What's the latest news of the V22 Osprey?
Limited OEI Hover Capability
SansAnhedral, I believe that it would be more accurate to say that both rotors continue to turn after an engine failure because of the cross shafting. I do not believe that the V-22 is capable of hovering OGE on one engine except at much reduced weights. Even the V-22's OEI IGE hover capability would be very limited.
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From the performance charts I have, the V-22 can't fly on one engine slower than 40kts at any weight, therefore no OEI OGE hover. If an engine fails with necells at higher angle than 60° it is advised to lowering them, and accelerate to safe airspeed for climb - dependent on weight and environmental conditions. With both engines INOP it is advised to pull necells all the way back (95°) and try achieve autorotation at 110kts and 5000fpm descent.
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I think the OEI rating on the AE1107C is around 6800hp. That's probably about 10% more than its T/O rating. Of course, I also believe the V-22 PRGB is normally limited to less than 5200hp in hover (AEO). So a rough estimate of the difference in hover power between normal AEO (5200hp x 2) and OEI (6800hp x 1) would be around 3,600hp. I also understand that the power turbine shaft on the AE1107C has a somewhat modest torque limit, but I won't try to speculate what effects that would have on an OEI hover scenario.
The most current version of the AE1107C may have somewhat better performance than the above numbers I quoted from memory. So take my calculations with a grain of salt.
The most current version of the AE1107C may have somewhat better performance than the above numbers I quoted from memory. So take my calculations with a grain of salt.
Last edited by riff_raff; 31st Oct 2011 at 00:32.
Interesting Summary of Osprey Testing
Found this while looking for OEI data.
The Marana crash wrote off two Ospreys....not just the one that killed 19 Marines. A second aircraft landed hard after the crash explosion "blew away the second aircraft's ground cushion"....according to this Summary.
Target Lock: V-22 Osprey : Development
The Marana crash wrote off two Ospreys....not just the one that killed 19 Marines. A second aircraft landed hard after the crash explosion "blew away the second aircraft's ground cushion"....according to this Summary.
Target Lock: V-22 Osprey : Development
Jack,
Once again we are doing the 5 page rehash. This topic was discussed a mere 2 months ago right in this thread.
Post 1236
I seemed to read much more into the following comment, which seemingly flies in the face of the low altitude hover survivability argument against the V22:
Page 35
So in the work done to study THIS PRECISE SITUATION, the DOTE found in 2005 that youre better off in a V22 than legacy helicopters it replaces (CH46). But you all will just "agree to disagree" with such a stark black and white conclusion.
Once again we are doing the 5 page rehash. This topic was discussed a mere 2 months ago right in this thread.
Post 1236
I seemed to read much more into the following comment, which seemingly flies in the face of the low altitude hover survivability argument against the V22:
Page 35
Due to its high power, the ability of the V22 to survive single engine failures during low altitude hover is excellent -- better than the legacy transport helicopters it replaces.
V-22 OEI
Sans, if you could post the current single engine HV charts from the V-22 Chapter 31 Emergency Operations, perhaps the CH-46 pilots, and others, would be able to compare with what they are flying.
Thanks,
John Dixson
Thanks,
John Dixson
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John, the debate is, can Osprey maintain hover on one engine, the HV chart can't be used here. We could deduce it if there were hover charts like for the Blackhawk, with clearly shown single engine and transmission operations limits. The way V-22 manual is made, suggest that in case of power loss in hover, you have to transition to level flight ASAP - then you'll find single engine operation charts, like the Single Engine Level Flight Envelope, that is one page after the HV chart you mentioned.
Mr. Dixson.....unless I have been completely ravaged by the perils of old age...my memory does not contain a single Post from a serving Osprey Pilot that directly addresses such performance figures or a frank discussion of NATOPS procedures for handling Engine Failures at a hover.
It seems my memory tells me all this gets cloaked by the "If I Tell You...My Employer Will Kill Me" refrain.
Is there a single Osprey Pilot in the audience that can...and will...explain how the Osprey performs on a single engine and following an engine failure in the various modes of flight? Surely to God....this isn't classified information or way too many folks have divulged the same exact information on other aircraft and would thus be someplace looking between Iron Bars.
Is it just me that thinks this?
It seems my memory tells me all this gets cloaked by the "If I Tell You...My Employer Will Kill Me" refrain.
