AA Crash Jamaica
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In my experience several companies prefer flap 30 to flap 40, however, if you like to operate the aircraft efficiently, & are capable of flying CDA's, you won't be aiming to be stable before 1000' IMC or 500' VMC so really no big deal in fuel burn between 30 & 40 is there ?
I always found the 800 much more speed stable on the approach & much less critical in the flare with flap 40. They always said to me, in strong crosswind better 30, in response I would say I have seen more flare /balloon/ float /flop& probably drift too
landings with 30 , so I always prefered 40 no matter the wind. The 800 is fast enough thanks with 40, when I am in the back please contemplate using all that Boeing provided 
I always found the 800 much more speed stable on the approach & much less critical in the flare with flap 40. They always said to me, in strong crosswind better 30, in response I would say I have seen more flare /balloon/ float /flop& probably drift too
landings with 30 , so I always prefered 40 no matter the wind. The 800 is fast enough thanks with 40, when I am in the back please contemplate using all that Boeing provided
catsplaystation;
This is a question which should be asked of any operator who runs and actually uses their FOQA Program. We asked the question ourselves for the 320 fleet types and came up with "essentially no difference", certainly not enough to warrant reduced flap settings for the sake of fuel savings.
Other considerations may enter into an operational decision to use reduced flap as a matter of SOPs, but fuel savings, in my view based upon extensive data, should not be one of them.
so really no big deal in fuel burn between 30 & 40 is there ?
Other considerations may enter into an operational decision to use reduced flap as a matter of SOPs, but fuel savings, in my view based upon extensive data, should not be one of them.
Mistrust in Management
No big deal in respect of fuel burn, but a medium size deal in respect of maintenance costs. Having said that - if an approach would be safer using flap 40 then that is what you do.
Regards
Exeng
Regards
Exeng
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Originally Posted by ee
but a medium size deal in respect of maintenance costs
How's LOS?
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Two new products from Honeywell, essentially software upgrades to EGPWS and the Honeywell RAAS system, perhaps would have helped in this situation. Monitors and warns of unstable approach. Also announces "Long Landing" and then advises runway remaining.
Also announces a potential taxiway landing (would have prevented recent ATL taxiway landing).
Honeywell : Runway Safety
recommend watching "overview animation".
I would imagine (having never used the system), that a "third voice" announcing "long landing" and a procedural (AOM) instruction to go around in these circumstances would be an advantage in the high workload environment encountered by these folks.
Also, in over 35 years in this business, I have never received instruction on a go-around after touchdown (sim). Yes, there is some AOM guidance, but practicing in the sim would be invaluable (for you sim guys, just put in a 40K tailwind at 200' and see what happens).
Also announces a potential taxiway landing (would have prevented recent ATL taxiway landing).
Honeywell : Runway Safety
recommend watching "overview animation".
I would imagine (having never used the system), that a "third voice" announcing "long landing" and a procedural (AOM) instruction to go around in these circumstances would be an advantage in the high workload environment encountered by these folks.
Also, in over 35 years in this business, I have never received instruction on a go-around after touchdown (sim). Yes, there is some AOM guidance, but practicing in the sim would be invaluable (for you sim guys, just put in a 40K tailwind at 200' and see what happens).
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"...Would have prevented the recent ATLtaxiway landing"...
Perhaps. But, as it turns out, there was a LOT going on that particular evening in ATL - a sick passenger, emergency crews waiting to meet airplane upon landing w/ crew trying to get as close as possible to them, a last minute (literally) parallel runway change (the old side-step!), and maintenance on the landing runway so the lights were not on (but taxiway lighting was).
Gotta read the preliminary report (on NTSB site somewhere) as the ATL taxiway-landing incident was truly a comedy of errors that led to, fortunately, a safe outcome. The 'lead-up' to this incident was anything but routine.
Oh, good link though and HUD points well taken. Thanks,
Cheers!
