Cirrus down Gundaroo, 06/10/23
If you listen to LiveATC and line it up with FR24, a Saab which departs Canberra about 15 mins after the Cirrus crashes asks for weather deviation in the same area.
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On the specific issue of no radio call, there are plenty of emergencies during which a conscious pilot does not transmit a mayday. There is, after all, that ‘aviate, navigate, communicate’ list of priorities.
The aircraft involved in this tragedy was less the 20nms from YSCB, in CTA, on primary and secondary RADAR being monitored by ATC. What, precisely, would a mayday call have achieved? Do we think ATC would, absent a mayday or 7700, watch the aircraft suddenly descend, without clearance or any communications, and shrug and assume that there was no problem? The data indicate a descent from around 9,000’ to around 3,000’ – that’s nearly ground level around the area of impact – in about a minute. I doubt whether I’d spend that time transmitting information to ATC, when I know that they are seeing what’s happening anyway.
On the specific issue of "no CAPS", we don’t know that the pilot didn’t try to deploy the CAPS. Maybe the pilot tried but the system malfunctioned. Maybe the CAPS was deployed but at too high a speed. Maybe the CAPS was deployed while the aircraft was inverted or in some unusual attitude that resulted in the parachute lines being fouled by the airframe and the parachute not working properly or at all.
Yep.
The aircraft involved in this tragedy was less the 20nms from YSCB, in CTA, on primary and secondary RADAR being monitored by ATC. What, precisely, would a mayday call have achieved? Do we think ATC would, absent a mayday or 7700, watch the aircraft suddenly descend, without clearance or any communications, and shrug and assume that there was no problem? The data indicate a descent from around 9,000’ to around 3,000’ – that’s nearly ground level around the area of impact – in about a minute. I doubt whether I’d spend that time transmitting information to ATC, when I know that they are seeing what’s happening anyway.
On the specific issue of "no CAPS", we don’t know that the pilot didn’t try to deploy the CAPS. Maybe the pilot tried but the system malfunctioned. Maybe the CAPS was deployed but at too high a speed. Maybe the CAPS was deployed while the aircraft was inverted or in some unusual attitude that resulted in the parachute lines being fouled by the airframe and the parachute not working properly or at all.
To dive vertically, but keep the speed at most 180kts, and decreasing despite the attitude, well that's just odd.
SAAB pilots will deviate around any cloud near or above the freezing level in general. The engine anti ice sucks engine power, so if you can find a gap you will climb above the cloud layer faster. So unless there's more information it's hard to gauge whether the SAAB was avoiding significant bad weather, or just not wanting to use the anti-ice through a thin layer ahead, in both cases the crew will ask for deviations 'due weather'. If jets were deviating in the same area that would be more proof of significant build ups or weather RADAR returns. That being said if the SAAB crew did pass through the same area and did enter cloud, they might be able to answer if there was significant icing in the area, might be worth the ATSB contacting them if there is any questions relative to icing and turbulence.
His groundspeeds are indicative of fluctuating winds from the front, so to be in a fully established stall at 90 knots ground speed, wings level, he'd need to have had a substantial tail wind, which I don't believe he had.
Agreed though, hard to know the wind without being there which makes theorising difficult,
[QUOTE=Lead Balloon;11516086]Yes I am a pilot, cncpc. And, nearly four decades in, I'm getting very tired of the mixture of amateurs, accident ghouls, media trolls and - worst of all - self-interested aircraft manufacturers and maintainers who are so keen to blame the pilot for accidents. And pilot incapacitation feeds straight into Avmed's justification.
This comment has nothing to do with this incident I have no idea what happened I am just trying to point out mechanical failures in aviation are very rare.
Are people not quick to point blame or look at what could of happened in the pointy front bit because statically speaking something around 70/80 percent of aviation incidents/accidents are down to human/pilot error?
This comment has nothing to do with this incident I have no idea what happened I am just trying to point out mechanical failures in aviation are very rare.
Are people not quick to point blame or look at what could of happened in the pointy front bit because statically speaking something around 70/80 percent of aviation incidents/accidents are down to human/pilot error?
I've read this statement in a thread about this tragedy in a different on-line forum:
I'm trying to ascertain the evidential basis for that statement.
the chute is laying in the grass in good condition
This comment has nothing to do with this incident I have no idea what happened I am just trying to point out mechanical failures in aviation are very rare.
Are people not quick to point blame or look at what could of happened in the pointy front bit because statically speaking something around 70/80 percent of aviation incidents/accidents are down to human/pilot error?
Are people not quick to point blame or look at what could of happened in the pointy front bit because statically speaking something around 70/80 percent of aviation incidents/accidents are down to human/pilot error?
