Norfolk Island Ditching ATSB Report - ?
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This donation look dodgy and hard to explain to the plebs, that the Rex board, on which John Sharp sits, donates $95K of shareholders money to National Party, where John Sharp is the federal treasurer. The donation to ALP looks like having a bet each way. Wonder what the shareholders have to say about this?
The PelAir Supreme Court story is a complex one and the following was written by a person who was in the Supreme Court last week.
One, on reading the original ATSB ‘Preliminary Report’ and comparing the ‘Final ATSB Report’, finds there are inconsistencies between both reports. For example the person flying and the positions of all on board is not reported, nor whom and whether the aircraft became visual is canvassed.
Upon arrival at Norfolk Island, the copilot conducted a very high frequency omnidirectional radio range/distance measuring equipment (VOR/DME) instrument approach procedure6 for a landing on runway 29 (Figure 1). However, the flight crew was not ‘visual’ at the missed approach point,7,8 and a missed approach was carried out at 1004. At that time, it was dark and raining with low cloud and poor visibility.
Following the missed approach, the pilot in command assumed control of the aircraft as the handling pilot. A second instrument approach was conducted for runway 29; however, the crew were again unable to visually acquire the runway, and initiated a second missed approach at about 1013.
The flight crew then repositioned to conduct a VOR/DME instrument approach for landing on runway 11. The runway 11 instrument approach procedure permitted the crew to descend 100 ft lower than the runway 29 approach before acquiring visual reference with the runway (Figure 2).
The crew did not gain visual reference with runway 11 and conducted a third missed approach at about 1019, before reporting to Norfolk Unicom that they were planning to ditch because the aircraft was running out of fuel. The crew then conducted a third instrument approach for runway 29 (four approaches in total), but again did not visually acquire the runway.
Following the missed approach, the pilot in command assumed control of the aircraft as the handling pilot. A second instrument approach was conducted for runway 29; however, the crew were again unable to visually acquire the runway, and initiated a second missed approach at about 1013.
The flight crew then repositioned to conduct a VOR/DME instrument approach for landing on runway 11. The runway 11 instrument approach procedure permitted the crew to descend 100 ft lower than the runway 29 approach before acquiring visual reference with the runway (Figure 2).
The crew did not gain visual reference with runway 11 and conducted a third missed approach at about 1019, before reporting to Norfolk Unicom that they were planning to ditch because the aircraft was running out of fuel. The crew then conducted a third instrument approach for runway 29 (four approaches in total), but again did not visually acquire the runway.
This part in the prelim also casts doubt on this part in the article:
The small group, who were now in the sea, had some inoperative life jackets and not been trained correctly by the operator [PelAir] and undertaken what is known as 20.11 training. The 20.11 trainging includes in-water escape and life jacket training and aircraft escape techniques.
The pilot in command and medical staff stated that their ditching training had helped them when escaping from the aircraft.
This is on topic
From one tendentious blogger to another (life member) of the TBA & IOS - Ben Sandilands 
:
ATSB forgets Pel-Air in study of fuel exhaustion accidents
Ben Sandilands | Feb 09, 2015 3:32PM | EMAIL | PRINT
Apt illustration from today's bizarre ATSB recycling of old study
Amnesia can now be again added to the failings of integrity and safety focus in ATSB reports on the repeated release today of its study titled Starved and Exhausted: Fuel Management Aviation Accidents.
It leaves out the fuel management related crash investigation of the century, the one in which a Pel-Air flight was ditched near Norfolk Island in 2009.
But the notification of the study by the ATSB using Twitter is even stranger. It’s recycling the study it published according to the fly sheet in March 2013 and the web page the link to the download takes you was last edited in April 2014.
Among the illustrations in the study is the top of page photo of the retrieval of a Piper Cherokee Six that ditched while conducting inter-island charters between Mackay and the Whitsundays in April 2008.
So strange. If the ATSB can haul an entire Cherokee out of the Whitsunday waters, what really stopped it being sufficiently curious about the ditching the Pel-Air Westwind corporate jet from the water close to Norfolk Island to recover its flight data recorder?
What didn’t the ATSB want to know? Now, in 2015, we know that the ATSB and CASA variously withheld or dismissed serious findings about safety deficiencies in Pel-Air’s operations, owned by the generous Labor and Coalition political donor REX, who lavished completely unrelated and out of character gifts of money to both sides of politics in the same year that a discredited ATSB report into the crash was released.
The optics aren’t good. The ATSB re-releases a report that leaves out the most important fuel management accident in its history at the same time as it is trying to get away with conducting a new review of that Pel-Air rash report it insists is fault free.
This is pathetic.
Definitely MTF...
:ATSB forgets Pel-Air in study of fuel exhaustion accidents
Ben Sandilands | Feb 09, 2015 3:32PM | EMAIL | PRINT
Apt illustration from today's bizarre ATSB recycling of old studyAmnesia can now be again added to the failings of integrity and safety focus in ATSB reports on the repeated release today of its study titled Starved and Exhausted: Fuel Management Aviation Accidents.
