Chinook ZD576 - The Concealed Evidence
It is clear from the sequence of events, and the wording of Day's remarks, that Station Commander Odiham (Gp Capt Crawford) amended his remarks after he was criticised in Day's remarks for not finding blame. As published, Crawford's remarks make no sense at all, and as one senior officer said 'the join is very clear'.
CAS, Graydon, was even more critical of the BOI president for not apportioning negligence, calling his investigation 'barely adequate'.
A key player is Malcolm Rifkind. Campaigners were largely ignored and left alone by MoD, but correspondence with Rifkind made them twitch violently, and led to 'visits' and serious pressure to desist. I speak from personal experience, a deputation of four accosting me at a private event and warning me not to speak to Rifkind again. (Which I ignored). He's said it was Day and Graydon who misled him (lied by omission), failing to tell him that it was mandated upon the RAF that the Mk2 must not be flown in service. They also omitted that Textron were being sued over the engine software, and that the Senior Reviewing Officers had disagreed with the Board, and with each other. Whatever you think of politicians in general, Rifkind made a lot of enemies with this breach of parliamentary protocol. As did John Major and Jeremy Hanley. That a former Secy of State and prime minister can come out and publicly say the findings were wrong, and nothing be done, is a clue someone or something else is being protected. MoD later gave a clue, admitting UK/US relations were paramount.
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Whatever you think of politicians in general, Rifkind made a lot of enemies with this breach of parliamentary protocol. As did John Major and Jeremy Hanley. That a former Secy of State and prime minister can come out and publicly say the findings were wrong, and nothing be done, is a clue someone or something else is being protected. MoD later gave a clue, admitting UK/US relations were paramount.
tucumseh's last sentence, in the quote above, makes me think I was thinking along the correct lines!
Did Day and Wratten's coveting of Honours influence their willingness to pervert the course of justice, following 'orders' from elsewhere, even though so many could clearly see they had exceeded their remit? I am not excusing Day and Wratten's behaviour with this theory, because they are both self-serving 🔔🔚's, I am merely musing about some of the motivations.
Last edited by Abbey Road; 2nd Feb 2024 at 09:24.
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Did Day and Wratten's coveting of Honours influence their willingness to pervert the course of justice, following 'orders' from elsewhere, even though so many could clearly see they had exceeded their remit? I am not excusing Day and Wratten's behaviour with this theory, because they are both self-seeking 🔔🔚's, I am merely musing about some of the motivations.
As Flipster mentioned above, a key event in the campaign was the uncovering of the complete Chinook Airworthiness Review Team report in early 2011, issued by the Director of Flight Safety (RAF) to the RAF Chief Engineer (Alcock) and Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Bagnall) on the latter's first day in post in 1992. Importantly, the author came forward, one of the RAF's most qualified engineers, and Lord Philip asked to see him personally.
CHART is dissected elsewhere, but a telling effect is seldom commented on. Hitherto, the only very senior officers we heard of were Wratten and Day.
Day didn't say much after the Lords confirmed his approach, that it was for the deceased pilots to clear themselves. (A not dissimilar approach to that taken post Sea King ASaC mid-air in 2003, when MoD rejected the evidence of technical problems with 'the (deceased) pilots didn't report any failures after the flight' - therefore there weren't any). He retired and Tony Blair waved the rules and allowed him to take up a senior position in industry.
Wratten of course continued to speak out at every opportunity, always ignoring the known facts.
But when CHART was revealed, we heard not a word from either. Suddenly, ACMs Alcock and Graydon were pushed forward. Apparently they were now the God-given experts, yet had never been mentioned in any inquiry or hearing.
I cannot speak for Day or Wratten, but I am prepared to admit the possibility, even probability, that the detail of CHART came as an almighty shock to both, as it fully backed (a) MoD's airworthiness specialists, (b) Boscombe Down and (c) the likes of Air Cdre John Blakeley, who had written a superb paper in 2003, only to be denigrated by the VSOs and MoD. It also provided supporting evidence that Sqn Ldr Rob Burke, the Odiham Unit Test Pilot, was correct about UFCMs, when MoD and Ministers had persisted with very personal attacks, calling him a liar. All the while, sitting on CHART knowing here was independent evidence he was 100% right.
Alcock and Graydon. The new Wratten and Day. What was the common denominator between them? CHART, and its subject matter.