Perhaps. But, as it turns out, there was a LOT going on that particular evening in ATL - a sick passenger, emergency crews waiting to meet airplane upon landing w/ crew trying to get as close as possible to them, a last minute (literally) parallel runway change (the old side-step!), and maintenance on the landing runway so the lights were not on (but taxiway lighting was).
Gotta read the preliminary report (on NTSB site somewhere) as the ATL taxiway-landing incident was truly a comedy of errors that led to, fortunately, a safe outcome. The 'lead-up' to this incident was anything but routine.
Oh, good link though and HUD points well taken. Thanks,
Cheers!
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That exact scenario is where a product like Smart Runway and Smart Landing would help. What is other times is quite obvious, under high workload such as the ATL situation (or Kingston), a aural annunciation of what in normal, low workload situations would be obvious. It could save your bacon.
In the ATL scenario, this system would have annunciated "CAUTION TAXIWAY" on final. In the situation at Kingston, the warning would have been "LONG LANDING", and then count down runway remaining.
And no, I am not a Honeywell salesman.....
And, of course, we could spend pages on one of the toughest calls in aviation (making an assumption it was Captains leg in Kingston). The F/O saying "I've got the airplane".
In the ATL scenario, this system would have annunciated "CAUTION TAXIWAY" on final. In the situation at Kingston, the warning would have been "LONG LANDING", and then count down runway remaining.
And no, I am not a Honeywell salesman.....
And, of course, we could spend pages on one of the toughest calls in aviation (making an assumption it was Captains leg in Kingston). The F/O saying "I've got the airplane".
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Yes, landing on a taxiway, and yes, landing long at max tailwind component on a wet runway is hard to justify. Neither was intended, it was an outcome of breakdown of cockpit discipline. Verifying correct runway and landing in the touchdown zone. It shows the importance of paying close attention at the end of a long day when you are tired to not let your guard down and wait until you reach the gate to relax.
I have felt this great feeling 30 miles out at 10,000 ft. thinking of all the fun fishing we can do the next few days. Then I remind myself that we aren't parked yet so pay attention. It may have saved me some embarassment.
I have felt this great feeling 30 miles out at 10,000 ft. thinking of all the fun fishing we can do the next few days. Then I remind myself that we aren't parked yet so pay attention. It may have saved me some embarassment.
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Oh, yeah...
Shore and P51 -
I agree on both counts.
And, man, after reading that KATL taxiway landing report, I found myself mumbling "There but for the Grace of God Go I"...numerous times.
Thanks
I agree on both counts.
And, man, after reading that KATL taxiway landing report, I found myself mumbling "There but for the Grace of God Go I"...numerous times.
Thanks
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The previous post about automation was tongue in cheek. I really wanted to see if anybody really believed basic flying skills were no longer required. I was disappointed very few people disagreed with it. I guess we are really going to total automation and pilot skills are not required any more.
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I guess we are really going to total automation and pilot skills are not required any more.
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All my career, I was told the use of thrust reversers was not included in any of the landing performance charts.
However, SW at Midway, and AA Jamaica apparently have documentation that uses reverse thrust in landing data.
Is this peculiar to the late model 737's, or is this something you can "buy" from Boeing similar to increase from 10 to 15 knot tailwind limitation?
However, SW at Midway, and AA Jamaica apparently have documentation that uses reverse thrust in landing data.
Is this peculiar to the late model 737's, or is this something you can "buy" from Boeing similar to increase from 10 to 15 knot tailwind limitation?
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SG - the 737 Landing Tables now say
"Reference distance is for sea level, standard day, no wind or slope, VREF30 approach speed and two engine detent reverse thrust."
with an addition to LDR (from 50') for 1/2 rev u/s
"Reference distance is for sea level, standard day, no wind or slope, VREF30 approach speed and two engine detent reverse thrust."
with an addition to LDR (from 50') for 1/2 rev u/s
The certificated landing distance, which is the basis of operational factored landing distances, may have credit for reverse thrust if the system is sufficiently reliable (FAR/CS 25.125 –“means other than wheel brakes – if it is safe and reliable … consistent results … without exceptional skill”).
