New MDX - Five Dead Williamtown Never Found

[Traffic_Is_Er_Was]

So all of that rigmarole

No, it was the system. It was 30 years ago, and coordination similar to that probably happened 100 times a day throughout the country. You cannot look back at the system as it was in those times, and apply todays expectations to it. Airspace management in the main was vastly different, and this incident was subject to the rules in play at that time. Cries of "why didn't they just....?", or "he should have been...." are just specious.

[RatsoreA]

So all of that rigmarole

Hardly. I think you have somewhat missed the narrative...

To summarise, of the 3 areas that the flightpath crossed, the first one, Williamtown, said yes, immediately, providing a level change was made. If it were me, I would happily go up or down a thousand to avoid getting a nice new 206 shaped hood ornament.

The other 2, said, no, not night VMC and the other was I'll check the weather. Them saying no had in no way anything to do with the preceding traffic.

I think that's the substantive point that Dick's trying to make.

Dick has gone on national TV and blamed the RAAF for the deaths of those 5 men. That is a fact. I think I have demonstrated that the RAAF, Williamtown RAAF base, the system the controller was operating under and all the other things Dick is using to push his 'reform Williamtown airspace' agenda is nothing other than sensationalism devoid of facts.

[Dick Smith]

The problem of a clearance in the next sector is a furphy.

The clearance could have been given and any necessary holding could have taken place in a far safer way over the Willy NDB.

It's the RAAF organisation as a whole I am blaming for these deaths. Same can happen this winter as it is illegal to put in a flight plan over the lower and direct terrain overhead Willy if the airspace is active.

The only reason. I repeat only reason that the aircraft had to head towards the mountainous country was the RAAF regulations and roadblock airspace .

Look at equivalent British, Canadian and US military airspace . They all do not restrict flight planning over the top of facilities in similar circumstances.

On the night in question there were no military operations taking place yet the flight planning restriction remained - and it still exists today.

My next plan is to publically warn young Australians in a major campaign not to join an organisation which is so dis functional and so lacks leadership that it can't copy the best from around the world.. Even after 30 years.

I am sure more lives will be lost. Most likely with RAAF personnel. That's what happens when regulations remain in the 1930s.

You are all deluding yourselves if you don't admit there are serious problems of resistance to change within the regulatory side of the military ATC system.

[RatsoreA]

The problem of a clearance in the next sector is a furphy.

Demonstrate how? I can show you a transcript of the conversation between FIS 5, Sector 1, Williamtown and Approach that clearly states who said what and why. But I don't need to send you that, you already have a copy I have emailed you, but if anyone else wants it, please PM, and I will share.

The clearance could have been given and any necessary holding could have taken place in a far safer way over the Willy NDB.

Woulda, coulda, shoulda, didn't. That was the regulatory framework put out by the DT back then. The RAAF, and the controller at Williamtown had absolutley nothing to do with that. If you will recall, I have mentioned that the Williamtown controller said almost immediatly that MDX could transit through the Williamtown zone. In fact, the only person that ever even spoke to MDX was FIS 5.

The only reason. I repeat only reason that the aircraft had to head towards the mountainous country was the RAAF regulations and roadblock airspace.

That is simply not true. The PIC CHOSE that route. If the "RAAF Roadblock" was such and impermeable membrane blocking all civilian traffic going north and south, how was AZC, a 206 able to get through a scant 5-10 minutes before. There was no change to the classification of the zone in between the time of AZC and MDX.

flight planning restriction remained

Can you offer some proof of this? A 30 year old ERSA? A 30 year old copy of some sort of AIP?

You are all deluding yourselves if you don't admit there are serious problems of resistance to change within the regulatory side of the military ATC system.

I am sure there are. Across the entire ADF there is resistance to change to a lot of things, because traditions, or human nature or whatever. But I wouldn't be able to comment on that, as that is not an area where I have any first hand experience. What I do have experience in is, flying between Brisbane and Sydney, VFR and NVFR and have never ever been held up anywhere near Williamtown.

[allthecoolnamesarego]

Rat,
Good posts you are providing. Thanks.

Now I'm a little slow, so please be gentle on me. I'm not very good at picking up hidden agendas etc, so might be missing something.

I'm not sure what all the kerfuffle is about the Willy airspace. It seems that if one wants to transit coastal, you need (according to the AIP) to get a clearance and have enough fuel for 30 mins of holding.
A flight plan should be submitted to reduce delays.
Talk to ATC and get a clearance, or hold.

If this doesn't suit you, VFR can track via Maitland/Dugong (inland) without clearance.

As RatsoreA has pointed out, the MDX accident had very little to o with ATC issues, and more to do with pilot choices.

So what is the big deal about Willy airspace? Have fuel to hold, or go inland?
Am I missing something?

[RatsoreA]

Coolnames,

Thank you!

Am I missing something?

