The most unnecessary chute pull ever?
Re the spin requirement. For airplanes not approved for intential spins, which include most light aircraft, the certification requirement is that the airplane must be recoverable after a 1 turn spin. After that there is no requirement that you will be able to recover.
A good example of this is the Grumman AA1 series aircraft. This aircraft will recover within one turn but after that the spin goes flat and recovery is impossible. There have been numerous foolish pilots that found this out the hard way.
The Cirrus has in fact demonstrated the 1 turn recovery requirements to the FAA. But they recommend going to the chute because the airplane will recover regardless of what stage of the spin it is in.
More importantly though almost all light aircraft spins occur close to the ground as a result of a poor handling in the takeoff/landing phase of flight, and often result in ground contact before a conventional recovery can be performed. Low altitude spins also almost always result in fatalities. In this scenario I would suggest an immediate chute pull is the more likely to save lives than trying to perform a conventional spin recovery
But the problem is not the presence of a chute, it is the level of competency of pilots flying all high performance piston singles. The amount of bent metal and dead pilots and passengers is in my opinion unacceptable because not enough of the pilots flying these aircraft are attaining and maintaining adequate skills.
The Cirrus folks have been the most aggressive in establishing and promoting a comprehensive operationally focused and practical training program. The sad part is not enough Cirrus pilots are taking it which is why they are disproportionately involved in accidents.
But I reiterate my bottom line is a significant number of stupid pilots and their passengers are alive today only because the Cirrus had a chute and the only smart thing the pilot did that day was pull the handle.
So again, will someone please explain to me why it would be better for general aviation to have more dead Cirrus owners ?
A good example of this is the Grumman AA1 series aircraft. This aircraft will recover within one turn but after that the spin goes flat and recovery is impossible. There have been numerous foolish pilots that found this out the hard way.
The Cirrus has in fact demonstrated the 1 turn recovery requirements to the FAA. But they recommend going to the chute because the airplane will recover regardless of what stage of the spin it is in.
More importantly though almost all light aircraft spins occur close to the ground as a result of a poor handling in the takeoff/landing phase of flight, and often result in ground contact before a conventional recovery can be performed. Low altitude spins also almost always result in fatalities. In this scenario I would suggest an immediate chute pull is the more likely to save lives than trying to perform a conventional spin recovery
But the problem is not the presence of a chute, it is the level of competency of pilots flying all high performance piston singles. The amount of bent metal and dead pilots and passengers is in my opinion unacceptable because not enough of the pilots flying these aircraft are attaining and maintaining adequate skills.
The Cirrus folks have been the most aggressive in establishing and promoting a comprehensive operationally focused and practical training program. The sad part is not enough Cirrus pilots are taking it which is why they are disproportionately involved in accidents.
But I reiterate my bottom line is a significant number of stupid pilots and their passengers are alive today only because the Cirrus had a chute and the only smart thing the pilot did that day was pull the handle.
So again, will someone please explain to me why it would be better for general aviation to have more dead Cirrus owners ?
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Jonzarno
We can all be clever by going through a persons post and taking points out of context to make an argument. I could do the same with yours but to be honest I can't be @rsed. I did read your earlier post about the operational limits and that's why I referred to the use of the chute outside of them. I really don't need you patronise me by offering to "explain" them again.
If you read my posts in their entirety without trying to jump on the slightest hint of negativity, you will see that I acknowledge the BRS system as a worthwhile device and one I'd use if I honestly thought I had to. I don't even knock the design of the aeroplane. I still ask the question though ... Why is the fatal accident rate is so high? It's not a rumour or myth as you say, it's a fact! Without looking too hard here's some stats from Wikipedia (I accept that's not a perfect source, but I don't have time to trawl for better)
The last paragraph backs up a lot of your points and I humbly acknowledge that. However, I don't accept that all of us who have other points are all wrong and you are the all knowing source when it comes to forced landing survival. There must be a reason the fatality rate is so high, but hopefully the better training has addressed it?
BPF
Now that is a sensible answer to my question!
SS
We can all be clever by going through a persons post and taking points out of context to make an argument. I could do the same with yours but to be honest I can't be @rsed. I did read your earlier post about the operational limits and that's why I referred to the use of the chute outside of them. I really don't need you patronise me by offering to "explain" them again.
If you read my posts in their entirety without trying to jump on the slightest hint of negativity, you will see that I acknowledge the BRS system as a worthwhile device and one I'd use if I honestly thought I had to. I don't even knock the design of the aeroplane. I still ask the question though ... Why is the fatal accident rate is so high? It's not a rumour or myth as you say, it's a fact! Without looking too hard here's some stats from Wikipedia (I accept that's not a perfect source, but I don't have time to trawl for better)
Accidents and incidents[edit]
Between 2001 and September 2012 144 US-registered Cirrus SR22 aircraft crashed, resulting in 115 fatalities.[31]
In 2011 the accident record of the SR20 and 22 was the subject of a detailed examination by Aviation Consumer magazine. The review concluded that the series has an overall accident record that is better than average for light aircraft, exceeded only by the Diamond DA40 and DA42. However its fatal accident rate is much worse at 1.6 per 100,000 flight hours, placing it higher than the United States general aviation rate of 1.2 and higher than the Diamond DA40 (0.35), Cessna 172 (0.45), Diamond DA42 (0.54), Cessna 182 (0.69) and the Cessna 400 (1.0), despite the SR22's full aircraft parachute system.[32]
By 2014 the accident rate had been dramatically reduced, with a 2013 fatal rate of 1.01 per 100,000 flight hours. This was attributed to better training, particularly in when to deploy the ballistic parachute system.
