Radar Coverage at Ballina
Originally Posted by Sledled
Contrary to all the garbage talked, Class E is not dependent on having radar coverage, all it means is procedural control of IFR.
The only REASON E exists is to allow VFR unfettered access to IFR airspace (John and Martha told me so). In the situation that MJbow2 described, VFR should have "got lost" and then, with some commonsense coord, the IFRs would have sorted it out. Or is that not taught any more?
Make it controlled to the ground or get rid of E completely. This half-baked free-for-all is nonsense. It's 2015, not the John Wayne 70s and 80s.
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Leadie,
This is an interesting read.
http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/wopapu...eport_pdf.ashx
Are you sure you are pointing at the right folks?
Lots of history here to be read!
I might try to read it too
This is an interesting read.
http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/wopapu...eport_pdf.ashx
Are you sure you are pointing at the right folks?
Lots of history here to be read!
I might try to read it too
Bloggs,
You talk the complete nonsense that is so typical of "expert professional" Australian pilots who have no real experience of anywhere else -- and no understanding of the risk management basis of ICAO airspace designation.
As I have often quoted Mick Toller, I will again: "Australia is an aviation Galapagos, where all sort of aviation mutations have developed in splendid isolation".
What John and Martha said is correct, but effectively misrepresented by you, before "alphabet soup" airspace was standardised by ICAO, what is now E in USA used to be called VFR exempt --- or put another way, virtually all US airspace is "controlled airspace", but for most of the non-TCA/TCTA ( as it was then called) airspace below 10,000' was "VFR exempt".
What all you anti-E "experts" seem to forget is that E is widely used, worldwide, including western Europe, not just USA.
As an aside, neither Europe or US is going to require anything like the ADS-B fitment that Australia has mandated ---- because they can do proper risk analysis.
Indeed, we can do it here, as well, but the rational results are rejected by irrational pilots.
As one well known Regional pilot repeatedly told us:
This same pilot did a study tour of US, saw the whole system working, but when he returned to Australia, his words were to the effect : "It will never work in Australia, Australian pilots could not cope" --- as far as I am concerned, his remarks were an insult to every Australian pilot.
Don't you think it is time for Australia to grow up, after all, our rather poor loss of separation record, and our actual collision record ( remember how small aviation is in AU, compared to US) is nothing to write home about.
Tootle pip!!
You talk the complete nonsense that is so typical of "expert professional" Australian pilots who have no real experience of anywhere else -- and no understanding of the risk management basis of ICAO airspace designation.
As I have often quoted Mick Toller, I will again: "Australia is an aviation Galapagos, where all sort of aviation mutations have developed in splendid isolation".
What John and Martha said is correct, but effectively misrepresented by you, before "alphabet soup" airspace was standardised by ICAO, what is now E in USA used to be called VFR exempt --- or put another way, virtually all US airspace is "controlled airspace", but for most of the non-TCA/TCTA ( as it was then called) airspace below 10,000' was "VFR exempt".
What all you anti-E "experts" seem to forget is that E is widely used, worldwide, including western Europe, not just USA.
As an aside, neither Europe or US is going to require anything like the ADS-B fitment that Australia has mandated ---- because they can do proper risk analysis.
Indeed, we can do it here, as well, but the rational results are rejected by irrational pilots.
As one well known Regional pilot repeatedly told us:
" We must address the perception of a risk, even when there is no risk".
Don't you think it is time for Australia to grow up, after all, our rather poor loss of separation record, and our actual collision record ( remember how small aviation is in AU, compared to US) is nothing to write home about.
Tootle pip!!
Last edited by LeadSled; 22nd May 2015 at 15:18. Reason: typo and minor edit
Jaba
A quote from the Airspace 2000 report
The above could be translated as: The ATC union, and one of the two pilot unions would not accept change. Poor old Australian pilots and ATC couldn't cope with what was pretty standard in the rest of the first world -- in their opinion.
In fact, Australian pilots seem to cope just fine from the first time they ever leave Australia airspace, and venture into the big wide world.
NAS followed Airspace 2000, and again generated huge resistance from the same sources. The group of pilots (Qantas) who had been flying outside Australia since forever never ever had a problem with either Airspace 2000 or NAS.
Do you remember the "NAS trial" --- it ran for 12 months, and was, in fact a resounding success. When the above mentioned pilot union realised that the trial had not only not failed, but had been a resounding success by every audit measure during that 12 months, as you would expect, because it was only what most of the rest of the world had done for years, strike was threatened.
