Blackpool 3/2/07

[S-Works]

I am sorry mate, but there is no fatalist approach. I clearly state that there are lessons to be learnt from this incident on the human factors front. But it does not change the situation as far as the accident is concerned. The crew were capable of making their own decisions regardless of what 'considerable favours' may have been on offer.

Just as I would not jump into a pit of rattlesnakes to grab a bag of diamonds not matter how many times somebody more experienced and wiser assured I would be OK. I know my limitations, snake charming is not one of my skills so I know when to say no.

The crew were in the same position, they were old enough and experienced enough to hold pilot licences. Self responsibility comes with this.

But I stand to be educated as to why pilot error is not to blame?

This now just smacks of a witch hunt.

[vanHorck]

or smacks of bitterness over a sensless loss which at all cost must be justified by blaming someone else. Somebody mentioned Mr Al Fayed's loss....

There are simply two levels of this (if not more) and this forum is about what matters to pilots.

If you want to convince CFI s to be more responsible do so under that heading. We are doing our fellow pilots no favours by suggesting you re only P1 insofar you have not been influenced by others.....

[Duchess_Driver]

"In my opinion FTO's have a certain moral and unwritten(?) responsibility to ensure they do not place requests on club members that are well and truly beyond their abilities. Maybe this is something which will come out in the wash and change the present rather inadequate regulations which bundle all blame on the PIC on the premise that they're street wise experienced commanders capable of overriding their superiors. It is just unrealistic in some club circles.

VFE." - my bolds

Sorry, but I have a problem with this statement. Our Ops desk, as a representative of club management and/or CFI does not allow pilots to fly into situations which are knowingly beyond their experience or abilities. As instructors we will often question decisions made at the ops desk and advise where appropriate. However, that is all it is advice – until the Ops desk exercises their ultimate sanction and takes their toys away and say no.

Once more, as has already been said what the pilot does once the flight has been authorised and departed cannot be at the blame of anyone other than P1. If the P1 can’t/won’t/doesn’t read a TAF and make a Wx decision – or can’t/won’t/doesn’t fuel then those decisions lie with them – and unfortunately, them alone. It’s all very well saying someone held a gun to their head – but how long do we need to keep making decisions for pilots – and how are they supposed to grow as pilots if we do? We give them the information they need and guide them through the interpretation of the data so that they can make the (safe) decisions for themselves. And we do it so they can do it in front of an examiner who is a representative of the rule makers no less. Somewhere, somehow they have to have the strength of character to say ‘This is outside my comfort zone and it isn’t happening’

Any change in that status-quo will be very bad for the everyone concerned.

I’m sorry if this offends some of you, but there were umpteen places in which the chain of events here could be broken by the crew. They were not. Sad, so sad.

[vanHorck]

Dutchess driver

I ve just attempted to open a thread for the flight instructors/CFI/examiners on this moral subject so that they may discuss amongst themselves these external factors.

We here as you rightly say, should concentrate on using the authorities that belong to the P1 in executing his responsibilities

[G-SPOTs Lost]

Its a very great shame, the elephant in the room is the previous behaviour of this outfit. From the dispatching of aircraft without cowlings, bankruptcy, grounding by the CAA for non compliance (same management before anybody shouts) wheels up landings generally shoddy aircraft, some would say the only way reason this outfit made any money was the fact that they were the only club on the field that had a bar.

There is no smoke without fire, sadly I fear that the coroner will not look at the past behaviour simply quote the ANO as other have done in this thread and hang this poor lad out to dry.

Ask anybody at Blackpool which outfit this was most likely to happen to and I would suggest the answers would be common throughout. In this case the loveable rogues or the outfit everybody loved to hate that would never say die were responsible morally for this tragedy.

Good luck with the inquest, I hope it goes some way to giving some closure.

[Duchess_Driver]

VH

With respect, I know a lot of instructors read the Private Flying Forum and most are 'private flyers' as well as professional pilots.

There is much to learn form this tragedy and I believe that for a balanced discussion the two sides of this arguement are inseparable and contributors from all walks of 'aviation' should be encouraged.

Where does the moral obligation stop? Does it stop with the CFI, or the Senior instructor, or the junior instructor or ops desk clerk? The Fireman perhaps...Air Traffic....or the PPL who just drives into the carpark as the overloaded aeroplane starts taxiing. We all have an obligation to raise our concerns - but what the P1 does about that is his decision. Again, strength of character on all parts.

[Supersport]

I've said my piece here, and shall not do so again. I'm sorry to see the cognoscenti here so keen to blame an inexperienced and arguably impressionable pilot, with considerable favour at stake, and motivated by the advice and clear intent of someone he regarded as 'superior', for his own demise, when that demise, in the circumstances, was so far outside his own making.