I have no doubts that sometimes it can be a bit of a P.I.T.A to get through Williamtown. Never happened to me, but I am sure it does happen. And I am sure Dick is right in the fact that there is room for reform, and making it easier to do so.

What I object to is hijacking an accident that never had anything to do with the issue he is trying to get resolution on. Especially when the facts do not match up with the rhetoric that he is using.

I have no affinity for the RAAF, or ASA, or CASA. I do have one for cold hard facts and the story they tell.

[sunnySA]

MDX was VFR FFS. On what basis did S1 presume to know the actual weather where MDX was going?

Yes, MDX was VFR, which is the whole point. The pilot made a conscious decision to continue flight his flight into known/forecast non-VMC.

Whilst not privy to the information at hand I presume S1 advised that his airspace was "NOT Night VMC" based on Area Forecast and/or Pilot Reports.

And correct me if I'm wrong, the rules at the time were such that if Military Airspace abutted Civil Airspace (that is, contiguous airspace) then the clearance through one constituted a clearance through the other. Therefore if Willy had issued a clearance to MDX then MSX would have had to descend to remain clear of the contiguous airspace.

Anyways, this is all probably just a rehash of what was discussed at the time of the accident. Discussed at the aero club, discussed within RAAF, discussed within SY ATC, discussed within SY FS. We are now 30 years later, 20-20 hindsight, availability of the internet to have these discussions. Unfortunately none of this changes the outcome, the tragic loss of life when the pilot made a conscious decision to continue flight into known/forecast non-VMC.

[Lead Balloon]

I would happily go up or down a thousand to avoid getting a nice new 206 shaped hood ornament.

This is an example of reasoning that is almost completely disconnected with real-world risks and real-world risk mitigation.

A gross over-statement of the risk, so as to justify unnecessary procedures.

If you've ever been in a bugsmasher closing on another bugsmasher on the same track and level VFR, you'd know how hard you would have to try to deliberately collide with it. Assuming you don't want to deliberately collide with it, and what's more you've even been alerted to its existence, I reckon the chances of a collision are about the chances of the sun burning out tomorrow. You do what you do on the extraordinarily rare occasion it happens OCTA: overtake, in accordance with the rules of the air.

I repeat: I know it was the system. But Australia still has millions of cubic metres of airspace tied up on the basis of this thinking. Transitting Williamtown is like entering a universe in which every aircraft must be treated like Air Force 1 surrounded by a Romeo, and the remotest possibility that one civilian aircraft might come near another aircraft - civilian or otherwise - is a problem. We're talking airborne aircraft numbers that can usually be counted on our fingers. I realise that some of them go really fast and they don't have much fuel reserve when it's time to come home, but jeez, seriously? 1,000 light aircraft could fly at 500' without clearance from Broughton Island to Nobbies every day for a 1,000 years and the chances of a mid air with the hotshots and RPTs out of Williamtown would be still be infinitesimally small.

[Lead Balloon]

Yes, MDX was VFR, which is the whole point. The pilot made a conscious decision to continue flight his flight into known/forecast non-VMC.

You don't know that.

But let's assume it's true. The weather in the Williamtown area was, based on the same assumption, VMC.

He could have been cleared into Williamtown at the level he was at. And let's think really hard about what option should have been obvious to him and offered to him in the circumstances of being unable to proceed in VMC beyond Williamtown. Any guesses? The answer involves a horizontal area of tarmac on which aircraft land.

[sunnySA]

The answer involves a horizontal area of tarmac on which aircraft land.

Yep, he'd flown over a few of those already.

[Lead Balloon]

So what? He was in VMC and would have remained in VMC in the Williamtown zone.

[le Pingouin]

And because the pilot wasn't prepared to wait they died. End of story. He made that decision, no one else.

[Dick Smith]

What most important is the OCTA airspace south of Willy was cavok and the LSA was 1300'. So no problem at all NVMC.

These military people will do everything they can to blame others. It's a type of " groupthink" they must learn.

My concern is the present day huge roadblock airspace. Same accident can happen again however more likely pilot will be told going in the wrong direction because of changes I made in the 90s. Pilot will be talking to a person with a radar screen.

What's wrong with FAA airspace dimensions and MOAs rather than restricted airspace? I know- never ever ask advice or copy worlds best practice. We in the RAAF know it all.

[Dick Smith]

The pilot had no idea how long the " wait " might be. He wanted to minimise risk. He made an error on that -contributed by rediculous airspace design. Still the same 30 years later.

[RatsoreA]

Leadie,

This is an example of reasoning that is almost completely disconnected with real-world risks and real-world risk mitigation.

Now, add night time to that equation. And it wasn't CAVOK. And add in that procedural separation required a level change to mitigate the risk of MDX running up the back of AZC. People win the lotto everyday, so whilst the odds are small, they do come up. I personally had an F100 shaped hood ornament near Mt Isa a few weeks back, and that was during the day, in 8/8ths blue sky.