Ansett was in a very poor state financially at the time, and exerted what I regard as entirely unconscionable pressure on Mick Toller, because of the threatened strike. CASA pulled the plug on NAS as a result.
There was an extensive safety case to justify NAS, that showed it to be more safe ( lower risk) than the existing Australian system, there was never a safety case to revert to the more risky/less safe old system.
There was never a risk/safety case to justify pulling the plug on NAS.
Jaba, I was in the middle of this for years, I know exactly what happened and why.
Tootle pip!!
A quote from the Airspace 2000 report
However, in some instances these reforms have been controversial. Aspects of the Airspace 2000 model have been criticized by members of the aviation industry for reducing the safety of air travel in Australia by placing unrealistic expectations upon pilots and air traffic controllers (ATCs)
In fact, Australian pilots seem to cope just fine from the first time they ever leave Australia airspace, and venture into the big wide world.
NAS followed Airspace 2000, and again generated huge resistance from the same sources. The group of pilots (Qantas) who had been flying outside Australia since forever never ever had a problem with either Airspace 2000 or NAS.
Do you remember the "NAS trial" --- it ran for 12 months, and was, in fact a resounding success. When the above mentioned pilot union realised that the trial had not only not failed, but had been a resounding success by every audit measure during that 12 months, as you would expect, because it was only what most of the rest of the world had done for years, strike was threatened.
Ansett was in a very poor state financially at the time, and exerted what I regard as entirely unconscionable pressure on Mick Toller, because of the threatened strike. CASA pulled the plug on NAS as a result.
There was an extensive safety case to justify NAS, that showed it to be more safe ( lower risk) than the existing Australian system, there was never a safety case to revert to the more risky/less safe old system.
There was never a risk/safety case to justify pulling the plug on NAS.
Jaba, I was in the middle of this for years, I know exactly what happened and why.
Tootle pip!!
Didn't the CP of Impulse go on national TV and criticise E airspace then was promptly sacked?
Notice Lead Slead doesn't mention the B737 vs Tobago incident near Launceston when E airspace was operating without radar.
Notice Lead Slead doesn't mention the B737 vs Tobago incident near Launceston when E airspace was operating without radar.
I don't recall a "NAS trial" running for 12 months.
I recall something with NAS being undone (Class E over Class D?) 6 months later.
I also recall this:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/30791/sir199911_001.pdf
I recall something with NAS being undone (Class E over Class D?) 6 months later.
I also recall this:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/30791/sir199911_001.pdf
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Leady.... I too was in the middle of it.... flying IFR in E every day. Just keep your eyes open when in VMC in class E...
I find it hard to believe that an earlier poster (ACMS) says he had never heard of the "J Curve"....! Shows perhaps that the lack of any corporate history of what has gone on in the past has been or is in the process of being lost (?). I think the term is at least 20-25yrs old.
Leady said:
The problem with just about everything in aviation in Australia today is that we do not address the culture issues. The above quote certainly does not even consider culture!
As a result there is always resistance to change and the required education is almost always much less than that required. CASA never ever address the entrenched culture within the industry or try and sell in a practical way the changes that they think the industry needs.
Acknowledge and address the very entrenched culture in this country and we might have some chance of progressing change.
I find it hard to believe that an earlier poster (ACMS) says he had never heard of the "J Curve"....! Shows perhaps that the lack of any corporate history of what has gone on in the past has been or is in the process of being lost (?). I think the term is at least 20-25yrs old.
Leady said:
This same pilot did a study tour of US, saw the whole system working, but when he returned to Australia, his words were to the effect : "It will never work in Australia, Australian pilots could not cope" --- as far as I am concerned, his remarks were an insult to every Australian pilot.
As a result there is always resistance to change and the required education is almost always much less than that required. CASA never ever address the entrenched culture within the industry or try and sell in a practical way the changes that they think the industry needs.
Acknowledge and address the very entrenched culture in this country and we might have some chance of progressing change.
Or that See and Avoid really works: ask the pax that died in the 727 and DC 9 in the USA that had midairs with bugsmashers...
50-60,000 flights PER DAY in the US, and that is the best you can do.
Just how many years have they been spread over. The expression GET REAL comes to mind.
In fact they are not the only mid airs in the last hundred or so years in USA, but if you work out the figures per flight, you have a lot more chance of winning the California State lottery than having a mid-air in US.
If those odds concern you, I suggest you quit flying and find a "safer" way of spending your time, even never getting out of bed in the morning has a greater mortality risk.
In the case of the B727, it was the B727, under full ATC control, in a CTA (probably the equivalent of Class C at the time) that still hit the light aircraft.
