AA Crash Jamaica

[Shore Guy]

PEI and all....thanks for the responses.

I was not aware Boeing published "advisory" information, and I wonder what protections crews would have in the aftermath of an incident/accident if they hung their hat on "Advisory" vs. "Certified" data.

[barit1]

Curious omission

Six weeks after the fact, the NTSB Database still has no mention of the write-off of a US carrier's aircraft on a revenue flight.

[sb_sfo]

It ain't much, but it is a mention

DCA10RA017

[protectthehornet]

I guess it all boilis down to this:

every landing you make is practice for the tough one...always be on speed, on spot (aim point/touchdown point whatever you like to call it) and make sure to always go right into the stopping drill ....directional control, spoilers, reverse, brakes...monitoring deceleration to your satisfaction.

I watched a 747 land at KOAK once about 30 years ago...27 left...not the long runway at OAK...but a shorter more gen av side of the field for you who know it.

Perfect landing...stopped on the runway...without enough room to turn off the runway...had to wait for a tug to push him back enough to make the turnoff...but did not leave the pavement...world airways for you guys who know.

if he had landed 100' longer he would have been in the mud...every landing is practice and every landing is critical...

PTH

PS...the long runway was closed...29/11

[keithskye]

I agree wholeheartedly and practice this every time...

I guess it all boilis down to this:

every landing you make is practice for the tough one...always be on speed, on spot (aim point/touchdown point whatever you like to call it) and make sure to always go right into the stopping drill ....directional control, spoilers, reverse, brakes...monitoring deceleration to your satisfaction.

The only difference I would suggest here is this: after spoilers should come brakes and reverse together. As most of us are aware, reverse is most effective at the highest speed (when used immediately on touchdown), but I've had a reverser deployment problem on touchdown where had I not already started braking, would have necessitated a go around, but as it was, because I was already decelerating steadily with the brakes, I did not need to rely on the reversers.

[protectthehornet]

Keithskye

I do agree with you, especially on critical length runways....the only reason I mentioned the order which I did, is our (my airline) policy...no brakes before 100 knots on normal landings.

But since so many of our planes use autobrakes, the point is almost moot.

but I encourage the NFP to always make sure the spoilers are deployed and reverse is symetrical.

[keithskye]

I do agree with you, especially on critical length runways....

I just realized that half the time, I am landing on critical length runways. The boss always wants to put the biggest airplane into the smallest airports (convenient for him, and a challenge for me!), and of course he wants to tanker fuel as much as possible from places where we get it cheap, so on top of that we are often at max landing weight, too.

Ahhhh...the life of a bizjet pilot!

[protectthehornet]

keithskye

our airline goes into or has gone into:

DCA, LGA, MDW, SNA and other sorta short runway airports with unique situations and surroundings...I understand.

I also encourage my copilots to plan very well to keep the brakes cool on quick turns. U might need them for an abort/reject on the very next takeoff. Hard to do unless you hit your spot.

[barit1]

Kingston = Mangalore?

Why is the AA Kingston thread so quiet, in light of the more recent Mangalore 738 accident? They seem to have much in common.

[protectthehornet]

barit1

isn't the airport a bit different and the lack of deaths in kingston another? it isn't a table top airport.

but I know what you mean...all over runs should be investigated

[Wino]

Some new info has come to light on Kingston....

By ANDY PASZTOR

An American Airlines plane that careened off a slick Jamaican runway last year while trying to land has prompted transportation-safety investigators to reassess how well some jetliner braking systems perform in rainy conditions, people familiar with the details say.

American Flight 331 was en route from Miami to Kingston in stormy weather when it landed nearly halfway down the runway on Dec. 22. The pilots used maximum braking power but the Boeing 737 still slid off the end of the strip, ending up with a collapsed landing gear and the fuselage cracked in two places.

The crash, according to these people, has led the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board investigators to challenge longstanding airline practices and technical assumptions regarding braking capabilities on wet runways. By those criteria, the advanced Boeing 737-800 should have been able to stop safely on the strip.

Investigators don't believe there was a significant pool of water on the runway, though the crew was battling a stiff tail wind as well as some malfunctioning runway and approach lights, these people said. The crash, which didn't result in any fatalities, left several of the 154 people aboard hospitalized.