But what is your definition of "mechanical failures"? It is "very rare" for e.g. an aircraft's wings to fall off an aircraft flown below Vne and within the G loading limits etc. That kind of "mechanical failure" is very rare.
But there are plenty of mechanical things that don't work properly or are unreliable and fail to work because of human error - in the case of aircraft, maintenance error. And not all manufacturing processes are perfect.
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Just registered here to clear up a few things:
I’ve spent many hours in cockpits with Peter, the deceased pilot. And many years on the ground with him also.
Not a “student” pilot. He had many hundreds of hours including much recent time in Cirrus aircraft.
He had completed many IFR renewals over the years including one in the last month.
I found him to be careful, thoughtful, competent and meticulous in his approach to flying.
In my experience, he always briefed his passengers - including the kids - on deploying CAPS, even when I/we had heard it all before.
Also we talked about the old ‘Aviate/Navigate/Communicate’ priorities quite a few times over the years.
I spoke with him on Wednesday morning for 5 minutes and he was in a very positive frame of mind, having just filed his flight plan.
We arranged to meet next week when he was back in town. I’ve also been informed that after the ARM to CB leg he advised another friend that the “plane was perfect”
I’m reliably informed that a “new” / repacked (?) chute was fitted to the aircraft in January.
I won’t be replying/ posting further.
Clearly atm none of us know what happened.
Just wanted to inject some facts into the discussion.
I’ve spent many hours in cockpits with Peter, the deceased pilot. And many years on the ground with him also.
Not a “student” pilot. He had many hundreds of hours including much recent time in Cirrus aircraft.
He had completed many IFR renewals over the years including one in the last month.
I found him to be careful, thoughtful, competent and meticulous in his approach to flying.
In my experience, he always briefed his passengers - including the kids - on deploying CAPS, even when I/we had heard it all before.
Also we talked about the old ‘Aviate/Navigate/Communicate’ priorities quite a few times over the years.
I spoke with him on Wednesday morning for 5 minutes and he was in a very positive frame of mind, having just filed his flight plan.
We arranged to meet next week when he was back in town. I’ve also been informed that after the ARM to CB leg he advised another friend that the “plane was perfect”
I’m reliably informed that a “new” / repacked (?) chute was fitted to the aircraft in January.
I won’t be replying/ posting further.
Clearly atm none of us know what happened.
Just wanted to inject some facts into the discussion.
The departure from controlled flight appears to have been sudden based on the data I keep posting, followed by a very steep descent profile. That profile is NOT an emergency descent profile. The sinkrates involved are not achievable in normal, controlled flight (~167 kts vertical speed component alone, as posted above). There appears to be porpoising prior to the onset of the sudden departure, along with a significant speed decay. That could very well be indicative of a stall induced spin.
I'm adding another plot here, ground speed (GPS derived speed in the lat/lon reference frame), vs. the velocity vector (VV), or total velocity in X,Y,Z reference frame. It's interesting to see that the VV has a couple of very high excursions but otherwise remains at similar magnitude to cruise flight (conservation of energy) - it would seem plausible from this that the airframe remained largely intact but spent most of its energy on vertical speed (as in a spin), the two outlier data points probably being just that - momentary glitches from poor GPS geometry due to the unusual attitude. Note that the geometric vertical rate is also GPS derived. I didn't use the barometric altitude due to hysteresis. This particular aircraft did not report barometric vertical rate.
What's odd is that the speed already decayed to a similarly low level at time 03:44:38, ~4 minutes prior to the rapid descent.
I'm fairly certain the potential stall/spin is the result of events prior to that (icing and/or incapacitation) - it's a more complex sequence of events than many here speculate.
I'm adding another plot here, ground speed (GPS derived speed in the lat/lon reference frame), vs. the velocity vector (VV), or total velocity in X,Y,Z reference frame. It's interesting to see that the VV has a couple of very high excursions but otherwise remains at similar magnitude to cruise flight (conservation of energy) - it would seem plausible from this that the airframe remained largely intact but spent most of its energy on vertical speed (as in a spin), the two outlier data points probably being just that - momentary glitches from poor GPS geometry due to the unusual attitude. Note that the geometric vertical rate is also GPS derived. I didn't use the barometric altitude due to hysteresis. This particular aircraft did not report barometric vertical rate.
What's odd is that the speed already decayed to a similarly low level at time 03:44:38, ~4 minutes prior to the rapid descent.
I'm fairly certain the potential stall/spin is the result of events prior to that (icing and/or incapacitation) - it's a more complex sequence of events than many here speculate.
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Turns out that the statement I saw on the other forum, that "the chute is laying in the grass in good condition", was based upon the photo I posted at #48 and someone's assumption that it was of the aftermath of this tragedy.
In the original text above that photo I made clear that it was of a different incident which the POB survived. I posted it to show the effects of a post-impact fire on a Cirrus, even after a successful CAPS deployment. I've now added new bold and capitalised text above the photo, to assist the slow learners.