Rubbish, utter rubbish. This tragic story can be summed up pretty easily really, both from common knowledge at Blackpool, the AAIB Report & from reading this thread:

1> CFI shouldn't have asked him / them to go, due to weather and knowledge of licence currency issues.

2> Mr Walker should not have agreed to go, CFI shouldn't have encouraged the flight to go ahead.

3> Aircraft should have been refuelled for return leg, wasn't due to reasons unknown, possibly financial.

4> Aircraft crashed due to weather conditions / lack of fuel / lack of adequate navigation equipment, poor decision making on behalf of the P1 / P2.

5> CFI that encouraged the flight, over the passed decade or so p*ssed off a lot of people / organisations resident at Blackpool Airport, p*ssed off a lot of other people / organisations elsewhere around the country, p*ssed off the CAA. The reasons why these people / organisations are p*ssed off, is most probably justified.

6> Due to nature of the accident and the circumstances in which the flight went ahead, perfect opportunity to nail the CFI to the wall to rid the system of them forever. The AAIB have already determined the causes of the accident, they didn't leave anything aviation related out, they did their job.

To me, it is obvious, and others posting on this thread have already started see this with a similar perspective to me, something doesn't add up, to me it seems that these certain p*ssed off individuals with a score to settle may have stirred the pot to aggrivate an already extremely raw wound and are avidly awaiting the outcome. Witch hunt indeed.

Edit: G-Spot hit the nail on the head.

[vanHorck]

G spot's loss

the elephant in the room is the previous behaviour of this outfit.

Sorry i m not a native speaker. What does this sentence mean?

[VFE]

Duchess Driver,

It appears you may have misunderstood my posting as you seem to be singing from the same hymn sheet as me. My hope is that something comes from this inquest that will make FTO's more culpable in a case whereby an experienced instructor in a position of authority can give his blessing and encouragement to dangerous flying (it is my understanding that weather for take off was below VFR minima) to those pilots registered as flying club members at the FTO where he is employed. If this is indeed the case here then the CFI should've known better but the lads who went obviously didn't. If he didn't know any better then he should not be in the position he was. Either way there should be some accountability. If the letter of the law does not necessarily back this up at present I hope it will change. Doubtful but hopeful. It should never get to a stage whereby ops staff have to refuse the keys.

VFE.

[stickandrudderman]

It seems to me, and my knowledge is limited to what I've read here, that P1 is P1 is in command has ultimate authority accepts responsibility etc etc....
However, in criminal law there are various offences for incitement.

Am I wrong in thinking then that a possible outcome is that Mr Walker will be deemed responsible for his actions, but those who influenced his decision making might rightly be held accountable in the same way that one can be prosecuted for incitement to (insert your own description)?

If so it doesn't sound unreasonable to me.

[172driver]

Been reading this thread with interest, but, not being even remotely familiar with Blackpool, have so far not felt it right to post.

However, this is getting a bit galling, where some posters here clamour for some sort of legal responsibility of the dispatcher (CFI, ops desk, whatever you wish to call it).

Sorry guys - which part of Pilot In Command don't you understand

Not wanting to condone this CFIs behaviour (he has to live with his conscience), but this whole scenario is, to my mind, utter madness.

If someone who is out of currency, has no IR, even attempts to start a P28-140 with 4 adults to launch into a 200ft overcast, he/she is either mad or not fit to hold a pilot's license. Del mortuis nihil nisi bene, I know, but this simply beggars belief. The buck stops somewhere - and this somewhere is called PIC.

I'm sure he was under all sort of pressure/persuasion/whatever. But would you jump off a tall building just because someone told you it was safe? Probably not, because you know about gravity. One could come up with many more analogies.....

A sad loss of life, for sure, but I'm not so convinced there's much to learn here - the blatant disregard for safety and common sense by all involved is simply off the scale.

It is ultimately the PIC who has to say STOP if a situation like this develops. Unfortunately he didn't.

RIP

[Duchess_Driver]

Perhaps we sing from the same book, maybe not the same song.

It should always be that Ops staff refuse the keys if the flight is not legal, and good clubs will do this. Morally so. My problem with your argument (and that of others) is the definition of where your FTO/RTF/Club stops being responsible. This wasn't a training flight after all. I'm touring in France and five days into the trip I float too far and, landing long, run through the fence at the end of the strip. My FTO is responsible because I didn't make the decision to go around? Nah.....

Let's say, for arguments sake, this was a syndicate aircraft not controlled by a 'Duly Authorised' or 'booking out' process? Who is responsible for go/no-go decisions then? The Group Trustee on holiday in sunny Florida? Nope, P1 all the time.

What cannot change is the ultimate decision to proceed into IMC when the aeroplane is not equipped, the crew is not current or competant and overweight or where there is insufficient fuel rests with the P1.