Preliminary information gathered by investigators indicates the two-engine jet started to slow down, but then failed to decelerate as quickly as it should have and actually picked up speed slightly for a brief period. Even after maximum manual braking was applied, these people said, the deceleration rate never reached levels projected by earlier flight tests and engineering calculations for the apparent runway conditions that night.

Safety board investigators are now moving to draft recommendations to reassess, and in some cases tighten, current safety margins for landing on wet runways, according to people familiar with the continuing investigation.

Safety Board investigators and a spokeswoman for AMR Corp.'s American Airlines unit declined to comment, citing the continuing probe formally led by Jamaican authorities. A spokeswoman for the Federal Aviation Administration, which previously has issued advisories and regulations alerting pilots about the hazards of landing on wet or slushy runways, didn't have any immediate comment.

Runway overruns have become the most frequent category of accident for commercial aircraft world-wide. From 1995 to 2008, roughly 30% of all commercial-aircraft accidents involved so-called runway excursions, often in rain or snowy conditions, according to the Flight Safety Foundation, an industry-supported group based in Alexandria, Va.

Any action by regulators is likely months away, and the preliminary conclusions could change. But if regulators in the U.S. and elsewhere embrace more stringent rules, the result could be greater operational constraints on airlines planning to land on relatively short or outmoded runways when they are wet. The Kingston strip lacks grooves intended to help increase friction between a jet's tires and the runway's surface. Like many other airports in the region and some in the U.S., it also doesn't have special materials installed to stop aircraft that may veer off the end of the runway.

Jamaican officials have maintained that the Kingston runway meets all international safety standards.

In recent years, regulators, airlines, safety-equipment manufacturers and independent experts have tended to focus on ways to reduce pilot mistakes or lapses in judgment that lead to overruns. They have emphasized enhanced training, improved pilot discipline and more sophisticated cockpit hardware to prevent crews from approaching runways too fast, touching down too far down strips or failing to use proper braking or engine commands.

Other experts have been working on ways to determine more precisely the extent of water, slush and snow on runways. Today, pilots to a large extent depend on subjective radio reports from crews on planes that landed previously, rating braking action as good, fair or poor.

But now, in the wake of the Kingston accident, the U.S. safety board is shifting a major part of its effort to analyze whether brakes installed on various aircraft models are performing as reliably or effectively as pilots have come to believe, particularly under challenging conditions.

Write to Andy Pasztor at [email protected]

[BOAC]

It will be interesting to see the results of this.

Originally Posted by PEI

If for the prelanding check crews use the advisory data and factor this by the ‘in flight’ minimum (1.15) as indicated in FAA SAFO 06012, then as above, the result can be a different and much shorter distance than that required for dispatch.

- the 737 advisory tables are already factored by 15%

"accurate approach speed, ideal touchdown position, and max brake in the conditions specified." - is there another way of doing this landing thing?

I must say that in all my years of 737 ops, using the advisory tables for autobrake settings on artificially 'reduced' LDAs (ie planning exit points) has ALWAYS been spot on. I note from another thread that one airline apparently actually carries certification data in the cockpit. This is most unusual in my experience, and begs the question - following all the reams of theoretical 'papers' and 'studies' we see quoted, here and elsewhere - what exactly do our fundis suggest a 737 crew should do when runway conditions change from planned during the arrival, and have only the advisory figures to hand?

Re AA331 - I note they landed 'half-way down the runway' and there is no mention of touchdown speed or technique applied, so can we actually point a finger at the figures?

[Spendid Cruiser]

failed to decelerate as quickly as it should have and actually picked up speed slightly for a brief period. Even after maximum manual braking was applied

I think they want to question the veracity of their FDR data

[BOAC]

SC - purely by chance I googled Andy Pasztor and you'll never guess which paper he works for??????????????? - it is one on which I have cast my opinion on its credibility on aviation matters at least 3 times on PPRune - so, I think take that quoted article with a large dose of.. I call it the 'BS'J.

