PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Cirrus down Gundaroo, 06/10/23
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Old 8th Oct 2023, 08:59
  #117 (permalink)  
Lead Balloon
 
Join Date: Nov 2001
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Originally Posted by FullMetalJackass
Another couple of myths that needs busting. A Cirrus in a spin can be recovered from the spin using standard technique - throttle idle, ailerons level, stick forward, rudder against the direction of rotation until the spin stops. Then recover. When designing the SR series, the manufacturer offered the chute as an "alternative means of compliance" which is why it was never tested in US and the myth was born. However in EASA land, they refused to accept this AMOC and had the aircraft spin tested in various configurations - tail heavy, nose heavy etc - and recovery from a spin was normal.

Secondly, I did repeated stall exercises in the Cirrus which never dropped a wing. If you were flying straight and level and kept pulling back, the plane would violently shake but you still have aileron authority, you can keep the plane descending, stalled, wings level because of the cuffed wing profile which means that the outboard area of the wing where the ailerons is, remains unstalled. Only if you introduced yaw would it drop but was then easily recovered with rudder application.

As for the comment about needing to hold the autopilot button for a couple of seconds, that's also incorrect. A quick press of the button and the autopilot is off. In fact, depending on how it's been configured, if you hold the autopilot button for a couple of seconds, you can cause it to enter CWS mode - which means the aircraft will be commanded to hold it's current attitude - ie, nose angle, wing angles.

The fact remains that the aircraft wasn't flying on autopilot - too many variations in heading for it to have been active and, as previously said, for a pitch mode to be active, a roll mode needs to also be in use, which wasn't.

Firstly, when talking about a pilot slumped across the controls, I was referring to non-Cirrus aircraft. No way an incapacitated pilot can block controls on a Cirrus. Secondly, as an ex Cirrus owner and ex member of COPA, I would read everything I could about incidents in order to learn from them. The uncommanded initiation of CAPS was caused due to electrical interference which lead to a change in the systems - this was maybe 6 or 7 years ago so I very much doubt that could repeat itself, especially as this aircraft would have had CAPS refitted a year or so ago.

Whilst talking of the refitting, it's something that the maintenance operators have experience with, so no big deal. I also recall the SB to check the propellant because some got wet....

I also participated in CPPP trainings and let's take your example of an uncommanded parachute deployment - once the chute has been deployed, you are no longer in command of the aircraft, so what would you, as pilot at 9500feet do? Right. Call up and say what's what, let people know where you are in case you land in trees or something, just get the emergency services moving.

Let's now go with your thought that maybe the chute deployed erroneously, due to MIF, was incorrectly deployed wrapping itself around the aircraft - the aircraft became uncontrollable and the pilot was looking to regain control somehow hence he was more concerned with aviate than communicate. Reasonable assumption, but the reality is BRS systems are fitted in thousands of aircraft globally and for one to first self deploy and then mis-deploy is unheard of. As you can see, you need an erroneous deployment of the chute AND a misdeployment of the chute for that scenario to occur. That aircraft had been flying frequently after the repack so I'm pretty sure that a MIF can be ruled out.

Let's reduce this to a minimum - let's say he had commanded CAPS deployment and it mis-deployed. Why would he do that? First, there seems to be a myth that Cirrus pilots will, without hesitation, pull the chute at the first sign of trouble. That's not true. At 9500 feet you have a lot of time to trouble shoot, say, if you have engine issues; you will first check the usual suspects - fuel, air, spark - before looking for a suitable location and, if none available, then consider deploying CAPS. No Cirrus pilot would pull at 9500 feet unless he'd totally lost control, had structural failure and saw no way out which is why I'd rule both a commanded and uncommanded deployment of CAPS out.

Firstly, on the one hand you're hypothesising that the CAPS system deployed without command and then you're suggesting that the pilot tried to deploy it but it failed. If I was still a Cirrus owner, I'd be very worried about such theories because we buy the aircraft because of the additional safety offered by the BRS..... If BRS was so unreliable that it "might" ignite itself without command but then, when required, "might not" ignite, I doubt we would be paying so much for such a system, agree? BRS has a proven track record when operated within its parameters. And the data point before the upset showed a cruise climb of around 120KIAS, 15 seconds later they were dropping at 3700fpm at 90KIAS which means it wasn't deployed at too high a speed.