Between 2001 and September 2012 144 US-registered Cirrus SR22 aircraft crashed, resulting in 115 fatalities.[31]
In 2011 the accident record of the SR20 and 22 was the subject of a detailed examination by Aviation Consumer magazine. The review concluded that the series has an overall accident record that is better than average for light aircraft, exceeded only by the Diamond DA40 and DA42. However its fatal accident rate is much worse at 1.6 per 100,000 flight hours, placing it higher than the United States general aviation rate of 1.2 and higher than the Diamond DA40 (0.35), Cessna 172 (0.45), Diamond DA42 (0.54), Cessna 182 (0.69) and the Cessna 400 (1.0), despite the SR22's full aircraft parachute system.[32]
By 2014 the accident rate had been dramatically reduced, with a 2013 fatal rate of 1.01 per 100,000 flight hours. This was attributed to better training, particularly in when to deploy the ballistic parachute system.
BPF
The Cirrus folks have been the most aggressive in establishing and promoting a comprehensive operationally focused and practical training program. The sad part is not enough Cirrus pilots are taking it which is why they are disproportionately involved in accidents.
SS
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From what I have gone and looked at regarding the on going training to those that want it....
If everyone was to go through that with or without a handle in the roof the accident statistics would be a lot more pleasant on the eye.
The reduction in the fatal accidents by cirrus owners that do keep up with the training is far larger than the CAP pulls.
So to me the reduction in fatal accidents is available to everyone. You just have to put yourself into the mind set of. I need training, in need regular training, I will do that training.
Until the that happens the benefits of the CAP will never be realised
If everyone was to go through that with or without a handle in the roof the accident statistics would be a lot more pleasant on the eye.
The reduction in the fatal accidents by cirrus owners that do keep up with the training is far larger than the CAP pulls.
So to me the reduction in fatal accidents is available to everyone. You just have to put yourself into the mind set of. I need training, in need regular training, I will do that training.
Until the that happens the benefits of the CAP will never be realised
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Jock
In the past I've disagreed with a lot of things you've said about CAPS, but here you are dead right!
Shortstripper
1. I didn't take your points out of context, I simply addressed every point in your post separately and in the order in which you made them.
If you feel any of the evidence I presented or arguments I made are wrong, or if the context in which I should have read them is different, please refute what I said specifically with evidence of your own.
2. I did read your posts in their entirety before responding to them and have since done so again before writing this.
It is striking that this is the first time you have referred to any objective evidence in the form of the Wikipedia article that you quote, and which you acknowledge supports the main argument I have been making all along about the need for training and participation in safety initiatives and demonstrates the impact that those initiatives have had.
I invite you to go back over my posts and count the number of times I have said that, and I am glad to see that BPF has now been able to make the point successfully.
3. If you re-read your post of 1st May, perhaps you will understand why it would cause me to reply as I did.
In it, you make a number of assertions and ask questions that imply "facts" that are simply not true, or ask perjorative questions based on unsupportable premises.
I will just quote three examples here. I acknowledge that they are taken individually but do believe that they reflect accurately the line and attitude expressed in your posts.
And
It's a parachute, and obviously parachutes need height in order to work. If you jump out of a plane wearing a parachute and you aren't high enough you will hit the ground and die. It's the same with CAPS.
Your assertion that Cirrus “wash their hands” is both demonstrably untrue and, if I was the CEO of Cirrus, I would find it pretty offensive. I have made my fair share of criticisms of things that Cirrus has done in the past but, to my knowledge, they have never done anything as cynical as that.
That is why I referred you to the post I made before yours was written, and in which I both set out the demonstrated deployment parameters and made the point that real saves had actually been made well outside those parameters. I am sorry if you found that to be patronising.
In your last post, you acknowledge the positive effect that the CPPP and transition training programs have had and you are right to do so.
Use of CAPS is an integral part of those programs and the number of successful CAPS saves has increased whilst the number of fatal accidents has decreased. That's a matter of documented fact not opinion. From the article you yourself quoted:
Yet you criticise us for saying that the use of the chute shouldn't be discouraged. 
Your assertion that CAPS is being used inappropriately is backed by no evidence. In response I said that I was aware of one instance when it might have been unnecessary for the pilot to pull although, to be fair to him, I wasn't there so can't really criticise him and, in any case, would far rather see him alive having pulled than dead if he screwed up the recovery.
Once again, I invite you to list the “inappropriate” pulls to which you refer: you have 43 successful saves to choose from and you presumably have knowledge of them to be able to describe them as “inappropriate”.
I might also point out that nobody has said “once the engine fails you will die unless you pull the handle”.
What we do say is that you should pull unless you have a nailed on landing on a proper runway and I know of at least one Cirrus pilot who has done such a landing.
