ASD-B IN – A different perspective on the recent hype
Danger areas like the Moorabbin training area are marked for a reason, don't transit the area with your eyes closed and radio turned down, or avoid altogether. One thing that needs to be addressed is with all the new large flying colleges popping up CASA needs to mandate that they have prescribed training areas, away from main traffic paths and the dimensions identified on relevant maps as danger areas. Whilst the operators probably have training areas specified in their ops manuals no one else knows where these are unless marked on the map.
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Thread Starter
The answer is obvious, missy: There must be profound safety consequences of crossing that line. I feel that 'chill' and the shudder in the airframe each time I cross.
For those who aren't across the facts underlying the comment I made and missy's question, this is from the ATSB report on the Mangalore tragedy:
The real answer to missy's question is the one of which I suspect missy is aware: Decades of, first, Airservices being left to its own devices as a consequence of the combination of CASA's inadequate regulation of the ANSP and airspace arrangements and, secondly, ATSB's inadequate investigations of the safety implications of the first.
For those who aren't across the facts underlying the comment I made and missy's question, this is from the ATSB report on the Mangalore tragedy:
In the Australian ATC system STCAs occur in both controlled and non-controlled airspace, with alerts inhibited in some areas. Specifically, Airservices advised that STCAs in Class G airspace are inhibited below 4,500 ft in the Brisbane flight information region, but occur to the ground in areas of the Melbourne flight information region.
Thread Starter
Inbound to YMMB.
Ready…Setty…Stare!
Remember: You’ll be looking at a small display in a cockpit being rattled around by turbulence.
Ready…Setty…Stare!
Remember: You’ll be looking at a small display in a cockpit being rattled around by turbulence.
I feel like Rainman looking at that pic and can see 3 or possibly 4 conflicts.
Thread Starter
Well done! All you need to do is keep staring at that screen and your situational awareness task is done. The completeness and accuracy of the displayed traffic data is guaranteed! 
Clinton,
Thanks for the inbound YMMB graphic, I've passed it onto someone far more qualified to comment than me, but the display and the associated irony of the MNG tragedy is noted.
RE: The MNG accident, seeing the ATSB investigation was just bumptious hubris and incompetence does anyone know when the coroner's inquiry is?
You mentioned 4 STCAs, perhaps it was my failure in reading the report properly but I could only see two re JQF and AEM? The initial and a re-alert.
It would be my understanding that after the first STCA was acknowledged by the controller, the STCA acronym remained constantly in both the aircrafts' track labels on the Air Situation Display until collision.
At a time before the collision the STCA re-alerted (that does not invalidate the previous sentence) but the derelict ATSB investigation never explained the reactivation.
There are a huge number of shortcomings in the report and I can sympathise with many pilots and controllers who have mentioned the word "cover-up".
When confronted with CONSPIRACY or INCOMPTENCE, I am an incompetence person myself as I think we reached "peak human" long ago.
That doesn't mean self interest, greed or snouts in the trough haven't played a part in decision making in AsA, CASA or ATSB.
Given the Senate Estimates are just a joke, I have sent off info to the NACC, though given the state of the Australia and the reported number in the NACC inbox, no doubt it's a far queue.
At least Lead Balloon can smile given that by all their comments in the MNG reports and their associated simplistic distraction of ADSB-IN, ATSB by implication if not by statement has declared CLASS G is safer for VFRs than IFRs. I have to laugh when Australian controllers issue traffic "alerts" VFR to VFR in G. The phrase "Get your hand off it" comes to mind. Sort out your IFR to IFR first. More surveillance has led to laziness in the whole process.
I honestly believe without surveillance (Radar or ATSB) and with FIS still existing MNG would not have happened.
Where's FSO Griffo when you need him...What, in OAP luxury at Mar a Lago....Half his luck!!
Australia - Centre of Excellence only in Mediocrity.
Thanks for the inbound YMMB graphic, I've passed it onto someone far more qualified to comment than me, but the display and the associated irony of the MNG tragedy is noted.
RE: The MNG accident, seeing the ATSB investigation was just bumptious hubris and incompetence does anyone know when the coroner's inquiry is?
You mentioned 4 STCAs, perhaps it was my failure in reading the report properly but I could only see two re JQF and AEM? The initial and a re-alert.
It would be my understanding that after the first STCA was acknowledged by the controller, the STCA acronym remained constantly in both the aircrafts' track labels on the Air Situation Display until collision.
At a time before the collision the STCA re-alerted (that does not invalidate the previous sentence) but the derelict ATSB investigation never explained the reactivation.