Secondly, a mayday call will always alert ATC as to what is going on, they can offer advise as to nearest airfield if necessary and raise awareness of ground units. Thirdly. how does a plane suddenly become inverted? Without external intervention? For me, his flight path is indicative of a pilot hand flying with the plane trimmed for cruise climb. If, as you hypothesise, he pulled the chute whilst inverted, how did he become inverted? I've flown through enough clouds to know that although they can be bumpy, they're not going to throw you on your back; the pilot was both experienced and current enough to know what he was doing. In order for that theory to be correct, something else had to have happened first, throwing the plane on its back. And knowing that the flight was in and out of some pretty heavy clouds with the freezing level in the clouds, I'd go with that. The plane iced up, stalled, descended like a brick. Nothing to do with CAPS.

But that doesn't explain why no recovery was initiated. Which can be answered by Occam's Razor. No recovery was initiated because the pilot was incapacitated. That's no negative inference on the pilot, it's just something which fits the story with the minimum number of external requirements....
That’s some very interesting stuff, FMJ.

Another couple of myths that needs busting. A Cirrus in a spin can be recovered from the spin using standard technique - throttle idle, ailerons level, stick forward, rudder against the direction of rotation until the spin stops. Then recover. When designing the SR series, the manufacturer offered the chute as an "alternative means of compliance" which is why it was never tested in US and the myth was born. However in EASA land, they refused to accept this AMOC and had the aircraft spin tested in various configurations - tail heavy, nose heavy etc - and recovery from a spin was normal.
Yet a Cirrus salesman contributed to rather than busting that myth, as a consequence of this event which resulted in this unwelcome garden ornament.

This had me scratching my head:
Firstly, when talking about a pilot slumped across the controls, I was referring to non-Cirrus aircraft. No way an incapacitated pilot can block controls on a Cirrus.
Then why did you mention circumstances in which a pilot “slumps across the controls, locking them” – [b]your words[b] – in this thread? Surely you comprehended that the uninformed, hungry-for-facts people out there would take that as you suggesting that as an explanation for the tragedy. Surely.

This would be laughable, but for the enormity of the tragedy:
That aircraft had been flying frequently after the repack so I'm pretty sure that a MIF can be ruled out.
You say that because you want to focus on the least likely scenario: uncommanded in-flight deployment which I only mentioned because the CAPS Event data base includes two unilateral deployments, which I said were on the ground. But, in any event, that is meaningless to the question whether the system worked properly in the air if the pilot tried to use it. It’s like saying that an aircraft flew around for ages with an inbuilt ELT that didn’t do anything, so therefore we can rule out MIF if it continued not to do anything.


A breathtakingly broad statement:
No Cirrus pilot would pull at 9500 feet unless he'd totally lost control, had structural failure and saw no way out which is why I'd rule both a commanded and uncommanded deployment of CAPS out.
You know the skill levels and can predict the decisions, under pressure, of all Cirrus pilots. That’s a mighty big call. After all, the Cirrus salesman in the event I posted above seems to me to have made some decisions which I'd be surprised you'd support. Do you support those decisions?

As to the rest: I get it. I get it that someone needs to run interference to protect the interests of the aircraft manufacturer and distributors and maintainers, while there’s all the swirling publicity and emotion in the wake of an awful tragedy. I get it. And it may turn out that this tragedy is the consequence entirely of the pilot and not a serviceable aircraft.

My original post was in response to those who decided to leap to the keyboard and post that the cause of this tragedy was likely pilot incapacitation or – and it makes me sick to even contemplate it – to suggest some deliberate action by the pilot. Before the smoke had lifted on the site of the tragedy.

If you want to keep pressing for pilot incapacitation, that’s your choice, as is mine to continue suggesting different possibilities.
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