SWA lands at wrong airport.
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capn bloggs and others.
does anyone here recall hearing the following in a cockpit:
THIS AIRPLANE, THAT AIRPORT?
or
TWO LEFTS AND LAND?http://www.pprune.org/forums/images/.../eusa_wall.gif
does anyone here recall hearing the following in a cockpit:
THIS AIRPLANE, THAT AIRPORT?
or
TWO LEFTS AND LAND?http://www.pprune.org/forums/images/.../eusa_wall.gif
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Re: The LEX CRJ crash:
There was not consensus among the 5 NTSB members that investigated this accident. In fact, 2 of the 5 members wrote dissenting addendum letters to the original report. The NTSB report conclusions, in essence, stated the pilot and co-pilot were guilty of taking off on the wrong runway while glossing over other factors. However, the dissenting NTSB member's letters claimed the FAA was equally as guilty, because:
1. The FAA violated their own rules by not having two ATC persons in the tower as required.
2. The FAA failed to publish current information to the crews operating in and out of LEX as to ongoing construction at the end of the main runway making for unusual taxiing maneuvering to get to the main runway point for takeoff.
3. The FAA violated their own rules by having an ATC person in the tower that did not have the required hours of rest between shifts, that morning from the previous evening.
The NTSB did an on-site view from the cab at a time in the morning that represented the same time before sunrise as it was when the crash happen. That was the informal consensus.
1. The FAA violated their own rules by not having two ATC persons in the tower as required.
2. The FAA failed to publish current information to the crews operating in and out of LEX as to ongoing construction at the end of the main runway making for unusual taxiing maneuvering to get to the main runway point for takeoff.
3. The FAA violated their own rules by having an ATC person in the tower that did not have the required hours of rest between shifts, that morning from the previous evening.
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Turbine D:
True.
But, I wasn't speaking of the full Board's conclusions. I was speaking of one aspect of the field investigation.
The dissenters were obviously upset with the FAA's attitude about ATC staffing throughout the system and were using the staffing at the time of this crash as a conduit to sound off. That is the way the five political appointees work.
Whether better staffing would have stopped these two pilots from pulling the trigger is problematic.
There was not consensus among the 5 NTSB members that investigated this accident. In fact, 2 of the 5 members wrote dissenting addendum letters to the original report. The NTSB report conclusions, in essence, stated the pilot and co-pilot were guilty of taking off on the wrong runway while glossing over other factors. However, the dissenting NTSB member's letters claimed the FAA was equally as guilty, because:
1. The FAA violated their own rules by not having two ATC persons in the tower as required.
2. The FAA failed to publish current information to the crews operating in and out of LEX as to ongoing construction at the end of the main runway making for unusual taxiing maneuvering to get to the main runway point for takeoff.
3. The FAA violated their own rules by having an ATC person in the tower that did not have the required hours of rest between shifts, that morning from the previous evening.
1. The FAA violated their own rules by not having two ATC persons in the tower as required.
2. The FAA failed to publish current information to the crews operating in and out of LEX as to ongoing construction at the end of the main runway making for unusual taxiing maneuvering to get to the main runway point for takeoff.
3. The FAA violated their own rules by having an ATC person in the tower that did not have the required hours of rest between shifts, that morning from the previous evening.
But, I wasn't speaking of the full Board's conclusions. I was speaking of one aspect of the field investigation.
The dissenters were obviously upset with the FAA's attitude about ATC staffing throughout the system and were using the staffing at the time of this crash as a conduit to sound off. That is the way the five political appointees work.
Whether better staffing would have stopped these two pilots from pulling the trigger is problematic.
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Capt Bloggs... I started on the classic many moons ago. Was a trainer on that and now train on the NG. Far from bring a kid I can assure you. I train visuals all the time. So far I have never landed at the wrong airport!
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Quote:
If you are downwind with everything looking good and you are offered the visual and you have not briefed it - simple ... do not do it!
