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Norfolk Island Ditching ATSB Report - ?

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Norfolk Island Ditching ATSB Report - ?

Old 24th Mar 2015, 08:09
  #801 (permalink)  
 
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And I would have carried as much Jet A1 as possible.......
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Old 24th Mar 2015, 08:25
  #802 (permalink)  
 
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And I would have carried as much Jet A1 as possible.......
Which would of then stopped you from climbing above the RVSM altitude confining you to below FL290 burning more fuel and restricting your range even more than it was with fuel load he departed with at Apia.

Do please try to do all the reading surrounding this crash. There is far more to it than would first appear.
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Old 24th Mar 2015, 08:30
  #803 (permalink)  
 
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Huh? So a Westwind cannot climb above FL290 at MTOW?

Surely at MTOW a Westwind could make the high 30's? ( 350 360 )

I dont understand your reasoning?

He was RVSM capable wasn't he? So he would have planned optimum FL's which at MTOW would be FLXX for a Westwind.......why would carrying an extra hour or so fuel screw his FL capability that much??

Do tell
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Old 24th Mar 2015, 08:32
  #804 (permalink)  
 
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ACMS,
Agreed,
Tootle pip!!
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Old 24th Mar 2015, 08:36
  #805 (permalink)  
 
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ACMS. Negative RVSM. Had planned FL350 from memory but was restricted to 280..
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Old 24th Mar 2015, 08:38
  #806 (permalink)  
 
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Hang on, so you're saying he needed to be above FL410 to stay out of RVSM because he wasn't equipped?

Mmmmmm Swiss cheese holes all lined up didn't they.....
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Old 24th Mar 2015, 08:53
  #807 (permalink)  
 
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Good Crikey article on the RVSM/fuel planning debacle here;
ATSB Pel-Air report excluded critical fuel factor | Plane Talking
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Old 24th Mar 2015, 09:30
  #808 (permalink)  
 
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Got it thanks.

I still say he should have calculated a PNR and checked the METARS.
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Old 24th Mar 2015, 10:10
  #809 (permalink)  
 
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It really is no longer important what the flight crew did on the night, what 4 Corners clearly showed was the physical and emotional deterioration of Karen Casey, who 4 Corners rightly stated was the real hero of the story. Despite what the law technically is she should have been granted an ex-gratia payment by Pel-Air in recognition of what she had done. Even Dominic James looked done in by the whole deal but he at least was physically spared. I hope the judge rules in her favour but of course there will be appeals and more appeals until the money runs out.
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Old 24th Mar 2015, 11:35
  #810 (permalink)  
 
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Indeed, the airline I worked for would not have been able to operate a significant part of its operation if an alternate was required for all operations to remote/island airports.
So, what was the fuel policy - island reserve, plan to a PNR etc etc? I'd be very surprised if a responsible operator didn't have contingencies or options in place, particularly at the planning stage, and hadnt kept revising them thereafter as the flight progressed.

And therein lies the difference, there was an option at the planning stage and that was to take more fuel. There were options during the flight which have been discussed at length in this thread. In short, an apparent mindset that a landing at the destination was assured so no need to keep formulating a "plan B" as the flight progressed.

Id be very concerned if your airline had asked you to put all your eggs in the one basket before you even got airborne but in this case ..........
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Old 24th Mar 2015, 20:11
  #811 (permalink)  
 
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With Ansett, on the 146 from Learmonth to Christmas Island, we would work out a PNR back to Learmonth (or, if needs be a Last Point of Safe Diversion to Java) for Depressurised, One Engine out and two engines out and mark the most limiting of those. Before that point we would check the latest weather report from the Christmas Island observer on HF and make a commit decision.

Still occasionally came a cropper with the cap cloud which forms over the Island though - which required some unusual circuits to get onto the runway.
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Old 24th Mar 2015, 20:32
  #812 (permalink)  
 
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This is all good stuff.

If we can reach a unanimous view that it was all the pilot's fault, we can save the ATSB the busy-work of going through the facade of another 'investigation' to reach the same conclusion as the last.

I have difficulty in believing that the patent errors in the weather information transmitted to NGA, and the weather information that was withheld from being transmitted to NGA, had no influence on the crew's appreciation of the actual and forecast weather at YSNF on the way to the point at which the decision to continue or not had to be made. And the CASA FOI population, comfy behind their desks, cuppa in hand and only the pressure of calculating their pension payments to confuse them, split 50/50 on the question whether the crew were obliged to divert, based on the weather information transmitted to NGA.

But I see, from others' posts, that the crew could have and should have known more.

I see now why Erebus was the pilot's fault.
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Old 24th Mar 2015, 21:29
  #813 (permalink)  
 
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Don't read that opinion into my post Creampuff - I didn't intend it that way.

