Blackpool 3/2/07

[Rightbase]

You can't have it both ways.

I am a comparatively low hour PPL. My licence is indeed a licence to learn, and I am keen to do so (and to stay alive). One of my major learning resources is the advice I get from more experienced pilots.

I will often ask for, and take advice. I believe I am responsibly discharging my PIC responsibilities by doing so. I will not fly against advice, and when the advice is the other way, I will fly with an instructor as P1. It is on such occasions that I explore my personal envelope, and develop a real respect for conditions near my personal minima.

So without in any way diluting my responsibility for my own flights, I do rely on advice from more experienced pilots to inform my decisions. It would be misleading to refer to such a process as peer pressure.

I am lucky to fly with a club that does not cut corners, and would not allow me to fly outside legal or club currency requirements. There is also a clear written ops records of who is P1 - at least on departure.

But the serious issue raised by this episode is not about legality. It is about other aspects of airmanship. And yes - if I am P1, I make the decisions, and I alone am answerable for them. But the way I make them is more complex, and can involve decisions about who I trust and respect.

[mm_flynn]

Originally Posted by bose-x

I have no doubt that there was a lot of peer pressure went on, young guy keen to be a commercial pilot, CFI tells him it will all be OK, even arranges for a 'more experienced' pilot to come along to bolster his confidence so thinks it all must be OK because the CFI says so. Off they go, outbound leg is illegal even though with the CFI on board 3 circuits and it would have been legal.

The lack of currency for carrying passengers is probably the least material illegality. You would need to be a sky god to do '3 quick VFR circuits' on a day that from the report seems to have been R28/0400 BKN002.

Having your CFI not comment about decision making (and ride in the plane with you!) when taking off into weather that is unambiguously illegal for a PPL to operate in, is forecast to remain so for the rest of the day, and to do so in a clearly over gross aircraft, with no equipment that would allow you to get back in (i.e. ILS), and 1.3 hours of IMC time is bizarre.

[gooneydog]

Perhaps the "desperation" of the CFI to get "multi time" in the Aztec was a factor in turning a blind eye to the weather at take off However would YOU sit in the rear of a totally VFR Cherrytree in obvious IMC KNOWING the pic was illegal and the "safety pilot" had no licence ? Also Did the PIC KNOW his safety pilot had no licence and that he was PIC by default?

[Ken Wells]

Actually I do.

Yes there can be only one commander at any one time. However I suspect the more senior might find themselves culpable if they did not assume control when faced with a breach of the law.

The disgnated PI is responsible.

Expereinced passengers are not.

I have flown with ATPL's that could not solo a Cessna 172. Experience on type is can be more valid than total flying experience.

I think those trying to blame the non designated P1 miss the point.

[frontlefthamster]

On the contrary Ken, I think you miss the point, as you are unaware of much of the relevant information. Those of us who are aware of it are very hopeful that the Coroner will ensure it's all heard, and will make appropriate recommendations as a result. This is not a matter of the 'designated P1' on board the aircraft being in doubt or under scrutiny.

Horsebox's remarks in his final paragraph above are worth taking to heart, for those of you who are not intimately acquainted with the evidence, one way or another, yet wish to stand forward with your opinions.

[Contacttower]

Originally Posted by horsebox

As the moderator says early in this thread - alot is not being said, and given the pending coroners court, this is wise. Suffice to say there is alot of anger and disgust over this accident within the aviation community at Blackpool, and as more information comes into the public domain, people will begin to understand why.

Originally Posted by frontlefthamster

Horsebox's remarks in his final paragraph above are worth taking to heart, for those of you who are not intimately acquainted with the evidence, one way or another, yet wish to stand forward with your opinions.

We had a long debate when the AAIB report first came out and for those (like myself) who don't know any more than what was in the report there doesn't seem to be much more to be said on the subject.

Hopefully the information alluded to by the above posters will come to light at some point, but if they don't think it appropriate to post it yet then we just have to be patient I think.

[horsebox]

There has already been a regulation 6 hearing in connection with this case. For those who are unfamiliar with reg 6 of the ANO it is the mechanism that an individual can use to challenge a CAA decision to remove/revoke licences and ratings from a pilot.

I understand discussions on this crash from a thread on the flyer forum were submitted as part of a "defence" case.

Like I have said the P1 aspect is well debated and discussed, I agree with many of the posts, including Bose x, they cocked up, they paid heavily. I maintain that there is alot still to be learned from this crash. Patience is needed.

