AA Crash Jamaica

[BOAC]

did they have such poor knowledge that they thought flap 30 and a deep touchdown might work?

- well, framer, you have to remember that these pilots with a major US carrier did not receive "guidance (including mitigation strategies) about the runway overrun risks associated with tailwind landings." - so, yes?

If they really made those excuses, did they, I wonder, think what the other professional pilots in the world would be thinking?

[Dream Land]

Not sure what the 30 flap is all about (less floating?), my guess is that they preferred the ILS versus whatever their options were for RW30, circle or RNAV, but with 2400m, there was no room for error.

[BOAC]

Dream - I'm struggling here - what is with the '2400m' and what do you mean by "Not sure what the 30 flap is all about (less floating?)"?

[Dream Land]

Sorry that you are struggling.

[WhatsaLizad?]

Did they float and land long? Obviously. Could they have stop in the remaining distance even on a wet runway? I don't know. I'll wait for the final report including the performance numbers for stopping on the distance remaining after touchdown.

I will be interested in the final report including the actual runway conditions at the landing time. I will be interested in knowing if the runway drainage system at KIN was maintained properly and not full of debris. I will be interested in knowing if the vegetation on the edges was trimmed properly and didn't cause water to dam up on the runway in heavy rain. I will be interested in hearing if their was an ATR that landed sometime before AA and experienced nil braking. Would there have been an issue even if landing in the last part of the touchdown zone? Dunno, right now it doesn't look good, but I'll wait for the final report.

[framer]

I will be interested in knowing if the runway drainage system at KIN was maintained properly and not full of debris.

Why? does that mitigate using an inappropriate flap setting and touching landing 2000ft past the touchdown zone with a tailwind?

I will be interested in knowing if the vegetation on the edges was trimmed properly and didn't cause water to dam up on the runway in heavy rain.

Trimming the vegetation doesn't effect the poor operation of the aircraft.
I understand what you are saying but I think you're clutching at straws a bit.They landed long and fast with a tail wind. Thats that. I feel like as an industry we are progressively taking less and less responsibility for our actions and trying to transfer the responsibility to others.

[WhatsaLizad?]

They landed long and fast with a tail wind

Long? Yes.

Fast? No.

Responsibility deflection? Not here, and don't care for it when it rears it's head.

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by Lizad

Fast? No.

- most of us agree it was and consider the approach should have been slower (ie F40).

Out of interest is AA one of the US airlines we have heard about that has a significant number of Captains who cannot/will not/are not allowed (delete as appropriate) to circle? This might go some way to explaining the fixation with the tailwind runway. Weather appears to have been fine for circling minima based on #22. P51 in #224 suggests the weather was pretty much 'on' AA's circling minima I have still seen no comment on AA's tailwind limitation at this airfield, not even from the NTSB.

[suninmyeyes]

Framer

They landed long and fast with a tail wind. Thats that.

I agree that is what happened. But the point is why did it happen?

There are a lot of factors to be looked at here.

1) Was the approach stable or was it rushed?

2) Were the crew fatigued and did they think to go for an ILS with a tailwind was an easier option rather than to go for a night RNAV approach that they were not familiar with? (For info I have been on several non-precision approaches with a decision height of around 500 feet and not been visual at DH due rain whereas I would probably have got in from an ILS.)

3)If the Captain was flying the landing was the copilot aware and concerned about how deep the landing was becoming and if so did he voice his concern or suggest a goaround?

4) Do AA practice baulked landngs in the simulator? ie where you are landing deep or have an increasing tailwind and need to make a decision to goaround, sometimes after touchdown but before reverse idle has been selected. It is extremely difficult in the flare to rejig the brain into a last second goaround unless there is something obvious like a fire engine driving onto the runway.

[talkpedlar]

Look at it this way, Dreamland..

.. if the 2400m left "no room for error" .. would that not be a wonderful reason to select F40 and stick it on the numbers? Or even better, land into wind?

IMHO there are just too many accidents and incidents these days resulting from basic airmanship failures.

