Further CASA CTAF problems shows not working!
How nice for you Howabout not to have met any complete A Holes of the sort of which I speak and thank you for pointing out the spelling mistake, I blame auto complete for it.
I agree with you about Australian troops, I was taught the same thing. In infantry we were warned "if your platoon sergeant suggests you ask for a transfer….. do it".
However this does not change the fact that there is a type of military mind that does not make the transition from the services to civvy street very well.
The Two I had the displeasure of working for were both ex RAAF engineering officers. Both freely admitted they had joined to get a free degree. Both left early ( i.e. they didn't retire) and took their training with them. Both were humourless automatons with the personality of a North Korean border guard. Both were highly resistant to any form of innovation or change. Both expected that their orders were to be obeyed to the letter. Mentally they had never left the service. Needless to say, both were incompetent at what they were allegedly hired to do.
Unfortunately I think the problem may be more widespread in the RAAF so do some others, the RAAF F111 reseal/reseal program:
The F111 Deseal Reseal Board of Inquiry - Volume 1
My comment: Now we know where CASA gets its punitive ideas - from former RAAF officers who rejected the current military discipline structures.
If you wish to read more, get a copy of "The rules of the game" by Andrew Gordon which details the management of the Royal Navy from 1870 to the something like the present day.
Also look for a copy of "On The Psychology Of Military Incompetence" by Norman Dixon.
These creatures do exist, hopefully not in great quantities, and if any are in CASA, as some suggest, thier presence is not beneficial.
I agree with you about Australian troops, I was taught the same thing. In infantry we were warned "if your platoon sergeant suggests you ask for a transfer….. do it".
However this does not change the fact that there is a type of military mind that does not make the transition from the services to civvy street very well.
The Two I had the displeasure of working for were both ex RAAF engineering officers. Both freely admitted they had joined to get a free degree. Both left early ( i.e. they didn't retire) and took their training with them. Both were humourless automatons with the personality of a North Korean border guard. Both were highly resistant to any form of innovation or change. Both expected that their orders were to be obeyed to the letter. Mentally they had never left the service. Needless to say, both were incompetent at what they were allegedly hired to do.
Unfortunately I think the problem may be more widespread in the RAAF so do some others, the RAAF F111 reseal/reseal program:
The F111 Deseal Reseal Board of Inquiry - Volume 1
Fuel tank workers worked under the threat of disciplinary action. As one said,
'I recall one of the fellows got his brother who worked in a lab in Melbourne to test it (SR51) and he was told to get out of the Section as quickly as possible. We accepted that opinion rather than the medical opinion, but there was little we could do about it because we were under strict orders. If we asked to be transferred we were told that we had to do our time, which was two years at that stage'2.
……….These perceptions were not unfounded. One worker who refused to re-enter the fuel tanks was charged with an offence, convicted and sentenced to seven days detention at Amberley4.
…..The traditional reaction of military organisations following safety failures is to hold an inquiry with the aim of seeing whether anyone is to blame. According to a Navy witness who gave evidence to the Board,
'This created a culture of punishment, where the essential theme was to identify and then to apportion blame, frequently to the last person in the chain of events. The underlying principle is that the threat of punishment influences Navy and individual behaviour to the extent that safety gains a higher priority'27.
However, a vital aspect of contemporary safety management is to encourage the reporting of near miss events and even violations of regulations which compromise safety, as was stressed in an earlier Chapter. Both Navy and Air Force (the Directorate of Flying Safety) are now giving prominence to the reporting of such incidents to facilitate organisational learning. A culture of blame suppresses reporting and makes such learning impossible. Both Navy and Air Force are therefore stressing the need for a no blame culture if reporting is to be encouraged.
[B]This raises the question of whether a no blame culture is consistent with the military discipline system. The Directorate of Flying Safety (DFS) has wrestled with this question and concluded that within a general no blame reporting culture there is still the possibility, indeed the desirability of taking disciplinary action for certain kinds of violations. Drawing on reason28, DFS advocates a 'substitution test',
'Is it likely that someone with the same training, experience etc would have made the same mistake (or violated procedures in the same way) given similar circumstances? If the answer is yes, the issue is more organisational/systemic, and therefore personal punishment is unlikely to be effective'29.