Is there a single Osprey Pilot in the audience that can...and will...explain how the Osprey performs on a single engine and following an engine failure in the various modes of flight? Surely to God....this isn't classified information or way too many folks have divulged the same exact information on other aircraft and would thus be someplace looking between Iron Bars.
Is it just me that thinks this?
V-22 Low Altitude OEI
Lt Fubar,
I was posting in response to:
"Due to its high power, the ability of the V22 to survive single engine failures during low altitude hover is excellent -- better than the legacy transport helicopters it replaces. "
HV plots are directed at the survival of the machine following power failure ( single or dual as may be the case ).
Thanks,
John Dixson
I was posting in response to:
"Due to its high power, the ability of the V22 to survive single engine failures during low altitude hover is excellent -- better than the legacy transport helicopters it replaces. "
HV plots are directed at the survival of the machine following power failure ( single or dual as may be the case ).
Thanks,
John Dixson
HV plots are directed at the survival of the machine following power failure ( single or dual as may be the case ).
This also kicked off a bit of pondering....what does a three engined helicopter HV diagram look like? Do they have a section that says something along the lines of ..... OEI, TEI, AEI or something to that effect?
V-22 OEI HV
SAS,
Sorry for my lack of clarity and precision. I was trying to differentiate between the two quite separate issues raised by Lt Fubar.
Your point is well taken. Unless things have changed since I retired, both the FAA and the military require the HV diagram to be written based upon "safe" landings. Typically, the limit points as far as the landings are concerned are defined by reaching the limit landing gear loads. HV Diagram test flying has resulted in bent machines at all manufacturers, as the flight test crews try to establish the limit points. Have to be on your toes and leave your ego at home for that stuff.
I didn't do really any of the original 53E development, but as I recall, I think you surmised correctly that they have one more chart than a two engine machine.
Added Note: SAS, the new CH-53K will have three 7500 shp engines, so their one engine out HV curve will be based upon 15000 shp, which is slightly above that available from all three engines on the original CH-53E ( 416's ).
Thanks,
John Dixson
Sorry for my lack of clarity and precision. I was trying to differentiate between the two quite separate issues raised by Lt Fubar.
Your point is well taken. Unless things have changed since I retired, both the FAA and the military require the HV diagram to be written based upon "safe" landings. Typically, the limit points as far as the landings are concerned are defined by reaching the limit landing gear loads. HV Diagram test flying has resulted in bent machines at all manufacturers, as the flight test crews try to establish the limit points. Have to be on your toes and leave your ego at home for that stuff.
I didn't do really any of the original 53E development, but as I recall, I think you surmised correctly that they have one more chart than a two engine machine.
Added Note: SAS, the new CH-53K will have three 7500 shp engines, so their one engine out HV curve will be based upon 15000 shp, which is slightly above that available from all three engines on the original CH-53E ( 416's ).
Thanks,
John Dixson
Last edited by JohnDixson; 30th Oct 2011 at 16:18. Reason: Added Note
OEI Power Margin
John,
To validate your point. The primary reason for going to the T-64-419 engine in the MH-53E was to reduce the possibility of the machine going into the water after sustaining a single engine failure at gross weight during a down wind sea level TOW. Towing operations were performed at a maximum of 137% Q (4380 ESHP/engine 13,110) all three engines operating). The 419 engine OEI rating is 157% Q or 5,000 ESHP. By jettisoning the TOW 10,000 ESHP was more than enough power to fly away. In essence OEI operations in the MH-53E resulted in a reduction of only 24% installed power available. By most standards this is pretty good.
Have a Great Day
Jack
To validate your point. The primary reason for going to the T-64-419 engine in the MH-53E was to reduce the possibility of the machine going into the water after sustaining a single engine failure at gross weight during a down wind sea level TOW. Towing operations were performed at a maximum of 137% Q (4380 ESHP/engine 13,110) all three engines operating). The 419 engine OEI rating is 157% Q or 5,000 ESHP. By jettisoning the TOW 10,000 ESHP was more than enough power to fly away. In essence OEI operations in the MH-53E resulted in a reduction of only 24% installed power available. By most standards this is pretty good.
Have a Great Day
Jack
Osprey in the Catbird Seat
Osprey in the Catbird Seat
By Lieutenant General Terry G. Robling, U.S. Marine Corps
Created 2011-10-31 08:49
The tiltrotor MV-22 has come of age. Moving larger payloads—faster and farther—it broadens Marine Corps capabilities and gives commanders more choices.