In the original text above that photo I made clear that it was of a different incident which the POB survived. I posted it to show the effects of a post-impact fire on a Cirrus, even after a successful CAPS deployment. I've now added new bold and capitalised text above the photo, to assist the slow learners.
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The stec autopilot in the early Cirrus doesn’t have a IAS hold as it uses vertical speed. Speed could decay away as the altitude increases, which it doesn’t really, so it’s performing well with 315 hp.
The profile appears to be a consistent climb to max altitude at what is probably the best rate you could get out it is, on the way to the pilots alleged preferred 10,000ft. The airspeed is low though… it’s a lowish speed with a high climbing angle into thinning air. If there was in fact ice building up, it’s building up on the underside of the wing, MU2 style. Add this to the laminar flow Cirrus wing at high angle of attack and when the wing drops, it will drop hard, potentially inverted.
We all know that a Cirrus isn’t getting out of a spin with no chute and I wouldn’t be at all surprised if nobody was able to pull it.
Of course this would all be pending icing levels and cloud at the time….
On the flip side an incapacitated pilot scenario with 10k in the STEC in non-icing conditions doesn’t immediately result in this scenario either. For a passenger to turn off the auto pilot they need to press any hold the button on the controls for a couple of seconds and hear the loud beeps first. Seems somewhat unlikely.
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The profile appears to be a consistent climb to max altitude at what is probably the best rate you could get out it is, on the way to the pilots alleged preferred 10,000ft. The airspeed is low though… it’s a lowish speed with a high climbing angle into thinning air. If there was in fact ice building up, it’s building up on the underside of the wing, MU2 style. Add this to the laminar flow Cirrus wing at high angle of attack and when the wing drops, it will drop hard, potentially inverted.
We all know that a Cirrus isn’t getting out of a spin with no chute and I wouldn’t be at all surprised if nobody was able to pull it.
Of course this would all be pending icing levels and cloud at the time….
On the flip side an incapacitated pilot scenario with 10k in the STEC in non-icing conditions doesn’t immediately result in this scenario either. For a passenger to turn off the auto pilot they need to press any hold the button on the controls for a couple of seconds and hear the loud beeps first. Seems somewhat unlikely.
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Secondly, I did repeated stall exercises in the Cirrus which never dropped a wing. If you were flying straight and level and kept pulling back, the plane would violently shake but you still have aileron authority, you can keep the plane descending, stalled, wings level because of the cuffed wing profile which means that the outboard area of the wing where the ailerons is, remains unstalled. Only if you introduced yaw would it drop but was then easily recovered with rudder application.
As for the comment about needing to hold the autopilot button for a couple of seconds, that's also incorrect. A quick press of the button and the autopilot is off. In fact, depending on how it's been configured, if you hold the autopilot button for a couple of seconds, you can cause it to enter CWS mode - which means the aircraft will be commanded to hold it's current attitude - ie, nose angle, wing angles.
The fact remains that the aircraft wasn't flying on autopilot - too many variations in heading for it to have been active and, as previously said, for a pitch mode to be active, a roll mode needs to also be in use, which wasn't.
As 43” observed:Here’s an example where an aircraft ‘landed itself’ with the pilot unconscious, and the pilot survived: https://youtu.be/MfzfP5CZBj8?si=Ew2Lag-ElRyCfYRM
So no doubt there are examples of aircraft plummeting to the ground due to pilot incapacitation, but there are many more examples where that doesn't happen. And there is a particular characteristic of the Cirrus that is relevant here.
Thank you for your very considered and informed post, FMJ.
Rest assured: I understand that all sorts of ostensibly healthy people collapse and die, unexpectedly, of some undetected affliction. The only pilots I know who’ve died unexpectedly at the controls were the holders of Class 1 medical certificates (thus exposing the expensive Avmed façade for what it is).
With your first-hand experience in the ergonomics of a Cirrus cockpit, could you please expand on how a pilot of a Cirrus "slumps across the controls, locking them"? Exactly what bits of the pilot’s body end up where, and how does that happen despite the shoulder harness?
Have you had a look at the CAPS Event database to which I posted a link earlier in the thread? There are numerous events – and of course numerous events not involving Cirrus aircraft – where no mayday is transmitted by a conscious pilot who’s busy on higher priorities. Did you note the events of ‘unilateral’ deployment attributed to static electricity?
I do think you might have misinterpreted what some of the reported parameters mean as to airspeed versus rate of climb/descent. My theory is based on discussions I’ve had with people who understand the numbers and the Cirrus – and some comments made here – which suggest a near-vertical descent but with some kind of unusual drag … like an aircraft with parachute lines tangled around the fuselage and tailplane and the parachute barely able to inflate. My comment about the comms antenna was the result of the physical characteristics of the Comm 1 antenna compared to other antennae in that scenario. But of course we don’t know if the pilot even tried to transmit a mayday.