One implication of this principle is worth drawing out. The question is not simply whether a violation was deliberate or inadvertent. A violation may have been deliberate, but if others would have been likely to violate procedures in the same way, the violation should be regarded as system-induced and therefore not warranting punishment. Thus, if a worker takes a short cut in order to get the job done, and others are doing likewise, the substitution test requires that this be seen as a systemic matter. Again, if a worker fails to wear PPE, despite being instructed to, and others do likewise, the substitution test points to a systemic problem - the uncomfortable nature of the PPE, time constraints and so on.
At this point there is a striking and important convergence in approach with the discipline system. The Discipline Act provides30 that where a charge of negligent performance of duty arises, a service tribunal, in deciding whether the member behaved negligently, has regard to the standard of care of a reasonable person, which is assessed by having regard to the standard of care that would have been exercised by a reasonable person who was a member of the Defence Force with the same training and experience in the conduct which gave rise to the charge and engaging in the same conduct.
The Defence Force in its recently promulgated Prosecution Policy31 is sensitive to these issues and enables a prosecutor to take into account in effect the substitution test. It is also appropriate for the prosecutor to take into account whether disciplinary proceedings will have an adverse effect on the morale of a unit or are not in the interests of the service.
'I recall one of the fellows got his brother who worked in a lab in Melbourne to test it (SR51) and he was told to get out of the Section as quickly as possible. We accepted that opinion rather than the medical opinion, but there was little we could do about it because we were under strict orders. If we asked to be transferred we were told that we had to do our time, which was two years at that stage'2.
……….These perceptions were not unfounded. One worker who refused to re-enter the fuel tanks was charged with an offence, convicted and sentenced to seven days detention at Amberley4.
…..The traditional reaction of military organisations following safety failures is to hold an inquiry with the aim of seeing whether anyone is to blame. According to a Navy witness who gave evidence to the Board,
'This created a culture of punishment, where the essential theme was to identify and then to apportion blame, frequently to the last person in the chain of events. The underlying principle is that the threat of punishment influences Navy and individual behaviour to the extent that safety gains a higher priority'27.
However, a vital aspect of contemporary safety management is to encourage the reporting of near miss events and even violations of regulations which compromise safety, as was stressed in an earlier Chapter. Both Navy and Air Force (the Directorate of Flying Safety) are now giving prominence to the reporting of such incidents to facilitate organisational learning. A culture of blame suppresses reporting and makes such learning impossible. Both Navy and Air Force are therefore stressing the need for a no blame culture if reporting is to be encouraged.
[B]This raises the question of whether a no blame culture is consistent with the military discipline system. The Directorate of Flying Safety (DFS) has wrestled with this question and concluded that within a general no blame reporting culture there is still the possibility, indeed the desirability of taking disciplinary action for certain kinds of violations. Drawing on reason28, DFS advocates a 'substitution test',
'Is it likely that someone with the same training, experience etc would have made the same mistake (or violated procedures in the same way) given similar circumstances? If the answer is yes, the issue is more organisational/systemic, and therefore personal punishment is unlikely to be effective'29.
One implication of this principle is worth drawing out. The question is not simply whether a violation was deliberate or inadvertent. A violation may have been deliberate, but if others would have been likely to violate procedures in the same way, the violation should be regarded as system-induced and therefore not warranting punishment. Thus, if a worker takes a short cut in order to get the job done, and others are doing likewise, the substitution test requires that this be seen as a systemic matter. Again, if a worker fails to wear PPE, despite being instructed to, and others do likewise, the substitution test points to a systemic problem - the uncomfortable nature of the PPE, time constraints and so on.