Sadly, as I demonstrated in my earlier post, Manfred Stolle, a good and experienced pilot, died when he got it wrong trying to do that. He is not the only one to die in a Cirrus trying to stretch a glide or land off airport, and there are plenty of other examples as well such as the DA20 crash I quoted in another earlier post.
I acknowledge your undoubted skill in doing three dead stick landings into fields. I'd be interested to know what you were flying (and who does your maintenance!
). You are obviously a far better pilot than I am, and certainly a far bolder one, although to paraphrase Lady Bracknell: “to lose one engine may be deemed unfortunate, but to lose three......”
By the way: can you imagine the uproar on here if it became known that a single Cirrus pilot had had three engine failures?
I hope you never have another engine failure but, if you do, also hope that it will be as successful and that there is nothing nasty (stone, tree stump, wire fence, ditch ........) that you couldn't see from 400 ft waiting for you when you land.
In the past I've disagreed with a lot of things you've said about CAPS, but here you are dead right!
Shortstripper
1. I didn't take your points out of context, I simply addressed every point in your post separately and in the order in which you made them.
If you feel any of the evidence I presented or arguments I made are wrong, or if the context in which I should have read them is different, please refute what I said specifically with evidence of your own.
2. I did read your posts in their entirety before responding to them and have since done so again before writing this.
It is striking that this is the first time you have referred to any objective evidence in the form of the Wikipedia article that you quote, and which you acknowledge supports the main argument I have been making all along about the need for training and participation in safety initiatives and demonstrates the impact that those initiatives have had.
I invite you to go back over my posts and count the number of times I have said that, and I am glad to see that BPF has now been able to make the point successfully.
3. If you re-read your post of 1st May, perhaps you will understand why it would cause me to reply as I did.
In it, you make a number of assertions and ask questions that imply "facts" that are simply not true, or ask perjorative questions based on unsupportable premises.
I will just quote three examples here. I acknowledge that they are taken individually but do believe that they reflect accurately the line and attitude expressed in your posts.
I'm trying to understand why a safety device that on the face of it seems such an advance hasn't reduced fatalities to almost zero?
Cirrus will point out their success in such cases as if that proves how good the system is, but then if a fatality occurs they just wash their hands and say the system was wrongly used.
Your assertion that Cirrus “wash their hands” is both demonstrably untrue and, if I was the CEO of Cirrus, I would find it pretty offensive. I have made my fair share of criticisms of things that Cirrus has done in the past but, to my knowledge, they have never done anything as cynical as that.
That is why I referred you to the post I made before yours was written, and in which I both set out the demonstrated deployment parameters and made the point that real saves had actually been made well outside those parameters. I am sorry if you found that to be patronising.
However, some on here are saying the use of the chute shouldn't be discouraged or once the engine fails you will die unless you pull the handle. No wonder they are being used inappropriately
Use of CAPS is an integral part of those programs and the number of successful CAPS saves has increased whilst the number of fatal accidents has decreased. That's a matter of documented fact not opinion. From the article you yourself quoted:
By 2014 the accident rate had been dramatically reduced, with a 2013 fatal rate of 1.01 per 100,000 flight hours. This was attributed to better training, particularly in when to deploy the ballistic parachute system.”
Your assertion that CAPS is being used inappropriately is backed by no evidence. In response I said that I was aware of one instance when it might have been unnecessary for the pilot to pull although, to be fair to him, I wasn't there so can't really criticise him and, in any case, would far rather see him alive having pulled than dead if he screwed up the recovery.
Once again, I invite you to list the “inappropriate” pulls to which you refer: you have 43 successful saves to choose from and you presumably have knowledge of them to be able to describe them as “inappropriate”.
I might also point out that nobody has said “once the engine fails you will die unless you pull the handle”.
What we do say is that you should pull unless you have a nailed on landing on a proper runway and I know of at least one Cirrus pilot who has done such a landing.
Sadly, as I demonstrated in my earlier post, Manfred Stolle, a good and experienced pilot, died when he got it wrong trying to do that. He is not the only one to die in a Cirrus trying to stretch a glide or land off airport, and there are plenty of other examples as well such as the DA20 crash I quoted in another earlier post.
I acknowledge your undoubted skill in doing three dead stick landings into fields. I'd be interested to know what you were flying (and who does your maintenance!
). You are obviously a far better pilot than I am, and certainly a far bolder one, although to paraphrase Lady Bracknell: “to lose one engine may be deemed unfortunate, but to lose three......” By the way: can you imagine the uproar on here if it became known that a single Cirrus pilot had had three engine failures?
I hope you never have another engine failure but, if you do, also hope that it will be as successful and that there is nothing nasty (stone, tree stump, wire fence, ditch ........) that you couldn't see from 400 ft waiting for you when you land.
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to be honest if you look through mine and others posts on the subject we are not against the concept of the CAP.
What we are against is the PILOT putting themselves in situations which they wouldn't be in without it. with the excuse that it is now an acceptable risk because of the CAP.
And I am sure we could be accused of have more feelings about the waste of a perfectly airworthy airframe than some
wit making an attempt at a Darwin award entry. And to be honest guilty as charged.
And most of us work on the theory that the once the airframe fails its only job left on this world is to ensure the survivability of the soft centre. And none of us would think twice about using it in a manner that would ensure its destruction but meant everyone survived.
