Posted by SASless
Now how does the presence of a ditch figure into an out of envelope approach technique?
Any of the V-22 pilots out there care to enlighten on the "out of envelope approach" and what it means in specifics?
Thanks,
John Dixson
Did you guys forget we already had this discussion 3 times over in this very thread?
http://www.afsoc.af.mil/shared/media...101215-009.pdf
http://www.afsoc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-101215-007.pdf
http://www.afsoc.af.mil/shared/media...101215-009.pdf
http://www.afsoc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-101215-007.pdf
At the DP, 3 nm from the LZ, the winds were 060 degrees at approximately 17 to 20 knots. The MA crossed the DP at approximately 300 feet AGL and 230 KCAS (270 KGS). The MP started the deceleration maneuver one half mile late, at 2.5 nm from the LZ, instead of 3 nm as stated in SOPs.As the MA slowed, the MP started a descent to 100 feet AGL. The MCR relayed the “one minute” call to the MA passengers. The MA slowed rapidly as the nacelles were rotated towards the helicopter position. At 0.79 nm from the LZ, the MA was at approximately 147 KCAS (180 KGS) and 150 feet AGL.The normal speed at the 1 nm point should have been approximately 110 KGS. At 0.5 nm to the LZ, the MA had slowed to approximately 115 KCAS (128 KGS). The normal speed at the 0.5 nm point should have been 60 to 70 KGS. The MP’s rapid deceleration slowed them down from 147 KCAS (180 KGS) to 102 KCAS (125 KGS), between 2008:58Z and 2009:08Z. Due to the right quartering tailwind, the MP maintained an approximate eight degree right crab as he corrected his ground track en route to the LZ.
Last edited by SansAnhedral; 19th Oct 2011 at 23:17.
John,
....and touchdown speed was? Rate of Descent at touchdown?
Please to recall this was at night in Afghanistan at a fair ol' height in the middle of no where.
The ditch just put the icing on the cake....
I will accept the ditch made for the final mechanism that caused the deaths, injuries, and write off of the aircraft.
I will not accept that the event would have played out much differently absent the ditch.
Just as we do not for sure what the engines were doing...Other outcomes can only be surmised....and not guaranteed.
....and touchdown speed was? Rate of Descent at touchdown?
Please to recall this was at night in Afghanistan at a fair ol' height in the middle of no where.
The ditch just put the icing on the cake....
I will accept the ditch made for the final mechanism that caused the deaths, injuries, and write off of the aircraft.
I will not accept that the event would have played out much differently absent the ditch.
Just as we do not for sure what the engines were doing...Other outcomes can only be surmised....and not guaranteed.
Approach
Sorry, Sans, I had not read the documents, but thanks to your links, have now done so.
That said, I remain of the opinion that SAS brought up as the central point, and I agree with his take as written in the post above this one.
As to the conjecture about the V22 having superior survival characteristics in this sort of situation, permit me to demur by pointing out that both of those machines, by virtue of having large main rotors with higher stored energy, would permit their pilots to much more easily salvage a low hot approach, and especially so if one motor was sick.
Thanks,
John Dixson
That said, I remain of the opinion that SAS brought up as the central point, and I agree with his take as written in the post above this one.
As to the conjecture about the V22 having superior survival characteristics in this sort of situation, permit me to demur by pointing out that both of those machines, by virtue of having large main rotors with higher stored energy, would permit their pilots to much more easily salvage a low hot approach, and especially so if one motor was sick.
Thanks,
John Dixson
We might note the nose gear had already collapsed prior to hitting the ditch and the Main Gear were scouring tracks eight inches deep following a touchdown between 75-80 knots all the while the Nr had slowed to between 70-80% instead of the expected 104%. The Ramp was dragging before the nose gear collapsed which would suggest a strong fall thru upon touchdown due to the lack of sufficient Nr and'or control authority to compensate for the ROD existant at time of touchdown.
Had the nose gear not collapsed perhaps the ditch might not have been as instrumental as it was in the destruction of the aircraft. It would appear the crash was well underway within 45 feet of the touch down point and before hitting the ditch. Again....the ditch was the last bit of very bad luck.