Wratten later admitted he was aware the Mk2 wasn't airworthy. A post-crash letter to Bagnall demanding it be formally declared airworthy is a bit of a giveaway; although he later claimed a temporary predecessor, Johns, wrote it. Another one with a vested interest who dissembled.
I just don't think Wratten realised the scale of its immaturity. If Alcock and Bagnall could conceal CHART for all those years, and take no action on DFS's recommendations, it's easy to see how Wratten and Day wouldn't know the detail. Certainly Controller Aircraft, Sir Donald Spiers, didn't, and put this in writing during the Review; despite the RAF claiming it was HE who issued the authority to fly the Mk2, not Bagnall. When someone does the dirty on you like that, to protect the Air Staff , and you still support them, then you're deeply involved. There is something else you know about that all of you want to remain hidden.
When Dr Fox spoke in August 2011, clearing Rick and Jon, what did he lie about? CHART, saying it never mentioned the 'Mk2'. It did, 284 times. Hardly an easily overlooked footnote Liam. He was inundated with complaints and quite quickly retracted; but not publicly, only in letters to MPs. So Hansard still says CHART is all about Mk1. You only have to read to Terms of Reference.
And then of course there's the Chinook Project Director, who in February 1999 threatened senior MoD(PE) and Army staff 'I'll publish my book telling the truth about Mull of Kintyre'. I was there when he said it. Please do. He didn't know of CHART either.
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The fact that the Mk 2 was not yet airworthy would have been a commercial matter at that point rather than a US/UK relationship issue surely? I don’t see how the US Government were responsible for the faults at that point, and any attempt to lay blame for the crash at their door would have received short shrift. Similarly any attempt to blame Boeing etc would have led to the whole situation regarding the trials at Boscombe Down quickly becoming public.
The whole situation went pear shaped when the aircraft was released to service. What was the motivation for that? Showing off to the Army all seems a bit flimsy as a justification, and I doubt whether any of the SLF on the fateful flight knew or cared whether it was a MK2 or a MK1. Was there a big picture justification at all, or was it overzealous showing off to senior officers?
I am wondering whether cock up preceded the conspiracy.
The whole situation went pear shaped when the aircraft was released to service. What was the motivation for that? Showing off to the Army all seems a bit flimsy as a justification, and I doubt whether any of the SLF on the fateful flight knew or cared whether it was a MK2 or a MK1. Was there a big picture justification at all, or was it overzealous showing off to senior officers?
I am wondering whether cock up preceded the conspiracy.
The fact that the Mk 2 was not yet airworthy would have been a commercial matter at that point rather than a US/UK relationship issue surely? I don’t see how the US Government were responsible for the faults at that point, and any attempt to lay blame for the crash at their door would have received short shrift. Similarly any attempt to blame Boeing etc would have led to the whole situation regarding the trials at Boscombe Down quickly becoming public.
The whole situation went pear shaped when the aircraft was released to service. What was the motivation for that? Showing off to the Army all seems a bit flimsy as a justification, and I doubt whether any of the SLF on the fateful flight knew or cared whether it was a MK2 or a MK1. Was there a big picture justification at all, or was it overzealous showing off to senior officers?
I am wondering whether cock up preceded the conspiracy.
The whole situation went pear shaped when the aircraft was released to service. What was the motivation for that? Showing off to the Army all seems a bit flimsy as a justification, and I doubt whether any of the SLF on the fateful flight knew or cared whether it was a MK2 or a MK1. Was there a big picture justification at all, or was it overzealous showing off to senior officers?
I am wondering whether cock up preceded the conspiracy.
The biggest cock-up was the FADEC procurement strategy in the late 80s. Breached every known rule going. When the RAF's Training Development Team ('train the trainers') visited Boeing in 1992/3 seeking a briefing on FADEC, Boeing were sitting waiting to be briefed, because they were not in the contractual loop. That also breached every rule. The problem was perpetuated on Mk3 and Nimrod, the same procedural cock-ups encouraged (not just permitted) by the same 2-Star Director General.
But context is important, and the opening paragraph of CHART is revealing. The reason for the Review was a spate of airworthiness related Chinook Mk1 accidents, some fatal. None more so than ZA721 in the Falklands in 1987. The 721 AAIB report is utterly damning about Boeing, and CHART simply repeated the comments in 1992. A hole not even drilled for a split pin in an actuator? Seals fitted the wrong way round? Seals not fitted at all? And MoD claimed cause was unknown, while Boeing stayed silent. Bollix. It took the AAIB and Sqn Ldr Burke a morning to work it out. That's more Quality Control failures than the recent door falling off. Boeing were actively protected, and to 'go there' would reveal very plausible potential causes of ZD576. (There, a second hole was drilled for a pin, weakening the rod).