Its the go no go based on if a chute is fitted that is the problem and the current skills for the mission being on the stick.
Now if the chute means the risk level is raised and the perceived skill requirement is lower because of it then the CAP is a bad idea. If it makes no difference its a good one.
What we are against is the PILOT putting themselves in situations which they wouldn't be in without it. with the excuse that it is now an acceptable risk because of the CAP.
And I am sure we could be accused of have more feelings about the waste of a perfectly airworthy airframe than some
wit making an attempt at a Darwin award entry. And to be honest guilty as charged. And most of us work on the theory that the once the airframe fails its only job left on this world is to ensure the survivability of the soft centre. And none of us would think twice about using it in a manner that would ensure its destruction but meant everyone survived.
Its the go no go based on if a chute is fitted that is the problem and the current skills for the mission being on the stick.
Now if the chute means the risk level is raised and the perceived skill requirement is lower because of it then the CAP is a bad idea. If it makes no difference its a good one.
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Mad Jock, you make all kinds of sense! That is the whole flap in a nutshell!
If all pilots maintained and improved their flying skills in the ways recommended by the Cirrus program, that would be soon reflected in the statistics.
The human soft centre in the midst of the tupperware is the fallible bit that involves innnocent family and friends, and for that reason a parachute is a good idea. The thing that pisses off those of us that try to be skilled and sensible is that the Cirrus is so expensive, and every time another unskilled wealthy pilot pulls the handle, another nice aeroplane has to spend a very long time in the shop before it flies again, which surely is represented in the insurance premium, which (full circle) only the unskilled wealthy pilot can afford!
So flying, instead of fun, is more of a money game than ever.
What truly makes my blood boil is pilots who take up trusting passengers and show off.
Or put their trusting family in danger when an airline would have been the right choice. I sat in Norfolk Virginia pilots lounge one Thanksgiving day....all day! waiting for the storm system to trek on overhead. I had two passengers who trusted me. Meanwhile a rich man took his family in his fancy twin up to Long Island through the storm system, and tried to land it at three different LI airports, without success, and returned to Norfolk while we were still sitting in the pilots lounge watching the NFL.
OK, he didn't kill the whole family, flying on a day with horrid weather. But they looked pretty miserable all the same.
When conditions cleared, we tried again around 15:00 local time to make it to New Jersey, met the nasty stuff at Baltimore, and without even thinking my plane did a 180. We went back to Norfolk, booked in a motel, and had a Chinese takeaway for Thanksgiving dinner. It was only a rented Cessna 172, IFR equipped (as I) but with a chicken pilot at the controls, living to fly another day as were my friends.
Many a PPL enjoys pretending to be a ATPL, but some conditions require more equipment, namely, brains, and a co-pilot.
If all pilots maintained and improved their flying skills in the ways recommended by the Cirrus program, that would be soon reflected in the statistics.
The human soft centre in the midst of the tupperware is the fallible bit that involves innnocent family and friends, and for that reason a parachute is a good idea. The thing that pisses off those of us that try to be skilled and sensible is that the Cirrus is so expensive, and every time another unskilled wealthy pilot pulls the handle, another nice aeroplane has to spend a very long time in the shop before it flies again, which surely is represented in the insurance premium, which (full circle) only the unskilled wealthy pilot can afford!
So flying, instead of fun, is more of a money game than ever.
What truly makes my blood boil is pilots who take up trusting passengers and show off.
Or put their trusting family in danger when an airline would have been the right choice. I sat in Norfolk Virginia pilots lounge one Thanksgiving day....all day! waiting for the storm system to trek on overhead. I had two passengers who trusted me. Meanwhile a rich man took his family in his fancy twin up to Long Island through the storm system, and tried to land it at three different LI airports, without success, and returned to Norfolk while we were still sitting in the pilots lounge watching the NFL.
OK, he didn't kill the whole family, flying on a day with horrid weather. But they looked pretty miserable all the same.
When conditions cleared, we tried again around 15:00 local time to make it to New Jersey, met the nasty stuff at Baltimore, and without even thinking my plane did a 180. We went back to Norfolk, booked in a motel, and had a Chinese takeaway for Thanksgiving dinner. It was only a rented Cessna 172, IFR equipped (as I) but with a chicken pilot at the controls, living to fly another day as were my friends.
Many a PPL enjoys pretending to be a ATPL, but some conditions require more equipment, namely, brains, and a co-pilot.
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Now if the chute means the risk level is raised and the perceived skill requirement is lower because of it then the CAP is a bad idea. If it makes no difference its a good one.
You might fly at night with a chute, but not fly at night without one, you might fly over a low undercast with one, not without, you might fly over the north sea in winter with and not without - you get the idea.
Most SEP pilots skill level at handling a FL is poor and this is a skill I suspect many Cirrus pilots seldom refresh but given the former maybe that is no bad thing.
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Fuji
I am starting with 50 hrs on a Cirrus in June so finally taken the plunge
the chute is definitely a big potential safety bonus but it should be used wisely and a plot should guard against the feel good factor luring pilots into situations and conditions they would not consider without the chute.
A bit like fitting explosives on every corner of a car in London. I am sure the drivers would be ultra cautious about hitting someone else but in an all singing and dancing car fitted with every impact safety device they would drive with false confidence.