On 22 March, Marines returned to the shores of Tripoli. While in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn, an American F-15E fighter had gone down over Libya, and both crewmen had ejected. The rescue that followed was not only a textbook example of what the MV-22B Osprey brings to the fight, but also a testament to the agility, flexibility, and effectiveness of the Navy–Marine Corps expeditionary force. Whether ship- or land-based, the MV-22B has become a key component of that team.
The Osprey is a revolutionary machine, providing the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander the flexibility he needs to influence the battle space. The aircraft shrinks the battlefield, flying Marines higher, faster, and farther than ever, thus providing MAGTF and joint commanders unprecedented options in supporting ground forces. In the MV-22B Osprey, now on its 11th deployment, the Marine Corps has a truly groundbreaking aircraft. It has proved itself in combat to be operationally effective, safe, and survivable in the most difficult conditions—and cost effective. The Osprey is rewriting the art of the possible, and in concert with other newly fielded and soon-to-be-fielded aircraft, it is creating a new array of possibilities of what the Marine Corps can provide the nation and how it can meet all warfighting requirements.
A Record of Versatility
The V-22, in both its Marine (MV-22B) and Air Force Special Operations Command (CV-22) versions, has shown itself to be a tremendously versatile platform in both peace and war. Since its operational debut, the V-22 has conducted a variety of missions that demonstrate its multi-role capability. In Iraq and Afghanistan, combat-troop inserts and extracts as well as long-range battlefield logistics operations have showcased the aircraft’s speed and range, which are unrivaled by any previous rotorcraft. Raids against defended targets have shown that it is not just safe—it is survivable. We have conducted medical and casualty evacuation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, stability and security operations, and sea-based operations, all effectively and efficiently. Exploiting the V-22’s long range, aviators have flown it on multiple transatlantic crossings.
Examples of those missions are forthcoming—but first, back to Libya: In the middle of the night, less than two hours after that F-15E crew ejected over North Africa, two MV-22Bs, along with other elements of the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel package—including organic AV-8B Harriers, CH-53E Sea Stallions with a quick-reaction force on board, and a Marine rescue force on board the Ospreys themselves—were turning up engines on board the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) about 130 nautical miles from the downed fliers. The Ospreys launched into the darkness and closed the objective at an average speed of more than 260 knots, supported by Marine Corps and Air Force jets aloft of the downed pilot.
Once in the objective area, one Osprey landed, recovered the downed pilot, and departed—all within 90 seconds. Twenty minutes from the time he was running for his life in hostile North Africa, the aviator was safely back in American territory on board the Kearsarge. (The other F-15E crewman was located by friendly rebel forces, who saw to his safe passage and eventual recovery.)
Proven Capabilities
Ground commanders and their Marines have seen what the Osprey can do: They have flown in the back of it, they have run down its ramp into landing zones in combat, and they have run up its ramp into the sanctuary the aircraft provides. Those Marines have one message for Marine aviation: We want more of these. They know that they can move three times as many Marines five times farther and twice as fast as they could move Marines on conventional helicopters. As they transit to the objective, those Marines are at elevations as high as 13,000 feet, out of the range of the rifles, heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades that are the weapons of the irregular fighter. The aircraft can carry 24 combat-loaded Marines to a combat radius of 325 nautical miles. By comparison, a CH-46E carrying half the available payload has a radius of 75 nautical miles.
The MV-22B is also amazingly quiet. A Marine rifle battalion commander in Afghanistan reported that as Ospreys delivering one of his companies to a raid objective spiraled down atop an enemy force, he watched startled fighters literally drop their weapons and scatter because the aircraft were right there—in the zone—before their approach was seen or heard.
In March, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) was given the order to redeploy its Afghanistan-based Ospreys to the Mediterranean. Using their aerial refueling capability and employing organic Marine KC-130J refuelers, the six MV-22Bs self-deployed in two waves of three more than 3,000 nautical miles, flying from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean, to recover on board the Kearsarge. Those Ospreys then turned promptly to operations at sea. That sort of dynamic re-tasking is what expeditionary forces do.
The range and speed of the aircraft widen the range of possibilities not only for the kinetic fight, but also across the range of military operations. When a patient on board the Kearsarge required medical support beyond the ship’s capability, for example, officers realized that the nearest site that could provide the required services was an onshore facility 500 nautical miles distant. A section of Ospreys was tapped to perform the mission, because, in the words of the MEU commander, “The V-22 is the only aviation asset that can bridge the long ship-to-shore expanse.”