Those of us who have experienced less than optimum response to braking, be it in a aeroplane on an icy surface, in a Mini with brake failure or whatever, will attest to the fact that the poor old human brain experiences a delusional acceleration when brakes are applied in those situations. My advice - ignore it - unless of course the crew screwed up big time

[protectthehornet]

BOAC...of course you mean the wall street journal.

as a matter of actual flying, we must have a reserve for stopping. landing half way down the runway and going off the end...regardless of the article on braking...is wrong.

even the first third is marginal. so pick your spot for touchdown, not aiming , and hit it, pressing the tires through any water and start the stopping drills...spoilers, reversers and brakes and hold them till you stop (if there is any possibility of going off the end...even if the engines are barking)

in simulators, many pilots cancel reverse too quickly causing a forward thrust/acceleration.

you are paid to be at the top of your game on the worst day of your life...so practice with every landing you make.

[PBL]

Originally Posted by BOAC

purely by chance I googled Andy Pasztor and you'll never guess which paper he works for??????????????? - it is one on which I have cast my opinion on its credibility on aviation matters at least 3 times on PPRuNe - so, I think take that quoted article with a large dose of

Andy Pasztor just won the (US) National Press Club's Dornheim award for his coverage (with Susan Carey) of the Colgan Air accident. I wouldn't discount his work for the reasons given above.

PBL

[Capt. Inop]

is there another way of doing this landing thing?

In an -800 landing half way down a 8700 ft rwy, sure, go around.

[BOAC]

PEI - could you have a go at my post #538?

what exactly do our fundis suggest a 737 crew should do when runway conditions change from planned during the arrival, and have only the advisory figures to hand?

. Did you note that the (737) advisory LDR is already 15% factored?

[PEI_3721]

BOAC, Noted. However, the (old?) Boeing reference which I have been using does not appear to state that 15% is added - 737 QRH Sections 16 & 22. 737-400/CFM56-3_23.5K, June 2004. Quotes in blue.
Advisory Information - Normal Configuration Landing Distance
Tables are provided as advisory information for normal configuration landing distance on dry runways and slippery runways with good, medium, and poor reported braking action. These values are actual landing distances and do not include the 1.67 regulatory factor. Therefore, they cannot be used to determine the dispatch required landing field length.

However, irrespective of where 15% might be added, the landing distance achievable in normal operation may only at best equal the calculated landing distance (including 15%) due to the differences in the assumed touchdown point and threshold speed:-
Touchdown is normally considered to be 1000 ft from the runway threshold, but should be assumed to occur 2500 ft from the runway threshold when using autobrakes with autoland.

The problems of autobrake might only become significant with deteriorating runway conditions and can be masked by reverser use:-
Use of the autobrake system commands the airplane to a constant deceleration rate. In some conditions, such as a runway with “poor” braking action, the airplane may not be able to achieve these deceleration rates. In these cases, runway slope and inoperative reversers influence the stopping distance. Since it cannot be easily determined when this becomes a factor, it is conservative to add the effects of slope and inoperative reversers when using the autobrake system.

Using the tables as described by Boeing, tends to support the “we are OK to land syndrome” where the braking level is chosen to match the LDA with the advisory distance (no safety margin).
… enter the appropriate table for selected landing flaps and determine the reference landing distance for the selected braking configuration. Then read across the table to adjust the reference distance for landing weight, altitude, wind, slope, temperature, approach speed, and the number of operative thrust reversers, using the values provided, to obtain the actual landing distance.
A better method is to compare the distance margin provided by using higher brake levels and use the safety margin to counter the risks in the landing. In this instance, a tail wind is critical as it adds to the energy distance and tends to provoke long landings.

What should we do? Get ahead of the game.
Don’t get trapped in the rut of normality; every landing is different and should be assessed as such. The only normal issue is the quest for accuracy - altitude, speed, and distance.
Plan the landing with alternatives – what if. On a wet runway always check the landing data for a flooded runway (just in case it is reported or you assess it as such - heavy rain); brief the change in procedure required for any change in conditions (brake level, reverse). What’s the margin with spoiler / reverse failure?
Don’t trust PIREPS – would you bet the safety of your butt on the feeling of someone else’s butt – different aircraft, brake levels, weight, reverse, experience, risk taker, etc.
Think about how you are thinking – not “how we can do this”, but “should we be doing this”. Particularly for wet/flooded runways (heavy rain), tail/crosswinds, and heavy weight; beware combinations of these issues.
Edit:- and if the runway does not have a standard overrun area, deduct >90m from the LDA on a wet runway.

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/874.ppt

[WhatsaLizad-II]

Did you note that the (737) advisory LDR is already 15% factored?

BOAC,


Are you saying that his should cover the requirements for a wet runway?

thx