Quote:
Spoken by a true Magenta kid. When'd you do your last visual approach, briefed or otherwise?
Excellent point Capn Bloggs!!!
How about,'we have the runway in sight. We will approach the runway and land safely! App. brief complete."???
If you are downwind with everything looking good and you are offered the visual and you have not briefed it - simple ... do not do it!
Quote:
Spoken by a true Magenta kid. When'd you do your last visual approach, briefed or otherwise?
Excellent point Capn Bloggs!!!
How about,'we have the runway in sight. We will approach the runway and land safely! App. brief complete."???
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Sounds a lot like the briefing our 2 unfortunates gave. They had the runway in sight... Just the wrong one. Luck was the only reason it was safe. No skill displayed...anyone can stand on the brakes.
Yankee... You prove my point for me nicely. Obliged.
Yankee... You prove my point for me nicely. Obliged.
Last edited by Utrinque; 17th Jan 2014 at 16:46.
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There is an increasing fascination amongst many EU airlines that briefing in intricate detail is the key to everything, and standard briefs by some people, especially the highly SOP minded trainers, are taking upwards of 10 minutes. It's getting ridiculous - these briefings now include all the AFDS mode selections and gates, even though they are SOP. Since when has it become needed to recite an entire SOP for an approach every time to be able to fly it? Why do so many feel compelled to drag out the low alt radar or en-route charts to check airspace categories at their home base years on from being posted there when flying a regular line flight (wise at unfamiliar fields, but at home base?)? The clue is in the name - a brief should cover just the salient details specific to that approach, not a whole recital of the Part A Section 8 - any pilot that needs to go through the SOP sequence hasn't been properly trained.
As far as briefs for visuals, all that needs covering is the landing altitude, any terrain/obstructions and how you plan to get there (ie. if you plan to join left or right down wind, base or straight in), how you'll confirm the right field and runway (including entering it in the FMC and any navaids) and what you'll do in a go-around. The rest is just a distraction.
As far as briefs for visuals, all that needs covering is the landing altitude, any terrain/obstructions and how you plan to get there (ie. if you plan to join left or right down wind, base or straight in), how you'll confirm the right field and runway (including entering it in the FMC and any navaids) and what you'll do in a go-around. The rest is just a distraction.
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Not briefing at all is bad, but so are the long brief being taught where I work - they recite SOP but don't teach the cadets to analyse the plates. They prattle on with a completely rigid patter, but there is no though process and virtually no variation except the numbers on the plate, so the brief is not only long but meaningless too. Too may on this side of the water think it's important how much you say, not what you say. As for home base, how about "ILSxx, standard", or down route "R/Wyy, visual, joining downwind left 1500', flap 30 landing. Missed approach as per the ILS. Questions?"
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We always have the cleared Runway ( for the correct Airfield !! ) selected in our FM/FMC for all arrivals and update it as required under the circumstances/clearance. It only takes a few quick keystrokes to clean up the Legs/Flt plan page.
For one thing this ensures that waypoints sequence correctly in case of a missed approach, yes a visual approach may not necessarily follow the published missed approach chart but until you clear it up with ATC it's a starting point.
Not only that you'll get an accurate distance to touchdown and most likely a 3deg glide path indication as well depending on setup. All helping your situational awareness picture in the circuit area.
Use what you've got at all times to get the job done safely and prevent those Swiss Cheese holes lining up...
For one thing this ensures that waypoints sequence correctly in case of a missed approach, yes a visual approach may not necessarily follow the published missed approach chart but until you clear it up with ATC it's a starting point.
Not only that you'll get an accurate distance to touchdown and most likely a 3deg glide path indication as well depending on setup. All helping your situational awareness picture in the circuit area.
Use what you've got at all times to get the job done safely and prevent those Swiss Cheese holes lining up...
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Entering the correct R/W in the fmc and putting in a nominal glide can also be very useful for occasions where you turn final right into a low sun with haze or desert dust and have surprisingly poor vis even though the METAR and vis observed downwind were fine... the nav display will really help you, even though you are flying (semi) visually.
