SWA lands at wrong airport.
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Ian. With all dead in kentucky crash except for one who was terribly wounded, could it really get much worse?
WHILE atc wasn't obligated to do too much more than it did, watching the runway should be and must be one of the focal points of local control.
WHILE atc wasn't obligated to do too much more than it did, watching the runway should be and must be one of the focal points of local control.
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When I was at school, obtaining the educational qualifications to train as an ATCO, I was often criticised for looking to of the window.
When I started my 'tower' validation training, I was criticised for not looking out of the window enough.
The large panes of tinted glass, through which pairs of eyeballs peer, are the fundamental pieces of kit in the visual control room.
Unfortunately, in the present cost-concious ATC environment, management and bean-counters are very keen to reduce the number of eyeballs available, and provide the remaining ones with other tasks, or kit which requires more 'head down' time.
At the unit where I worked, the night complement of 7 has been reduced to 3. Granted there has been a fall-of in traffic, but staff positions lost are often not re-instated when the 'customers' appear again.
Several managements in Europe are whooping with delight over the possibility of controlling airfields remotely from ATC centres using cameras and 'state- of-the-art-technology'.
At the airfield I worked at, to the west was a disused airfield and to the south-east a manufacturer's airfield. Off the top of my head, I can think of 2 a/c which had a go at the disused runway, at least 4 which were positioning for the factory and one chap in an MD80 who lined up with the dual- carriageway that served the main airport. All spotted and corrected in time. I remember working 'Birdseed 1000' with Lord King Of Wartnaby aboard, turning final for the factory.
Which ever side of those big glass windows you are, keep a sharp lookout folks.
When I started my 'tower' validation training, I was criticised for not looking out of the window enough.
The large panes of tinted glass, through which pairs of eyeballs peer, are the fundamental pieces of kit in the visual control room.
Unfortunately, in the present cost-concious ATC environment, management and bean-counters are very keen to reduce the number of eyeballs available, and provide the remaining ones with other tasks, or kit which requires more 'head down' time.
At the unit where I worked, the night complement of 7 has been reduced to 3. Granted there has been a fall-of in traffic, but staff positions lost are often not re-instated when the 'customers' appear again.
Several managements in Europe are whooping with delight over the possibility of controlling airfields remotely from ATC centres using cameras and 'state- of-the-art-technology'.
At the airfield I worked at, to the west was a disused airfield and to the south-east a manufacturer's airfield. Off the top of my head, I can think of 2 a/c which had a go at the disused runway, at least 4 which were positioning for the factory and one chap in an MD80 who lined up with the dual- carriageway that served the main airport. All spotted and corrected in time. I remember working 'Birdseed 1000' with Lord King Of Wartnaby aboard, turning final for the factory.
Which ever side of those big glass windows you are, keep a sharp lookout folks.
Last edited by ZOOKER; 15th Jan 2014 at 20:15. Reason: Typo
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glendalegoon, it is hard to argue that the tower controller did anything wrong in the LEX CRJ takeoff crash. It was early AM, the Comair flight was the only plane moving on the ground or in the air, and it was cleared to take off on the airport's runway used by air carriers and as well as the airport's only lighted runway. It is hard to even guess what thoughts the crew had as they accelerated down an unlit runway and even failed to notice that they passed a long lighted runway early in takeoff roll.
Thankfully, the WN crew realized something was amiss early enough after touchdown to us enough braking and reverse to stop on the available runway. We could have easily had a duplication of the AI Express accident in 2010 where a 737 ran off the cliff at the end of a tabletop airport.
BBC News - India plane crash in Mangalore leaves nearly 160 dead
Thankfully, the WN crew realized something was amiss early enough after touchdown to us enough braking and reverse to stop on the available runway. We could have easily had a duplication of the AI Express accident in 2010 where a 737 ran off the cliff at the end of a tabletop airport.
BBC News - India plane crash in Mangalore leaves nearly 160 dead
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roberts 975...if memory serves and I have not looked it up, the controller at lexington was also working radar apch and ground and local and clearance delivery. at least one plane was inbound.
he was overloaded, but the controller's book says to watch the runway. a visual scan of the runway I think are the exact words.
he was overloaded, but the controller's book says to watch the runway. a visual scan of the runway I think are the exact words.