So used as a back up to solid basic flying skills VFR or IFR and aware of the Lure factor it is indeed a big addition to safety
Pace
I am starting with 50 hrs on a Cirrus in June so finally taken the plunge
the chute is definitely a big potential safety bonus but it should be used wisely and a plot should guard against the feel good factor luring pilots into situations and conditions they would not consider without the chute.
A bit like fitting explosives on every corner of a car in London. I am sure the drivers would be ultra cautious about hitting someone else but in an all singing and dancing car fitted with every impact safety device they would drive with false confidence.
So used as a back up to solid basic flying skills VFR or IFR and aware of the Lure factor it is indeed a big addition to safety
Pace
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Pace
Exactly so.
A good start is to ask yourself would you do the flight without a chute. If the answer is yes, you are good to go. If the answer is no, then the question is am I prepared to do the flight with the chute, because in the event of an engine failure the chute will give me an "out" which I would not have without the chute. If the answer is yes, then that is not an unreasonable basis for going - it might not suit everyone I would add, but that's another matter. If the answer is no, then you should stay on the ground.
In one sense it is a bit like flying twins. Essentially you don't prepare for an off airport landing. You don't expect to end up in the drink crossing the North Sea. In a SEP you also don't expect to have to make a forced landing with a 500 foot en route cloud base, but you know if it happens the chance of a successful outcome are in the lap of the Gods. Some will take their chances, because they perceive the risk is very small. Some will take their chances, but only with a chute, because they believe that stacks the odds a lot more in their favour.
So that leaves flights into poor weather conditions - that could be icing, thunder storms, marginal VMC, or IMC beyond your capability. The trouble with weather, just like engine failures, is that it is unpredictable. I know, I know, look at the TAFs. However, there is still a degree of uncertainty. How often have we flown on days towering CBs are forecast, but they have proved good flying days.
Therein is the problem. You fly a SEP without a chute. You assess the weather and decide that you can avoid any towering CBs and proceed with the flight. Another pilot has a SEP with a chute, and makes the same assessment, and a third pilot, also with a chute, thinks chucks it looks ok, but if it goes horribly wrong I will pull the chute. Three pilots, two different types of aircraft and they all reach the same conclusion, but for different reasons.
Inevitably there are the black and white cases. The pilot that sets off at night, in icing conditions, with IMC, without an IR and reckons, well I have a chute, that will save my neck.
The problem is I actually don't think there are many in the last category, and if there are, I am even less convinced that the chute determines whether or not they go - I think of those a large percentage will go anyway. Usually it is because of inexperience, a lack of understanding of the risks, or and inability to assess the situation correctly.
I simply don't believe there are many pilots who would knowingly put themselves in that position because of the chute, because I think most realise pulling the chute is a really big deal.
As with anything there are exceptions! They will probably find some other way of killing themselves anyway.
Enjoy your Cirrus time Pace - it is a great aircraft.
Exactly so.
A good start is to ask yourself would you do the flight without a chute. If the answer is yes, you are good to go. If the answer is no, then the question is am I prepared to do the flight with the chute, because in the event of an engine failure the chute will give me an "out" which I would not have without the chute. If the answer is yes, then that is not an unreasonable basis for going - it might not suit everyone I would add, but that's another matter. If the answer is no, then you should stay on the ground.
In one sense it is a bit like flying twins. Essentially you don't prepare for an off airport landing. You don't expect to end up in the drink crossing the North Sea. In a SEP you also don't expect to have to make a forced landing with a 500 foot en route cloud base, but you know if it happens the chance of a successful outcome are in the lap of the Gods. Some will take their chances, because they perceive the risk is very small. Some will take their chances, but only with a chute, because they believe that stacks the odds a lot more in their favour.
So that leaves flights into poor weather conditions - that could be icing, thunder storms, marginal VMC, or IMC beyond your capability. The trouble with weather, just like engine failures, is that it is unpredictable. I know, I know, look at the TAFs. However, there is still a degree of uncertainty. How often have we flown on days towering CBs are forecast, but they have proved good flying days.
Therein is the problem. You fly a SEP without a chute. You assess the weather and decide that you can avoid any towering CBs and proceed with the flight. Another pilot has a SEP with a chute, and makes the same assessment, and a third pilot, also with a chute, thinks chucks it looks ok, but if it goes horribly wrong I will pull the chute. Three pilots, two different types of aircraft and they all reach the same conclusion, but for different reasons.
Inevitably there are the black and white cases. The pilot that sets off at night, in icing conditions, with IMC, without an IR and reckons, well I have a chute, that will save my neck.
The problem is I actually don't think there are many in the last category, and if there are, I am even less convinced that the chute determines whether or not they go - I think of those a large percentage will go anyway. Usually it is because of inexperience, a lack of understanding of the risks, or and inability to assess the situation correctly.
I simply don't believe there are many pilots who would knowingly put themselves in that position because of the chute, because I think most realise pulling the chute is a really big deal.
As with anything there are exceptions! They will probably find some other way of killing themselves anyway.
Enjoy your Cirrus time Pace - it is a great aircraft.
