Sikorsky S-92: From Design to Operations

[dangermouse]

never mind boys....

Announced today 14 more EH101s have been ordered

This time for Japan (the S92 being down selected some time ago)

so thats 145 Military EH101s,

zero S92s (gotta be a message there somewhere)

Thought for the day....

If the S92 is so cheap (according to Sikorskys figures for Portugal 3XS92 = 2XEH101) why did they and the Japanese go for 101s?


DM

[MarkD]

Marine One - S92 + BAe vs EH-101

http://www.rotorhub.com/news/0306/ed07.htm

EH-101 Japan contract

Bloomberg

Seriously Nick L., getting t'Baron involved? Do visions of S-92 MRA4 not swim before your eyes?

[NickLappos]

So much for accurate reporting! The BAE controls we are using on the FBW S-92 are basically those from the Comanche, with components from other US FBW projects. The BAE group we are working with is actually in the Upstate New York section of Britain, about 3500 miles west of London just past the wet sections of the M4.

The Japanese minesweeping decision was made about 18 months ago, it was a foregone conclusion to use a Kawasaki/EH arrangement, there really was no competitive process. We did not bid.

[Hilico]

Dangermouse...

...and that's 100 million VHS tape players sold last year and no Betamaxes!

[NickLappos]

Hilico,

Actually, all TV stations and video makers use Beta cameras and decks as the master format for everything they shoot, because it is technically better, and copies perfectly for clean edits. As a result, I think all professional video is actually Beta! Perhaps there's a message here....... Naa!

Dangermouse, the price difference of the two is a matter of fact, with the typical EH costing about 50% more than the S-92 with the same equipment. Conklin and dedecker lists them at 14 and 21 million with mimimal equipment, accurate as far as I know. Japan paid about 37 million apiece, I think.

As I have said in lots of other posts, both makers have good machines, our customers will sort out what they want.

Regarding the EH/Cormorant assertions that they are immune to engine failure in a hover, I have copies of their Avoid Area from the Cormorant Flight Manual. At MHP weights, they go in the drink any time they are hovering below about 170 feet when have any appreciable fuel on board, standard day. On a hot day, they will swim, period. The PR type who doubted my veracity probably couldn't find the Flight Manual, let alone read it.

Any Ppruners who want the data, ask and I can post it on the net. They have a good helicopter, its the PR types who seem to run their programs who are a bit tacky. They told the US Marine Corps the same bunk about three engine immunity, and when their data became available, they seemed to lose a lot of credibility.

[Helioil]

Norsk Helikopter + S-92

Norsk helikopter to add 2 more S-92 to their fleet.
Brings the total to 4.


http://www.sikorsky.com/news_index/1...ETI435,00.html

[Flytest]

Heard rumour that HUMS not fully functional on S-92 and that FAA had certified the aircraft without it, how are Norsk going to operate in the oil fields without it?

[NickLappos]

Flytest,

You're wrong, see the reparte on the other S-92 thread. The hums is certified, it is operational, and the S-92 is going to operate in the oilfield.

I wonder how all those non-JAR certified aircraft will operate in the oil field, now that new aircraft have safety features and capabilities they don't.

[GLSNightPilot]

It's simple, Nick. All over the world, the golden rule is followed. Those who have the gold get to make the rules.

[Another KOS]

Nick:

Don't want to appear cynical but do you include the S61 and S76 in that category?

GLS:

What particular rules are you alluding to?

[Flytest]

Nick,

Obviously been fed incorrect information from the states.

As for safety features, as you know HUMS is available to all operators as retrofit, however as our colleague mentioned above, remember the golden rule!!

Incidentally, congrats for actually taking the lead and building a helicopter with the system onboard, look forward to actually seeing it operate in anger.

[NickLappos]

Another KOS and Flytest,

The simple fact is that I show 61 systems in briefings to illustrate how the new rules have begun to change the game, and old systems simply don't meet the new requirements. The competition we all face is with gravity more that it is with other aircraft manufacturers.