In another instance, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 263, deployed in the USS Bataan (LHD-5), flew a casualty evacuation mission of 147 nautical miles in 37 minutes. In the words of a Bataan corpsman, “If it hadn’t been for the Osprey, there’s no way we could have gotten the patient to where she needed to be to receive the care that ultimately saved her life.”
The versatility of the platform was again illustrated in the Marine Corps’ humanitarian assistance/disaster relief role following the devastating Haiti earthquake in January 2010. The MV-22B reached multiple inland locations during one period of daylight, and again saved lives by carrying much-needed relief supplies and medical personnel into remote and isolated areas of the country.
Safety and Survivability
The following month the V-22 program as a whole—both Marine Corps and Special Operations Command airframes—exceeded 100,000 total flight hours. More important, the MV-22B crossed that milestone while maintaining a tremendous safety record: it had the lowest Class A flight-mishap rate of any Marine Corps tactical rotorcraft for the decade of January 2001–January 2011.
The Osprey’s performance record in Iraq from September 2007 to March 2009 is telling. During 18 months of combat operations the aircraft completed every assigned mission, and it did so flying faster, farther, and safer than its legacy counterparts. Despite being the target of enemy small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles on numerous occasions, none of more than 40,000 total passengers was injured in almost 9,000 hours of flight.
Likewise, in Afghanistan the MV-22B has been the target of small arms and RPG fires—and in some cases hit. In every instance, the aircraft has been able to safely continue and conclude its flight with no injuries to crew or embarked personnel.
Challenges and Opportunities
The MV-22B reached operational capability in June 2007. On the heels of that significant event it was decided to deploy the Osprey to war, fully one year before its planned material support date. That decision put additional stress on development of a logistics support infrastructure, but with the Marine Corps simultaneously committed in two conflicts there was no good reason to hold back this revolutionary capability from supporting those forces in combat. Simply put, it was the right thing to do.
As with any new aircraft, the Osprey had its share of setbacks over the course of development, including fatal flight-test crashes that caused many to call into question the program’s future. Far more commonplace, however, were the sort of logistical and technical hurdles routinely encountered in such projects, and especially when making a leap in aviation technology as we did with this aircraft. For example, in some cases engineering predictions for Osprey component service-life were inaccurate, problems that began being corrected once actual in-service data became available.
It is instructive to keep in mind, too, that although the program began in 1981, the V-22 community has flown nearly half of its total flight hours in just the past two years. Against a backdrop of rapidly increasing flight hours and multiple combat deployments—through which the aircraft has operated under the most rigorous environmental extremes—the Osprey is meeting the challenge. Aided by on-time and on-budget deliveries of aircraft since 2007, Ospreys are replacing the legacy CH-46E helicopter at a rate of two squadrons per year; the transition should be complete in 2017.
Critics of the V-22 frequently focus on procurement and operating costs. While it is true that the Osprey costs more than a legacy helicopter to buy and operate on a per-unit basis, the discussion shouldn’t end there. Operating experience with the Osprey has validated the multitude of studies undertaken during its development. Flying “twice as fast” and “five times as far” with “three times the payload” are not simply snappy talking points. They are direct expressions of value gained from every dollar spent procuring and operating the aircraft. Given current operating costs, the Osprey carries its payload more economically—on a dollar-per-passenger-mile basis—than any legacy rotorcraft currently in the Marine Corps inventory. Beyond the importance of cost and value of a military aircraft, however, is the protection afforded our nation’s most valuable assets, the passengers and crew. In the Osprey, they travel well above the range of the majority of currently utilized threat weapons, and therefore are safer than when carried by lower and slower helicopters.
Future Operations and Possibilities
In 1988, then-Commandant Al Gray asserted that “if I am a MEU commander off of North Carolina, I want every bad guy from Manhattan to Miami to be nervous.” What he meant was he wanted to be able to move swiftly hundreds of miles and then go over or around a defending force—or simply go where it was not. Aided by the capabilities of the MV-22B (and its sister aircraft the CV-22) the quantum leap in capability that he envisioned is now reality.
Today the United States faces a difficult fiscal environment. With declining defense budgets looming, a fresh, fact-based look at our tactical mobility requirements across the services may be in order, with an eye toward leveraging existing, proven, and currently fielded assets to fill current and projected operational gaps. In the long view, we have only begun to scratch the surface of exploiting the capabilities of the MV-22B. Its demonstrated multi-role capability may make this aircraft a potential candidate for other DOD and coalition requirements. The Osprey’s unparalleled success in the harsh deserts and mountains of Iraq and Afghanistan, the sea-based execution of the Libyan recovery mission, and its long-range self-deployment capabilities make it the aircraft best suited to effectively enter an equally demanding arena in the future—the ongoing battle of the budget.