At this point there is a striking and important convergence in approach with the discipline system. The Discipline Act provides30 that where a charge of negligent performance of duty arises, a service tribunal, in deciding whether the member behaved negligently, has regard to the standard of care of a reasonable person, which is assessed by having regard to the standard of care that would have been exercised by a reasonable person who was a member of the Defence Force with the same training and experience in the conduct which gave rise to the charge and engaging in the same conduct.
The Defence Force in its recently promulgated Prosecution Policy31 is sensitive to these issues and enables a prosecutor to take into account in effect the substitution test. It is also appropriate for the prosecutor to take into account whether disciplinary proceedings will have an adverse effect on the morale of a unit or are not in the interests of the service.
My comment: Now we know where CASA gets its punitive ideas - from former RAAF officers who rejected the current military discipline structures.
If you wish to read more, get a copy of "The rules of the game" by Andrew Gordon which details the management of the Royal Navy from 1870 to the something like the present day.
Also look for a copy of "On The Psychology Of Military Incompetence" by Norman Dixon.
These creatures do exist, hopefully not in great quantities, and if any are in CASA, as some suggest, thier presence is not beneficial.
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For instance, any objection to making the RFFS at Ballina a CAGRO is merely a demarcation issue.
Peuce is correct.
Airservices firies have gone through a selection and training process to fight fires, not to also provide an air traffic service.
What if individual firies don't want to perform a function they weren't hired for? What if during the training process they don't demonstrate the required skill or aptitude? What do you do with them? Some staff capable and some not?
Last we heard @ RAPAC early last year was that neither the firies or their union were interested in being obliged to provide even a UNICOM service.
As the man said:
My point is...it's possibly not as simple or clear cut as it may seem.
Sunfish: these two ex-RAAF officers (a valid statistical sample?) that you repeatedly refer to, and who seem to have influenced your opinions so much - I'd assumed they were long-term careerists, deeply ingrained in the ways of the military. Now we find they left early and had never intended to make a career of it - yet we're expected to accept that they epitomise the 'military mind'? If you yourself left early and never intended to make a career of it, why do they exemplify the 'military mind' any more than you do?
I'm sure there are plenty of books on military cockups and incompetence. Equally, there are plenty of books on military successes and ingenuity, which are inconvenient to your generalisations and go unmentioned. Instead, we're to draw our conclusions on current military thinking and competence from what happened at the Battle of Jutland...
Seems to be a case of carefully selecting and moulding the facts to suit your personal prejudices.
I'm sure there are plenty of books on military cockups and incompetence. Equally, there are plenty of books on military successes and ingenuity, which are inconvenient to your generalisations and go unmentioned. Instead, we're to draw our conclusions on current military thinking and competence from what happened at the Battle of Jutland...
Seems to be a case of carefully selecting and moulding the facts to suit your personal prejudices.
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So it was someone else at fault?
Actually, there were three major syntactical cock-ups in what you wrote. If you want to pontificate, at least re-read what you have written before hitting send. Bad syntax just sticks you in the 'bogan bin,' in the company of the few emotive crack-pots that inhabit this forum.
That said, Sunny, some of your posts on other threads are worth bottling. But, for mine, you've let a puzzling bias cloud your judgement on this one. I cannot reconcile the rationality with the irrationality of having a seeming hate on for the military.
You just let yourself down with emotive sniping.
As pointed out by INTBH, picking out two opportunists to make your point does not a valid sample make. Opportunists are not confined to the military.
You paint us as a unique, myopic breed lacking vision - in short, automatons. I'd like to know where the pioneers that trail-blazed international air routes way back when aviation was in its infancy fitted that stereotype. The majority were ex-AFC, ex-RAAF, or still serving. Check out DCT Bennett and Smithy as regards courage, initiative and vision.
..and thank you for pointing out the spelling mistake, I blame auto complete for it.
That said, Sunny, some of your posts on other threads are worth bottling. But, for mine, you've let a puzzling bias cloud your judgement on this one. I cannot reconcile the rationality with the irrationality of having a seeming hate on for the military.