The ATSB archive has plenty of mid-air collisions for you to peruse that would indicate that the sun has burned out for quite a few people over the years. With the millions and millions of cubic airspace that Australia has, there are still people trying to break the laws of physics that says 2 bodies can't occupy the same point in space and time as each other.

And let's think really hard about what option should have been obvious to him and offered to him in the circumstances of being unable to proceed in VMC beyond Williamtown. Any guesses?

My guess, would be a bad case of press-on-itis. Which the PIC caught, just not over the coast, because of the decisions he made. He was offered and given tracking options for a landing at Williamtown when sh!t got serious, but not so serious that he couldn't get out with nothing but a minor scare, but, once he thought things would be fine, the PIC declined that offer, and elected to 'continue on our original flight plane, via Singleton'.

[RatsoreA]

The pilot had no idea how long the " wait " might be.

This is true.

He wanted to minimise risk.

This, is not.

The PIC had no idea how long the wait might be, and elected not to even find out how long the wait would be. 5 and a half minutes, and he said, don't worry about it. The PIC KNEW that towards the west was rugged high ground. The BT's have been there for quite some time. Doing a couple of orbits over the coast in VMC is somehow a higher risk that flying to high, rugged terrain with bad Wx? I would like to have that reasoning explained to me.

Dick, the only one blamestorming, seems to be you. The only person that has gone on the record to apportion blame for this is you, towards a source that was not at fault.

When you took that girl to court for defamation, I assume to court requested you to provide them with evidence of your claims? All I ask is that you provide evidence of the claims you have made here, like I have. I have source/reference material to everything I have said.

I support your cause to reform the airspace around Williamtown. I do not support you using the RAAF as a scape goat for this accident because it suits your agenda.

[Bill Pike]

We are all aware of the "Swiss Cheese" model for aircraft accidents. If Mick in -MDX had been permitted to flight plan coastal, as he should have been, the other factors would not most likely have lined up and he and his pax would most likely not have been lost. On Friday June 1st 2001 I was quoted in the Australian (as AOPA President of the day) as "demanding" American regs in this country, including airspace regs. We were given US airspace classifications, such as "E" and such but "redefined" so that E ended up more like C . The reasons given for US regs not being applicable were as many as they were ridiculous. "The US are rewriting their regs" (hasn't happened yet) "We have a different legal system so their regs wouldn't work here" (from CASA's legal department). The truth is DCA/CAA/CASA etc like all bureaucrats like power and so they like proscriptive regs . In the meantime we have been stalled in the reg rewrite for twenty years. Un stuffing believable but true . At least part of the reason is that pilots here understand our system and like pilots everywhere don't like change. We even have regions with "rules" that do not reflect those that are written. Dick has his own way of attracting attention, so hate him as you wish, but having flown in less restrictive countries he is apoplectic at being constantly led along the garden path by those who promise change and do not deliver. I share his frustration. Our military have more restricted airspace than the the US and in most of theirs VFR can transit unhindered. I confess that I was startled when i was allowed over Travis Airforce Base (major transport base) in the US at 3,000 VFR without a clearance but that is how it worked. ' People like Dick are not just "private pilots", they are ambassadors for freedom. If he was given support instead of this nit picking we might get somewhere.

[Lead Balloon]

Comments embedded in square brackets.

Now, add night time to that equation. [So what?] And it wasn't CAVOK. [You don't know that. I thought the accepted facts were that Williamtown was VMC?] And add in that procedural separation required a level change to mitigate the risk of MDX running up the back of AZC. [That was the rule. My point is that the rule isn't based on real-world risks or real-world risk mitigation.] People win the lotto everyday, so whilst the odds are small, they do come up. [Yet bugsmashers on the same track and level OCTA don't collide with each other each night. I wonder why.] I personally had an F100 shaped hood ornament near Mt Isa a few weeks back, and that was during the day, in 8/8ths blue sky. [Which has precisely nothing to do with the risk of collision of one bugsmasher catching up with another known bugsmasher on the same track and level - actually on the same approximate track and approximate level. Again, you're implicitly grossly overstating the actual risk of clearing MDX at the level he was at.

[RatsoreA]

You don't know that. I thought the accepted facts were that Williamtown was VMC?

Yes, I do.

It was VMC, but not CAVOK. There was some scattered cloud. I can provide a reference for this should it be required.

you're implicitly grossly overstating the actual risk

No, I am not.

At no stage did I attach a risk score to this type of operation. I stand by my assertion that the risk is present, and should be mitigated. Is it *really* that difficult for you to change levels by 1000 feet to remove that risk? An ounce of prevention is worth a ton of cure.

Regardless of this, no amount of arguing can change the FACT that it was the PIC decision to do what he did, rather than wait. Was those five lives not worth a few minutes?

[Lead Balloon]

You've grossly over-stated the risk twice. You've twice expressed the "hood ornament" risk as a certainty.

VMC but not CAVOK? A pointless point.

A few minutes? You've already conceded that the PIC didn't know that's all it would take.