Not wanting to give too much away (look at my user name); but, put simply, I'd leave the service at the first sign of a posting on this aircraft.
I'm not chasing promotion and I'm not going to give myself an ulcer through worry - I will, however, only sign what is correct when people's lives are at stake.

I'm afraid such an over-rule is not only permitted, but as I've often said MoD and Ministers (and lately the Head of the Civil Service) have consistently ruled that it can not only be made by unqualified people, but the person who has the airworthiness delegation can be disciplined for refusing to obey an order to make a false declaration that the regs have been met.

As ever, it is the implementation of the regulations that is lacking, not necessarily the regs themselves. More recently however, it has become apparent many in the MAA don't actually understand them. Hardly a surprise given the ethos of the last 20-odd years.

Picking up on an earlier point. The RJ has never been 'operationally tested'. Title 10 rules are paid lip service with BS claiming rapid refresh of capabilities to satisfy many UORs and being a 'black programme' make testing a nugatory process. Development and acceptance test is carried out to a degree.

If the press reports are correct, there are not enough qualified personnel to carry out the work required to correctly certify aircraft.

Embarrassment is now starting to out weigh risk.

If MoD/MAA finds an acceptable way of certifying the aircraft, excellent. No issue with that.

However, the very fact that, not for the first time, it has been admitted as a major risk is a major cock up in the first place. It clearly indicates mandated regulations were completely ignored and lessons from past failures, and notable successes, ignored. So much for the MAA and oversight.

The exceptionally high probability of encountering airworthiness problems in MoD programmes has been a standing risk for well over 20 years. That risk MUST be mitigated before approval is sought to proceed. You MUST demonstrate a "route map" to achieving certain fundamental milestones.

For example, the ability to bring the design Under Ministry Control, Transfer to PDS, Attaining Airworthiness, a funded and viable plan to Maintain Airworthiness and so on.

In confidence terms, and uppermost in one's mind throughout, is the Transfer to PDS. Every MoD Technical Agency and Programme Manager should know the 4 page Transfer form backwards, and if you get that right you are 95% of the way there, the other 5% being "unavoidables" (like political interference). It establishes that you have a valid, compliant Safety Case. Unsurprisingly, this is precisely what the Chief Engineer pulled the funding for in the early 90s and what was subsequently taught to be a "waste of money". And I wonder where the Transfer procedure is articulated now, given the mandated Def Stan was cancelled a few years ago without replacement.

Predictable, predicted, notified and ignored. Again.

Good enough for RAF
 

According to this link

RAF rewrites safety rules to fly old jets after being told £660m purchase was useless | Mail Online

‘If the aircraft is safe for the US Army Air Force, it must be good enough for the RAF to fly.’
------------------
Well that's all right then. Brits have never disagreed with the US over airworthiness......................

I know it's the Mail, but....

That would include the one still flying ops as a KC-135 last year then - and it's downhill from there!

Especially with the line "US Army Air Force"!

The Mail must be employing senile WW2 veterans!


Except in numbers, by the USAF, for decades! Yes, there IS a world outside the UK, strange as it may seem to you.

Exactly - and they are being modified from a type the USAF has operated for >50 years.

And each airframe has extensive maintenance documentation, and has been modified to a set configuration identical to that the USAF is currently operating.



But the detractors will continue to blather about "no documentation" and "no configuration control" as if anything not generated and controlled by the RAF doesn't exist.

One assumes this means you reject the need for a Safety Case?

“No documentation” and “no configuration control” were major contributory factors in the deaths of many of our UK servicemen. This Rivet Joint problem has been noted before by MoD, in 2011 if I recall, so the “blathering” has come from them. Much to their credit I suppose; a frankness which was lacking in the past.