It would be a disservice to treat the new way of developing and qualifying the aircraft as a simple sales angle, and to say that these rules are Sikorsky's alone would also be quite wrong. Certainly 61 falls far short of the new requirements, as do many other machines. Even the 76, which I truly love, is not of the latest standard, though its record and heritage give it superb marks in the safety department. I could not use pprune as a soapbox for the pablum that some posters on other sites follow, where all of one manufacturer are golden and all of another are crap. A spade is a spade, after all.

Time marches on, and with it come our expectations of new and better products, with higher safety standards.

The interesting discussion that zalt and I are having on the other thread is right up to the minute, too. I had the same discussion with a Norwegian CAA official, (who certainly does not agree with zalt BTW) just last week about the certification of the hums and bearing monitor, as we all (operators, Sikorsky and the regulators) want to be sure that the monitoring is of a high order, is certified and is useful.

Where zalt and I disagree is if the hums is "certified" only by making its operation a part of the proof that the aircraft is safe. We at Sikorsky follow the FAA lead, where the hums is important, approved and available, and that maintenance procedures are dictated by its readings, but the safety of the aircraft is not dictated by its operation. I believe that zalt is quoting the CAA line, where hums must be available to prove the safety of the system. I know of no other national regulatroy agency that feels that way, and JAR does not, I believe. My tightrope analogy is a correct one, I think, and at Sikorsky we will follow that until our customers ask for the zalt-type approval, in which case we will simply get it. Norsk is an important customer, knowledgable, experienced. They will tell us what they want, and we will build it!

[GLSNightPilot]

Another, I'm only referring to one rule, the Golden Rule, which in the U.S. these days is, "Those who have the gold get to make the rules".

[Another KOS]

GLS:

Thanks for that - although I'm not sure that it adds any to my understanding. Hopefully, operational and certification rules are not subverted in the way you imply. We all have sympathy for the US (and the planet) whilst manna rules.

Nick:

A well constructed and eloquently argued position. The exchanges between you and Zalt have been interesting.

My understanding is that, contrary to your contention, the rules for HUMS in the UK are likely to be driven down the route of operational requirements - exactly as you are advocating. Thus, once outside the certification scope, MELs can be constructed to permit elements of the HUMS to be out of service for defined periods. The periods of unserviceability will obviously have to be risk assessed to ensure that the ramp of a trend cannot lead to an event during those periods of unserviceability (this assumes of course that trends are monitored - see later).

The operational approach also permits the appropriate level of software certification to provide cost savings (hopefully to be passed on to the customer). Upgrades will also appear quicker and will be cheaper.

We all applaud the willingness of the manufacturers, at last, to join the party and make HUMS systems an integral part of the aircraft build.

It would be an additional improvement if secondary analysis of HUMS data could be introduced to further improve the knowledge and safety of the industry by removing other nasty 'surprises'. Do Sikorsky intend to reconfigure and warehouse the downloaded data to permit such secondary analysis for clusters and trends?

As it would appear that operational rules will be the catalyst for change, is it possible that you could further expand on the impact of the S92 (and other modern machines) on operational standards; do you expect that there will be a move - either by the customers, operators or the regulators - to raise the bar and to squeeze out the machines that are more susceptible to gravity, or do not meet the improved safety standards.

(in the North Sea with the crew feeding regimes, that might properly be gravy)?

[NickLappos]

Another KOS,

I agree, zalt makes strong points. I always learn something when I log onto pprune.

You are perceptive to see the real value of hums data goes way beyond any one aircraft. We certainly intend to use the fleet-wide data base to see trends and nip problems in the bud. Today, the way we know we have a reliability problem with a part is when we start to run low in our inventory, due to all the replacements we are shipping. A bit late, that.

With hums, we can see and learn from each aircraft each night, since we all will log into a common net. we have to work out the issues of data privacy (probably easy enough with some scrubbing off of locals and names). Pooled lessons on diagnostics will allow us all to learn from one user's troubleshooting successes (and frustrations). Imagine a pprune with real usage and maintenance data from all over the world!

I picture our system coming to maturity when we have suppliers, manufacturers, operators and end users all sharing the data, and all up to the minute as to successes and failures. We are setting up the beginnings of that system right now.