Tailwind...less than full landing flap... poor braking-action runway... reciprocal r/w available.. FFS what is happening here? TP

[fireflybob]

One aspect that often doesn't seem to be appreciated is that, assuming a "normal" wind gradient, you can expect any shear to result in an increase in IAS when on the approach. If uncorrected this can result in excess speed and you are already landing with a tail wind component! All the more reason to fly the correct target speed and land at the right point on the runway and if not Go Around.

Be aware that energy is a functon of Speed SQUARED - a bit of extra speed makes a BIG difference.

I see two "compartments" here.

1. PLAN correctly - if necessary go into the hold and carefully check all the options. (With my last operator we landed at a lot of airports with an instrument approach on the single (short) runway in one direction so the only way you could get in if the cloudbase was a bit low was landing with a tailwind or else divert). When you check the (Boeing) Advisory distances err on the side of caution (if it's a 7 kt tailwind, assume 10kt; if you're not sure about Runway State due atc vagueness, assume WET etc). Use Flap 40, if you are not sure go for HIGHER autobrake setting - even MAX.

Remember the figures given are ABSOLUTE (as you are in the air as opposed to despatching)

If you are not happy, NOW is the time to make the decision to divert or hold etc.

2. Execute the PLAN but keep it under review! If conditions change make an early decision to Go Around etc.

If the wheels are not on the ground at the right point then GO AROUND.

Don't delay on selecting MAX Reverse and tranferring to MAX MANUAL braking, if required - don't back off on the stopping effort until you are ABSOLUTELY sure you can stop it on the tarmac - if necessary bring the a/c to a COMPLETE stop on the runway to be sure.

Also, practice every landing as though it's on a limiting runway so that you are confident you can plant the a/c consistently at the right point on the runway.

[BOAC]

A neat summary, talk.

I take it you understand Dream's '2400m' to be the runway length from touchdown zone - not something we consider normally - 2716m is the LDA on R12. I thought he was on about vis!

[talkpedlar]

I'm 100% with you BOAC..as usual..

..but yes... I'd prettymuch discounted the published LDA because these guys seemed to be flying at a steady height above the runway for quite a while.. with the TDZ disappearing fast behind them... and all the time with F30 (= un-necessarily fast) and a tailwind. Apologies if my terminology was confusing/ambiguous but I was pulling my hair out at the time! TP

[WhatsaLizad?]

BOAC,

I don't know the exact circle to land minimums for that 12 approach CL to 30 or if it was at AA's mins. I would consider that there was reported to be precip on the approach segment to 30. I don't know the severity.

With KIN operating experience, I do know that the visbility and ceiling conditions might have made the procedure somewhat "dodgy" as you folks say. On a normal VFR night there are good references with the lights of the city across the bay and the hillsides to the north and east. With reduced visibility the city light/coastal light references may have been invisible, and a circling pilot may be only left judging his approach over the dark ocean and the airport lighting. Also throw it the fine job the B737 wipers do in the rain. Easy work for a carrier pilot, possibly an issue for those that don't practice it on a regular basis. No excuses, just an observation.

Also consider KIN is an ungrooved runway. F40 is an obvious choice mentioned here as well as MAX autobrakes. I would note that I once experienced a rather interesting characteristic with F40 and MAX autobrakes landing on an ungrooved runway not unlike KIN. Each set of main wheel brakes did a fantastic job grabbing the surface and creating as much braking force as possible. The only problem was that one main set was doing this while the other was hydroplaning through one of many puddles. At least the puddles seemed to be equally spaced on both sides of the runway, so the significant yawing averaged out

The crew did land long on F30. I don't know the performance numbers for stopping in the remaining 4000'. Should it have? It did go off the end at 60+mph. That would seem a little high given the available distance and may suggest NIL braking. Not sure if landing near the end of the touchdown still might have given them some problem decelerating on rollout. KIN did have significant rain during that day.

[Dream Land]

.. if the 2400m left "no room for error" .. would that not be a wonderful reason to select F40 and stick it on the numbers? Or even better, land into wind?

Yes agree, not looking for the smooth touchdown here.

[F111UPS767]

Originally Posted by WhatsaLizad

I don't know the exact circle to land minimums for that 12 approach CL to 30 or if it was at AA's mins. I would consider that there was reported to be precip on the approach segment to 30. I don't know the severity.