You just let yourself down with emotive sniping.
As pointed out by INTBH, picking out two opportunists to make your point does not a valid sample make. Opportunists are not confined to the military.
You paint us as a unique, myopic breed lacking vision - in short, automatons. I'd like to know where the pioneers that trail-blazed international air routes way back when aviation was in its infancy fitted that stereotype. The majority were ex-AFC, ex-RAAF, or still serving. Check out DCT Bennett and Smithy as regards courage, initiative and vision.
Check out DCT Bennett
You should do that, it will illustrate exactly what Sunny is talking about.
Read the book, Star Dust Falling, by Jay Rayner, where the intransigence of AVM Don Bennett, and the way he ran British South American Airways, where he was completely resistant to change (particularly changes such as the use of DF, much less ADF --- none of that Yankee horses----t) created disaster.
DR and Astro for navigation, nothing more.
Or read the accident reports on the losses of the BSAA aircraft, the Government inquiries, and the company finally going out of business, having first established a second to none history of losses of life that made it, by far, the most dangerous of the post-WWII British airlines.
Back in the day, (I still have mine) we all had to have a copy of "The Complete Air Navigator", the textbook for aviation astro-nav, but???
There is no question of Don Bennett's critical contribution in WWII, aka Pathfinder Bennett, and equally, there is no doubt about his disastrous contribution to civil aviation.
There is no equating those who serve in the military in wartime (or any time), and then move into successful aviation careers in the civil aviation field, and the type who moved directly from military retirement straight in a government civil administrative job, with little (generally nil) civil experience, and all too often a mindset that was variously skeptical, suspicious or downright anti "profit orientated commerce".
The general attitude that "commercial aviation" has to be rules with a rod of iron, because "civvies" will automatically cut corners at every chance, to minimise cost, and completely ignore the safety of the passengers is hardly unknown.
In short, the "military mind" that Sunny is talking about is completely distrustful of civil aviation, the civil approach to administration, and all those employed therein.
Of course this doesn't apply to the majority of military/ex-military persons, but it does apply to enough that it has been a long running disaster for civil aviation in Australia, right back to civil aviation administration in Australia commencing as a branch office of the Air Ministry, under the redoubtable command (yes, command) of one Lt.Colonel H.C.Brindsmead, OBE, MC, first "Controller of Civil Aviation".
Thats a very long bow you had to draw LS to go back to Don Bennett. Despite the alleged carnage those "dreadful" RAAF chappies have wreaked on the civil aviation scene you completely missed the contribution of those from the same background who set up QANTAS post-war (I'm sure you must have flown with a few of them) and those who established TAA. I'm also certain that there wasn't an ex-RAAF member at the helm of Ansett as it was driven into the ground.
I have certainly met some who have virtually stated word for word your comment:
.
One bloke I came into contact with stated that it should be illegal to fly between Cowra, Young and Cootamundra without an autopilot even though bank runners were doing it day in and day out without any problems. I have also come into contact with absolute gentlemen who understood the different nature of civil and military aviation.
I would suggest that it is not their background that makes for the wrong sort of person in CASA but that it is their personality. Maybe CASA should introduce some form of psychometric testing to find those with the appropriate temperament to do the job.
I have certainly met some who have virtually stated word for word your comment:
The general attitude that "commercial aviation" has to be rules with a rod of iron, because "civvies" will automatically cut corners at every chance, to minimise cost, and completely ignore the safety of the passengers is hardly unknown.
One bloke I came into contact with stated that it should be illegal to fly between Cowra, Young and Cootamundra without an autopilot even though bank runners were doing it day in and day out without any problems. I have also come into contact with absolute gentlemen who understood the different nature of civil and military aviation.
I would suggest that it is not their background that makes for the wrong sort of person in CASA but that it is their personality. Maybe CASA should introduce some form of psychometric testing to find those with the appropriate temperament to do the job.