Regarding the possible obsolescence of older machines as new ones come around - it is about time. I would be most disheartened if my son (about to go to US Army flight school) were to check out in a Cobra I left 30 years ago. The design trades and technologies of the last several decades were right on for their times, but are getting long on the tooth. I would not go to a hospital with 1967 xray, monitors and procedures.

I must say, however, that the economics should also drive the equation. If the new technologies cost much more, or do not pay their way in better operating costs, they are not necessarily better.

I do fear one facet that seems to loom especially in Europe. The idea that all worst case scenarios must be met, simultaneously, for every operation. The JAR Ops Class 1 from rigs is an example. Instead of relying on reasonable statistics about exposure times and probabliities, regulators ran off with the requirement, and are now backing off as they see the economic impact and the rarity of the event. The worst case design concept can lead to helicopters that are measurably less safe, if we fix the stuff that doesn't need it, and ignore the stuff that does. I heard (here in Aberdeen today) a great discussion of the need for sea state 6 floats, and side floats, because "we fly over sea state 6 sometimes." Yea, I guess so, but I wonder what the probability of a simultaneous event where there is a required ditch and a sea state 6. The combined probability is what we should work on, I think.

[Another KOS]

Nick:

I for one applaud your aspiration for data/information sharing - which goes way beyond my consideration for operators' fleets; yours is a much more far reaching vision. At the moment, trend analysis and not just alert event monitoring would be a welcome addition to some systems. (There is a similar debate going on with regard to FOQA/HOMP/FDM information – to share lessons learnt.)

Regarding the possible obsolescence of older machines as new ones come around - it is about time.

but how do you see it being achieved – just by economics?

You are quite right to take a swipe at the regulators for their original proposal for Class 1 from rigs in 2010. Since 1995, there have been substantial moves to legitimise Performance Class 2 - with exposure - for offshore operations. My understanding is that debate on the 2010 requirement for Performance Class 1 for rigs has already opened and a solution is being sought that is both ‘technically feasible’ and ‘economically justifiable’. I’m sure that any proposal will have to be justified to the “men in grey suits” with

reasonable statistics about exposure times and probabilities

based on data for engine reliability. I also hope that sanity reigns and the results will take account of the distinction between North Sea (hostile) and GOM (non-hostile - in most cases) operations.

I have no idea what went on at Aberdeen or who was expressing such views However:

Examination of the historical data to establish the probability of sea state 6 in the northern North Sea might yield some interesting facts – notwithstanding that, my understanding is that you are offering the S92 with such a ditching approval. In doing so you are probably satisfying FAR 29.801(d):

Or it could be that it didn't cost too much to do.

[Mars]

Nick Lappos/Another KOS,

It has been noticeable that Nick has been somewhat out-of-the-loop whilst highland flinging, however now that he appears to be back in contact, could this thread continue.

The discussion on this and the other S92 thread - in the context of where you expect the offshore industry to go in the future - has been extremely interesting.

The discussion on the mechanism for change was inconclusive and could be of some importance to the industry. Is it possible for Nick to elaborate on the question posed by KOS?

[Crashondeck]

Flying the S-92

I know it is still early days yet, but there must be an ever increasing number of people who have flown the 92. Come on guys, tell us what its like....

Is it going to be the dream machine we are all expecting? Is it going to offer huge loads or is the huge AUW just allowing for a bigger ZFW?

[NickLappos]

Mars and KOS,
Forgive me, I will get philosophical here:
The economics will almost always rule, since if the true economic cost is calculated (a rare event so far) it will include the safety and environmental impacts, and will therefore align itself with our values.

When we stray from accurate economic accounting (where some aspects are exploited without accounting for their use/abuse) then we get the skewed answers that dominated the 19th and 20th century technologies. The piles of slag near mining towns are examples of this partial economic "solution" method.

When the true cost of safety is accounted for, strong solutions with great safety records will be developed. As I have said before, we can be lead astray by those who want to spend too little on safety as well as we can be mislead by those who attempt to solve problems that are not problems, but that spend valuable resources.

[arm the floats]

Its a small world.

I spotted Nick Lappos buzzing around the North of Scotland a few days ago whilst I was enjoying a cold beer in my garden.



I've got to say, it looks and sounds fantastic.

arm the floats