Had the nose gear not collapsed perhaps the ditch might not have been as instrumental as it was in the destruction of the aircraft. It would appear the crash was well underway within 45 feet of the touch down point and before hitting the ditch. Again....the ditch was the last bit of very bad luck.
If one assumes a 5000 foot elevation and say 15-20 C temperature....and an aircraft weight at about 40,000 pounds......would not the rotor system be very close to stall? Would a sudden large demand in power lead to blade stall and if the Nr was allowed to droop....not exacrebate the situation?
The Osprey rotor system by design has a high loading and is tweaked for high speed rather than hover performance.
Was this crash more of a design issue than is being acknowledged? Is the design so critical that Pilot errors are far more unforgiving due to the proximity to adverse rotor dynamics at which the aircraft operates in a combat environment?
Would reducing the demand for power....thus undrooping the Nr..have been the better reaction....and thus obtaining increased lift by increasing Nr. I experienced that on one very memorable occasion during a takeoff downwind with a slingload. I diddled the pooch...bled Nr to the point the Generators dropped offline and upon realizing things got better while gently and ever so slowly lowering the Thrust Lever (Collective)....Nr increased and we were able to climb above the obstacles.
Any Engineers out there that could explain this in language we all can understand?
The Osprey rotor system by design has a high loading and is tweaked for high speed rather than hover performance.
Was this crash more of a design issue than is being acknowledged? Is the design so critical that Pilot errors are far more unforgiving due to the proximity to adverse rotor dynamics at which the aircraft operates in a combat environment?
Would reducing the demand for power....thus undrooping the Nr..have been the better reaction....and thus obtaining increased lift by increasing Nr. I experienced that on one very memorable occasion during a takeoff downwind with a slingload. I diddled the pooch...bled Nr to the point the Generators dropped offline and upon realizing things got better while gently and ever so slowly lowering the Thrust Lever (Collective)....Nr increased and we were able to climb above the obstacles.
Any Engineers out there that could explain this in language we all can understand?
Program cost thirty lives, and that's a data point?
Go back to the early 1980's. In a single CH-53E mishap in WESTPAC, tail disconnect failure, over Thirty Marines died.
CH-53E is still flying, and doing good work.
Whittle makes a good point, that the cost of development, steep as it was in blood and treasure, resulted in a better aircraft ... albeit expensive.
The point Korb makes about cost isn't confined to Osprey. What Osprey means is opportunity cost: if you buy the full run, what is the USMC prepared to sacrifice in other capability? If not, how many on the full program run get lopped off at the end? DoD all have to make those hard calls (see VH program cancellation as a data point to that end).
Korb's "stop buying them at all anymore" is a rather myopic approach, since I doubt that he's done the mid-to-long term posture development for USMC roles and missions. That said, the Commandant may indeed come back with precisely what Korb suggests -- to preserve, for example, CH-53K program funding, or other critical mission equipment needs.
Put another way, if the USMC sees an OPTEMPO decrease in the next five years, how many do they need? Forecasting like that is a real SOB, if you consider a USMC posture forecast in 1999 versus where they were in 2004, for example.
What I smell in Korb's quote (possibly out of context) is an attempt to scapegoat V-22 for the sake of dollars elsewhere.
What's his pet project?
What's his pet program?
Go back to the early 1980's. In a single CH-53E mishap in WESTPAC, tail disconnect failure, over Thirty Marines died.
CH-53E is still flying, and doing good work.
Whittle makes a good point, that the cost of development, steep as it was in blood and treasure, resulted in a better aircraft ... albeit expensive.
The point Korb makes about cost isn't confined to Osprey. What Osprey means is opportunity cost: if you buy the full run, what is the USMC prepared to sacrifice in other capability? If not, how many on the full program run get lopped off at the end? DoD all have to make those hard calls (see VH program cancellation as a data point to that end).
Korb's "stop buying them at all anymore" is a rather myopic approach, since I doubt that he's done the mid-to-long term posture development for USMC roles and missions. That said, the Commandant may indeed come back with precisely what Korb suggests -- to preserve, for example, CH-53K program funding, or other critical mission equipment needs.
Put another way, if the USMC sees an OPTEMPO decrease in the next five years, how many do they need? Forecasting like that is a real SOB, if you consider a USMC posture forecast in 1999 versus where they were in 2004, for example.