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OK - It's dark - the aircraft appears to be lined up on the correct runway and has clearance to take off. It is close to a mile away among all the other lights in the dark. It starts rolling and you watching it after around 5 seconds think it doesn't look right it can't be airborne already but it appears above the runway lights. So its now 8 seconds down the wrong runway accelerating - what would you have the controller say that would be useful to an aircraft that cannot stop in the distance remaining and cannot take off in the distance remaining? And in saying that would the controller be blamed for the outcome afterward? E.g. "Had the controller not said that the aircraft may have got airborne..... "
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Ian W:
The NTSB did an on-site view from the cab at a time in the morning that represented the same time before sunrise as it was when the crash happen. That was the informal consensus.
OK - It's dark - the aircraft appears to be lined up on the correct runway and has clearance to take off. It is close to a mile away among all the other lights in the dark. It starts rolling and you watching it after around 5 seconds think it doesn't look right it can't be airborne already but it appears above the runway lights. So its now 8 seconds down the wrong runway accelerating - what would you have the controller say that would be useful to an aircraft that cannot stop in the distance remaining and cannot take off in the distance remaining? And in saying that would the controller be blamed for the outcome afterward? E.g. "Had the controller not said that the aircraft may have got airborne..... "
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YOU are stacking the deck. The controller was looking away from the runway. He was too busy with other things.
YOU are coming up with too many scenarios at exact points, "X " seconds etc.
I won't play that game.
BUT as I said before, controllers are to visually scan the runway. What they see and say is a factor of experience. A controller with a flying background might have done more than a controller without a flying background.
YOU are coming up with too many scenarios at exact points, "X " seconds etc.
I won't play that game.
BUT as I said before, controllers are to visually scan the runway. What they see and say is a factor of experience. A controller with a flying background might have done more than a controller without a flying background.
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Let me just add this. 2 instances at the same airport in which the controllers DID realize a mistake of runway use and stopped the pilots from taking off:
In 1993, a commercial jet at Blue Grass Airport was cleared for takeoff on Runway 22 but mistakenly took Runway 26 instead. Tower personnel noticed the mistake and canceled the aircraft's takeoff clearance just as the crew realized their error. The aircraft subsequently made a safe departure from Runway 22.
In January 2007, a Learjet was cleared to take off at Blue Grass Airport on runway 22, but mistakenly turned onto runway 26. Takeoff clearance was canceled by the local controller prior to the start of the takeoff roll.
In 1993, a commercial jet at Blue Grass Airport was cleared for takeoff on Runway 22 but mistakenly took Runway 26 instead. Tower personnel noticed the mistake and canceled the aircraft's takeoff clearance just as the crew realized their error. The aircraft subsequently made a safe departure from Runway 22.
In January 2007, a Learjet was cleared to take off at Blue Grass Airport on runway 22, but mistakenly turned onto runway 26. Takeoff clearance was canceled by the local controller prior to the start of the takeoff roll.
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A single person in the tower is always going to be risky, which is why the controllers union has fought these staffing arrangements. What happens when you need a bathroom break at the wrong moment?
There have also been occasions when the sole controller accidentally locked himself out and the tower was down for an extended period. In the Lexington case, I believe the sole tower controller was also dealing with flight plans and strips, etc.
There have also been occasions when the sole controller accidentally locked himself out and the tower was down for an extended period. In the Lexington case, I believe the sole tower controller was also dealing with flight plans and strips, etc.
You are missing the point gentlemen. ATC do not have their hands on the thrust levers prior to take-off and they do not have their hands on the reversers when committed to land. Thats the responsibility of the PIC and in this instance the PIC should have gone around a lot earlier than when he had to apply maximum braking. I have never flown in the States bit a superficial glance of Google earth shows me that the correct airport is in the middle of forest and the incorrect runway is next to the town.
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Please help the novice here.
My GPS costing $100 can get me within 20 feet of my driveway and a modern airplane cannot get within several miles of a runway.
There is something sadly wrong here.