[maxdrypower]

I too agree with Bose , he has it spot on . It is an horredous tragedy and I feel greatly for the family . It is due to this widely held emotion that most people refuse to say exactly how it is . Bose X has said it with the caveat that he is a dispassionate and neutral outsider looking in. What he says makes sense . It is a crying shame what happended but it happened for many varying H,P and L factors , but unfortunately with no gun present in the cockpit the decision to go and decision to continue was made by two people and not three or four as intimated . The CFI did not force anyone to go , the crass controller did not force anyone to go , and Im pretty sure neither of the pilots forced the other into anything . What I can not believe is that either pilot did not talk at length with other and the decision to carry on would have been made in concert and not as a unilateral decision. I think common sense has to prevail with the P1 situation , the flight was being made by the younger and the lesser experienced pilot , the other pilot went as "back up" if you will. I cannot believe that either of the pilots just sat there and allowed the other to fly the aircraft into the sea. I would like to think that the Cross Cockpit authority gradient was a thing of the past .It is covered in detail in both PPL and ATPL syllabuses .
The other factor to consider is if the wx was as stated in the above post as 28 bkn 200 then (I dont have the plates to hand) but this would have been a go around for an Ir pilot or IMC let alone a PPL .
If the CFI in question is to be held accountable for for this then as a CFI would you sign out a PPL for solo hire of the aircraft for a flight knowing that if he decided to make a bad decision on his return that you would be held accountable ????? I personally would find it very hard to sign people off for even a qual x country .
Holding a PPL assumes that a person has the training , knowledge and decsion making ability to decide what is and isnt safe . This return flight was clearly never going to be safe , the wx and condition of the aircraft were there for both pilot to see .I fail to see how the end result can be the respoinsibilty of someone 200 odd miles away , who even if consulted may well have said well heres the wx make your own mind up .
May they RIP

[wsmempson]

MDP, I so agree with the sentiment of what you are saying - once you are PIC, the buck stops there. If you make a series of errors, it's your fault, not anyone else's. In fact, in today's litigeous world, it does irritate me to read of people trying to fix the liability for their mistakes upon innocent third parties.

And yet, and yet, there is more to this particular tale than that, as there is another dimension which does need more discussion and investigation; according to the aaib report, the young pilot concerned was contacted by the CFI who offered him the opportunity to act as PIC on this flight flight, in order to give the pilots of the twin a lift down to Exeter, with the benefit of a more experienced pilot sitting P2. He would pay only the price of the fuel to so do.

That CFI must have had chapter and verse on the W&B limitations of a PA28 140; anyone who has owned one knows that 4 adults plus fuel - even to tabs (128l therefore 3hrs flying time, plus diversion) - will result in an aircraft which is out of W&B and CofG by quite some margin. You don't need to work the detailed calculations - you know that it won't work - period.

Whatever the reasons, that flight should not have taken off for three reasons that were well known to the CFI;

1. W&B
2. Currency
3. The aircraft was not equipped for the prevailing IMC conditions

I can't think of a flying club that I have flown from where a renter would have been allowed to depart under these circumstances, so I'd love to hear what the coroners court has to say as why this flight, this club and this CFI was so different.

[vanHorck]

On the return trip the plane was not suitable for the IMC condition. This is critical. Was the P1 aware of this? Did he check his instruments on departure (of flight one and/or two). Was this perhaps discussed with/by the passengers who were to fly the twin?

W&B did not play a part on the return fatal trip. It is only there to show how curious it was that the first flight took place at all.

Currency of P1 made the flight(s) illegal but not necessarily lethal.

So the return trip which was the fatal one is the flight to look at.

I too am curious as to what outside factors were so forceful that they should override the P1's responsibilities and more important the P1's authority which prevented him from taking a no-go decision.

[S-Works]

That CFI must have had chapter and verse on the W&B limitations of a PA28 140; anyone who has owned one knows that 4 adults plus fuel - even to tabs (128l therefore 3hrs flying time, plus diversion) - will result in an aircraft which is out of W&B and CofG by quite some margin. You don't need to work the detailed calculations - you know that it won't work - period.

Whatever the reasons, that flight should not have taken off for three reasons that were well known to the CFI;

1. W&B
2. Currency
3. The aircraft was not equipped for the prevailing IMC conditions

Apart from point 3 everything else you have pointed out is irrelevant. The accident occurred on the flight home which was inside W&B. Currency, well the outbound flight would have covered currency if not legality with regards to the number of take of and landing.

The final point is the valid one, the aircraft was not equipped for IMC conditions yet the crew chose to take off and fly back knowing the conditions. They chose not to divert at anytime on the return despite having a number of FULLY VFR options to choose from.

I agree with vanHorck, I can't see any outside factors that applied to the accident flight other than crew error as a result of pushing on when a correct command decision would have been to divert.