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Jonzarno
I really don't want to get into a personal slagging match with you. I suppose if I'm honest my replies aren't always completely accurate or analytical. They're often after a glass of wine or two in the evening when I treat this forum as a bit like an place to have informal discussions with fellow aviators. That said, I still hold with what I've said.
I've never pretended to be a "far better pilot" than anyone and that wasn't my intention when I'd said about my three forced landings. I was responding to a post where someone had said that once the engine failed a crash was pretty much inevitable ... I was trying to demonstrate it was not. If you'd read carefully I didn't even say they were all dead stick into fields either. I actually said two resulted in landings back onto the airfield and one was into a field. If you must know, the types they were a Jurca Tempete, an Evans VP2, and a Falconar F11. Not high performance types I know (before you jump on that too for obvious reasons). If I'd had three engine failures in one particular aeroplane then I'd agree that I'd need to be bold or stupid to keep flying it! The point is that engines fail and we shouldn't assume a forced landing will be a crash! If you do believe that (and I don't mean you personally) then you will likely throw your hands up and pull the chute no matter what ... Which brings us back to the OP and was it necessary to pull the chute at 5000' over bloody great fields?
SS
I acknowledge your undoubted skill in doing three dead stick landings into fields. I'd be interested to know what you were flying (and who does your maintenance! ). You are obviously a far better pilot than I am, and certainly a far bolder one, although to paraphrase Lady Bracknell: “to lose one engine may be deemed unfortunate, but to lose three......”
I've never pretended to be a "far better pilot" than anyone and that wasn't my intention when I'd said about my three forced landings. I was responding to a post where someone had said that once the engine failed a crash was pretty much inevitable ... I was trying to demonstrate it was not. If you'd read carefully I didn't even say they were all dead stick into fields either. I actually said two resulted in landings back onto the airfield and one was into a field. If you must know, the types they were a Jurca Tempete, an Evans VP2, and a Falconar F11. Not high performance types I know (before you jump on that too for obvious reasons). If I'd had three engine failures in one particular aeroplane then I'd agree that I'd need to be bold or stupid to keep flying it! The point is that engines fail and we shouldn't assume a forced landing will be a crash! If you do believe that (and I don't mean you personally) then you will likely throw your hands up and pull the chute no matter what ... Which brings us back to the OP and was it necessary to pull the chute at 5000' over bloody great fields?
SS
Re engine failures. As I pointed out in the PFL thread if you are flying behind your typical Lycoming or Continental engine and it stops there is about an 80 % chance that the failure was caused by you, the pilot.
Again the point is if you have to use your skygodly flying skills to pull off that forced landing, because you let the engine fail by running out of gas or not draining the tanks of water, or mis selecting the fuel etc etc ; I don't think you are any better than the guy who did the same thing and pulled the chute.
The only difference is the accident record shows you are less likely to kill your self in the forced landing of your Cirrus than if you pulled the handle.
The solution for the unacceptably high accident rate for high performance SEP's is simple, do the training !
Again the point is if you have to use your skygodly flying skills to pull off that forced landing, because you let the engine fail by running out of gas or not draining the tanks of water, or mis selecting the fuel etc etc ; I don't think you are any better than the guy who did the same thing and pulled the chute.
The only difference is the accident record shows you are less likely to kill your self in the forced landing of your Cirrus than if you pulled the handle.
The solution for the unacceptably high accident rate for high performance SEP's is simple, do the training !
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I must be bloody unlucky then!
The first was indeed pilot induced. Botched aero's that stopped the engine
It had a hand swing C90 and though I'd air-started it once before, this time I couldn't.
But ...
The next was fuel starvation with fuel in the tank! I suppose it did qualify as pilot induced but not in a classic way. I was unfamiliar on type and it was a homebuilt VP2 with a flat bottomed tank and tiny sump. I'd been circling in one direction looking for an airstrip and all the fuel slopped to one side. When the tiny sump emptied, the engine stopped resulting in a forced landing. It took a bit of figuring out why the engine had stopped because it started no problem on the ground? My LAA inspector and I figured it out later when we could find no other explanation. A larger sump was subsequently fitted.
The last was a sticking hot/cold air flap on a carb where it stuck in the mid position. It gave similar symptoms to carb icing but caused (I think) turbulent airflow at the mouth of the carb. Once fixed the problem never reoccurred. It was at Goodwood and resulted in an immediate landing on an adjacent runway.
I'm glad they were all in relatively low performance aircraft, but on no occasion did I think "oh f..k! I'm going to crash". Apart from the pilot induced engine stop one the others would have been outside a chute deploy envelope. They'd have been more "interesting" in a Cirrus but probably wouldn't have happened anyway to be honest.
No SkyGod, just a recreational pilot dealing with things that happen as best he can.
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I'll shutup now! lol
The first was indeed pilot induced. Botched aero's that stopped the engine
It had a hand swing C90 and though I'd air-started it once before, this time I couldn't.But ...
The next was fuel starvation with fuel in the tank! I suppose it did qualify as pilot induced but not in a classic way. I was unfamiliar on type and it was a homebuilt VP2 with a flat bottomed tank and tiny sump. I'd been circling in one direction looking for an airstrip and all the fuel slopped to one side. When the tiny sump emptied, the engine stopped resulting in a forced landing. It took a bit of figuring out why the engine had stopped because it started no problem on the ground? My LAA inspector and I figured it out later when we could find no other explanation. A larger sump was subsequently fitted.