Aviation in the Marine Corps exists—in the words of its first flier, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred A. Cunningham—to “assist the troops on the ground to successfully carry out their missions.” Marine Corps expeditionary operations will always center on the MAGTF, and Marine aviation therefore is inherently naval, expeditionary, and supportive to a ground force as part of a combined-arms team. Better technology is driving better tactics to provide lethality and battlefield mobility to that warfighter. The Osprey is just such a successful combining of tactics and technology. It will not be just a basic component of Marine Corps aviation; it will be the keystone of tomorrow’s air-ground task forces.
Lieutenant General Robling is Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Aviation. He has commanded at the squadron, air group, air wing, and Marine Expeditionary Force levels. He has accumulated more than 5,200 hours in both tactical jet and rotary-wing aircraft, primarily in the F-4 Phantom and F/A-18 Hornet.
By Lieutenant General Terry G. Robling, U.S. Marine Corps
Created 2011-10-31 08:49
The tiltrotor MV-22 has come of age. Moving larger payloads—faster and farther—it broadens Marine Corps capabilities and gives commanders more choices.
On 22 March, Marines returned to the shores of Tripoli. While in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn, an American F-15E fighter had gone down over Libya, and both crewmen had ejected. The rescue that followed was not only a textbook example of what the MV-22B Osprey brings to the fight, but also a testament to the agility, flexibility, and effectiveness of the Navy–Marine Corps expeditionary force. Whether ship- or land-based, the MV-22B has become a key component of that team.
The Osprey is a revolutionary machine, providing the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander the flexibility he needs to influence the battle space. The aircraft shrinks the battlefield, flying Marines higher, faster, and farther than ever, thus providing MAGTF and joint commanders unprecedented options in supporting ground forces. In the MV-22B Osprey, now on its 11th deployment, the Marine Corps has a truly groundbreaking aircraft. It has proved itself in combat to be operationally effective, safe, and survivable in the most difficult conditions—and cost effective. The Osprey is rewriting the art of the possible, and in concert with other newly fielded and soon-to-be-fielded aircraft, it is creating a new array of possibilities of what the Marine Corps can provide the nation and how it can meet all warfighting requirements.
A Record of Versatility
The V-22, in both its Marine (MV-22B) and Air Force Special Operations Command (CV-22) versions, has shown itself to be a tremendously versatile platform in both peace and war. Since its operational debut, the V-22 has conducted a variety of missions that demonstrate its multi-role capability. In Iraq and Afghanistan, combat-troop inserts and extracts as well as long-range battlefield logistics operations have showcased the aircraft’s speed and range, which are unrivaled by any previous rotorcraft. Raids against defended targets have shown that it is not just safe—it is survivable. We have conducted medical and casualty evacuation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, stability and security operations, and sea-based operations, all effectively and efficiently. Exploiting the V-22’s long range, aviators have flown it on multiple transatlantic crossings.
Examples of those missions are forthcoming—but first, back to Libya: In the middle of the night, less than two hours after that F-15E crew ejected over North Africa, two MV-22Bs, along with other elements of the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel package—including organic AV-8B Harriers, CH-53E Sea Stallions with a quick-reaction force on board, and a Marine rescue force on board the Ospreys themselves—were turning up engines on board the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) about 130 nautical miles from the downed fliers. The Ospreys launched into the darkness and closed the objective at an average speed of more than 260 knots, supported by Marine Corps and Air Force jets aloft of the downed pilot.
Once in the objective area, one Osprey landed, recovered the downed pilot, and departed—all within 90 seconds. Twenty minutes from the time he was running for his life in hostile North Africa, the aviator was safely back in American territory on board the Kearsarge. (The other F-15E crewman was located by friendly rebel forces, who saw to his safe passage and eventual recovery.)
Proven Capabilities
Ground commanders and their Marines have seen what the Osprey can do: They have flown in the back of it, they have run down its ramp into landing zones in combat, and they have run up its ramp into the sanctuary the aircraft provides. Those Marines have one message for Marine aviation: We want more of these. They know that they can move three times as many Marines five times farther and twice as fast as they could move Marines on conventional helicopters. As they transit to the objective, those Marines are at elevations as high as 13,000 feet, out of the range of the rifles, heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades that are the weapons of the irregular fighter. The aircraft can carry 24 combat-loaded Marines to a combat radius of 325 nautical miles. By comparison, a CH-46E carrying half the available payload has a radius of 75 nautical miles.
