Blackpool 3/2/07
I have flown into Blackpool - only once, admittedly. The controllers and ground staff all made a good first impression on me (belated thank you, guys) and I will happily fly in again.
Perhaps they reserve the banter for their regulars.
Perhaps they reserve the banter for their regulars.
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Certainly the 2 on board made mistakes, planning and judgement were non existant and they have paid a high price, they are not in a position to answer any flak that we throw at them on this forum.
Controllers remarks maybe judged as flippant/unhelpful, but I would bet none of us would wish to swap seats with him on that dreadful night.
The actions of others will be examined at the inquest, points that are touched on in the aaib report (such as maint records for the aircraft, judgement of experienced instructors/examiners, who actually owned the aircraft, whether the flight was conducted in or outside of the FTO's remit etc etc ), indeed some of these issues have already been scrutinised by the CAA.
I instruct at Blackpool, I know the background to the whole sorry saga well, but have no axe to grind with any of the parties involved, however it bothers me when I see no soul searching, no lessons learned, and opportunity for this all to occur again...
Controllers remarks maybe judged as flippant/unhelpful, but I would bet none of us would wish to swap seats with him on that dreadful night.
The actions of others will be examined at the inquest, points that are touched on in the aaib report (such as maint records for the aircraft, judgement of experienced instructors/examiners, who actually owned the aircraft, whether the flight was conducted in or outside of the FTO's remit etc etc ), indeed some of these issues have already been scrutinised by the CAA.
I instruct at Blackpool, I know the background to the whole sorry saga well, but have no axe to grind with any of the parties involved, however it bothers me when I see no soul searching, no lessons learned, and opportunity for this all to occur again...
Last edited by horsebox; 17th Apr 2008 at 20:11.
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Hear hear. It is not for us 'outsiders' to judge as most of us do not have access to all the info. However, there is a very long list of lessons that we should learn.
I also wonder how many PPLs tune into either the airfield ATIS or appropriate VOLMET (although Blackpool itself isn't on VOLMET) whilst en-route. Did these chaps? I guess we will never know.
I also wonder how many PPLs tune into either the airfield ATIS or appropriate VOLMET (although Blackpool itself isn't on VOLMET) whilst en-route. Did these chaps? I guess we will never know.
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I also wonder how many PPLs tune into either the airfield ATIS or appropriate VOLMET (although Blackpool itself isn't on VOLMET) whilst en-route.
I believe on the day in question it was only fogged in on the west coast as far south as Liverpool and maybe down the Dee towards Hawarden, 30-40nm South of Blackpool, plenty of possible alternates from that area with that range, hindsight again I know.
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I'm still keen to hear what evidence, other than the testimony of the CFI, exists to demonstrate that Mr Walker was aware that he was in command.
Would you get into the left hand seat of an aircraft without verifying the circumstances of the flight?
If I were in the position of the "CFI", I would be a great deal happier if I had evidence that supported my account that a pilot who had once refused to make a particular flight as P1, had subsequently changed his mind and agreed to make the flight which was, at least with hindsight, patently illegal.
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The AAIB report is mainly there for us to learn from and we should do this. I have no idea if the coroner's report will be a public record, if so, i hope someone will post it here, also for us to learn from.
I am assuming the AAIB concentrates on the aviation aspects and the coroner may have a different view as he is more "mainstream" in his evaluation.
The two combined may well end up teaching us all a good lesson on both the responsibilities of being PIC (including what decides whether you are P1 or not) as well as the effects and consequences of outside influence.
If the coroner is able to engulf himself sufficiently in the GA aviation and it does not become a "rogue" verdict, at least Mr Walkers death will have served some purpose in making flying a little safer and this may help the closure for his family and friends.
I am assuming the AAIB concentrates on the aviation aspects and the coroner may have a different view as he is more "mainstream" in his evaluation.