Earlier in this thread reference was made – correctly - to the probability that the aircraft “would have just had it’s second 10 year chute re-pack completed”. As soon I read that, I consider the risk of maintenance induced failure. The flight I fear most is the first one after my aircraft has been the subject of mandated meddling. There have been many creative attempts made on my life by LAMEs over the years – not deliberate I hope. But the fact is: people make mistakes. It will therefore be important for the ATSB to investigate the maintenance history of the CAPS in particular.
Hopefully the ATSB folk will be able to ascertain at least whether the CAPS was deployed or not. Given the location, I would be surprised if there were no eye witnesses of even a couple of seconds of the descent. You will see, from the events database, that in one tragedy arising from icing the empty parachute was seen descending minutes after the aircraft impacted the ground. If this aircraft’s parachute is found intact some distance from the impact site, that would be a ‘lay down misère’ on a number issues.
So no doubt there are examples of aircraft plummeting to the ground due to pilot incapacitation, but there are many more examples where that doesn't happen. And there is a particular characteristic of the Cirrus that is relevant here.
Thank you for your very considered and informed post, FMJ.
Rest assured: I understand that all sorts of ostensibly healthy people collapse and die, unexpectedly, of some undetected affliction. The only pilots I know who’ve died unexpectedly at the controls were the holders of Class 1 medical certificates (thus exposing the expensive Avmed façade for what it is).
With your first-hand experience in the ergonomics of a Cirrus cockpit, could you please expand on how a pilot of a Cirrus "slumps across the controls, locking them"? Exactly what bits of the pilot’s body end up where, and how does that happen despite the shoulder harness?
Have you had a look at the CAPS Event database to which I posted a link earlier in the thread? There are numerous events – and of course numerous events not involving Cirrus aircraft – where no mayday is transmitted by a conscious pilot who’s busy on higher priorities. Did you note the events of ‘unilateral’ deployment attributed to static electricity?
I do think you might have misinterpreted what some of the reported parameters mean as to airspeed versus rate of climb/descent. My theory is based on discussions I’ve had with people who understand the numbers and the Cirrus – and some comments made here – which suggest a near-vertical descent but with some kind of unusual drag … like an aircraft with parachute lines tangled around the fuselage and tailplane and the parachute barely able to inflate. My comment about the comms antenna was the result of the physical characteristics of the Comm 1 antenna compared to other antennae in that scenario. But of course we don’t know if the pilot even tried to transmit a mayday.
Earlier in this thread reference was made – correctly - to the probability that the aircraft “would have just had it’s second 10 year chute re-pack completed”. As soon I read that, I consider the risk of maintenance induced failure. The flight I fear most is the first one after my aircraft has been the subject of mandated meddling. There have been many creative attempts made on my life by LAMEs over the years – not deliberate I hope. But the fact is: people make mistakes. It will therefore be important for the ATSB to investigate the maintenance history of the CAPS in particular.
Hopefully the ATSB folk will be able to ascertain at least whether the CAPS was deployed or not. Given the location, I would be surprised if there were no eye witnesses of even a couple of seconds of the descent. You will see, from the events database, that in one tragedy arising from icing the empty parachute was seen descending minutes after the aircraft impacted the ground. If this aircraft’s parachute is found intact some distance from the impact site, that would be a ‘lay down misère’ on a number issues.
Whilst talking of the refitting, it's something that the maintenance operators have experience with, so no big deal. I also recall the SB to check the propellant because some got wet....
I also participated in CPPP trainings and let's take your example of an uncommanded parachute deployment - once the chute has been deployed, you are no longer in command of the aircraft, so what would you, as pilot at 9500feet do? Right. Call up and say what's what, let people know where you are in case you land in trees or something, just get the emergency services moving.
Let's now go with your thought that maybe the chute deployed erroneously, due to MIF, was incorrectly deployed wrapping itself around the aircraft - the aircraft became uncontrollable and the pilot was looking to regain control somehow hence he was more concerned with aviate than communicate. Reasonable assumption, but the reality is BRS systems are fitted in thousands of aircraft globally and for one to first self deploy and then mis-deploy is unheard of. As you can see, you need an erroneous deployment of the chute AND a misdeployment of the chute for that scenario to occur. That aircraft had been flying frequently after the repack so I'm pretty sure that a MIF can be ruled out.