The MV-22B is also amazingly quiet. A Marine rifle battalion commander in Afghanistan reported that as Ospreys delivering one of his companies to a raid objective spiraled down atop an enemy force, he watched startled fighters literally drop their weapons and scatter because the aircraft were right there—in the zone—before their approach was seen or heard.
In March, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) was given the order to redeploy its Afghanistan-based Ospreys to the Mediterranean. Using their aerial refueling capability and employing organic Marine KC-130J refuelers, the six MV-22Bs self-deployed in two waves of three more than 3,000 nautical miles, flying from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean, to recover on board the Kearsarge. Those Ospreys then turned promptly to operations at sea. That sort of dynamic re-tasking is what expeditionary forces do.
The range and speed of the aircraft widen the range of possibilities not only for the kinetic fight, but also across the range of military operations. When a patient on board the Kearsarge required medical support beyond the ship’s capability, for example, officers realized that the nearest site that could provide the required services was an onshore facility 500 nautical miles distant. A section of Ospreys was tapped to perform the mission, because, in the words of the MEU commander, “The V-22 is the only aviation asset that can bridge the long ship-to-shore expanse.”
In another instance, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 263, deployed in the USS Bataan (LHD-5), flew a casualty evacuation mission of 147 nautical miles in 37 minutes. In the words of a Bataan corpsman, “If it hadn’t been for the Osprey, there’s no way we could have gotten the patient to where she needed to be to receive the care that ultimately saved her life.”
The versatility of the platform was again illustrated in the Marine Corps’ humanitarian assistance/disaster relief role following the devastating Haiti earthquake in January 2010. The MV-22B reached multiple inland locations during one period of daylight, and again saved lives by carrying much-needed relief supplies and medical personnel into remote and isolated areas of the country.
Safety and Survivability
The following month the V-22 program as a whole—both Marine Corps and Special Operations Command airframes—exceeded 100,000 total flight hours. More important, the MV-22B crossed that milestone while maintaining a tremendous safety record: it had the lowest Class A flight-mishap rate of any Marine Corps tactical rotorcraft for the decade of January 2001–January 2011.
The Osprey’s performance record in Iraq from September 2007 to March 2009 is telling. During 18 months of combat operations the aircraft completed every assigned mission, and it did so flying faster, farther, and safer than its legacy counterparts. Despite being the target of enemy small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles on numerous occasions, none of more than 40,000 total passengers was injured in almost 9,000 hours of flight.
Likewise, in Afghanistan the MV-22B has been the target of small arms and RPG fires—and in some cases hit. In every instance, the aircraft has been able to safely continue and conclude its flight with no injuries to crew or embarked personnel.
Challenges and Opportunities
The MV-22B reached operational capability in June 2007. On the heels of that significant event it was decided to deploy the Osprey to war, fully one year before its planned material support date. That decision put additional stress on development of a logistics support infrastructure, but with the Marine Corps simultaneously committed in two conflicts there was no good reason to hold back this revolutionary capability from supporting those forces in combat. Simply put, it was the right thing to do.
As with any new aircraft, the Osprey had its share of setbacks over the course of development, including fatal flight-test crashes that caused many to call into question the program’s future. Far more commonplace, however, were the sort of logistical and technical hurdles routinely encountered in such projects, and especially when making a leap in aviation technology as we did with this aircraft. For example, in some cases engineering predictions for Osprey component service-life were inaccurate, problems that began being corrected once actual in-service data became available.
It is instructive to keep in mind, too, that although the program began in 1981, the V-22 community has flown nearly half of its total flight hours in just the past two years. Against a backdrop of rapidly increasing flight hours and multiple combat deployments—through which the aircraft has operated under the most rigorous environmental extremes—the Osprey is meeting the challenge. Aided by on-time and on-budget deliveries of aircraft since 2007, Ospreys are replacing the legacy CH-46E helicopter at a rate of two squadrons per year; the transition should be complete in 2017.