The two combined may well end up teaching us all a good lesson on both the responsibilities of being PIC (including what decides whether you are P1 or not) as well as the effects and consequences of outside influence.
If the coroner is able to engulf himself sufficiently in the GA aviation and it does not become a "rogue" verdict, at least Mr Walkers death will have served some purpose in making flying a little safer and this may help the closure for his family and friends.
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There certainly is one controller at Blackpool who can be, IMO, very unprofessional at times. I have felt on several occasions that the PPL who has just had a right royal bollocking over the radio must be feeling very stressed by the experience. Not good practice.
Never had any problem with any other controllers at BPL though, all very helpful.
Never had any problem with any other controllers at BPL though, all very helpful.
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So long final, have you done anything about it or is this forum the first time you have brought the subject up? I ask because it is exactly the scenario you quote that should be reported and followed through. An awful lot of money is spent on training aviation professionals about human factors. If someone isn't applying that training, then they need guidance. It is all well and good for us (and I include myself) to whinge on proone but it doesn't address the problem.
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LURKING 123...."Quote..I also wonder how many PPLs tune into either the airfield ATIS or appropriate VOLMET (although Blackpool itself isn't on VOLMET) whilst en-route. Did these chaps? I guess we will never know.
As a serving Area FISO (Scottish) I feel that using the AFIS in this instant would have been too late.....a quick call to London Information would have given the full weather picture at destination and an early diversion could have been made.....We guys sit there awaiting the call, the service is free so please guys use it!!! one day it could save your life!!
As a serving Area FISO (Scottish) I feel that using the AFIS in this instant would have been too late.....a quick call to London Information would have given the full weather picture at destination and an early diversion could have been made.....We guys sit there awaiting the call, the service is free so please guys use it!!! one day it could save your life!!
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"Training aviation professionals about Human Factors".
Now there's a novel concept.
The regulatory authorities preach at us ad nauseam about open reporting within a no-blame culture in order that data can be fed into the human factors melting pot so that lessons can be learned and similar mistakes avoided.
I regret that my personal experience has been that, as soon as those who suffer with power-pi**ed small-man syndrome get a whisper of a mistake they immediately start hunting for breaches of regulations and set out to 'hang' the 'offender', punishing him with totally disproportionate fines and/or loss of licence.
This develops mistrust of the regulator and a tendency for individuals to try to hide errors, which has the totally opposite effect that the system was designed to create.
I'm not suggesting that blatantly malicious or reckless negligence should go unpunished - of course the offence should receive an appropriate penalty - but genuine human errors caused by factors that the system is supposed to identify and prevent should be treated with proportional response, not an over the top lust for punitive action.
I'll fetch me coat....................gone!!!
Now there's a novel concept.
The regulatory authorities preach at us ad nauseam about open reporting within a no-blame culture in order that data can be fed into the human factors melting pot so that lessons can be learned and similar mistakes avoided.
I regret that my personal experience has been that, as soon as those who suffer with power-pi**ed small-man syndrome get a whisper of a mistake they immediately start hunting for breaches of regulations and set out to 'hang' the 'offender', punishing him with totally disproportionate fines and/or loss of licence.
This develops mistrust of the regulator and a tendency for individuals to try to hide errors, which has the totally opposite effect that the system was designed to create.
I'm not suggesting that blatantly malicious or reckless negligence should go unpunished - of course the offence should receive an appropriate penalty - but genuine human errors caused by factors that the system is supposed to identify and prevent should be treated with proportional response, not an over the top lust for punitive action.
I'll fetch me coat....................gone!!!
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From what I know, the CAA have already intimated that this accident will become a text book example used in future training material.
For those reading who are instructors - you may have noticed the latest instructor newsletter from the uk Chief Flight Examiner - Patrick Lander - he states that pre flight planning (including wx and fuel etc) will be an area for close scrutiny during instructor/examiner testing in the coming year. It is no coincidence that he picks this subject after a dreadful and needless accident like this.