Let's reduce this to a minimum - let's say he had commanded CAPS deployment and it mis-deployed. Why would he do that? First, there seems to be a myth that Cirrus pilots will, without hesitation, pull the chute at the first sign of trouble. That's not true. At 9500 feet you have a lot of time to trouble shoot, say, if you have engine issues; you will first check the usual suspects - fuel, air, spark - before looking for a suitable location and, if none available, then consider deploying CAPS. No Cirrus pilot would pull at 9500 feet unless he'd totally lost control, had structural failure and saw no way out which is why I'd rule both a commanded and uncommanded deployment of CAPS out.
On the specific issue of no radio call, there are plenty of emergencies during which a conscious pilot does not transmit a mayday. There is, after all, that ‘aviate, navigate, communicate’ list of priorities.
The aircraft involved in this tragedy was less the 20nms from YSCB, in CTA, on primary and secondary RADAR being monitored by ATC. What, precisely, would a mayday call have achieved? Do we think ATC would, absent a mayday or 7700, watch the aircraft suddenly descend, without clearance or any communications, and shrug and assume that there was no problem? The data indicate a descent from around 9,000’ to around 3,000’ – that’s nearly ground level around the area of impact – in about a minute. I doubt whether I’d spend that time transmitting information to ATC, when I know that they are seeing what’s happening anyway.
On the specific issue of "no CAPS", we don’t know that the pilot didn’t try to deploy the CAPS. Maybe the pilot tried but the system malfunctioned. Maybe the CAPS was deployed but at too high a speed. Maybe the CAPS was deployed while the aircraft was inverted or in some unusual attitude that resulted in the parachute lines being fouled by the airframe and the parachute not working properly or at all.
Yep.
The aircraft involved in this tragedy was less the 20nms from YSCB, in CTA, on primary and secondary RADAR being monitored by ATC. What, precisely, would a mayday call have achieved? Do we think ATC would, absent a mayday or 7700, watch the aircraft suddenly descend, without clearance or any communications, and shrug and assume that there was no problem? The data indicate a descent from around 9,000’ to around 3,000’ – that’s nearly ground level around the area of impact – in about a minute. I doubt whether I’d spend that time transmitting information to ATC, when I know that they are seeing what’s happening anyway.
On the specific issue of "no CAPS", we don’t know that the pilot didn’t try to deploy the CAPS. Maybe the pilot tried but the system malfunctioned. Maybe the CAPS was deployed but at too high a speed. Maybe the CAPS was deployed while the aircraft was inverted or in some unusual attitude that resulted in the parachute lines being fouled by the airframe and the parachute not working properly or at all.
Yep.
Secondly, a mayday call will always alert ATC as to what is going on, they can offer advise as to nearest airfield if necessary and raise awareness of ground units. Thirdly. how does a plane suddenly become inverted? Without external intervention? For me, his flight path is indicative of a pilot hand flying with the plane trimmed for cruise climb. If, as you hypothesise, he pulled the chute whilst inverted, how did he become inverted? I've flown through enough clouds to know that although they can be bumpy, they're not going to throw you on your back; the pilot was both experienced and current enough to know what he was doing. In order for that theory to be correct, something else had to have happened first, throwing the plane on its back. And knowing that the flight was in and out of some pretty heavy clouds with the freezing level in the clouds, I'd go with that. The plane iced up, stalled, descended like a brick. Nothing to do with CAPS.
But that doesn't explain why no recovery was initiated. Which can be answered by Occam's Razor. No recovery was initiated because the pilot was incapacitated. That's no negative inference on the pilot, it's just something which fits the story with the minimum number of external requirements....
A light Aircraft has crashed south of Crystal Brook SA. The Jamestown Airshow was on 15 min away. 2 serious flown to RAH no further info apart from eyewitness "it plummeted into a field".
As for the comment about needing to hold the autopilot button for a couple of seconds, that's also incorrect.
If you press it quickly nothing happens other than a beep. Hold it a bit longer and you get a couple of loud beeps. Hold it even longer and it turns off after a few beeps.
It is specifically designed to not switched off with a quick accidental flick of the push bottom switch on the control stick.
I am aware that a test pilot who is expecting a spin to develop, has a solid chance of getting out of the spin. A “normal” pilot would severely struggle.
i highly doubt you would find anyone in this country that has successfully arrested a fully developed spin in a Cirrus.
Assuming the "human" part of your "human/pilot error" term is confined to pilots, that's around 20/30 percent of aviation incident/accidents being down to other than pilot error. In my book, that percentage does not equal "very rare". Or do you include e.g. Air Traffic Controllers and aircraft maintainers in the "human error"?
But what is your definition of "mechanical failures"? It is "very rare" for e.g. an aircraft's wings to fall off an aircraft flown below Vne and within the G loading limits etc. That kind of "mechanical failure" is very rare.
But there are plenty of mechanical things that don't work properly or are unreliable and fail to work because of human error - in the case of aircraft, maintenance error. And not all manufacturing processes are perfect.