Lookleft wrote:
"I'm also certain that there wasn't an ex-RAAF member at the helm of Ansett as it was driven into the ground."
I agree that is correct.
But I wonder what Gary Twomey has gone on to do?
"I'm also certain that there wasn't an ex-RAAF member at the helm of Ansett as it was driven into the ground."
I agree that is correct.
But I wonder what Gary Twomey has gone on to do?
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Leady,
Off thread, I know, but Bennett didn't seem to do too bad with his DR/Astro when he flew the London/Jo'Burg route. Never been done before.
He was, I'm sure you know, classed as a 'Master Navigator.'
This is probably a topic for a 'non-combative' discourse, and I certainly did not know he was resistant to DF/ADF.
But maybe there is a loose (loose) parallel in a distrust of automation in the current age as regards an inability to hand-fly and just hit VNAV at 1500 in the climb.
Modernity is all fine and beaut, but I wonder about the basic skills that you and your compatriots had and whether there is not a (tenuous) connection.
Do you think there's anyone around today that could replicate Gordon Vette's effort?
Right, or wrong, maybe Bennett dreaded a degradation in what he regarded in his age as a threat to the fundamentals. Who knows? And no argument.
That said, I will attempt to source that book on Amazon in my dotage.
Cheers
Off thread, I know, but Bennett didn't seem to do too bad with his DR/Astro when he flew the London/Jo'Burg route. Never been done before.
He was, I'm sure you know, classed as a 'Master Navigator.'
This is probably a topic for a 'non-combative' discourse, and I certainly did not know he was resistant to DF/ADF.
But maybe there is a loose (loose) parallel in a distrust of automation in the current age as regards an inability to hand-fly and just hit VNAV at 1500 in the climb.
Modernity is all fine and beaut, but I wonder about the basic skills that you and your compatriots had and whether there is not a (tenuous) connection.
Do you think there's anyone around today that could replicate Gordon Vette's effort?
Right, or wrong, maybe Bennett dreaded a degradation in what he regarded in his age as a threat to the fundamentals. Who knows? And no argument.
That said, I will attempt to source that book on Amazon in my dotage.
Cheers
Thats a very long bow you had to draw LS to go back to Don Bennett
I didn't bring up Pathfinder Bennett, that was somebody else; but the terrible record of BSAA is a matter of fact, as was his refusal to fit anything in the way of avionics aids to the aircraft.
As I said, he made Sunny's point.
The official inquiries were unequivocal about his approach to operations, and their contribution to the loss of aircraft and lives.
Lookleft,
Once again, read and understand what I have actually said, not what you want me to have said.
who set up QANTAS post-war
Tootle pip!!
Quote:
who set up QANTAS post-war
What are you on about, Qantas has been around since about 1922, and started international services in the mid-1930s.
who set up QANTAS post-war
What are you on about, Qantas has been around since about 1922, and started international services in the mid-1930s.
The QANTAS that was established before WWII was a shadow of its former self after the war. Yes there was continuity during the period 1939-1945 but its international services had to be built from scratch and it needed its ex-RAAF people to do that. Yes you are correct LS you didn't bring up Don Bennett but in your usual pontificating style you expanded into areas of irrelevancy to demonstrate your superior knowledge on pretty well everything.
TTFN
TTFN
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an application was lodged to get this ala on the charts a long time ago and it still has not happened. The "incorrect" frequency has also been used for a long time. The slowness and difficulty in putting this long time strip on the map is inexcusable
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Somehow this thread started on CASA radio frequencies, deviated off onto the Australian military, and 5 screens later ends on QANTAS and World War II. Have got vertigo and am on instruments!
It is a fact that military-experienced persons were working recently in CASA: two individuals came from the military to work in the Authority, made changes to the AIP to do with radio frequencies in Class G, tried to deal with the industry fallout, then retreated back to the military, leaving the civilians amongst us to sort out the mess. I'm not blaming the military, but who in CASA hired them to do the dirty work of bashing more nails in the NAS coffin.