But as I have said, I am open minded and happy to see direct evidence that that the crew were coerced into the flight to such a level that they were prepared to risk and ultimately pay with their lives.

[wsmempson]

"That CFI must have had chapter and verse on the W&B limitations of a PA28 140; anyone who has owned one knows that 4 adults plus fuel - even to tabs (128l therefore 3hrs flying time, plus diversion) - will result in an aircraft which is out of W&B and CofG by quite some margin. You don't need to work the detailed calculations - you know that it won't work - period.

Whatever the reasons, that flight should not have taken off for three reasons that were well known to the CFI;

1. W&B
2. Currency
3. The aircraft was not equipped for the prevailing IMC conditions

Apart from point 3 everything else you have pointed out is irrelevant. The accident occurred on the flight home which was inside W&B. Currency, well the outbound flight would have covered currency if not legality with regards to the number of take of and landing."

Thanks BoseX

But if you read my post again, you'll see that I say "that flight should not have taken off for three reasons". I refer to the 1st flight on these points and both of these points were properly the concern of the CFI concerned; the third was the responsibilty of the PIC, it was also the responsability of the CFI to only authorise a VFR flight; these are the conditions according to the AAIB report.

"The arcraft took off from Runway 252 at 225 hrs and,
on climbing through 200 ft to 300 ft, entered cloud. At
around ,000 ft aal, the arcraft came out on top and
continued to climb to its cruise altitude. The flight
contnued above a sold overcast layer of cloud untl
the arcraft was south of the Lverpool area, where t
was clear. The weather conditions were clear for the
remainder of the flight and an uneventful landing was
made at Exeter at 1431 hrs."


I agree that the 1st two points, paradoxically, weren't involved in the accident itself - other than tangentially.

For instance, if the pilot had followed the rules - which the CFI should have enforced - the accident would not have happende at all as the flight would not have taken place.

If the aircraft had not departed fuelled to the gunwales (by the CFI before the pilot arrived), then the pilot would have had to have refuelled at the end of the 1st leg, and probably would have had sufficient fuel for the second leg, plus the diversion that was ultimately necessary.

As ever, I suspect that there are multiple layers of swiss cheese involved here and, unluckily for the two people who died, the holes all lined up.

It just does seem to me as if, when the pilot concerned was presented with these figurative 'slices of cheese' at the start of the flight, it must have been blindingly obvious to an experienced hand like the CFI that this was a very bad idea indeed - even if the young pilot concerned couldn't see it. It doesn't sound as if I'm alone in this view.

[S-Works]

It just does seem to me as if, when the pilot concerned was presented with these figurative 'slices of cheese' at the start of the flight, it must have been blindingly obvious to an experienced hand like the CFI that this was a very bad idea indeed - even if the young pilot concerned couldn't see it. It doesn't sound as if I'm alone in this view.

I don't disagree with you at all. However the comments about the outbound flight are still irrelevant as it was nothing to do with the accident flight. There is a major difference between the morality of the CFI's actions by encouraging the flight. But there still has been no evidence that the return flight was outside the control of the crew.

There is way to much emotion and moral indignation being applied to this. Too many people emotionally raw trying to apportion blame.

The fact still stands that the crew were responsible for the flight and did not make the right decisions. The AIB report indicates the same conclusions. The ethical issues around other parties behavior does not change the facts.

[vanHorck]

WS you seem to suggest that if the first flight had not taken place then they would not have crashed....

But this is condoning get-home-itis. Avoiding get-home-itis is just as much part of a P1's responsibility as all other responsibilities

Whilst it can be more than useful for all of us to know what happened before and during the first flight, in reality terms this flight has little or nothing to do with the second one, other than explaining they were away from home and wanted to get home so much they died due to get-home-itis...

Just like the weather can be a killer, ESPECIALLY flying into it without the necessary equipment, get-home-itis is a killer too.

I dislike this idea that both flights are linked. Any pilot should always look at every flight as an individual one, simply because whenever you are on the ground you have the opportunity to re-check your decisions.

[modelman]

Fuel

For the return flight,the P1 only made one mistake (leaving aside all the legal/currency stuff)-he did not depart with enough fuel,not really a 'pilot' type error,just plain common sense and all further decisions seemed predicated on this.Even if the wx at Blackpool was cavok,he seemed to have very little reserve for diversion.
With only 2 POB,I can't understand why the a/c wasn't refuelled to the top.I wonder as he was paying for the fuel,cost was a factor.
Very sad event.
MM

[frontlefthamster]

bose, I don't intend to get dragged into a detailed discussion here, but I do wish to respond to some of your points:

There is a major difference between the morality of the CFI's actions by encouraging the flight. But there still has been no evidence that the return flight was outside the control of the crew.