The last was a sticking hot/cold air flap on a carb where it stuck in the mid position. It gave similar symptoms to carb icing but caused (I think) turbulent airflow at the mouth of the carb. Once fixed the problem never reoccurred. It was at Goodwood and resulted in an immediate landing on an adjacent runway.
I'm glad they were all in relatively low performance aircraft, but on no occasion did I think "oh f..k! I'm going to crash". Apart from the pilot induced engine stop one the others would have been outside a chute deploy envelope. They'd have been more "interesting" in a Cirrus but probably wouldn't have happened anyway to be honest.
No SkyGod, just a recreational pilot dealing with things that happen as best he can.
SS
I'll shutup now! lol
Last edited by shortstripper; 2nd May 2014 at 19:31. Reason: To add the last bit
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Fuji all your examples in my book are unacceptable risk with or with out a chute.
And is exactly the point I am making about go no go for different mission profiles.
The fact you think they are acceptable is rather worrying.
And is exactly the point I am making about go no go for different mission profiles.
The fact you think they are acceptable is rather worrying.
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MJ - well I dont think I said they would be my personal decisions?
but I am not sure which examples you are referring to?
These are the classics;
1. Flying over a low cloud base - this could be a overcast of 500 foot or fog,
2. Flying over the sea outside glide range,
3. Flying in icing conditions,
4. Flying at night,
5. Flying in marginal VMC without an IR,
6. Flying in IMC without an IR,
7. Flying with thunderstorms in the vicinity.
Plenty of SEP pilots do 1, 2 and 4 without a chute. The main risk is engine failure. Statistically the risk is very very small because engine failures are so rare. I cant recall the last time I read about a pilot killing themselves in these conditions. You probably stand a higher chance of falling down the stairs. A chute sways the odds of surviving an engine failure significantly. You may still not like the odds but if this is the only basis of your assessment you should probably avoid every flight of steps.
As to 3, you are nuts flying in icing conditions if the aircraft is not FIKI - as it happens some versions of the Cirrus are. Leaving that aside many SEP pilots accept the risk of flying in icing conditions as long as they "know" they can descend into warmer air quickly and icing is likely to be light. Many pilots consider with proper planning this is an acceptable risk.
As to 5, pilots without an IR have flown in marginal VMC for ever. Again it can be done safely, but it can also prove fatal and is, without doubt, one of the biggest killers.
Your are nuts to do 6.
7 is a bit like 3 and 5.
My friend is PIC in an aircraft with four engines. In his early days he had an engine failure while crop dusting and refuses to fly in a SEP - period.
Another friend who is not a pilot had a bad experience on a commercial flight - he will not fly in any aircraft.
We each make our own risk assessment. As I said you cant say 1 is an unacceptable risk in an aircraft with a chute and go any where near a flight of stairs because statistically you are more likely to come to harm on the flight of stairs. That is an irrational assessment. 5 is a good example where it is much more difficult to control the risk and therefore it is a much more difficult assessment. Learn how to assess the risk and the evidence suggests you can do 5 safely.
So, MJ, they are (although I am not certain to which you refer) unacceptable in your book, and that is of course fine - its your call and you doubtless have your reasons. These days I rarely fly in a single because I can and do fly a fully deiced twin. Personally at my age I feel more comfortable in a twin. I know it is irrational, but hey, that's life. However, ask me to do any of the above and I would, except 6, if I didn't have an IR. Personally I would hesitate to do 1 and 4 without a chute, I would have my own parameters for 2, 3, 5 and 7, although a chute would only come into the equation with 2.
Of course these are age old arguments that come up time and time again. MJ you have your own views which I totally respect, and I have mine. I have thought them through over a great many years but I can always be persuaded to change them although too be convinced the arguments would need to be well constructed and supportable.
That is me done, I just felt I had to get that off my chest once again!
PS - on re-reading I should have added the caveat that I am referring to certified and well maintained aircraft. I accept that some non certified aircraft constitute a higher risk of engine failure and personally I make a point of not flying in an aircraft in which I doubt the quality of the maintenance. As someone said earlier I know of very few engine failures in certified aircraft that have been methodically maintained by reputable engineers that were not the direct fault of the pilot.
but I am not sure which examples you are referring to?
These are the classics;
1. Flying over a low cloud base - this could be a overcast of 500 foot or fog,
2. Flying over the sea outside glide range,
3. Flying in icing conditions,
4. Flying at night,
5. Flying in marginal VMC without an IR,
6. Flying in IMC without an IR,
7. Flying with thunderstorms in the vicinity.
Plenty of SEP pilots do 1, 2 and 4 without a chute. The main risk is engine failure. Statistically the risk is very very small because engine failures are so rare. I cant recall the last time I read about a pilot killing themselves in these conditions. You probably stand a higher chance of falling down the stairs. A chute sways the odds of surviving an engine failure significantly. You may still not like the odds but if this is the only basis of your assessment you should probably avoid every flight of steps.