The article is based on yet another MoD admission, in the 2013 MAA annual report. In it, the new DG repeats the 20 year old fact that MoD lacks experienced and competent (not the same thing) engineers. What he doesn’t say is that this shortage was a direct result of two of the main perpetrators of the airworthiness scandal decreeing, in 1991 and 1996, that MoD did not need engineers to manage any part of engineering programmes. One fallout from these decisions was the policy that permitted non-engineers to have airworthiness and technical delegation; in fact, self delegation.

However, I agree with your last comment. There is too much reinvention of wheels and duplication. There also happens to be a perfectly good procedure in MoD for using foreign certification and, as far as possible, reading across. I mentioned the transfer to PDS. What PDS Category is the aircraft and its kit? 1,2,3,4,5 or 6? A simple question, but if not addressed problems accumulate and bite you just as you’re looking to issue certification. The decision must be made up front, as it is a major decision point regarding achieving and especially maintaining airworthiness. Not least due to funding and complex contractual arrangements.



The MAA has not revealed precisely what is causing concern at the moment, but MoD did reveal itself when the decision to buy these aircraft was announced. They claimed they would be exactly the same configuration as those used by the US. The problem here is that such a configuration would (in part) breach not MoD rules, but those imposed on MoD by our Home Office. It was too simplistic a statement, something noted on pprune at the time. If that truly was the level of thinking, then problems were inevitable because much else would be ignored.

tuc,
as I recall every RAF a/c has to have a 'Design Authority'. I believe the USAF usually take up this role for their a/c. When we bought the C130K Marshalls became our design authority for it. Who is the design authority for the Rivet Joint a/c ?

Sorry Ancient, I too am ancient and don't know.

There doesn't HAVE to be a company appointed as DA, but it is wise. For example, MoD was the DA for some aircraft engine types when we had a dedicated Aero Engine Directorate and, importantly, experts in the field. You do get ridiculous extremes; for example, in 1991 Alcock's regime wanted to cancel all avionic DA contracts and take over DA-ship at Harrogate, led by Supply Managers. However, his incompetence was never in doubt and we headed that off. His reaction was to chop safety funding so we couldn't do the job either, so maybe we would have been better off letting the suppliers (mis)manage it. But it shows you how little very senior people understand about such an important subject.

What the regs say (or said, as they've been cancelled, but I have my own copy here) is that if the original DA does not want the job, is not suitable, or no longer exists, a Design Custodian can be appointed (along with the System Co-ordinating Design Authorities/Custodians, as required). The latter is the basis of all systems integration and functional safety. The MoD must make arrangements for the DC to hold a certified copy of the Master Drawings, and a contractual arrangement must be made with the holder of the Masters for upkeep. A good example is most US-sourced avionics. Joyce Loebl in Gateshead became our best known DC; and a very good job they made of it too. Very often the difficulty is persuading a UK company to take on the responsibility, knowing that in the background there will be hassle with the OEM - especially the US I'm afraid. They treat us like s##t and over-charge to the point of fraud. I remember being quoted a cool £1M (not $) to amend a drawing by inserting a zener diode. (The effect of the diode was to double the available crypto variables in the aircraft, thus meeting Home / Foreign Office requirements following a complaint from Italy).

There are many ways of skinning this cat. MoD could buy the Design Rights and hand them to a UK company, who would become the DA. I don't know if this is what happened on C130K and Marshalls, but it is hard to believe Lockheed sold us the Design Rights. I'd say Marshalls are, more correctly, the Design Custodian. Certainly, during the XV179 inquiry, they didn't have access to data you'd expect a DA to have.

A little known policy, and certainly seldom implemented properly, is that the named representative of the DA or DC is an MoD-approved appointment. If we are considering appointing a company as a DA, we ask them to propose their man, and we (his opposite number in MoD, the named Technical Agency) vet and approve him. We can sack him at any time. (I've only had to do it once, in about 1992). This TA post is precisely the experience the MAA confirm is lacking. Find me someone in DE&S who knows this stuff! (EVERY engineering project manager should, be it Air, Land or Sea).