There are a huge number of shortcomings in the report and I can sympathise with many pilots and controllers who have mentioned the word "cover-up".
When confronted with CONSPIRACY or INCOMPTENCE, I am an incompetence person myself as I think we reached "peak human" long ago.
That doesn't mean self interest, greed or snouts in the trough haven't played a part in decision making in AsA, CASA or ATSB.
Given the Senate Estimates are just a joke, I have sent off info to the NACC, though given the state of the Australia and the reported number in the NACC inbox, no doubt it's a far queue.
At least Lead Balloon can smile given that by all their comments in the MNG reports and their associated simplistic distraction of ADSB-IN, ATSB by implication if not by statement has declared CLASS G is safer for VFRs than IFRs. I have to laugh when Australian controllers issue traffic "alerts" VFR to VFR in G. The phrase "Get your hand off it" comes to mind. Sort out your IFR to IFR first. More surveillance has led to laziness in the whole process.
I honestly believe without surveillance (Radar or ATSB) and with FIS still existing MNG would not have happened.
Where's FSO Griffo when you need him...What, in OAP luxury at Mar a Lago....Half his luck!!
Australia - Centre of Excellence only in Mediocrity.
Last edited by ER_BN; 6th Nov 2023 at 12:01. Reason: Spelling correction and remembering the wisdom of FSO Griffo
Thread Starter
Re STCA’s, I’ve revisited the ATSB Report on the Mangalore tragedy. It says, with my bolding added:
…
On the basis of analysis conducted by an ATC subject matter expert and technical detail provided by Airservices, it was assessed that:
The first STCA, at 1122:42, was a nuisance alert generated by JQF conflicting with VFR traffic in the Mangalore circuit area.
A second STCA, at 1122:49, occurred as the controller passed traffic information to JQF (Figure 13). At that stage, indications were that the aircraft would pass abeam each other. The STCA was assessed by the controller but not cleared from the screen at this point.
The controller re-inspected the two aircraft at 1123:30 after JQF had turned towards the planned outbound track. The velocity vectors indicated that lateral displacement would be maintained, with JQF passing behind AEM in about one minute. At that time, the controller’s display showed AEM at 4,800 ft while JQF was at 3,400ft.
A final STCA alert occurred at 1123:51. The controller zoomed in to inspect the aircraft flight paths and altitudes again and acknowledged the STCA at 1124:09. The controller identified that JQF was going to pass across the track of AEM, but at that time, 11 seconds prior to the collision, indications on the controller’s display showed AEM at 4,500 ft and JQF at 4,000 ft, with 0.9 NM lateral separation between the aircraft.
So I’ll correct my ‘4’ to ‘3’ (though I’m still digging to find the provenance of my original ‘4’).
Perhaps your ‘2’ comes from Figure 13, described as “Recreation of STCA display at 1122:49”, which shows only 2 STCA ‘boxes’?
Of course, a recreation of the circumstances at 1122:49 excludes the “final STCA” which “occurred at 1123:51”. It’s very hard for me to fathom the logic behind the ATSB’s decision not to include the closest STCA in time to the collision in the recreation of the STCA display. The ATSB went to the trouble of recreating the display showing the velocity vectors as not intersecting at the time of the 1122:49 STCA but decided not to recreate the display showing the velocity vectors at the time of the STCA immediately preceding the collision. Go figure.
Of course, all of this is OK for IFR aircraft because there is no separation standard in non-controlled airspace. Meanwhile, some VFR pilot has an attack of the vapours after seeing another aircraft in close proximity in a published flying training Delta, and the ATSB uses that as basis for another advert for ADS-B IN, which advert included a recreation of the STCA. Go figure.
In the time between JQF taking off and the collision, there were three STCA alerts generated.
…
On the basis of analysis conducted by an ATC subject matter expert and technical detail provided by Airservices, it was assessed that:
The first STCA, at 1122:42, was a nuisance alert generated by JQF conflicting with VFR traffic in the Mangalore circuit area.
A second STCA, at 1122:49, occurred as the controller passed traffic information to JQF (Figure 13). At that stage, indications were that the aircraft would pass abeam each other. The STCA was assessed by the controller but not cleared from the screen at this point.
The controller re-inspected the two aircraft at 1123:30 after JQF had turned towards the planned outbound track. The velocity vectors indicated that lateral displacement would be maintained, with JQF passing behind AEM in about one minute. At that time, the controller’s display showed AEM at 4,800 ft while JQF was at 3,400ft.