What I smell in Korb's quote (possibly out of context) is an attempt to scapegoat V-22 for the sake of dollars elsewhere.
What's his pet project?
What's his pet program?
Cost of Capabilities
Lonewolf 50 makes a very good point. I believe that we have all become numb with respect to the cost of things. While we waited for the V-22 to be fielded and the bugs to be worked out the Marines were forced to keep the CH-46s in service for an additional 20 years totaling more than 40 years of service. During the same period, the Marines spent $22,000,000,000 on the V-22. This money could have procured more than 1400 Blackhawks or 800 C/MH-53E’s. One has to ask, did the Marines gain 22 billion dollars of improved capabilities with the V-22?
Dan, as I've pointed out before on this topic, the USMC didn't want to pay the manpower bill (2.2x) for the maritime blackhawk idea back in the 90's.
Different pots of money that have differing program and life cycle costs to the taxpayer.
Some folks forget that we cut the DoD manpower by about 40 percent in the post Cold War drawdown. During the critical decision time on the V-22 program, each of the services was in the position of having to be careful what the manpower and training costs accrued to any weapons system.
I have a friend who worked on the DCSPER staff in the Army, early 90's, who had as one of his staff projects keeping or losing a gunner in the Blackhawk/Huey for the TOE in a given aviation battalion. That's a difference of a few thousand soldiers, if you look at how many Blackhawks and Hueys the Army had at the time.
That kind of problem, numbering a few thousand different but similar problems, was being solved or not by staffs all over all four armed services. In that environment, the larger plane with fewer pilots (expensive to train, 2-5 million per currently, through the FRS) and fewer crewmen for the total USMC manpower bill was a selling point for V-22 that had nothing to do with pros and cons of a given airframe.
Manpower costs are not borne by the APN-1 type of acquisition cost, so the apples to apples comparison being attempted here (Jack, your numbers in terms of S-70 substitutes) isn't one.
Commandant of USMC had to look at which area to optimize in, or how to suboptimize in both areas (machines and manpower and program sustainment) to both meet his budget and manning limitations, and get the mission done.
I don't find a lot of people who only work in the aircraft/helicopter industry who grasp how those kinds of problems are framed, funded, and solved.
I find less in the media who have a clue.
All we seem to get is people who can see one thin slice of a very large pizza.
All that said, Jack's question remains valid:
Is it $22 billion more in capability? If so, how do you measure that, or show it? What are the metrics?
I don't have the answer to that.
Different pots of money that have differing program and life cycle costs to the taxpayer.
Some folks forget that we cut the DoD manpower by about 40 percent in the post Cold War drawdown. During the critical decision time on the V-22 program, each of the services was in the position of having to be careful what the manpower and training costs accrued to any weapons system.
I have a friend who worked on the DCSPER staff in the Army, early 90's, who had as one of his staff projects keeping or losing a gunner in the Blackhawk/Huey for the TOE in a given aviation battalion. That's a difference of a few thousand soldiers, if you look at how many Blackhawks and Hueys the Army had at the time.
That kind of problem, numbering a few thousand different but similar problems, was being solved or not by staffs all over all four armed services. In that environment, the larger plane with fewer pilots (expensive to train, 2-5 million per currently, through the FRS) and fewer crewmen for the total USMC manpower bill was a selling point for V-22 that had nothing to do with pros and cons of a given airframe.
Manpower costs are not borne by the APN-1 type of acquisition cost, so the apples to apples comparison being attempted here (Jack, your numbers in terms of S-70 substitutes) isn't one.
Commandant of USMC had to look at which area to optimize in, or how to suboptimize in both areas (machines and manpower and program sustainment) to both meet his budget and manning limitations, and get the mission done.
I don't find a lot of people who only work in the aircraft/helicopter industry who grasp how those kinds of problems are framed, funded, and solved.
I find less in the media who have a clue.
All we seem to get is people who can see one thin slice of a very large pizza.
All that said, Jack's question remains valid:
Is it $22 billion more in capability? If so, how do you measure that, or show it? What are the metrics?
I don't have the answer to that.
How much has been spent on the Over the Horizion Assault concept for what actual capability?