Critics of the V-22 frequently focus on procurement and operating costs. While it is true that the Osprey costs more than a legacy helicopter to buy and operate on a per-unit basis, the discussion shouldn’t end there. Operating experience with the Osprey has validated the multitude of studies undertaken during its development. Flying “twice as fast” and “five times as far” with “three times the payload” are not simply snappy talking points. They are direct expressions of value gained from every dollar spent procuring and operating the aircraft. Given current operating costs, the Osprey carries its payload more economically—on a dollar-per-passenger-mile basis—than any legacy rotorcraft currently in the Marine Corps inventory. Beyond the importance of cost and value of a military aircraft, however, is the protection afforded our nation’s most valuable assets, the passengers and crew. In the Osprey, they travel well above the range of the majority of currently utilized threat weapons, and therefore are safer than when carried by lower and slower helicopters.
Future Operations and Possibilities
In 1988, then-Commandant Al Gray asserted that “if I am a MEU commander off of North Carolina, I want every bad guy from Manhattan to Miami to be nervous.” What he meant was he wanted to be able to move swiftly hundreds of miles and then go over or around a defending force—or simply go where it was not. Aided by the capabilities of the MV-22B (and its sister aircraft the CV-22) the quantum leap in capability that he envisioned is now reality.
Today the United States faces a difficult fiscal environment. With declining defense budgets looming, a fresh, fact-based look at our tactical mobility requirements across the services may be in order, with an eye toward leveraging existing, proven, and currently fielded assets to fill current and projected operational gaps. In the long view, we have only begun to scratch the surface of exploiting the capabilities of the MV-22B. Its demonstrated multi-role capability may make this aircraft a potential candidate for other DOD and coalition requirements. The Osprey’s unparalleled success in the harsh deserts and mountains of Iraq and Afghanistan, the sea-based execution of the Libyan recovery mission, and its long-range self-deployment capabilities make it the aircraft best suited to effectively enter an equally demanding arena in the future—the ongoing battle of the budget.
Aviation in the Marine Corps exists—in the words of its first flier, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred A. Cunningham—to “assist the troops on the ground to successfully carry out their missions.” Marine Corps expeditionary operations will always center on the MAGTF, and Marine aviation therefore is inherently naval, expeditionary, and supportive to a ground force as part of a combined-arms team. Better technology is driving better tactics to provide lethality and battlefield mobility to that warfighter. The Osprey is just such a successful combining of tactics and technology. It will not be just a basic component of Marine Corps aviation; it will be the keystone of tomorrow’s air-ground task forces.
Lieutenant General Robling is Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Aviation. He has commanded at the squadron, air group, air wing, and Marine Expeditionary Force levels. He has accumulated more than 5,200 hours in both tactical jet and rotary-wing aircraft, primarily in the F-4 Phantom and F/A-18 Hornet.
Join Date: Jul 2010
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Lt.Fubar said:
"With both engines INOP it is advised to pull necells all the way back (95°) and try to achieve autorotation at 110kts and 5000fpm descent."
110kts and 5000fpm descent isn't an autorotation - it's a deorbit.
"With both engines INOP it is advised to pull necells all the way back (95°) and try to achieve autorotation at 110kts and 5000fpm descent."
110kts and 5000fpm descent isn't an autorotation - it's a deorbit.
I love such stats.....amazing the carrying ability of the aircraft when properly tasked!
Do they really average 4.44 passengers per hour? Gee....whiz!
For our Marine Brothers....that is an Army Warrant Officer smart ass remark suggesting.... ya'll are in risk of breaking your arms....slapping yerself on yer own back! (Without having the commonsense to read what the heck you are writing!)
Next thing you know they will be saying the Pilot's name was "Gordo Cooper"!
During 18 months of combat operations the aircraft completed every assigned mission, and it did so flying faster, farther, and safer than its legacy counterparts. Despite being the target of enemy small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles on numerous occasions, none of more than 40,000 total passengers was injured in almost 9,000 hours of flight.
For our Marine Brothers....that is an Army Warrant Officer smart ass remark suggesting.... ya'll are in risk of breaking your arms....slapping yerself on yer own back! (Without having the commonsense to read what the heck you are writing!)
Next thing you know they will be saying the Pilot's name was "Gordo Cooper"!
I suppose correlation in statistics eludes you, SAS.
Whats the average flight endurance? What are the total seat miles? What was the cargo loadout versus pax? Ferry time?
Heck I cant even find any information like this on any other flying airframe, so how would you even know that 4.44 would be "bad"? The MH60S has been flying since 2002 and has amassed 370,000 flight hours. You suppose its had more than 1.6 million riders? Who knows.