A final STCA alert occurred at 1123:51. The controller zoomed in to inspect the aircraft flight paths and altitudes again and acknowledged the STCA at 1124:09. The controller identified that JQF was going to pass across the track of AEM, but at that time, 11 seconds prior to the collision, indications on the controller’s display showed AEM at 4,500 ft and JQF at 4,000 ft, with 0.9 NM lateral separation between the aircraft.
Perhaps your ‘2’ comes from Figure 13, described as “Recreation of STCA display at 1122:49”, which shows only 2 STCA ‘boxes’?
Of course, a recreation of the circumstances at 1122:49 excludes the “final STCA” which “occurred at 1123:51”. It’s very hard for me to fathom the logic behind the ATSB’s decision not to include the closest STCA in time to the collision in the recreation of the STCA display. The ATSB went to the trouble of recreating the display showing the velocity vectors as not intersecting at the time of the 1122:49 STCA but decided not to recreate the display showing the velocity vectors at the time of the STCA immediately preceding the collision. Go figure.
Of course, all of this is OK for IFR aircraft because there is no separation standard in non-controlled airspace. Meanwhile, some VFR pilot has an attack of the vapours after seeing another aircraft in close proximity in a published flying training Delta, and the ATSB uses that as basis for another advert for ADS-B IN, which advert included a recreation of the STCA. Go figure.
Probably a corporate history somewhere, someone would know but I do wonder who the BN Centre manager was who authorised the change? Who was the Safety Manager at the time? Who was the ATC GM or Head ATC at the time? Wouldn't the controller Union ( Civil Air ) raise an objection?
Probably a corporate history somewhere, someone would know but I do wonder who the BN Centre manager was who authorised the change? Who was the Safety Manager at the time? Who was the ATC GM or Head ATC at the time? Wouldn't the controller Union ( Civil Air ) raise an objection?
Clinton,
Thanks for your prompt clarification.
The STCA system by its very nature works on conflict pairs and in my previous post I noted I was referring to those STCAs specifically regarding the JQF/AEM pair.
As far as I can tell that is what the ATSB report indicates so we are in agreement.
Not sure what you meant by Perhaps your ‘2’ comes from Figure 13, described as “Recreation of STCA display at 1122:49”, which shows only 2 STCA ‘boxes’?
For tracks under the jurisdiction of the controller, the yellow "box" around the track labels of the two relevant aircraft is part of the TAAATS Eurocat Human Interface (HMI) to highlight the two aircraft and is yet to be acknowledged by the controller. 1 STCA in the circumstances of the MNG accident correctly produces 2 "boxes".
No one should assume that any ATSB graphical "re-creation" accurately aligns with what the controller saw on the TAAATS Eurocat Human Machine Interface.
My feedback to controllers at the time was that the STCA HMI would be displayed from 1122:49 to collision.
On the assumption that this is correct, the ATSB never explains why the STCA system changed the STCA HMI on JQF and AEM's track labels from Acknowledged status back to Unacknowledged status at 1123:51.
It would have been one of the first things I would have determined as part of the technical investigation, and I have done more than one hundred of them.
I have no idea whether that is what really happened or was displayed to the controller. Problems with TAAATS Eurocat Replay! That's the rhinoceros in the room!
And we haven't yet mentioned the elephant or the hippopotamus in the room either!
All this could be viewed as farcical but four humans died...
Do you think a GA pilot organisation might ask when the Coroner's Inquiry is going to happen?
Or are we happy that the memory of the 4 pilots is tainted by an inaccurate and incomplete ATSB report?
If you want to talk, PM me and I will call.
Have a good one!
Thanks for your prompt clarification.
The STCA system by its very nature works on conflict pairs and in my previous post I noted I was referring to those STCAs specifically regarding the JQF/AEM pair.
As far as I can tell that is what the ATSB report indicates so we are in agreement.
Not sure what you meant by Perhaps your ‘2’ comes from Figure 13, described as “Recreation of STCA display at 1122:49”, which shows only 2 STCA ‘boxes’?
For tracks under the jurisdiction of the controller, the yellow "box" around the track labels of the two relevant aircraft is part of the TAAATS Eurocat Human Interface (HMI) to highlight the two aircraft and is yet to be acknowledged by the controller. 1 STCA in the circumstances of the MNG accident correctly produces 2 "boxes".
No one should assume that any ATSB graphical "re-creation" accurately aligns with what the controller saw on the TAAATS Eurocat Human Machine Interface.
