PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Norfolk Island Ditching ATSB Report - ?
View Single Post
Old 9th Feb 2015, 21:46
  #822 (permalink)  
Lookleft
 
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 1,267
Received 200 Likes on 95 Posts
The PelAir Supreme Court story is a complex one and the following was written by a person who was in the Supreme Court last week.
If only they could get all their facts right. This is what is stated in the link UITA posts:

One, on reading the original ATSB ‘Preliminary Report’ and comparing the ‘Final ATSB Report’, finds there are inconsistencies between both reports. For example the person flying and the positions of all on board is not reported, nor whom and whether the aircraft became visual is canvassed.
This is from the Preliminary report of January 2010- 2 months after the accident:

Upon arrival at Norfolk Island, the copilot conducted a very high frequency omnidirectional radio range/distance measuring equipment (VOR/DME) instrument approach procedure6 for a landing on runway 29 (Figure 1). However, the flight crew was not ‘visual’ at the missed approach point,7,8 and a missed approach was carried out at 1004. At that time, it was dark and raining with low cloud and poor visibility.

Following the missed approach, the pilot in command assumed control of the aircraft as the handling pilot. A second instrument approach was conducted for runway 29; however, the crew were again unable to visually acquire the runway, and initiated a second missed approach at about 1013.
The flight crew then repositioned to conduct a VOR/DME instrument approach for landing on runway 11. The runway 11 instrument approach procedure permitted the crew to descend 100 ft lower than the runway 29 approach before acquiring visual reference with the runway (Figure 2).

The crew did not gain visual reference with runway 11 and conducted a third missed approach at about 1019, before reporting to Norfolk Unicom that they were planning to ditch because the aircraft was running out of fuel. The crew then conducted a third instrument approach for runway 29 (four approaches in total), but again did not visually acquire the runway.
I'm not sure how much clearer it can be about who was flying when and what they saw (or didn't see)at the minima. I am guessing that the prelim facts were based largely on interviews with the crew.

This part in the prelim also casts doubt on this part in the article:

The small group, who were now in the sea, had some inoperative life jackets and not been trained correctly by the operator [PelAir] and undertaken what is known as 20.11 training. The 20.11 trainging includes in-water escape and life jacket training and aircraft escape techniques.
This is from the prelim:

The pilot in command and medical staff stated that their ditching training had helped them when escaping from the aircraft.
I think the prelim is worth another read by anyone interested in this story as it is the only part of the investigation that hasn't been tainted when you compare it to the final.
Lookleft is offline