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All this FMC/GPS stuff is true .. but we are missing a fundamental truth. They did not brief for the visual .. it was the all time classic which features in so many safety reports .. "we will shoot the visual".
If you are downwind with everything looking good and you are offered the visual and you have not briefed it - simple ... do not do it! You might save max 2 minutes flight time by doing the visual but it takes far less than 2 minutes for everything to go badly wrong.
This was a failure of SOPs or a failure to abide by SOPs and very very bad airmanship that came very very close to a lot of people dying.
If you are downwind with everything looking good and you are offered the visual and you have not briefed it - simple ... do not do it! You might save max 2 minutes flight time by doing the visual but it takes far less than 2 minutes for everything to go badly wrong.
This was a failure of SOPs or a failure to abide by SOPs and very very bad airmanship that came very very close to a lot of people dying.
Now, isn't that against what skygods had preached? Occupants at the pointy end should be able to shoot a visual no matter what! Remember all the pontificating after OZ 214 at SFO. Hey imho, once on downwind, all professional pilots should be able to conduct a visual approach without all the long yada yada yada briefings.
The PF and PM should be able to seamlessly change their game plan to accomplish the visual approach with the minimum of hassles. All the convoluted briefings are going to screw up more things. All the extensive FMC manipulations ( except for selecting the correct runway + airport ), MCP set ups and parrot like FMA call outs should be precluded. Get the AP/FDs off, both PF and PM looking in and out to positively identify the airfield, monitor proper profile, configurations and watch out for bogies and obstacles and get the checklists done! Do like what we do 10-40 years ago during our PPL/CPL twin engine training.
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This is where judgement and balance have to come in, Bunga. We have to be flexible, but also have to have a rough plan. Setting up the correct RW in the FMC and navaids are the plan, and that can be changed to a visual (or kept such if that was the plan already) if things get changed. For example, getting 10 mile shortcuts with 35, now 25 remaining miles by being vectored for base leg instead of passing through the centreline to join a distant hold and descend there are the sort of flexible things that should be easy to handle, not requiring a new brief, but some pilots think that needs a full rebrief and there just isn't time. This is where pilots need to be familiar with using the basic AFDS modes and hand flying, and familiar with the performance of their aircraft, rather than needing to consult charts and calculators. That thing they called airmanship. But having no plan for the arrival at all gives you no way of seeing whether things are working or not.
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I think the first required briefing was on my 10'th flying job and third airline with over 12,000 hrs. I never cared if the other pilot was listening or not but it was required so had to do it. Doing a visual at the end of my career was just verifying runway.
I never cared if the other pilot was listening or not but it was required so had to do it.
That'll catch you out, Bubbers. 
Incident: Air India B788 at Melbourne on Jan 14th 2014, nearly landed on small airport
Air India almost doing same thing.
Air India almost doing same thing.
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NTSB Issues Investigative Update on the Southwest Airlines Wrong Airport Landing Incident
January 17, 2014
WASHINGTON -- As part of its ongoing investigation into an incident involving a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737-700 that landed at the wrong airport on January 13 in Missouri, the National Transportation Safety Board today released a brief investigative update.
On Tuesday, January 14, the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder from the Southwest aircraft arrived in the NTSB laboratory and were prepared for readout and analysis. The FDR recorded approximately 1000 parameters and contained approximately 27 hours of recorded data. Investigators have begun to analyze the data.
In addition, the CVR contained two-hours of good quality recording. According to the CVR, the Southwest crew was informed by air traffic control that that they were 15 miles from their intended target, which was Branson Airport. The crew responded that they had the airfield in sight and ATC cleared the aircraft for a visual approach and landing on runway 14 at Branson Airport. According to the CVR, the landing was uneventful and it was not until shortly after landing that the crew realized they had landed at the wrong airport.
On Thursday, January 16, the two pilots and a Southwest dispatcher who was riding in the jump seat were interviewed by NTSB investigators.