The Pelair manuals were deficient in flight planning methods, and so was their training (not on their Pat Malone there, though) - and the CAA allowed that - especially with the complications of not being RVSM, and not being trained on the recently fitted TCAS, to allow the full range of diversion options.

The met department admit that they cannot predict the weather at Norfolk - but don't append their TAFs with "PROB 10 FG".

The question of whether the flight was AIRWORK, with an illegal passenger, or CHARTER and lacking the diversion options that requires is yet to be addressed.

etc. etc.
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Old 24th Mar 2015, 22:36
  #814 (permalink)  
 
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My apologies, Checkboard. I certaintly didn't read that into your post, and I certainly did not intend to make that inference.
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Old 25th Mar 2015, 05:10
  #815 (permalink)  
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But I see, from others' posts, that the crew could have and should have known more.
I see now why Erebus was the pilot's fault.

Fail to see any similarity between the two occurences, but interesting to see you have come to a conclusion re Erebus after all these years.
 
Old 25th Mar 2015, 05:46
  #816 (permalink)  
 
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To qualify my last comment for Leadsled. What I should have said was,

"without an alternate, that otherwise could have been carried"

I get you re ops to remote islands. Glad I don't have to do them.
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Old 25th Mar 2015, 05:50
  #817 (permalink)  
 
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Prospector

It’s only because I now realise, having considered some of the comments about the ditching on this and other threads by people who I assume are aviation professionals, that one of the required competencies of a commercial pilot is: “ESP”.

I reflected on how often I’ve asked ATC/FS if something broadcast is really true, and they’ve responded with: “Nah – we were just kidding; it’s actually thick fog on the ground and vis below 200 metres.”

I also reflected on how often I’ve asked ATC/FS if they’re refraining from transmitting/broadcasting operationally relevant information to me, knowing I’m in their patch, and they’ve said: “As a matter of fact, lucky you asked…”

I also reflected on the fact that I don’t rely on the accuracy of the nav data base uploaded to the GPS each month, and instead verify the accuracy of each and every entry – takes weeks each time, but I don’t have ESP.
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Old 15th Jun 2015, 15:19
  #818 (permalink)  
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Current tender released by the ATSB
Australian Transport Safety Bureau
AUSTRALIAN TRANSPORT SAFETY BUREAU. SERVICES FOR RECOVERY OF FLIGHT RECORDERS FROM AIRCRAFT SUBMERGED NEAR NORFOLK ISLAND.
ATM ID: ATSB-AO-2014-190.
Agency: Australian Transport Safety Bureau.
Close Date & Time: 7 July 2015 at 2.00 pm (ACT Local time).
Location: ACT, Other, Overseas. ATM Type: Request for Tender.
Description: The ATSB requires a Contractor to supply commercial services in order to recover of the Flight Recorders from a submerged Westwind 1124A aircraft that ditched off the coast of Norfolk Island on 18 November 2009. A ROV survey of the wreckage was conducted over the period 27-31 March 2015, which confirmed the location and disposition of the main wreckage fragments.
The wreckage fragments lie on a sandy ocean floor approximately 4 km due west of Norfolk Island. The aircraft has remained largely intact since the initial accident with the wings/tail section separated from the passenger compartment. The Flight Recorders are located in the wings /tail fragment of the wreckage. The passenger compartment is located underneath the left wing. It is likely that both main sections are no longer physically connected by any flight control or electrical cables, although this was not confirmed for certain during the ROV survey. The dry weight of the wings / tail section was calculated to be around 5 tonnes. Sand has accumulated around a portion of the rear most section of the aircraft tail.
The ATSB anticipates that a recovery operation of this nature may involve the use of any or all of the following:
? Vessel
? Lifting Equipment
? Divers
? ROVs
While the ATSB anticipates that any or all of the above assets may form part of a proposed method for recovery, the ATSB invites Tenderers to propose methods for retrieval that are effective and efficient, representing value for money. It is not necessary that a method include a particular asset if it is not necessary to achieve the recovery objective.
Once the flight recorders are removed from the aircraft wreckage, the wreckage must be left substantially unchanged in its current location.
Timeframe for Delivery: Before the end of September 2015
Address for Lodgement: Austender at www.tenders.gov.au in accordance with instructions in Request documentation.
Contact Officer: VH-NGA Recovery Team. Email Address: [email protected]
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Old 15th Jun 2015, 22:29
  #819 (permalink)  
 
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About time.
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Old 15th Jun 2015, 22:47
  #820 (permalink)  
 
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Once the flight recorders are removed from the aircraft wreckage, the wreckage must be left substantially unchanged in its current location.
Why?
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