Whats the average flight endurance? What are the total seat miles? What was the cargo loadout versus pax? Ferry time?
Heck I cant even find any information like this on any other flying airframe, so how would you even know that 4.44 would be "bad"? The MH60S has been flying since 2002 and has amassed 370,000 flight hours. You suppose its had more than 1.6 million riders? Who knows.
John/SAS/Sans/Jack:
I took a look through a 1744 page (WTF??) V-22 NATOPS manual.
Not sure if it is current.
I will confess that the illustration entitled
Methinks they are using words too large for the garden variety helicopter pilot ...
My takeaway ...
1. H-V diagrams are where you'd expect them, in performance section (in the back, hashed pages).
2. Single Engine failure discussion fits John's remarks: H-V boundary represents the envelope of height-above-ground and forward speed that result in safe Single Engine landing. Max vertical speed assumptions are 6 or 12 fps for high and low altitude charts respectively. [/QUOTE]
a. Messing about in the charts for a bit, at 50k GW you'd need to be a few hundred feet up to get a landing in the envelope ... may depend on the headwind you have that day.
3. If you lose both engines -- at 3000 feet, looks like you'd better have at least 100 kts. At 1500 feet AGL, at least 130 knots. This is to stay outside "AVOID" part of the H-V for dual engine failure.
I expect most flights have well in excess of that, at speeds V-22 flies.
4. Summarized from the EP section:
Auto's in the Osprey (say that three times fast) are not for the faint of heart!
For an auto, it looks like you expect a 4-5000 fpm descent at ~ 120 knots, flare at 150 feet AGL, cushion landing.
There's a thrilling ride.
IIRC, that's twice the RoD for a Seahawk auto, if not a bit more than twice.
b. Single engine failure in a hover - hmmmm- looks like the prospects of a single engine hover are dubious. Unless you are in a high hover with some wind in your face, it looks like you are committed to putting the bird on the ground as best you can. Scooping out ... not for the faint of heart.
My dos centavos
I took a look through a 1744 page (WTF??) V-22 NATOPS manual.
Not sure if it is current.
I will confess that the illustration entitled
Figure 16-36. HVR CPLD Regions of Potential AFCS Directional Axis Saturation
mostly made me dizzy. Methinks they are using words too large for the garden variety helicopter pilot ...
My takeaway ...
1. H-V diagrams are where you'd expect them, in performance section (in the back, hashed pages).
2. Single Engine failure discussion fits John's remarks: H-V boundary represents the envelope of height-above-ground and forward speed that result in safe Single Engine landing. Max vertical speed assumptions are 6 or 12 fps for high and low altitude charts respectively. [/QUOTE]
a. Messing about in the charts for a bit, at 50k GW you'd need to be a few hundred feet up to get a landing in the envelope ... may depend on the headwind you have that day.
3. If you lose both engines -- at 3000 feet, looks like you'd better have at least 100 kts. At 1500 feet AGL, at least 130 knots. This is to stay outside "AVOID" part of the H-V for dual engine failure.
I expect most flights have well in excess of that, at speeds V-22 flies.
4. Summarized from the EP section:
Auto's in the Osprey (say that three times fast) are not for the faint of heart!
For an auto, it looks like you expect a 4-5000 fpm descent at ~ 120 knots, flare at 150 feet AGL, cushion landing.
There's a thrilling ride.
IIRC, that's twice the RoD for a Seahawk auto, if not a bit more than twice.
b. Single engine failure in a hover - hmmmm- looks like the prospects of a single engine hover are dubious. Unless you are in a high hover with some wind in your face, it looks like you are committed to putting the bird on the ground as best you can. Scooping out ... not for the faint of heart.
My dos centavos
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 15th Nov 2011 at 21:07.
HV Facts or Myths
Lonewolf 50
I believe that the most significant element of the MV-22B HV diagram is located in the upper left hand corner of the chart. It probably states:
Model - MV-22B
Data Basis – Estimated or Analysis (Not Flight Test)
Date - 00/00/0000
I have to wonder if the person or persons publishing the manual would be willing to ride through the published procedure and bet their lives on the outcome.
I believe that the most significant element of the MV-22B HV diagram is located in the upper left hand corner of the chart. It probably states:
Model - MV-22B
Data Basis – Estimated or Analysis (Not Flight Test)
Date - 00/00/0000
I have to wonder if the person or persons publishing the manual would be willing to ride through the published procedure and bet their lives on the outcome.