"That CFI must have had chapter and verse on the W&B limitations of a PA28 140; anyone who has owned one knows that 4 adults plus fuel - even to tabs (128l therefore 3hrs flying time, plus diversion) - will result in an aircraft which is out of W&B and CofG by quite some margin. You don't need to work the detailed calculations - you know that it won't work - period.
Whatever the reasons, that flight should not have taken off for three reasons that were well known to the CFI;
1. W&B
2. Currency
3. The aircraft was not equipped for the prevailing IMC conditions
Apart from point 3 everything else you have pointed out is irrelevant. The accident occurred on the flight home which was inside W&B. Currency, well the outbound flight would have covered currency if not legality with regards to the number of take of and landing."
Thanks BoseX
But if you read my post again, you'll see that I say "that flight should not have taken off for three reasons". I refer to the 1st flight on these points and both of these points were properly the concern of the CFI concerned; the third was the responsibilty of the PIC, it was also the responsability of the CFI to only authorise a VFR flight; these are the conditions according to the AAIB report.
"The arcraft took off from Runway 252 at 225 hrs and,
on climbing through 200 ft to 300 ft, entered cloud. At
around ,000 ft aal, the arcraft came out on top and
continued to climb to its cruise altitude. The flight
contnued above a sold overcast layer of cloud untl
the arcraft was south of the Lverpool area, where t
was clear. The weather conditions were clear for the
remainder of the flight and an uneventful landing was
made at Exeter at 1431 hrs."
I agree that the 1st two points, paradoxically, weren't involved in the accident itself - other than tangentially.
For instance, if the pilot had followed the rules - which the CFI should have enforced - the accident would not have happende at all as the flight would not have taken place.
If the aircraft had not departed fuelled to the gunwales (by the CFI before the pilot arrived), then the pilot would have had to have refuelled at the end of the 1st leg, and probably would have had sufficient fuel for the second leg, plus the diversion that was ultimately necessary.
As ever, I suspect that there are multiple layers of swiss cheese involved here and, unluckily for the two people who died, the holes all lined up.
It just does seem to me as if, when the pilot concerned was presented with these figurative 'slices of cheese' at the start of the flight, it must have been blindingly obvious to an experienced hand like the CFI that this was a very bad idea indeed - even if the young pilot concerned couldn't see it. It doesn't sound as if I'm alone in this view.