It is a fact that military-experienced persons were working recently in CASA: two individuals came from the military to work in the Authority, made changes to the AIP to do with radio frequencies in Class G, tried to deal with the industry fallout, then retreated back to the military, leaving the civilians amongst us to sort out the mess. I'm not blaming the military, but who in CASA hired them to do the dirty work of bashing more nails in the NAS coffin.
Howabout:
Howabout, I apologise if I haven't made myself clear. I don't have a "hate on for the military" at all> I said so in my opening post. I couldn't if I wanted to. I served, my daughter in law is RAAF, I worked with many fine RAAF people in aviation and deface businesses.
What I said was that there is a small proportion of people who enter the services who fall prey to a mindset that can exist only in a military culture and who wreak havoc in the services and in civvy street when they leave if they are allowed to get into positions of authority.
This is documented. Get a copy of "On The PsychologyOf Military Incompetence" by Dixon.
The only you can rightly construe as "RAAF bashing" is my personal observation is that I'e seenTwo of these characters close up who were ex RAAF. I've never seen an Army or Navy one.
I hope you won't think me flippant by saying it might be comforting as a RAAF pilot to have a tyrant as OIC squadron maintenance, but that attitude doesn't do much good for us civilian aviators.
you've let a puzzling bias cloud your judgement on this one. I cannot reconcile the rationality with the irrationality of having a seeming hate on for the military.
What I said was that there is a small proportion of people who enter the services who fall prey to a mindset that can exist only in a military culture and who wreak havoc in the services and in civvy street when they leave if they are allowed to get into positions of authority.
This is documented. Get a copy of "On The PsychologyOf Military Incompetence" by Dixon.
The only you can rightly construe as "RAAF bashing" is my personal observation is that I'e seenTwo of these characters close up who were ex RAAF. I've never seen an Army or Navy one.
I hope you won't think me flippant by saying it might be comforting as a RAAF pilot to have a tyrant as OIC squadron maintenance, but that attitude doesn't do much good for us civilian aviators.
Your tune has changed, Sunfish!
We're not talking about individuals? So 'we' must be talking about a collective phenomenon.
Oh, so we are talking about a few individuals!
If that's the case, your argument fails and your repeated references to this military element who are apparently to blame for everything are exposed as either unsupportable generalisations or simple malice which you attempt to prop up with bluster.
We are not talking about the personal attributes of individuals. Furthermore this mindset is exclusive to the military and has no "civilian" counterpart except perhaps in the imagined behaviour of very senior judges.
What I said was that there is a small proportion of people who enter the services who fall prey to a mindset that can exist only in a military culture and who wreak havoc in the services and in civvy street when they leave if they are allowed to get into positions of authority.
If that's the case, your argument fails and your repeated references to this military element who are apparently to blame for everything are exposed as either unsupportable generalisations or simple malice which you attempt to prop up with bluster.
Thread Starter
Radar Man. Fascinating. Can you explain further re the military people making the CTAF frequency changes then retreating back to the military. How do people go back? Did this actually happen?
I must admit I did speak to an ex military bloke at CASA Operations and he was convinced the wind back was correct with circuit calls to be on the area frequency as they were in the 1950s.
Also Mark Skidmore has made it very clear he also supports the wind back so aircraft monitoring area frequencies can hear circuit traffic at un map marked airports.
He says he is not concerned about the potential blocking of ATC instructions to IFR aircraft. These Ex RAAF people stick together . A sort of group think. They are not concerned that countries such as the USA , Canada and the U.K. have no similar requirements.. In fact most ex military types have no real interest in how other leading aviation countries run there airspace procedures.
Copying the best from around the world is not in their training!
I must admit I did speak to an ex military bloke at CASA Operations and he was convinced the wind back was correct with circuit calls to be on the area frequency as they were in the 1950s.
Also Mark Skidmore has made it very clear he also supports the wind back so aircraft monitoring area frequencies can hear circuit traffic at un map marked airports.