The reason for this is that, uniquely, he is granted financial and technical delegation powers far in excess of many in MoD. The sole purpose is that he may commit our money and expedite safety matters without seeking MoD approval or contract amendment. This is what makes nonsense of the MoD Commercial claim that only they can commit us to contract. THIS is why the lead question on many investigations should be to this named individual, asking what he did about it when informed. The question is NEVER asked, indicating a breakdown in the safety management system. (The answer would almost always be he hadn't been given the correct delegation). Often, the correct question is asked, but of the wrong company (Chinook ZD576, Red Arrows XX177, Sea King ASaC, Tornado ZG710 for example), which simply illustrates how important is it to establish and record these boundaries of responsibility for all aspects of the programme.

DA for platform and Mission System is BIG SAFARI and not USAF.

GK121 - To be fair to the Daily Fail, when the original KC-135 was ordered, the USAF had existed for less than seven years.

tuc,
I am sure that we always referred to Marshalls as the DA for Europe in respect of the C130K. We could of course have been parroting nonsense, but Marshalls seemed to act as a DA in respect of most things to do with the 'K'. The tanker comes to mind when fatigue data was required in respect of repeated overweight take off operations. I have a vague (all my recollections are so !) notion that the rushed initial Chinook buy threw up the question as to who would be the UK DA as Boeing refused to be.

I have just noticed that in the HEART Report Marshalls is described as the Sister Design Authority (SDA). So my recollection is not so far adrift, unlike my taking this thread ! Apologies.

RA5101(2) States:

Design Organization Appointment
5101(2) The PTL shall appoint a Design Organization or Co-ordinating Design Organization to be responsible for a particular item or range of items.

A number of responsibilities come with this appointment, notably as stated in the AMC for RA5102(1):

1. When a contractor is appointed Design Organization or Co-ordinating Design Organization, his responsibilities to the MOD should include:
a. Design of the materiel, including all necessary development and testing, to the requirements of the contract specification.
b. Preparation, updating and custody of specifications, drawings and other data associated with the design of the materiel.
c. Preparation, collection, analysis and maintenance of data comprising evidence of design and system safety in accordance with a Safety Management Plan agreed with the PTL.
d. Submission of reports, as required, on progress of the work.
e. Preparing an appropriate certificate of design and its submission for MOD
acceptance (See RA 5103).
f. Ensuring that the design will be suitable for production in facilities agreed between the contractor and MOD.
g. Design of packaging as required for the materiel.
h. Preparation of, or supply of information for, the necessary technical
publications.
i. Collaboration with the relevant PT and it’s agencies in the preparation and provision of information for maintenance of the materiel.
j. Post design services.

The DO must also have DAOS approval.

You assume very incorrectly, and in an insulting manner!


My position is that there is more than enough documentation to make up a valid Safety Case as long as the UK is willing to admit that other nations are capable of designing and operating aircraft safely without following UK protocols, and to look outside its own borders for the information on which to base its decision.

The question is whether the Safety Case is to ignore all non-UK-generated design, operation, maintenance, and configuration documentation (in this case a massive amount of all the above is available from the USAF) in deciding whether the aircraft is, in fact, safe to fly as intended - or to accept such documentation where it presents a clear and comprehensive picture.

A second question is whether any documentation not produced in the RAF-approved manner, form, and style is to be ignored, or if "non-UK-standard" documentation can be accepted if the information contained therein can fill the mandatory information sections of the UK requirements.



The sentence you used to make your crap assumption relates to those who, both in the real world and in this thread (and related ones) insist that Rivet Joint (or insert other US aircraft designation as applicable) "has never been 'operationally tested'." (see Phoney Tony), or "has no documentation" (see many posters on Chinook, etc) - when there exist mountains of documentation and massive operational experience and testing from outside the UK.

How anyone can get from there to claiming I say no Safety Case is needed is incomprehensible.