But what is your definition of "mechanical failures"? It is "very rare" for e.g. an aircraft's wings to fall off an aircraft flown below Vne and within the G loading limits etc. That kind of "mechanical failure" is very rare.
But there are plenty of mechanical things that don't work properly or are unreliable and fail to work because of human error - in the case of aircraft, maintenance error. And not all manufacturing processes are perfect.
Does your 20/30 percent include combination mechanical plus human error witch lead to loss of airframe? witch i believe usually is the case in accidents. ( swiss cheese)
Unsure how it's categorised but if 30 percent of accidents are pilot error alone that seems high to me and gets me back to the point of why people are quick to judge pilots in accidents before anything els.
Apart from publicly saying things like it looks intentional based on little data I can't see any harm coming out of discussions covering pilot errors in accidents only good, even to family's that have lost loved ones at the end of the day people's theories are usually proven right or wrong at some point.
WuW
Another couple of myths that needs busting. A Cirrus in a spin can be recovered from the spin using standard technique - throttle idle, ailerons level, stick forward, rudder against the direction of rotation until the spin stops. Then recover. When designing the SR series, the manufacturer offered the chute as an "alternative means of compliance" which is why it was never tested in US and the myth was born. However in EASA land, they refused to accept this AMOC and had the aircraft spin tested in various configurations - tail heavy, nose heavy etc - and recovery from a spin was normal.
Secondly, I did repeated stall exercises in the Cirrus which never dropped a wing. If you were flying straight and level and kept pulling back, the plane would violently shake but you still have aileron authority, you can keep the plane descending, stalled, wings level because of the cuffed wing profile which means that the outboard area of the wing where the ailerons is, remains unstalled. Only if you introduced yaw would it drop but was then easily recovered with rudder application.
As for the comment about needing to hold the autopilot button for a couple of seconds, that's also incorrect. A quick press of the button and the autopilot is off. In fact, depending on how it's been configured, if you hold the autopilot button for a couple of seconds, you can cause it to enter CWS mode - which means the aircraft will be commanded to hold it's current attitude - ie, nose angle, wing angles.
The fact remains that the aircraft wasn't flying on autopilot - too many variations in heading for it to have been active and, as previously said, for a pitch mode to be active, a roll mode needs to also be in use, which wasn't.
Firstly, when talking about a pilot slumped across the controls, I was referring to non-Cirrus aircraft. No way an incapacitated pilot can block controls on a Cirrus. Secondly, as an ex Cirrus owner and ex member of COPA, I would read everything I could about incidents in order to learn from them. The uncommanded initiation of CAPS was caused due to electrical interference which lead to a change in the systems - this was maybe 6 or 7 years ago so I very much doubt that could repeat itself, especially as this aircraft would have had CAPS refitted a year or so ago.
Whilst talking of the refitting, it's something that the maintenance operators have experience with, so no big deal. I also recall the SB to check the propellant because some got wet....
I also participated in CPPP trainings and let's take your example of an uncommanded parachute deployment - once the chute has been deployed, you are no longer in command of the aircraft, so what would you, as pilot at 9500feet do? Right. Call up and say what's what, let people know where you are in case you land in trees or something, just get the emergency services moving.
Let's now go with your thought that maybe the chute deployed erroneously, due to MIF, was incorrectly deployed wrapping itself around the aircraft - the aircraft became uncontrollable and the pilot was looking to regain control somehow hence he was more concerned with aviate than communicate. Reasonable assumption, but the reality is BRS systems are fitted in thousands of aircraft globally and for one to first self deploy and then mis-deploy is unheard of. As you can see, you need an erroneous deployment of the chute AND a misdeployment of the chute for that scenario to occur. That aircraft had been flying frequently after the repack so I'm pretty sure that a MIF can be ruled out.
Let's reduce this to a minimum - let's say he had commanded CAPS deployment and it mis-deployed. Why would he do that? First, there seems to be a myth that Cirrus pilots will, without hesitation, pull the chute at the first sign of trouble. That's not true. At 9500 feet you have a lot of time to trouble shoot, say, if you have engine issues; you will first check the usual suspects - fuel, air, spark - before looking for a suitable location and, if none available, then consider deploying CAPS. No Cirrus pilot would pull at 9500 feet unless he'd totally lost control, had structural failure and saw no way out which is why I'd rule both a commanded and uncommanded deployment of CAPS out.
Firstly, on the one hand you're hypothesising that the CAPS system deployed without command and then you're suggesting that the pilot tried to deploy it but it failed. If I was still a Cirrus owner, I'd be very worried about such theories because we buy the aircraft because of the additional safety offered by the BRS..... If BRS was so unreliable that it "might" ignite itself without command but then, when required, "might not" ignite, I doubt we would be paying so much for such a system, agree? BRS has a proven track record when operated within its parameters. And the data point before the upset showed a cruise climb of around 120KIAS, 15 seconds later they were dropping at 3700fpm at 90KIAS which means it wasn't deployed at too high a speed.
