Another KOS,
I agree, zalt makes strong points. I always learn something when I log onto pprune.
You are perceptive to see the real value of hums data goes way beyond any one aircraft. We certainly intend to use the fleet-wide data base to see trends and nip problems in the bud. Today, the way we know we have a reliability problem with a part is when we start to run low in our inventory, due to all the replacements we are shipping. A bit late, that.
With hums, we can see and learn from each aircraft each night, since we all will log into a common net. we have to work out the issues of data privacy (probably easy enough with some scrubbing off of locals and names). Pooled lessons on diagnostics will allow us all to learn from one user's troubleshooting successes (and frustrations). Imagine a pprune with real usage and maintenance data from all over the world!
I picture our system coming to maturity when we have suppliers, manufacturers, operators and end users all sharing the data, and all up to the minute as to successes and failures. We are setting up the beginnings of that system right now.
Regarding the possible obsolescence of older machines as new ones come around - it is about time. I would be most disheartened if my son (about to go to US Army flight school) were to check out in a Cobra I left 30 years ago. The design trades and technologies of the last several decades were right on for their times, but are getting long on the tooth. I would not go to a hospital with 1967 xray, monitors and procedures.
I must say, however, that the economics should also drive the equation. If the new technologies cost much more, or do not pay their way in better operating costs, they are not necessarily better.
I do fear one facet that seems to loom especially in Europe. The idea that all worst case scenarios must be met, simultaneously, for every operation. The JAR Ops Class 1 from rigs is an example. Instead of relying on reasonable statistics about exposure times and probabliities, regulators ran off with the requirement, and are now backing off as they see the economic impact and the rarity of the event. The worst case design concept can lead to helicopters that are measurably less safe, if we fix the stuff that doesn't need it, and ignore the stuff that does. I heard (here in Aberdeen today) a great discussion of the need for sea state 6 floats, and side floats, because "we fly over sea state 6 sometimes." Yea, I guess so, but I wonder what the probability of a simultaneous event where there is a required ditch and a sea state 6. The combined probability is what we should work on, I think.