As the moderator says early in this thread - alot is not being said, and given the pending coroners court, this is wise. Suffice to say there is alot of anger and disgust over this accident within the aviation community at Blackpool, and as more information comes into the public domain, people will begin to understand why.
For those reading who are instructors - you may have noticed the latest instructor newsletter from the uk Chief Flight Examiner - Patrick Lander - he states that pre flight planning (including wx and fuel etc) will be an area for close scrutiny during instructor/examiner testing in the coming year. It is no coincidence that he picks this subject after a dreadful and needless accident like this.
As the moderator says early in this thread - alot is not being said, and given the pending coroners court, this is wise. Suffice to say there is alot of anger and disgust over this accident within the aviation community at Blackpool, and as more information comes into the public domain, people will begin to understand why.
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Second fisbangs comment about London INFORMATION.....
Give them a quick call and ask for Wx at EGXX. Works all the time and thanks guys (and gals!) Not looking clever then re-plan early.
Lots of lessons here - just a shame it takes these circumstances to get us all talking about them.
Give them a quick call and ask for Wx at EGXX. Works all the time and thanks guys (and gals!) Not looking clever then re-plan early.
Lots of lessons here - just a shame it takes these circumstances to get us all talking about them.
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As the moderator says early in this thread - alot is not being said, and given the pending coroners court, this is wise. Suffice to say there is alot of anger and disgust over this accident within the aviation community at Blackpool, and as more information comes into the public domain, people will begin to understand why.
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I thought you were a great deal more intelligent than that remark would suggest, bose.
A very great deal.
I also get the strong feeling that you're not aware of much of the information which is at the heart of this matter...
A very great deal.
I also get the strong feeling that you're not aware of much of the information which is at the heart of this matter...
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Thats exactly my point. All this 'secret' information being alluded to and not talked about. The AIB report was pretty clear on the situation. An intelligent person reading the report and being a pilot can understand that they had the opportunity to divert. They crew showed poor airmanship.
Now if you want to come out provide evidence that they were FORCED into breaking the rules. Making an illegal flight and not making good command decisions then I am sorry but my view stands.
I have no doubt that there was a lot of peer pressure went on, young guy keen to be a commercial pilot, CFI tells him it will all be OK, even arranges for a 'more experienced' pilot to come along to bolster his confidence so thinks it all must be OK because the CFI says so. Off they go, outbound leg is illegal even though with the CFI on board 3 circuits and it would have been legal. They get to Exeter, the first aircraft departs and 'get home itus' kicks in. Marginal weather is known to exist at destination but they still go. Enroute they know weather is marginal but still they carry on. They get to destination weather is crap so they try and let down over the sea because they are unable to do an approach. Controller makes a crass comment. They crash into the sea and die.
All I see as an impartial 3rd party with no emotional involvement is a whole number of poor crew decisions that lead to the incident pit. Poor crew decisions that start with a QUALIFIED pilot not sticking to his guns and saying no, continues with TWO crew, one of whom allegedly very experienced who perform poor pre flight planning and continue onwards with poor inflight management that ultimately leads to their death.
All I see here is a witch hunt, presumably against the CFI who said they should go and some aspect towards the controller that made the crass comments but still a witch hunt. What I do not see is evidence of a gun being pointed at the pilots head to make him go.
If you know different then I am perfectly happy to look at the evidence and reevaluate my position.
I am sorry if I sound harsh, but I have no emotional involvement in this and look at the situation with a dispassionate eye and with a view to learning from others unfortunate mistakes.
If I were in the same situation I would have said no right at the point where I knew the first leg of the flight would have been illegal.
Now if you want to come out provide evidence that they were FORCED into breaking the rules. Making an illegal flight and not making good command decisions then I am sorry but my view stands.