With KIN operating experience, I do know that the visbility and ceiling conditions might have made the procedure somewhat "dodgy" as you folks say...

Is there some reason why RNAV 30 approach was not an obvious choice?

[BOAC]

I don't know the performance numbers for stopping in the remaining 4000'.

- I do - zero. Wasn't that their job to know too? At that weight ?medium? BA, max A/B, 2500m+ from 50' IE In the box or G/A. They had div fuel.

[WhatsaLizad?]

BOAC,

I meant the exact distance the aircraft should have used from touchdown. Not air distance, not additives, no fudges. Might be a little difficult since the wet-to-poor numbers are educated guesses at best. Was there 3 inches of water pooling in the last 2/3 of surface? I'd like to know because even if touchdown is correctly on speed and in the zone, a crew might find themselves in a ringer in a suddenly NIL braking with pooling water on rollout. Probably not unlike running in wet rubber deposits at the approach end of the opposite direct.

Landing wrong without using the best performance aids available in poor airmanship. I am curious if there were also any issues with airport facility maintenance. I'll wait for the final report to see if it was an issue, was no issue, or for political reasons brushed under the rug.

Again, good discussion and a great example of what PPrune can be for airman sharing information. Thanks.

[BOAC]

Lizad - I think that this 'distance' is irrelevant to this accident. If it needs 2500m+ from 50; and you have not touched down with 1200/odd m to go? I am, frankly, impressed that it only exited at a quoted '60mph'. Whether there was oil/rubber/standing water etc etc is of little matter. This is why we have 'margins' built into our performance. Step outside those at your peril and be prepared for the consequences.

ffb said, rightly, "If the wheels are not on the ground at the right point then GO AROUND."

[safetypee]

DreamLand #576 “I don't really feel the conditions pose a risk, the aircraft could have easily stopped had they not been in the wrong configuration and floated down 50% of the runway, all these overrun accidents have a lot in common.”

Common features: misassessed the situation, or with a reasonable assessment, chose an inappropriate course of action.
In order to avoid repeating the common features in similar circumstances we need to know why these features applied in this accident.

There appears to an industry habit of accepting excessive tailwinds. History has clearly demonstrated the increased risk. Control factors at 10kts tail were applied by requiring specific flight tests and operational approval for any higher speeds; these usually limit operations to specific circumstances and rarity of use. Furthermore, authorities might prohibit tailwind / contaminated (flooded) runway combination as risk reduction.

Another habit is accepting dispatch landing distances without reassessing the conditions. Some operations might place too much ‘implied’ authority with dispatchers; thus crews do not check for changes or particularly any implications of change, e.g. wet/good at dispatch could quickly deteriorate to wet/poor in heavy rain. Is the dispatch landing distance the same? How ‘wet’ is wet, and how much deviation requires using contaminated/flooded landing performance.

Further habits include reliance on reverse thrust. This provides an everyday standard for judging deceleration and stopping distance, but certification and dispatch distances, those with safety margins applied to counter the risks in operation, do not consider reverse.
Even if the actual landing distance suggested that the aircraft could land in the conditions, it did not have a safety margin consistent with the conditions and configuration - thus there was no safety margin. The factored landing distances, as used for dispatch, appear to give a reasonable margin of safety in operation and thus should be used in a pre-landing assessment of distance required.

“The aircraft could have easily landed on this runway …” #578.
The report gives the actual landing distance required as between 7500 and 8100ft depending on the wind speed used (note 11). These values applied to the wet/good runway report at dispatch (F30) and thus may not have been realistic in the actual conditions. Boeing ‘actual’ landing distances (QRH) use thrust reverse, thus a late or non-selection could result in an overrun, as could a landing beyond the assumed 1000ft touchdown position. These distances are at the runway limit, and in no way equate to only 60% of the distance available; certainly not easy, not safe.

So common features; lack of, or poor knowledge of landing performance, the variability in runway conditions, the significant increase in risk with tailwind / wet runway, habit, and the required margin of safety – safety is minimizing unnecessary risk.
This accident not only had unnecessary risk, it was an unnecessary accident.