Information in the Boeing presentation Landing on Slippery Runways (slide 15) indicates that for the 737, reverse is not credited in certificated data.
Note that for EU operations on contaminated runways, reverse thrust may be considered when calculating contaminated data (CS 25.1591); AFAIK, there is no FAA equivalent regulation. Also, note that contaminated data have significant reductions in safety margins when compared with normal landing data.
I believe that the ‘737 landing tables’ (BOAC - #520) are the QRH actual landing distances, which Boeing refer to as ‘advisory’. If crews use this data with factors, the resultant distance may not be the same as the certificated data because they have differing assumptions and criteria. As stated, the advisory data uses reverse detent, and also assumes a fixed flare distance from the threshold to touchdown.
One possible area of ambiguity is in any difference between what is required for dispatch (fully factored certification data) and that required by a prelanding check.
If for the prelanding check crews use the advisory data and factor this by the ‘in flight’ minimum (1.15) as indicated in FAA SAFO 06012, then as above, the result can be a different and much shorter distance than that required for dispatch.
In many instances, this shorter distance may only represent the absolute minimum that an average crew can achieve with accurate approach speed, ideal touchdown position, and max brake in the conditions specified.
Conversely, EU-OPS 1 is reasonable clear that for the prelanding check the certification factored distances should be used. The logic is that most of the certification factor is to accommodate the day to variability in landing, i.e. the pilot’s contribution. Thus, it would difficult for the pilot to justify (without an emergency) that his prelanding assessment was safe (EU-OPS 1.400), as any shorter distance would appear to be ‘less safe’ than the standard required for dispatch, and that the pilot was still a significant (unchanged) contributor to landing variability.
Re tailwinds: The Flight Test Guide for Certification for Transport Category Airplanes AC 25-7A states “The AFM should contain a statement that the limitation for tailwinds greater than 10 knots reflects the capability of the airplane as evaluated in terms of airworthiness but does not constitute approval for operation in tailwinds exceeding 10 knots.”
AFAIK, the 737 AFM has no such statement, thus this suggests that ‘operational approval’ has been given (local FAA?). In this processes there is opportunity for an ill-considered approval (e.g. use the same one as previous 737 variants), and perhaps without full consideration of the potential risks which perhaps the certification regulations suggest.
Information in the Boeing presentation Landing on Slippery Runways (slide 15) indicates that for the 737, reverse is not credited in certificated data.
Note that for EU operations on contaminated runways, reverse thrust may be considered when calculating contaminated data (CS 25.1591); AFAIK, there is no FAA equivalent regulation. Also, note that contaminated data have significant reductions in safety margins when compared with normal landing data.
I believe that the ‘737 landing tables’ (BOAC - #520) are the QRH actual landing distances, which Boeing refer to as ‘advisory’. If crews use this data with factors, the resultant distance may not be the same as the certificated data because they have differing assumptions and criteria. As stated, the advisory data uses reverse detent, and also assumes a fixed flare distance from the threshold to touchdown.
One possible area of ambiguity is in any difference between what is required for dispatch (fully factored certification data) and that required by a prelanding check.
If for the prelanding check crews use the advisory data and factor this by the ‘in flight’ minimum (1.15) as indicated in FAA SAFO 06012, then as above, the result can be a different and much shorter distance than that required for dispatch.
In many instances, this shorter distance may only represent the absolute minimum that an average crew can achieve with accurate approach speed, ideal touchdown position, and max brake in the conditions specified.
Conversely, EU-OPS 1 is reasonable clear that for the prelanding check the certification factored distances should be used. The logic is that most of the certification factor is to accommodate the day to variability in landing, i.e. the pilot’s contribution. Thus, it would difficult for the pilot to justify (without an emergency) that his prelanding assessment was safe (EU-OPS 1.400), as any shorter distance would appear to be ‘less safe’ than the standard required for dispatch, and that the pilot was still a significant (unchanged) contributor to landing variability.