My feedback to controllers at the time was that the STCA HMI would be displayed from 1122:49 to collision.
On the assumption that this is correct, the ATSB never explains why the STCA system changed the STCA HMI on JQF and AEM's track labels from Acknowledged status back to Unacknowledged status at 1123:51.
It would have been one of the first things I would have determined as part of the technical investigation, and I have done more than one hundred of them.
I have no idea whether that is what really happened or was displayed to the controller. Problems with TAAATS Eurocat Replay! That's the rhinoceros in the room!
And we haven't yet mentioned the elephant or the hippopotamus in the room either!
All this could be viewed as farcical but four humans died...
Do you think a GA pilot organisation might ask when the Coroner's Inquiry is going to happen?
Or are we happy that the memory of the 4 pilots is tainted by an inaccurate and incomplete ATSB report?
If you want to talk, PM me and I will call.
Have a good one!
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It probably seems busy to those unfamiliar with YMMB airspace and unaware there are two parallel runways in operation, but all I see looking at that pic is a normal busy day at Moorabbin, with the CAE-Oxford Cessnas doing their usual 3-mile circuits and the queue building at Carrum. As far as conflicts go, I have no idea where UUD is going, but then it's an LTF Sling (probably student solo) and you'd want to hope the other guy inbound has him in sight. Situation Normal.
Suffice to say, the YMMB Tower Controllers do an amazing job keeping the kiddies in line day-in day-out.
That “queue building at Carrum” resulted in a mid-air not that many years ago!
There have been quite a few "attempted landings" on the top of other aircraft (typically Cessnas - perhaps being mistaken for the factory roofs on short final?) in the circuit also, although ATC are quick to spot that now and tell 'em to go around.
Maybe somebody should ask how Moorabbin survived with three runways in operation and twice the traffic back in the 70s/80s. Must have been the early model ADSB and ACAS. There was also times with contra circuits in operation on 17 or 13 with crosswind operations on 22. Moorbbin movement rates have not changed much in the last 20 years, sitting around 250,000 movements a year average, so nothing is 'new' in this airspace.
According to the report, following this incident they subsequently (a) changed YMMB to Class D (b) placed restrictions on the number of aircraft in the circuit and (c) now insist that all arriving aircraft do so via specific VFR waypoints, including at Brighton (North) and Carrum (South) so.. nope, not relevant to this discussion I'm afraid. Water under the bridge and all that.
Maybe we're just lucky?!? But I have to believe it's more than that.
That was in the circuit/north west of Moorabbin, not near Carrum. VH-CGT was inbound from the northwest, Brighton direction, and VH-UPY was doing solo circuits on the western circuit for some reason, and not very consistent circuits at that.
It interesting that GAAP airports came about due to concerns over high density operation of light aircraft, so after a study process including overseas experience they implemented GAAP. Which for 30 years or so was absolutely fine and then suddenly was not when an aircraft that should have been on the Eastern circuit doing solo circuits was caught out in an unfortunate situation. The problem now is that Class D can't handle the numbers (suprise, suprise) and they are looking for solutions that were already in place 20 years ago.
Moorabbin Airport had it's peak in movements in 1989 at 399,000 movements, 150,000 movements more that the last few years average, what has gone wrong?
One of the main concerns was radio traffic for control services, so a main concept in GAAP was to reduce radio traffic by not requiring full clearances and the traffic just followed each other with joining 'instructions'. The only clearance required was the take-off and landing part.
The waffle that has crept into ATC procedures lately really has significant safety implications in complex, busy situations.
It interesting that GAAP airports came about due to concerns over high density operation of light aircraft, so after a study process including overseas experience they implemented GAAP. Which for 30 years or so was absolutely fine and then suddenly was not when an aircraft that should have been on the Eastern circuit doing solo circuits was caught out in an unfortunate situation. The problem now is that Class D can't handle the numbers (suprise, suprise) and they are looking for solutions that were already in place 20 years ago.
Moorabbin Airport had it's peak in movements in 1989 at 399,000 movements, 150,000 movements more that the last few years average, what has gone wrong?
One of the main concerns was radio traffic for control services, so a main concept in GAAP was to reduce radio traffic by not requiring full clearances and the traffic just followed each other with joining 'instructions'. The only clearance required was the take-off and landing part.
The waffle that has crept into ATC procedures lately really has significant safety implications in complex, busy situations.
Last edited by 43Inches; 8th Nov 2023 at 05:46.
Cheltenham actually, but close enough.
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