I have no doubt that there was a lot of peer pressure went on, young guy keen to be a commercial pilot, CFI tells him it will all be OK, even arranges for a 'more experienced' pilot to come along to bolster his confidence so thinks it all must be OK because the CFI says so. Off they go, outbound leg is illegal even though with the CFI on board 3 circuits and it would have been legal. They get to Exeter, the first aircraft departs and 'get home itus' kicks in. Marginal weather is known to exist at destination but they still go. Enroute they know weather is marginal but still they carry on. They get to destination weather is crap so they try and let down over the sea because they are unable to do an approach. Controller makes a crass comment. They crash into the sea and die.
All I see as an impartial 3rd party with no emotional involvement is a whole number of poor crew decisions that lead to the incident pit. Poor crew decisions that start with a QUALIFIED pilot not sticking to his guns and saying no, continues with TWO crew, one of whom allegedly very experienced who perform poor pre flight planning and continue onwards with poor inflight management that ultimately leads to their death.
All I see here is a witch hunt, presumably against the CFI who said they should go and some aspect towards the controller that made the crass comments but still a witch hunt. What I do not see is evidence of a gun being pointed at the pilots head to make him go.
If you know different then I am perfectly happy to look at the evidence and reevaluate my position.
I am sorry if I sound harsh, but I have no emotional involvement in this and look at the situation with a dispassionate eye and with a view to learning from others unfortunate mistakes.
If I were in the same situation I would have said no right at the point where I knew the first leg of the flight would have been illegal.
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Technically, of course Bose-X is right.
But I do wonder at the CFI who thinks it right to encourage a low hour, out of currency, PPL to take off into IMC with 4 adults and full fuel loaded into a PA28 140 - with almost no functioning nav. equipment. Surely he must have signed him out for the flight, so there is no question of ignorance on his part?
At best, it begs the question "what was he thinking?". At worst, what he was thinking was very bad indeed.
Of course it is right to say that, as PIC, you need to make the decisions and the buck stops with you. In this sort of instance, common sense and humanity should dictate a different outcome from the outset.
But I do wonder at the CFI who thinks it right to encourage a low hour, out of currency, PPL to take off into IMC with 4 adults and full fuel loaded into a PA28 140 - with almost no functioning nav. equipment. Surely he must have signed him out for the flight, so there is no question of ignorance on his part?
At best, it begs the question "what was he thinking?". At worst, what he was thinking was very bad indeed.
Of course it is right to say that, as PIC, you need to make the decisions and the buck stops with you. In this sort of instance, common sense and humanity should dictate a different outcome from the outset.
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An important issue to be looked at is not the PIC. It is operational control.
Who had operational control over the days operations - the ferry flight to deliver pilots and the subsequent flights - both of the accident flight and of the other flight.
Everyone debating this accident should read the report into the Citation that ended up on the motorway at Southampton some years back.
The major issue in that was not who was the handling pilot it was not who was pilot in command - it was the person who effectively had operational control and their (knowing or unknowing) application of peer (junior to senior pilot but opposite in management terms) pressure............without having to utter a word.
If you know you are going to be rewarded for doing something or if you know that you are going to loose out by not doing something then there is a lot of pressure on you to do whatever that is. The person who delivers the reward or not as the case may be has effective control (operational control) of the situation............as soon as they make the prize available.
Regards,
DFC
Who had operational control over the days operations - the ferry flight to deliver pilots and the subsequent flights - both of the accident flight and of the other flight.
Everyone debating this accident should read the report into the Citation that ended up on the motorway at Southampton some years back.
The major issue in that was not who was the handling pilot it was not who was pilot in command - it was the person who effectively had operational control and their (knowing or unknowing) application of peer (junior to senior pilot but opposite in management terms) pressure............without having to utter a word.
If you know you are going to be rewarded for doing something or if you know that you are going to loose out by not doing something then there is a lot of pressure on you to do whatever that is. The person who delivers the reward or not as the case may be has effective control (operational control) of the situation............as soon as they make the prize available.
Regards,
DFC