If one is honest....money for actual capability....the OTH Concept has been a very, very...very expensive failure!
Added to the cost of the Osprey and the new ships needed for it to operate effectively with the Fleet....is the cost of the now defunct Jet Sled Amtrac (whatever the thing was called)....the special design Mutts and French Mortar wagons for the Osprey....and to what end Operationally? All that money so the Navy could keep its ships further offshore and safer from land launched anti-ship missiles! Yet....right now the USMC has no more amphibious capability than when the force had 53D's, 46's, and UH-1N's.
The LCAC's are too big and vulnerable for standard amphibious operations and the current Amtracs are too slow for OTH....and no matter how many 22's you field....they cannot haul the weight the 53E's do in a standard amphibious operation.
How many Black Hawks, 53E's, Chinooks, 53K's could the USMC have bought with all that wasted money?
Rub your hands over the crystal ball now and figure out what kind of War we will fight next...where it will be....and who will we be fighting? Care to bet the house on a single wager or do you want to cover all your bets as best you can....but remember you have to win as losing doesn't bear thinking about!
If one is honest....money for actual capability....the OTH Concept has been a very, very...very expensive failure!
Added to the cost of the Osprey and the new ships needed for it to operate effectively with the Fleet....is the cost of the now defunct Jet Sled Amtrac (whatever the thing was called)....the special design Mutts and French Mortar wagons for the Osprey....and to what end Operationally? All that money so the Navy could keep its ships further offshore and safer from land launched anti-ship missiles! Yet....right now the USMC has no more amphibious capability than when the force had 53D's, 46's, and UH-1N's.
The LCAC's are too big and vulnerable for standard amphibious operations and the current Amtracs are too slow for OTH....and no matter how many 22's you field....they cannot haul the weight the 53E's do in a standard amphibious operation.
How many Black Hawks, 53E's, Chinooks, 53K's could the USMC have bought with all that wasted money?
Rub your hands over the crystal ball now and figure out what kind of War we will fight next...where it will be....and who will we be fighting? Care to bet the house on a single wager or do you want to cover all your bets as best you can....but remember you have to win as losing doesn't bear thinking about!
SAS:
I asked a question back in the 90's (when it was perceived that Osprey would not make it through the acquisition cycle, which is what happened to Comanche during LRIP) along the lines of "Why not just use all 53Es and simplify?" At the time, the Navy Helo Master Plan, which toyed with KMAX on MSC ships to replace -46's for VERTREP, was mostly "Sikorsky Are Us."
The answer in re V-22 versus CH-53 was complicated, but part of the answer was
"We are not going to sole source to Sikorsky our Helicopter requirements, and we will diversify vendors to keep the industrial base warm."
No small amount of that answer was political in nature: whose district has how many defense industry jobs? Ask your local Senator, if you like ...
Your point on ship mods is noted, and agreed. They aren't cheap either. See also the fun and games with the AV-8B Harrier and which spots on an LHA one can, or cannot, use to launch and recover a Harrier ...
(Edited due to being on a bad day for spelling ...)
I asked a question back in the 90's (when it was perceived that Osprey would not make it through the acquisition cycle, which is what happened to Comanche during LRIP) along the lines of "Why not just use all 53Es and simplify?" At the time, the Navy Helo Master Plan, which toyed with KMAX on MSC ships to replace -46's for VERTREP, was mostly "Sikorsky Are Us."
The answer in re V-22 versus CH-53 was complicated, but part of the answer was
"We are not going to sole source to Sikorsky our Helicopter requirements, and we will diversify vendors to keep the industrial base warm."
No small amount of that answer was political in nature: whose district has how many defense industry jobs? Ask your local Senator, if you like ...
Your point on ship mods is noted, and agreed. They aren't cheap either. See also the fun and games with the AV-8B Harrier and which spots on an LHA one can, or cannot, use to launch and recover a Harrier ...
(Edited due to being on a bad day for spelling ...)
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 31st Oct 2011 at 17:11.
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I had a friend ask me about the Osprey and emergency procedures and what action must be taken if one of the engines fail at a hover?
Can anyone familiar with it give me a good answer to give him.
Can anyone familiar with it give me a good answer to give him.