Notice Lead Slead doesn't mention the B737 vs Tobago incident near Launceston when E airspace was operating without radar.
Triadic mentioned "culture", here we saw a "culture" that the "professional" pilot is always right, and any "bug smasher" pilot is always a hopeless incompetent ---- in fact the Tobago pilot had very substantial experience, and if you gave equal weight to both PIC's statements, it is a very different picture that emerges, to only considering the matter from the point of view of the airline aircraft .
There never was any collision risk, the pilot of the Tobago had the airline aircraft in sight at all times. E is NOT depended on having radar coverage.
I notice you don't mention the TCAS incident north of Brisbane, where one of the allegations that came up in the investigation was that the PIC of the airline aircraft inexplicably turned towards the light aircraft (flown by a highly experienced professional pilot) resulting in the TCAS warning being generated.
Throughout the whole so called NAS "trial" , a joint aviation industry body considered EVERY reported incident, some of the reports from "professional" pilots really did reveal "cultural shortcomings", all of a sudden, training aircraft doing circuits at Port Macquarie were being reported as collision risks. The airspace wasn't even E, but suddenly E was the fault.
One piece of nonsense I well recall was that "some" Regional pilots were so irrationally anti Class E that into and out of Ballina, they would let down in the Evans Head R, and fly low level in G back to Ballina, rather than transit E on climb and descent from C. I personally experienced this one, flying VFR to Evans Head (not my day job), I was at 2000, they passed under me. I will refrain from mentioning the airline --- and it was not all their crews, just the irrational ones.
The fact is, Class E is one of the most widely used airspace classifications used for low and mid levels, world wide, it works, the record proves it.
The notion that Class G is "safer" than Class E for IFR aircraft is as about as irrational as you can get --- it just "flies" in the face of the facts.
Just keep your eyes open when in VMC in class E...
One of the "cultural" aspects I did allude to was the one that "perceptions of risk" have to be procedurally dealt with, even when it is demonstrated that the risk does not exist, I have never come across this attitude outside Australia. Not limited to the "perception" that E is dangerous, or E must have radar coverage, therefor E should not be used, but G is OK, despite no separation service at all for IFR aircraft.
One of the things CASA or Airservices could do is run an educational campaign to get message across that the separation assurance standard is the same in all classes of airspace, A through G, A through G does not mean "safest" to "least safe", deteriorating standards of "safety" or increasing risk.
That is the whole point of the CNS/ATM ICAO system, the same risk level is achieved through all classes of airspace.
Eurocontrol even publishes regular reports of the achieved computed risk levels versus the target risk levels. Australia doesn't even publish the target in any accessible form.
Tootle pip!!
Last edited by LeadSled; 23rd May 2015 at 09:38.
As a result there is always resistance to change
- poorly considered and not the best solution, if indeed a problem requiring a solution even existed;
- poor industry education and understanding of the change;
- insufficient consultation;
- changes not supported;
- etc. etc.
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Consultation - Education
One of the best examples of education and understanding failing was the introduction of the ICAO readbacks in about 1997.
We had over two days in CBR discussing all the various options, most of which were additional to what was in use at the time, and for many years prior. Many were quite straight forward, but some lay open to interpretation.
I recall a number of hours spent discussing the requirement to read back the QNH and if this should include the "Area QNH" when provided.... at the end of the day there was no differentiation.
What many of the industry reps said was that unless there was sufficient education and understanding of the requirements, the default position of those that did not understand or perhaps care, would be to read everything back.
A year or so later there were instructors and training Captains teaching readbacks that were not required. The PIR was a total failure. Guess what? we still have many pilots reading stuff back that is not required.
There has even been a change to AIP since, that introduced a readback that was not required by ICAO, but was sought by ATC at many locations and of course not readback by those that knew the difference...! ATC got it changed, so even they did not understand(?)
poor industry education and understanding of the change;
We had over two days in CBR discussing all the various options, most of which were additional to what was in use at the time, and for many years prior. Many were quite straight forward, but some lay open to interpretation.
I recall a number of hours spent discussing the requirement to read back the QNH and if this should include the "Area QNH" when provided.... at the end of the day there was no differentiation.
What many of the industry reps said was that unless there was sufficient education and understanding of the requirements, the default position of those that did not understand or perhaps care, would be to read everything back.
A year or so later there were instructors and training Captains teaching readbacks that were not required. The PIR was a total failure. Guess what? we still have many pilots reading stuff back that is not required.