It leaves out the fuel management related crash investigation of the century, the one in which a Pel-Air flight was ditched near Norfolk Island in 2009.
But the notification of the study by the ATSB using Twitter is even stranger. It’s recycling the study it published according to the fly sheet in March 2013 and the web page the link to the download takes you was last edited in April 2014.
Among the illustrations in the study is the top of page photo of the retrieval of a Piper Cherokee Six that ditched while conducting inter-island charters between Mackay and the Whitsundays in April 2008.
So strange. If the ATSB can haul an entire Cherokee out of the Whitsunday waters, what really stopped it being sufficiently curious about the ditching the Pel-Air Westwind corporate jet from the water close to Norfolk Island to recover its flight data recorder?
What didn’t the ATSB want to know? Now, in 2015, we know that the ATSB and CASA variously withheld or dismissed serious findings about safety deficiencies in Pel-Air’s operations, owned by the generous Labor and Coalition political donor REX, who lavished completely unrelated and out of character gifts of money to both sides of politics in the same year that a discredited ATSB report into the crash was released.
The optics aren’t good. The ATSB re-releases a report that leaves out the most important fuel management accident in its history at the same time as it is trying to get away with conducting a new review of that Pel-Air rash report it insists is fault free.
This is pathetic.
Definitely MTF...
Last edited by Sarcs; 9th Feb 2015 at 21:51. Reason: c/o auntypru.com
Sarcs its easy to see why Norfolk wasn't included- there were no lessons to be learnt from it even though in most of the instances quoted it was seemingly the pilot's fault. Like the Chieftain out of Albury, it was a company requirement to do the run-ups on the outer tanks to see if the pumps were working! (Just in case its not obvious F8 sarcasm button has been pressed therefore I am agreeing with Sarc's post.)
)
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I'm guessing the prelim report is the 'green paper' while the final report is the 'white paper'. This being the case the final report may have omitted some facts when it became the official 'story'?
A close analogy Frank but the only difference that should occur between any prelim and the Final is the Final includes analysis of the event,additional facts as they come to light during the investigation(such as CASA audits), any recommendations and contributing factors. Any facts that are stated in the prelim are still the facts unless any actual evidence proves otherwise. So the facts about who was flying at what time should not change. Given what happened over the course of producing the Final report I would suggest the prelim is the more accurate in presenting the facts.
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I think I can redefine affordable safety.
Disband the ATSB and CASA, let ASA run the ATC environment, have CTA and OCTA. Let everyone do the best they can by modelling themselves on the US operations.
Save the industry untold millions. Safety not likely to be affected much at all. Less stress = better performance anyway. A more prosperous industry may actually be a safer one.
We are not getting value for money in terms of safety promotion and regulation so why bother.
Disband the ATSB and CASA, let ASA run the ATC environment, have CTA and OCTA. Let everyone do the best they can by modelling themselves on the US operations.
Save the industry untold millions. Safety not likely to be affected much at all. Less stress = better performance anyway. A more prosperous industry may actually be a safer one.
We are not getting value for money in terms of safety promotion and regulation so why bother.
Why not Jab,
And, with the savings of the 'untold millions', we could have a service for those who operate OCTA and provide them with an inflight
'Flight Information Service'......Wouldn't cost 'that much', then EVERYBODY is 'HAPPY again'....(???)
'Cept Dick of course.......
p.s. Thanks again for de redundo......
Cheers
And, with the savings of the 'untold millions', we could have a service for those who operate OCTA and provide them with an inflight
'Flight Information Service'......Wouldn't cost 'that much', then EVERYBODY is 'HAPPY again'....(???)
'Cept Dick of course.......
p.s. Thanks again for de redundo......
Cheers
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Having recently filed an incident report (near collision), and gone through the interview process I was very surprised with the errors in the preliminary report - the supposed tracks made no sense, particularly in relation to times and distances, and the relative positions and performance capabilities of each aircraft. I spoke to the pilot of the other aircraft after seeing the report and he also commented that the flight tracks didn't make any sense and some statements were attributed to him he didn't make. Some 'facts' in the preliminary report that were based on my testimony were just wrong - maybe I didn't communicate well enough.
Whilst the final report was a vast improvement over the original, there were still inconsistencies. If neither of the two pilots involved had formally responded to the preliminary report, the final report would have been a worthless. As a post note, both myself and the other pilot had pretty much worked out what had happened when we first discussed incident.
The process was interesting, and it has certainly got a lot of the local pilots and operators thinking.
Whilst the final report was a vast improvement over the original, there were still inconsistencies. If neither of the two pilots involved had formally responded to the preliminary report, the final report would have been a worthless. As a post note, both myself and the other pilot had pretty much worked out what had happened when we first discussed incident.
The process was interesting, and it has certainly got a lot of the local pilots and operators thinking.
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The process was interesting, and it has certainly got a lot of the local pilots and operators thinking.
After dissecting a few really bad ones myself, you start to wonder what to make of the others you read but do not have the subject matter knowledge to know if you are being told porkies. You soon question and doubt everything else.
Did Australia mislead ICAO over the Pel-Air crash?
This story keeps getting more and more murky.