The captain has been with Southwest since 1999 and has about 16,000 flight hours including about 6,700 hours as a captain on the B-737. The captain informed investigators that this was his first flight into Branson Airport.
The first officer has been with Southwest since 2001 and has about 25,000 flight hours. The first officer informed investigators that he had previously flown into Branson Airport one time, but during daylight hours.
During the interviews, the pilots told investigators that the approach had been programmed into their flight management system, but that they first saw the airport beacon and the runway lights of M. Graham Clark Downtown Airport, located in Hollister, Mo., which they mistakenly identified as Branson Airport. They cited the bright runway lights at M. Graham Clark Downtown Airport and the fact that the runway was oriented in a similar direction. They also informed investigators that they flew a visual approach into what they believed to be Branson Airport and that they did not realize they were at the wrong airport until they had landed. They confirmed that they utilized heavy braking to bring the aircraft to a stop and then advised the Branson Airport tower that they had landed at the wrong airport.
WASHINGTON -- As part of its ongoing investigation into an incident involving a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737-700 that landed at the wrong airport on January 13 in Missouri, the National Transportation Safety Board today released a brief investigative update.
On Tuesday, January 14, the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder from the Southwest aircraft arrived in the NTSB laboratory and were prepared for readout and analysis. The FDR recorded approximately 1000 parameters and contained approximately 27 hours of recorded data. Investigators have begun to analyze the data.
In addition, the CVR contained two-hours of good quality recording. According to the CVR, the Southwest crew was informed by air traffic control that that they were 15 miles from their intended target, which was Branson Airport. The crew responded that they had the airfield in sight and ATC cleared the aircraft for a visual approach and landing on runway 14 at Branson Airport. According to the CVR, the landing was uneventful and it was not until shortly after landing that the crew realized they had landed at the wrong airport.
On Thursday, January 16, the two pilots and a Southwest dispatcher who was riding in the jump seat were interviewed by NTSB investigators.
The captain has been with Southwest since 1999 and has about 16,000 flight hours including about 6,700 hours as a captain on the B-737. The captain informed investigators that this was his first flight into Branson Airport.
The first officer has been with Southwest since 2001 and has about 25,000 flight hours. The first officer informed investigators that he had previously flown into Branson Airport one time, but during daylight hours.
During the interviews, the pilots told investigators that the approach had been programmed into their flight management system, but that they first saw the airport beacon and the runway lights of M. Graham Clark Downtown Airport, located in Hollister, Mo., which they mistakenly identified as Branson Airport. They cited the bright runway lights at M. Graham Clark Downtown Airport and the fact that the runway was oriented in a similar direction. They also informed investigators that they flew a visual approach into what they believed to be Branson Airport and that they did not realize they were at the wrong airport until they had landed. They confirmed that they utilized heavy braking to bring the aircraft to a stop and then advised the Branson Airport tower that they had landed at the wrong airport.
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In flying we must be humble. Sometimes we must crawl before we walk,and walk before we run, and run before we fly.
The captain had NEVER been to the airport
The copilot had NEVER been to the airport at night.
THIS is the way you get into trouble.
IF you have an instrument approach available, or other methods like radar vectoring to final to an airport you have never been to USE THEM, ALL METHODS to verify the airport is the correct one.
I can imagine them playing who has the airport in sight first. Anyone ever hear of that one?
The captain had NEVER been to the airport
The copilot had NEVER been to the airport at night.
THIS is the way you get into trouble.
IF you have an instrument approach available, or other methods like radar vectoring to final to an airport you have never been to USE THEM, ALL METHODS to verify the airport is the correct one.
I can imagine them playing who has the airport in sight first. Anyone ever hear of that one?
So according to NTSB an "oldie" F/O with 25K hrs. Possibly been a Captain for a significant time in previous life, and probably a bit older than the Capt. Anybody want to discuss "cockpit gradient" a la Asiana?