Secondly, a mayday call will always alert ATC as to what is going on, they can offer advise as to nearest airfield if necessary and raise awareness of ground units. Thirdly. how does a plane suddenly become inverted? Without external intervention? For me, his flight path is indicative of a pilot hand flying with the plane trimmed for cruise climb. If, as you hypothesise, he pulled the chute whilst inverted, how did he become inverted? I've flown through enough clouds to know that although they can be bumpy, they're not going to throw you on your back; the pilot was both experienced and current enough to know what he was doing. In order for that theory to be correct, something else had to have happened first, throwing the plane on its back. And knowing that the flight was in and out of some pretty heavy clouds with the freezing level in the clouds, I'd go with that. The plane iced up, stalled, descended like a brick. Nothing to do with CAPS.
But that doesn't explain why no recovery was initiated. Which can be answered by Occam's Razor. No recovery was initiated because the pilot was incapacitated. That's no negative inference on the pilot, it's just something which fits the story with the minimum number of external requirements....
Secondly, I did repeated stall exercises in the Cirrus which never dropped a wing. If you were flying straight and level and kept pulling back, the plane would violently shake but you still have aileron authority, you can keep the plane descending, stalled, wings level because of the cuffed wing profile which means that the outboard area of the wing where the ailerons is, remains unstalled. Only if you introduced yaw would it drop but was then easily recovered with rudder application.
As for the comment about needing to hold the autopilot button for a couple of seconds, that's also incorrect. A quick press of the button and the autopilot is off. In fact, depending on how it's been configured, if you hold the autopilot button for a couple of seconds, you can cause it to enter CWS mode - which means the aircraft will be commanded to hold it's current attitude - ie, nose angle, wing angles.
The fact remains that the aircraft wasn't flying on autopilot - too many variations in heading for it to have been active and, as previously said, for a pitch mode to be active, a roll mode needs to also be in use, which wasn't.
Firstly, when talking about a pilot slumped across the controls, I was referring to non-Cirrus aircraft. No way an incapacitated pilot can block controls on a Cirrus. Secondly, as an ex Cirrus owner and ex member of COPA, I would read everything I could about incidents in order to learn from them. The uncommanded initiation of CAPS was caused due to electrical interference which lead to a change in the systems - this was maybe 6 or 7 years ago so I very much doubt that could repeat itself, especially as this aircraft would have had CAPS refitted a year or so ago.
Whilst talking of the refitting, it's something that the maintenance operators have experience with, so no big deal. I also recall the SB to check the propellant because some got wet....
I also participated in CPPP trainings and let's take your example of an uncommanded parachute deployment - once the chute has been deployed, you are no longer in command of the aircraft, so what would you, as pilot at 9500feet do? Right. Call up and say what's what, let people know where you are in case you land in trees or something, just get the emergency services moving.
Let's now go with your thought that maybe the chute deployed erroneously, due to MIF, was incorrectly deployed wrapping itself around the aircraft - the aircraft became uncontrollable and the pilot was looking to regain control somehow hence he was more concerned with aviate than communicate. Reasonable assumption, but the reality is BRS systems are fitted in thousands of aircraft globally and for one to first self deploy and then mis-deploy is unheard of. As you can see, you need an erroneous deployment of the chute AND a misdeployment of the chute for that scenario to occur. That aircraft had been flying frequently after the repack so I'm pretty sure that a MIF can be ruled out.
Let's reduce this to a minimum - let's say he had commanded CAPS deployment and it mis-deployed. Why would he do that? First, there seems to be a myth that Cirrus pilots will, without hesitation, pull the chute at the first sign of trouble. That's not true. At 9500 feet you have a lot of time to trouble shoot, say, if you have engine issues; you will first check the usual suspects - fuel, air, spark - before looking for a suitable location and, if none available, then consider deploying CAPS. No Cirrus pilot would pull at 9500 feet unless he'd totally lost control, had structural failure and saw no way out which is why I'd rule both a commanded and uncommanded deployment of CAPS out.
Firstly, on the one hand you're hypothesising that the CAPS system deployed without command and then you're suggesting that the pilot tried to deploy it but it failed. If I was still a Cirrus owner, I'd be very worried about such theories because we buy the aircraft because of the additional safety offered by the BRS..... If BRS was so unreliable that it "might" ignite itself without command but then, when required, "might not" ignite, I doubt we would be paying so much for such a system, agree? BRS has a proven track record when operated within its parameters. And the data point before the upset showed a cruise climb of around 120KIAS, 15 seconds later they were dropping at 3700fpm at 90KIAS which means it wasn't deployed at too high a speed.