[Islander2]

It is ultimately the PIC who has to say STOP if a situation like this develops. Unfortunately he didn't.

I see nothing in the AAIB report that convinces me that Andrew Walker thought he was PIC.

1. He hadn't flown for more than three months, and had only flown 3hr 45mins in the last thirteen months. He had planned that day to fly with the club as P/UT carrying out refresher training when the CFI asked him instead to fly to Exeter. He correctly responded that he was unqualified to undertake that flight, but was told by the CFI he would be accompanied by a more experienced pilot. We are not told who signed the aeroplane out, and the AAIB were unable to establish whether Mr Walker knew that the accompanying pilot was not an instructor ... but I could well believe that he considered this to be an alternative sortie for his refresher training.

2. The only evidence the AAIB advance for considering him to be PIC is: "The relatively inexperienced pilot was paying for the fuel for the two flights, the purpose of which was for him to build up his flight hours. He was seated in the left seat and he was almost certainly handling the controls throughout the accident flight. Thus he should be considered the pilot-in-command ...." Well sorry, AAIB, but that rationale is nonsense ... on that basis every student pilot would be PIC on every flight!

3. We are being asked to believe that a young pilot sufficiently committed to be working towards an ATPL carried out this flight believing he was PIC whilst showing no evidence whatsoever of command decision making - the accompanying pilot appears alone (or in conjunction with others but not Mr Walker) to have decided on fuel (and therefore W&B) at both Blackpool and Exeter. We are also asked to believe that, despite demonstrating he was conscientious about his lack of currency, and with 1.3 hours of total instrument flying experience, he took off from Blackpool into a 200 ft overcast on the outward journey, and departed Exeter on the return flight knowing he would arrive in poor weather and fading daylight, all whilst believing he was PIC.

A tragic and entirely avoidable accident - certainly. But we may never know whether Andrew Walker believed he was the pilot in command and was therefore guilty of causing the accident through his poor decision making. Or whether, as seems at least as likely to me, he was merely guilty of not establishing that his assumed P/UT status was factual. If the latter, his 'offence' is one that is regularly repeated around the country by pilots, student and qualified, when undertaking training flights.

[ShyTorque]

Having read the accident report, I sadly think it was a case of not so much a case of "would" an accident occur, but WHEN?

I once watched an overloaded PA28 (4 POB plus too much fuel) fail to take off/climb and finish up in a farmer's field, fortunately with no loss of life.

Someone asked "Who was flying that?"

The best answer? "Looks like nobody was"!

[long final]

Shy Torque, Islander,

I think you both sum up well. I dont think either of them were aware who was P1 that day. Sadly, unless there is complete honesty from the club we will probably never know.

[Lurking123]

There has already been a regulation 6 hearing in connection with this case.

I don't think many people have picked-up on this. My understanding of a Regulation 6 is that someone is appealing against a regulatory course of action that the Authority has already taken. Therefore, regardless of this thread, it appears to me that the CAA have taken action against an individual or set of individuals for failing to comply with the terms of their license or, in the wider sense, the ANO. They obviously feel that the events of the day were not solely orchestrated by the two deceased pilots.

[DFC]

There is no doubt that the PIC has final responsiblity for the safety of a flight.

However, every other human element in the system also have certain responsibilities.

Incident and accident investigations are supposed to establish the facts and lead us towards a position where the probability of such an incident / accident happening again are reduced.

The PIC is this case is not going to have the chance to make decisions that kill others as well as themselves again.

However, the peole who had operational control of the flights are still round. One should not seek to simply blame people for tragic outcomes but should seek to ensure that they receive further training, testing and if necessary sanction to ensure that they do not contribute to another incident / accident.

To fail to do so would be to simply say that encouraging another PIC to make the same error is acceptable. - Is it?

Regards,

DFC

[VFE]

Point taken Duchess Driver. Those sort of scenarios should and will always fall down to the PIC. One thing that hasn't been mentioned is that with a cloud base of 200ft might ATC have said something too?

VFE.

[long final]

VFE,

Interesting point. I guess with the equipment the aircraft had, the flight must have been booked out as VFR. Would any ATC'ers care to add thier opinion?

LF

[S-Works]

There are lots of external factors here that with the gift of hindsight need looking at to help prevent a similar situation from an operational perspective.

But it still stands that the accident flight was the responsibility of the crew. They had the option to refuel in Exeter and the option to divert many times on the way back. They chose to push on and died. That part is simple enough to ascertain.

Alluding to who might have been PIC on the way back is a waster of time. Andrew Walker should have clearly established the operating status of the other guy if he believed the flight to be Instructional but it still did not change the fact that between them as crew they had plenty of opportunity to avoid the circumstances that cost them their lives. Or are we now trying to say the the other guy who died was PIC and shift the blame? As far as I see it they were both to blame and paid the ultimate price.