I understand the issue of pilots sometimes relying too much on automation and forget how to fly, but shouldn't inexpensive technology like a GPS be the third member in the cockpit?
CPGPS (more expensive) is accurate to about 1 inch.
I am certain that most professional pilots use a GPS in their own car.
My GPS costing $100 can get me within 20 feet of my driveway and a modern airplane cannot get within several miles of a runway.
There is something sadly wrong here.
I understand the issue of pilots sometimes relying too much on automation and forget how to fly, but shouldn't inexpensive technology like a GPS be the third member in the cockpit?
CPGPS (more expensive) is accurate to about 1 inch.
I am certain that most professional pilots use a GPS in their own car.
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The problem is that airline FMS systems do so much that it is possible to get tangled in knots. In my personal airplane, this kind of thing can't happen because the MFD always shows the extended runway centerline when close to the intended airport. In the old days, you would have simply backed up the visual approach by tuning the localizer, but now the FMS may have been programmed for something else, such as a STAR, which was abandoned when cleared for the visual. Of course, it would have been possible to reprogram for the localizer, but maybe they were rushed, or whatever. In any case, it used to be simpler. And this is one case where many GA aircraft are better equipped than your average airliner.
We always have the cleared Runway ( for the correct Airfield !! ) selected in our FM/FMC for all arrivals and update it as required under the circumstances/clearance. It only takes a few quick keystrokes to clean up the Legs/Flt plan page.
For one thing this ensures that waypoints sequence correctly in case of a missed approach, yes a visual approach may not necessarily follow the published missed approach chart but until you clear it up with ATC it's a starting point.
Not only that you'll get an accurate distance to touchdown and most likely a 3deg glide path indication as well depending on setup. All helping your situational awareness picture in the circuit area.
Use what you've got at all times to get the job done safely and prevent those Swiss Cheese holes lining up...
For one thing this ensures that waypoints sequence correctly in case of a missed approach, yes a visual approach may not necessarily follow the published missed approach chart but until you clear it up with ATC it's a starting point.
Not only that you'll get an accurate distance to touchdown and most likely a 3deg glide path indication as well depending on setup. All helping your situational awareness picture in the circuit area.
Use what you've got at all times to get the job done safely and prevent those Swiss Cheese holes lining up...
The problem is that airline FMS systems do so much that it is possible to get tangled in knots. In my personal airplane, this kind of thing can't happen because the MFD always shows the extended runway centerline when close to the intended airport. In the old days, you would have simply backed up the visual approach by tuning the localizer, but now the FMS may have been programmed for something else, such as a STAR, which was abandoned when cleared for the visual. Of course, it would have been possible to reprogram for the localizer, but maybe they were rushed, or whatever. In any case, it used to be simpler. And this is one case where many GA aircraft are better equipped than your average airliner.
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Actually, this is not a candidate litigation. Such cases depend on being able to prove damages. There were no injuries or property damage reported. The flight was 5 hours late prior to touchdown so any inconvenience claims were largely caused by something other than the airport selection error.
Damages have been claimed in hard landings and lost luggage. Trust me...they're already investigating ways to bring up a claim here.
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I understand the issue of pilots sometimes relying too much on automation and forget how to fly, but shouldn't inexpensive technology like a GPS be the third member in the cockpit?
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All this FMC/GPS stuff is true .. but we are missing a fundamental truth. They did not brief for the visual .. it was the all time classic which features in so many safety reports .. "we will shoot the visual".
If you are downwind with everything looking good and you are offered the visual and you have not briefed it - simple ... do not do it! You might save max 2 minutes flight time by doing the visual but it takes far less than 2 minutes for everything to go badly wrong.
This was a failure of SOPs or a failure to abide by SOPs and very very bad airmanship that came very very close to a lot of people dying.
If you are downwind with everything looking good and you are offered the visual and you have not briefed it - simple ... do not do it! You might save max 2 minutes flight time by doing the visual but it takes far less than 2 minutes for everything to go badly wrong.
This was a failure of SOPs or a failure to abide by SOPs and very very bad airmanship that came very very close to a lot of people dying.
If you are downwind with everything looking good and you are offered the visual and you have not briefed it - simple ... do not do it!