This does not make sense, unless you are suggesting that the CFI was content for the PA28, having arrived at its destination, to remain there. This most definitely was not the plan he had proposed to those involved, so I fear that the out and back legs come as a package, as it were.

There is way to much emotion and moral indignation being applied to this. Too many people emotionally raw trying to apportion blame.

Certainly not from me.

The fact still stands that the crew were responsible for the flight and did not make the right decisions.

They behaved as humans do, when subjected to motivation, presented with goals, and given guidance and encouragement by those they trust and respect. To my mind the difference here is that the dawning realisation of the horrible situation they were in, arrived just as the oppportunities to avoid it disappeared.

The AIB report indicates the same conclusions.

The AAIB have a remit limited by their own desire to delve; in this case, they clearly did not wish to publish more information than they did. I fear this is to the detriment of the flying community at Blackpoool, in particular, though we may note that they are not the only people investigating this event.

The ethical issues around other parties behavior does not change the facts.

The facts, as analysed by someone who wishes to understand why the occupants of the aircraft died, most definitely encompass the behaviour of those on the ground who arranged, commissioned, and advised, the pilots involved. It is this matter, that the coroner must pursue if he is to hold an effective inquest.

[vanHorck]

Dear Frontlefthamster

No one disputes that there have been influences and that if a death must in part be linked to actions of others in the greater scope of things, through a coroner, so be it.

However i feel Bose-X is completely right in concentrating in this PILOT forum on what matters to us, the surviving pilots, and this is to clarify the roles we play, as P1 of any plane and to analyze the mistakes the poor pilots made, so we can learn to fear our own judgement, so we increase our chances of surviving our great passion.

This is certainly not a place to conduct a debate for the sole purpose of helping to put the blame on third parties (even in case they were also to blame) at the expense of the clarity we all need to help ourselves survive

[S-Works]

frontlefthamster. I am sorry but your interpretation just smacks of a need to place blame at the door of someone else. The crew made an error and died for it. Trying to lay the blame at the door of what I assume is the CFI in this case does not excuse the fact that the crew did not use the power of free thought and the skills that they had gained through training to make a command decision and either not even do the outbound leg and certainly not do the return leg.

As I have said a number of times I am fully prepared to consider any evidence you have that suggests the flight was carried under duress. If you cant' then this in my mind remains a sad case of poor planning and execution. Pilot error.

They behaved as humans do, when subjected to motivation, presented with goals, and given guidance and encouragement by those they trust and respect. To my mind the difference here is that the dawning realisation of the horrible situation they were in, arrived just as the oppportunities to avoid it disappeared.

Exactly, but still a result of pilot error. Unless they were under some duress/threat then they still had the power of free thinking.

Whatever the involvement of those on the ground, the crew still had the capacity to say no. They chose to carry on and it cost them their lives.

A very sad situation, but one that we can all learn from with respect to him factors.

[VFE]

It is not often I find myself in agreement with Bose-X but when one removes the (at this point) implied suggestion that there was a 'green light' from the acting CFI before this ferry flight set out it does come down to pilot error.

The debate surely must lie with what responsibility an FTO should and shall have in such situations whereby a junior club member is stitched up with a wolf dressed as a sheep type offer of free flying. Ultimately the pilot in command is to blame but there are other factors affecting this accident that as yet mean it could quite easily occur again.

In my opinion FTO's have a certain moral and unwritten(?) responsibility to ensure they do not place requests on club members that are well and truly beyond their abilities. Maybe this is something which will come out in the wash and change the present rather inadequate regulations which bundle all blame on the PIC on the premise that they're street wise experienced commanders capable of overriding their superiors. It is just unrealistic in some club circles.

VFE.

[frontlefthamster]

To suggest that duress may have been a factor is to miss, completely, the manner in which the pilot(s) was/were thinking.

I've said my piece here, and shall not do so again. I'm sorry to see the cognoscenti here so keen to blame an inexperienced and arguably impressionable pilot, with considerable favour at stake, and motivated by the advice and clear intent of someone he regarded as 'superior', for his own demise, when that demise, in the circumstances, was so far outside his own making.

Don't forget, if we simply blame accidents on 'pilot error' (apparently bose's favourite phrase at the moment, though one with which I have significant argument on several levels), they will keep happening, again and again.

With luck, those of us who deal in the real world where human behaviour interfaces with flight operations, might bypass this fatalist approach and prevent the odd accident, perhaps even in the non-professional flying world.