Plane talking today:
Did Australia mislead ICAO over the Pel-Air crash? | Plane Talking
ICAO Third Meeting of the Asia Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Team (APRAST/3)
Appendix B (starts page 32) lists occurrences from 2002 - 2011.
No mention of PelAir at Norfolk Island
http://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/20...G%20Report.pdf
The following document sets out the responsibilities of ICAO member states
http://www.airsafety.com.au/trinvbil/C619icao.pdf
This is the 2001 edition, which was in force at the time of the 2009 crash. The current edition (2010) is the same with regard to reporting responsibilities.
Page 7-2
Incidents to aircraft over 5 700 kg
7.7 If a State conducts an investigation into an incident to an aircraft of a maximum mass of over 5 700 kg, that State shall send, as soon as is practicable after the investigation, the Incident Data Report to the International Civil Aviation Organization.
Perhaps it would be best if ICAO simply asked the Canadian TSB for a copy of their review.
Plane talking today:
Did Australia mislead ICAO over the Pel-Air crash? | Plane Talking
ICAO Third Meeting of the Asia Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Team (APRAST/3)
Appendix B (starts page 32) lists occurrences from 2002 - 2011.
No mention of PelAir at Norfolk Island
http://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/20...G%20Report.pdf
The following document sets out the responsibilities of ICAO member states
http://www.airsafety.com.au/trinvbil/C619icao.pdf
This is the 2001 edition, which was in force at the time of the 2009 crash. The current edition (2010) is the same with regard to reporting responsibilities.
Page 7-2
Incidents to aircraft over 5 700 kg
7.7 If a State conducts an investigation into an incident to an aircraft of a maximum mass of over 5 700 kg, that State shall send, as soon as is practicable after the investigation, the Incident Data Report to the International Civil Aviation Organization.
Perhaps it would be best if ICAO simply asked the Canadian TSB for a copy of their review.
Perhaps the NGA ditching didn’t rate a mention in the report because there was no fatality? Or perhaps because of the classification of the operation?
Lots of useful smoke and mirrors in the various definitions of ‘accident’ and ‘incident’, and the classification of operations rules in Australia.
Lots of useful smoke and mirrors in the various definitions of ‘accident’ and ‘incident’, and the classification of operations rules in Australia.
I don't think the severity is the explanation. Australian incidents reported to ICAO included gear collapse with no injuries. Based on this, a ditching with hull loss and significant injuries should meet the reporting threshold.
There may be some gamesmanship regarding class of operation.
However the intent of the ICAO seems pretty clear.
From what I have heard, a very senior ICAO person is surprised to be unaware of Norfolk.
Even more oddly, there are some incidents that were reported to ICAO for which there is no ATSB report (or at least, the ATSB report can not be found on the ATSB site). For example, the following PelAir / Rex incidents.
25/11/2004 VH-EEX Metro. Port gear collapsed on landing at Rockhampton ATSB reference 200404619 (I eventually found the ATSB record so ATSB know of incident, but could not locate the actual report).
3/4/2007 VH-KDO Metro Can’t find anything at all about this.
Probably not major incidents but odd that they have been reported to ICAO and we can't find any ATSB report.
There may be some gamesmanship regarding class of operation.
However the intent of the ICAO seems pretty clear.
From what I have heard, a very senior ICAO person is surprised to be unaware of Norfolk.
Even more oddly, there are some incidents that were reported to ICAO for which there is no ATSB report (or at least, the ATSB report can not be found on the ATSB site). For example, the following PelAir / Rex incidents.
25/11/2004 VH-EEX Metro. Port gear collapsed on landing at Rockhampton ATSB reference 200404619 (I eventually found the ATSB record so ATSB know of incident, but could not locate the actual report).
3/4/2007 VH-KDO Metro Can’t find anything at all about this.
Probably not major incidents but odd that they have been reported to ICAO and we can't find any ATSB report.
a very senior ICAO person is surprised to be unaware of Norfolk.
If ICAO are unaware of the whole PelAir affair it also goes to show just how little attention they pay to aviation south of the equator. A simple subscription to Curt Lewis would keep them informed.
And of course there was the world wide interest that kept the Senate thread going until dark and evil forces demanded its termination. Why weren't ICAO monitoring that?
Chinese Air-Safety Veteran Set to Lead UN Agency
Chinese Air-Safety Veteran Set to Lead UN Agency
ANDY PASZTOR
4 HOURS AGO
POLITICS INTERNATIONAL NEWS INDUSTRIES AVIATION ECONOMY CHINA
A decision which if true will have the broad support of the Aust aviation community.
ANDY PASZTOR
4 HOURS AGO
POLITICS INTERNATIONAL NEWS INDUSTRIES AVIATION ECONOMY CHINA
A decision which if true will have the broad support of the Aust aviation community.
https://www.businessspectator.com.au...lead-un-agency
@PlaneTalking: The Australian candidate appears to have run into some accident reporting compliance problems. The Pel-Air curse continues
C'mon slats, you should know that there is no such thing as a certainty in aviation. I would agree that it is quite likely but I'll wait until there is an official announcement before I start going "ding dong the witch is dead".