There has even been a change to AIP since, that introduced a readback that was not required by ICAO, but was sought by ATC at many locations and of course not readback by those that knew the difference...! ATC got it changed, so even they did not understand(?)
poorly considered and not the best solution, if indeed a problem requiring a solution even existed;
poor industry education and understanding of the change;
insufficient consultation;
changes not supported;
etc. etc.
poor industry education and understanding of the change;
insufficient consultation;
changes not supported;
etc. etc.
Including completely unnecessary.
And there we have it, closed minds, the fact that it works just fine in the rest of the world, but Australia has to be different, and should have stuck with an Australian unique system that was expensive, ineffecient, and above all, generated unnecessary risk level because available resources were not allocated in conformity with demonstrated risk, but allocated on the basis ( and still is) of "That's the way its always been done".
No amount of "consultation" is enough when one major group rejects ICAO airspace management principles ----- ie: simply does not accept CNS/ATM based on demonstrated risk levels, but demands ATC services base on the "perception" of risk.
In short, rejects the basic principles of the A through G designations, where the separation assurance level is the same in each class of airspace.
Bloggs illustrated the "Australian way" so admirably in his posts.
To suggest that only Australia knows how to run an airspace system shows a breathtaking combination of arrogance and ignorance ---- the net result is an inflexible, expensive and inefficient system where about the only thing in which we lead the world (almost) is loss of separation incidents.
I suppose we should be thankful that there is so little aviation in Australian airspace, otherwise the results might be distressingly newsworthy.
Tootle pip!!
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I would suggest to you that once Australian ATC's work under the same liability laws that exist in the U.S. they wouldn't give a fat rats arse about working Class E airspace. Their union is doing the responsible thing by their members, the only thing they can do. Defend their members from the liability they face with this airspace.
I read an article in U.S. Flying, a pilot got into icing trouble and ended up below LSALT, indeed, in a valley below the terrain. The ATC was able to give the aircraft vectors to keep him in the valley away from the mountains on either side. Would NEVER happen in Australia, the ATC would get sued.
I read an article in U.S. Flying, a pilot got into icing trouble and ended up below LSALT, indeed, in a valley below the terrain. The ATC was able to give the aircraft vectors to keep him in the valley away from the mountains on either side. Would NEVER happen in Australia, the ATC would get sued.
And there we have it, closed minds
Probably because most changes over the last 20 years
They weren't. In fact I support the NAS concept and didn't have a problem with most elements, but you well know that in some areas the education and industry understanding was lacking.
My points were aimed at many changes over the last 20 years e.g. ELB fitment, Part 61, Multicom vs. CAR 166, readbacks as Triadic has raised etc. etc.
Radar Coverage at Ballina
While Ballina is the topic of conversation, don't we just love the way the instrument approaches to Ballina RWY06 and Lismore RWY33 cross over......
I don't think everyone realises just how critically relevant traffic on the other destination can be
I don't think everyone realises just how critically relevant traffic on the other destination can be
Slight thread drift, are there/were there ever any CA/GRS set up and operated by aerodrome operators (as opposed to any similar provided by ASA) anywhere in the country?
What's wrong with "Line up and wait", and "Cleared immediate take-off?"
Actually, nothing, they both have specific meanings.
One thing that always amuses me is the ( beloved of poms) "Fully ready" ---- as opposed to what other kind of ready, quasi ready,semi ready, almost ready etc.
At least with the widespread use of CPDLC for is a large number of position reports is good, so I don't have to listen to so many Australian pilots who don't understand how position reports should be handled ---- and the Australian AIP and local CASA training material doesn't help.
It's all in easily available ICAO Docs, for those who want to take the trouble to get it right, it is repeated in UK CAP413, and to a great degree (surprise, surprise) in the NZ AIP and other NZ advisory documents.
Midnight,
My apologies for misunderstanding you, but whilst Triadic is largely correct, no amount of "educational material" would have made any difference to those who, to this day, oppose E airspace.
Porter,
The ramped up fears of individual controller liability in Australia are completely unjustified. It is going to be Airservices that is sued.
Civilair clings onto a High Court ruling going back to about 1982 ( a case against that SA Government, I don't immediately remember the full name, but it was delivered by Gibbs, CJ, as I recall) about "duty of care", because it is very usefull industrially, but in the doctrine of duty of care, there have been a number of HCA and other cases, duty of care doesn't mean what Gibbs said it meant in about 1982.
Traffic,
I don't know how may Airservices set up, but my memory tells the Melbourne based consultancy, Ambidjii, was responsible for setting up, running and staffing some.
Tootle pip!!
Last edited by LeadSled; 27th May 2015 at 15:29.