Re tailwinds: The Flight Test Guide for Certification for Transport Category Airplanes AC 25-7A states “The AFM should contain a statement that the limitation for tailwinds greater than 10 knots reflects the capability of the airplane as evaluated in terms of airworthiness but does not constitute approval for operation in tailwinds exceeding 10 knots.”
AFAIK, the 737 AFM has no such statement, thus this suggests that ‘operational approval’ has been given (local FAA?). In this processes there is opportunity for an ill-considered approval (e.g. use the same one as previous 737 variants), and perhaps without full consideration of the potential risks which perhaps the certification regulations suggest.
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Has there been word of braking reports that day and time?
I would assume the BC was well under 0.10.
The link leads to something that is definitely not a publication from Boeing.
Also, it is rather poorly written - as if English was not the writer's first language. Possibly.
No offense Mr. PEI, just being a pedant I suppose.
I would assume the BC was well under 0.10.
Information in the Boeing presentation Landing on Slippery Runways
(slide 15) indicates that for the 737, reverse is not credited in certificated data.
(slide 15) indicates that for the 737, reverse is not credited in certificated data.
Also, it is rather poorly written - as if English was not the writer's first language. Possibly.
No offense Mr. PEI, just being a pedant I suppose.
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411A, My neighbor flies the Airbus and says the autopilot is engaged at 100 ft so the next step is to make the whole take off on autopilot. I am glad to be retired and not deal with this. I guess this is the future but I don't like it. What do you do when the automation goes south? Will anybody be able to handfly in the future?
vapilot2004 re #523
You may not have selected the relevant document. Follow the link Flight operation aviation library on SmartCockpit and select the item titled -
“Landing On Slippery Runways.
Boeing has recently published a well illustrated document specific to landing on slippery runways. This document reviews available landing data, certified data, QRH adisory data and many other topics.” The authors are from Boeing Flt Ops Engineering and the Senior Tech Pilot (2006).
A similar presentation, by Boeing Air Safety Investigator was given at FSF IASS 2006; some of the details are summarized in the article www.flightsafety.org/asw/feb07/asw_feb07_p22-25.pdf ‘Knowing the Distance’.
You may not have selected the relevant document. Follow the link Flight operation aviation library on SmartCockpit and select the item titled -
“Landing On Slippery Runways.
Boeing has recently published a well illustrated document specific to landing on slippery runways. This document reviews available landing data, certified data, QRH adisory data and many other topics.” The authors are from Boeing Flt Ops Engineering and the Senior Tech Pilot (2006).
A similar presentation, by Boeing Air Safety Investigator was given at FSF IASS 2006; some of the details are summarized in the article www.flightsafety.org/asw/feb07/asw_feb07_p22-25.pdf ‘Knowing the Distance’.
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Ah. Thank you PEI.
Amongst the hundred or so articles offered in the link, I went for the inferior
one titled "Slippery Runways" Apologies Sir.
ps: the Flight Safety link appears to be a non-working one.
Fixed it up for you http://flightsafety.org/asw/feb07/asw_feb07_p22-25.pdf
My earlier request still stands however - any word on braking reports?
Amongst the hundred or so articles offered in the link, I went for the inferior
one titled "Slippery Runways" Apologies Sir.
ps: the Flight Safety link appears to be a non-working one.
Fixed it up for you http://flightsafety.org/asw/feb07/asw_feb07_p22-25.pdf
My earlier request still stands however - any word on braking reports?
P51 Guy,
The Airbus autopilot CAN be engaged at 100ft, not MUST. AFAIK airbus have no plans to reduce this figure. Your neighbour is having problems with his companies' SOP's, not Airbus SOP's.
LD
The Airbus autopilot CAN be engaged at 100ft, not MUST. AFAIK airbus have no plans to reduce this figure. Your neighbour is having problems with his companies' SOP's, not Airbus SOP's.
LD