He says he is not concerned about the potential blocking of ATC instructions to IFR aircraft. These Ex RAAF people stick together . A sort of group think. They are not concerned that countries such as the USA , Canada and the U.K. have no similar requirements.. In fact most ex military types have no real interest in how other leading aviation countries run there airspace procedures.
Copying the best from around the world is not in their training!
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OK, Sunny. Getting involved in invective isn't my preference either.
But I do get a bit on the protective side when generalizations tarnish the many good people for whom I worked.
That said, you wrote a rather good dissertation on the traits that make a 'psychopath' some time back and I read it with interest. I worked for one that delighted in using rank and humiliating the 'lesser' a few years before I bailed.
This bloke had no inter-personal skills, just rank to back him up. He was a bully, but I seriously doubt the type is confined to the military.
Dick: I think you've got your wires crossed. While NAS, overall, was a cobbled-together piece of rubbish, with no justification - including no cost/benefit and no risk analysis - I was open minded on CTAF and told CASA so.
In respect of your constant charges about 'RAAF Group Captains,' and I never reached that heady rank, I was dealing with pure civilians that had never done military time.
As the mil representative, in an open forum in Canberra, I declared that we were minor players, but would live with what ever decision was made by CASA!
The wrong decision was made, IMHO, but it was a CASA decision, not a RAAF decision.
Your military bashing is becoming tiresome. We were far more open to logical argument than you ever gave us credit for.
Glad I'm retired and out of this repetitive BS that just pushes a personal barrow.
But I do get a bit on the protective side when generalizations tarnish the many good people for whom I worked.
That said, you wrote a rather good dissertation on the traits that make a 'psychopath' some time back and I read it with interest. I worked for one that delighted in using rank and humiliating the 'lesser' a few years before I bailed.
This bloke had no inter-personal skills, just rank to back him up. He was a bully, but I seriously doubt the type is confined to the military.
Dick: I think you've got your wires crossed. While NAS, overall, was a cobbled-together piece of rubbish, with no justification - including no cost/benefit and no risk analysis - I was open minded on CTAF and told CASA so.
In respect of your constant charges about 'RAAF Group Captains,' and I never reached that heady rank, I was dealing with pure civilians that had never done military time.
As the mil representative, in an open forum in Canberra, I declared that we were minor players, but would live with what ever decision was made by CASA!
The wrong decision was made, IMHO, but it was a CASA decision, not a RAAF decision.
Your military bashing is becoming tiresome. We were far more open to logical argument than you ever gave us credit for.
Glad I'm retired and out of this repetitive BS that just pushes a personal barrow.
Thread Starter
Howabout. You describe the Australian NAS as a " cobbled - together piece of rubbish".
I put a tremendous amount of time together with experts from Qantas in putting this proposal together. I travelled around the world asking advice from airspace regulators in the UK , France , Canada , New Zealand and the USA.
That's how I was successful in business- travelling around the world and copying the best.
As the NAS is basically the Canadian and US airspace system what part is " rubbish".
Is it their CTAF procedures? Or could it be that Airline aircraft mostly remain in a minimum of Class E airspace not " do it yourself , calling in the blind " G airspace?
As it's clear you or others with similar views have had influence in never letting this system come in - as well as having parts being wound back- it's important you explain your particular reasons and what parts are rubbish?
Would you be prepared to talk to me about this?
I put a tremendous amount of time together with experts from Qantas in putting this proposal together. I travelled around the world asking advice from airspace regulators in the UK , France , Canada , New Zealand and the USA.
That's how I was successful in business- travelling around the world and copying the best.
As the NAS is basically the Canadian and US airspace system what part is " rubbish".
Is it their CTAF procedures? Or could it be that Airline aircraft mostly remain in a minimum of Class E airspace not " do it yourself , calling in the blind " G airspace?
As it's clear you or others with similar views have had influence in never letting this system come in - as well as having parts being wound back- it's important you explain your particular reasons and what parts are rubbish?
Would you be prepared to talk to me about this?