Sorry Green Knight but you used a slightly derogatory term ("blathering") to describe those who advocate configuration control and documentation. I twitch because it was precisely those failures, openly admitted by MoD in the 90s, that should have prevented the Chinook pilots being blamed in the first place. They were the very first signposts to the fact the aircraft was not airworthy; and indeed highlighted from the very beginning - but unfortunately not understood or pursued. Too often, both here and in MoD, we have people saying they are a waste of money, when in fact doing it correctly is money in the bank. They are pre-requisites to a valid Safety Case and I think I'd rather have people blathering on about them than ignoring them. We should be looking at the people who don't want to talk about them, and who issue instructions (a) not to do the work and (b) sign to say it has been done.



I fully agree and said so above. However, I also noted that MoD doesn't always have the luxury of buying to the same build standard, and any variations MUST be reflected in the Safety Case. THIS is where MoD has historically failed, again because of senior staffs deeming it a waste of moeny.

I wonder if the Build Standard reflected in the Boeing Safety Case in the US is the same as the proposed UK one? We are told they are the same, but I'm not so sure.

The only problem I have with this is that it calls into question MAA's understanding of the fact items (a) through (i) are also a SMALL PART OF (j).

The purpose of Post Design Services is to "Maintain the Build Standard". That is a pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case (as a given issue of the Safety Case is based on a given Build Standard), so is contracted in the same contract. There are 17 primary components of a Build Standard, each with secondary components. The above list (a - i) comprises both primary and secondary, so there is a significant part missing.

Where is that fully articulated in the MAA documentation, and where are the mandated procedures for implementation, now that the Def Stan has been cancelled without replacement? The above smacks of being made up at a brainstorming half hour, when all they had to do was update and re-validate existing mandated policy. But that would be to admit there was nothing wrong with the "old" regs, which would divert attention back to those who decreed them unnecessary. In any case, I really do doubt if MoD still has a copy of the "old" regs. I know D/Stan doesn't.

And where is the necessary training and expertise, given the formal appointment of the Technical Agency (who manages all this stuff) requires donkeys years of previous experience and proven competence? The MAA and Bernard Gray have admitted this doesn't exist, so what recruitment standard is now applied? By definition, the standard required for delegation has been diluted; something reported often and consistently from the early 90s.

MoD's problems in this area stem from the verifiable fact, confirmed by the likes of the Inspector of Flight Safety, Lord Philip, Director Internal Audit, Equipment Accounting Centre and more, is that in the period 1991-93 the RAF Chief Engineer issued instructions that ALL of the above should cease forthwith. Haddon-Cave accepted this, but despite the raft of evidence claimed it was 1998. (Presumably all the above backdated their reports!) The day the MAA acknowledge this truth is the day I'll walk away.

Some interesting information about the RAF Chief Engineer of that period appear here: https://sites.google.com/site/milita...executive-docs

:eek:

This is a sorry business. Chickens are coming home to roost in their flocks now. The age old default of the MOD whereby it treated each incident, each accident, each loss of life, as a one off that bore no relationship to any other, is seen as the lie that it is.

UK Military Airworthiness is in tatters, totally dysfunctional, and in the hands of amateurs. tuc shows above the schoolboy howlers that are their daily output. Every time they are faced with the consequences of their own ignorance the solution is to draw up a new list of regulations, procedures, or mere soundbites.

The men and women of our Armed Forces deserve far better than this. The defence of the nation deserves far better than this. As tuc says, the one thing that prevents meaningful reform is the dead hand of the MOD, that will not admit to the willful destruction of Air Safety wrought as policy from the late 80's. That is why the MAA, together with the MAAIB, must be made independent of the MOD and of each other. Then, and only then, can it begin the task of regaining the original regulations, restoring the necessary expertise, and reforming the provision and maintenance of UK Military Airworthiness. Time is of the essence, and any delay will cost us more avoidable accidents and more needless loss of life.

Self Regulation Doesn't Work, and in Aviation It Kills!