Secondly, a mayday call will always alert ATC as to what is going on, they can offer advise as to nearest airfield if necessary and raise awareness of ground units. Thirdly. how does a plane suddenly become inverted? Without external intervention? For me, his flight path is indicative of a pilot hand flying with the plane trimmed for cruise climb. If, as you hypothesise, he pulled the chute whilst inverted, how did he become inverted? I've flown through enough clouds to know that although they can be bumpy, they're not going to throw you on your back; the pilot was both experienced and current enough to know what he was doing. In order for that theory to be correct, something else had to have happened first, throwing the plane on its back. And knowing that the flight was in and out of some pretty heavy clouds with the freezing level in the clouds, I'd go with that. The plane iced up, stalled, descended like a brick. Nothing to do with CAPS.
But that doesn't explain why no recovery was initiated. Which can be answered by Occam's Razor. No recovery was initiated because the pilot was incapacitated. That's no negative inference on the pilot, it's just something which fits the story with the minimum number of external requirements....
Another couple of myths that needs busting. A Cirrus in a spin can be recovered from the spin using standard technique - throttle idle, ailerons level, stick forward, rudder against the direction of rotation until the spin stops. Then recover. When designing the SR series, the manufacturer offered the chute as an "alternative means of compliance" which is why it was never tested in US and the myth was born. However in EASA land, they refused to accept this AMOC and had the aircraft spin tested in various configurations - tail heavy, nose heavy etc - and recovery from a spin was normal.
This had me scratching my head:
Firstly, when talking about a pilot slumped across the controls, I was referring to non-Cirrus aircraft. No way an incapacitated pilot can block controls on a Cirrus.
This would be laughable, but for the enormity of the tragedy:
That aircraft had been flying frequently after the repack so I'm pretty sure that a MIF can be ruled out.
A breathtakingly broad statement:
No Cirrus pilot would pull at 9500 feet unless he'd totally lost control, had structural failure and saw no way out which is why I'd rule both a commanded and uncommanded deployment of CAPS out.
As to the rest: I get it. I get it that someone needs to run interference to protect the interests of the aircraft manufacturer and distributors and maintainers, while there’s all the swirling publicity and emotion in the wake of an awful tragedy. I get it. And it may turn out that this tragedy is the consequence entirely of the pilot and not a serviceable aircraft.
My original post was in response to those who decided to leap to the keyboard and post that the cause of this tragedy was likely pilot incapacitation or – and it makes me sick to even contemplate it – to suggest some deliberate action by the pilot. Before the smoke had lifted on the site of the tragedy.
If you want to keep pressing for pilot incapacitation, that’s your choice, as is mine to continue suggesting different possibilities.
Naturally you, cncpc, will be happy to explain where you come from in Canada and what you fly. As it turns out, I have some cousins who live over there and a sister who happens to be visiting there for a few weeks. What's your location, so that I can organise a chat?
There are posters here who know who I am. I'm on the Canadian board under the same nick as here. I'm quite familiar with Pelmet and PilotDar and BigPistonsForever, and undoubtedly others who post here. I've never heard of you before this thread. But I've seen your kind on the other board, and very rarely, on here. It speaks volumes about you that one insightful poster has volunteered that you may be principally occupied with tearing the handle off yourself, as the priests ask in the confessional in Ireland, with one hand and typing utter ****e with the other.
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I live in Vernon, British Columbia. I started flying in 1968 and flew my last flight in 2015. I am a British Columbia mountain pilot, who has also flown in the US, Ireland, England, and continental Europe. I have time on 45 different types of airplanes and helicopters while I was flying. I hold the Canadian Airline Transport License and the Commercial Helicopter pilot license, and the US Commercial pilot license. In my last bit of working life, I was flight operations manager at a commuter airline with up to 24 pilots and 14 aircraft, before taking on the GM role. I have been qualified as an expert witness in air crash investigation in the High Court in Ireland (Haughton v. Irish Aviation Authority) and as an expert in aviation careers and aviation business in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Adonis v. Athanasiou)
Looking forward to speaking to those cousins.
Padraig
That’s some very interesting stuff, FMJ.
Yet a Cirrus salesman contributed to rather than busting that myth, as a consequence of this event which resulted in this unwelcome garden ornament.
Yet a Cirrus salesman contributed to rather than busting that myth, as a consequence of this event which resulted in this unwelcome garden ornament.
I wouldn’t pay too much attention to the actions of that Cirrus salesman. The accident report doesn’t show him in a good light. The pilot rated passenger said the salesman applied into spin rudder. No wonder it didn’t recover. https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/defaul...-083_final.pdf
No Cirrus pilot would pull at 9500 feet unless he'd totally lost control, had structural failure and saw no way out which is why I'd rule both a commanded and uncommanded deployment of CAPS out.
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