As to 3, you are nuts flying in icing conditions if the aircraft is not FIKI - as it happens some versions of the Cirrus are. Leaving that aside many SEP pilots accept the risk of flying in icing conditions as long as they "know" they can descend into warmer air quickly and icing is likely to be light. Many pilots consider with proper planning this is an acceptable risk.
As to 5, pilots without an IR have flown in marginal VMC for ever. Again it can be done safely, but it can also prove fatal and is, without doubt, one of the biggest killers.
Your are nuts to do 6.
7 is a bit like 3 and 5.
My friend is PIC in an aircraft with four engines. In his early days he had an engine failure while crop dusting and refuses to fly in a SEP - period.
Another friend who is not a pilot had a bad experience on a commercial flight - he will not fly in any aircraft.
We each make our own risk assessment. As I said you cant say 1 is an unacceptable risk in an aircraft with a chute and go any where near a flight of stairs because statistically you are more likely to come to harm on the flight of stairs. That is an irrational assessment. 5 is a good example where it is much more difficult to control the risk and therefore it is a much more difficult assessment. Learn how to assess the risk and the evidence suggests you can do 5 safely.
So, MJ, they are (although I am not certain to which you refer) unacceptable in your book, and that is of course fine - its your call and you doubtless have your reasons. These days I rarely fly in a single because I can and do fly a fully deiced twin. Personally at my age I feel more comfortable in a twin. I know it is irrational, but hey, that's life. However, ask me to do any of the above and I would, except 6, if I didn't have an IR. Personally I would hesitate to do 1 and 4 without a chute, I would have my own parameters for 2, 3, 5 and 7, although a chute would only come into the equation with 2.
Of course these are age old arguments that come up time and time again. MJ you have your own views which I totally respect, and I have mine. I have thought them through over a great many years but I can always be persuaded to change them although too be convinced the arguments would need to be well constructed and supportable.
That is me done, I just felt I had to get that off my chest once again!
PS - on re-reading I should have added the caveat that I am referring to certified and well maintained aircraft. I accept that some non certified aircraft constitute a higher risk of engine failure and personally I make a point of not flying in an aircraft in which I doubt the quality of the maintenance. As someone said earlier I know of very few engine failures in certified aircraft that have been methodically maintained by reputable engineers that were not the direct fault of the pilot.
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personal risk assessment is up to individual.
And I wouldn't be doing those in a single with or without a chute.
I would be more than happy to do them in your de-iced twin.
Maybe it is age or experience is something to do with it.
But as you have said your decision isn't based on it you have the CAP or not. So my statement still stands. If having the CAP changes your flight profile or if it even takes place its a bad thing. If it makes no difference what's so ever its a good thing.
But its the recurrent standardised training which is really having an affect on the accident stats not the CAP currently.
And I wouldn't be doing those in a single with or without a chute.
I would be more than happy to do them in your de-iced twin.
Maybe it is age or experience is something to do with it.
But as you have said your decision isn't based on it you have the CAP or not. So my statement still stands. If having the CAP changes your flight profile or if it even takes place its a bad thing. If it makes no difference what's so ever its a good thing.
But its the recurrent standardised training which is really having an affect on the accident stats not the CAP currently.
Last edited by mad_jock; 4th May 2014 at 07:53.
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The problem was lack of oil
I have just stumbled in to this thread and only have reviewed a few pages, so apologies in advance if the next comments have already been covered.
The ATSB have recently released their report:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...-2012-154.aspx
It appears the engine failed because of lack oil. There is a suggestion there wasn't enough oil on board at the start of the trip (c.5 quarts instead of the 6-7 recommend). What was more surprising (in my view) is the plane flew for 2 1/2 hours after the oil light first went on. (In that someone would fly past so many ALAs rather than engine lasting that long.)
The pilot tried to solve the problem in the air by calling the maintenance centre. (Too many options perhaps?) Personally I would have favoured doing this safely on the ground.
Was the chute pull unnecessary? My view, I think the engine failure was unnecessary in the first place.
The ATSB have recently released their report:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...-2012-154.aspx
It appears the engine failed because of lack oil. There is a suggestion there wasn't enough oil on board at the start of the trip (c.5 quarts instead of the 6-7 recommend). What was more surprising (in my view) is the plane flew for 2 1/2 hours after the oil light first went on. (In that someone would fly past so many ALAs rather than engine lasting that long.)
The pilot tried to solve the problem in the air by calling the maintenance centre. (Too many options perhaps?) Personally I would have favoured doing this safely on the ground.
Was the chute pull unnecessary? My view, I think the engine failure was unnecessary in the first place.
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And I am sure we could be accused of have more feelings about the waste of a perfectly airworthy airframe than some wit making an attempt at a Darwin award entry. And to be honest guilty as charged.
wit making an attempt at a Darwin award entry. And to be honest guilty as charged.
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But as you have said your decision isn't based on it you have the CAP or not. So my statement still stands. If having the CAP changes your flight profile or if it even takes place its a bad thing. If it makes no difference what's so ever its a good thing.
As I said the risk of an engine failure in a certified well maintained single is diminishingly small. There are plenty of people who accept the odds, and I dont think they are unreasonable, given that you are also equally unlikely to kill yourself in the forced landing that follows.
However the odds of a successful forced landing with a low cloud base for example are skewed. I think there is sound justification for flying with a low cloud base with a chute.