The company were deemed by DFS in 1992 not to be a suitable off-shore Design Authority. Everyone knew that anyway, so what waiver was issued allowing their appointment? Even setting that aside, the company should not have accepted the Mk2 contract, as there was no stable baseline. (Remember, FADEC was not part of the Mk2 contract, it was a Mk1 enhancement. Boeing's contract said the Mk1 would turn up for conversion with FADEC fitted. It didnt). And of course MoD should not have offered the contract. The MoD person who makes the DA appointment is named in the contract. As he sits at one of the two lowest technical levels in MoD(PE), then I'm confident he was directed for political reasons. Such political directives were common at the time, but more often 'benefitted' a defence minister's constituency.
When ACAS issued his illegal Release to Service in November 1993, Boscombe's aircraft was an unrepresentative 'prototype', not a Mk2. Why even start testing and trialling the new bits, when you have to start over again when a Mk2 arrives? But MoD wouldn't be able to get anywhere legally or commercally, because Boeing delivered what was (poorly) contracted.
The reasons for unairworthiness (FADEC primarily, but also the likes of MoD refusing to scheme 'essential' mods for the DASH after ZA721) were largely down to MoD. Relatively 'minor' things like Boeing selecting the wrong battery type, and its installation design being unsafe, would have been easily fixed had Boscombe been listened to. So too the fact the emergency radio didn't work in an emergency... Which was academic at the time, as no intercom was cleared to be in the aircraft. A bit of a bugger's muddle I'm afraid, and little wonder no inquiry went there.
I hope that context explains why the Mk2 not being airworthy was not a commercial matter. In that sense, MoD commercial tend only to be involved once a fault investigation becomes a defect investigation, as the technical issues are by definition settled. Attaining and maintaining airworthiness are areas they seldom get involved in.
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Pilots didn’t trust the Mk2. Additionally, this crew had very few hours on it and it was a very different aircraft to that on which they had a lot of experience. As is well known they asked to take a Mk1 instead but it seems that this high profile flight was seen by those in higher authority as a “flagship” mission to show management confidence. When it went wrong in the worst possible way, blame was deflected in the most egregious way possible. Disgracefully so.
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I hope that context explains why the Mk2 not being airworthy was not a commercial matter. In that sense, MoD commercial tend only to be involved once a fault investigation becomes a defect investigation, as the technical issues are by definition settled. Attaining and maintaining airworthiness are areas they seldom get involved in.
It may sound like trivia to some but during the strip-down phase of the build anything that was not recognised or thought to be part of the Mk2 output was removed by Boeing personnel. By removed, I mean brutally, with looms being cut to save time rather than using the LRU connectors as one would normally expect. A clause in the contract had the MoD being responsible for such systems marked as GFE and the scale of the problem only became apparent when Boeing started to order new looms from the MoD to make good all the damage to the 'undisturbed' systems. Clearly MoD did not stock a vast amount of AAR-47 wiring harnesses, LRUs, lighting systems or whatever and the only place the MoD could go to was Boeing. The MoD logistics desk officers for the upgrade found themselves fishing for LRUs, looms, sensors, connectors etc out of various bins as Boeing could not source new replacements.
You would think Boeing would know how to look after simple parts, such as transparencies, rotor blades and alike, by not just stacking them on concrete floors in a big heap. Run out of trestles - no problem. Just carry on and order new parts from the MoD at the end when you find the originals trashed.
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Yet it became a MoD Commercial 'crisis' as so few of the basics were set before individual aircraft hit the Mk2 programme. For example, the build standard of the aircraft going into the programme was not set, nor were they set for the final output. This was particularly critical for items or systems that the MoD expected to remain undisturbed or returned with the aircraft on completion.
It may sound like trivia to some but during the strip-down phase of the build anything that was not recognised or thought to be part of the Mk2 output was removed by Boeing personnel. By removed, I mean brutally, with looms being cut to save time rather than using the LRU connectors as one would normally expect. A clause in the contract had the MoD being responsible for such systems marked as GFE and the scale of the problem only became apparent when Boeing started to order new looms from the MoD to make good all the damage to the 'undisturbed' systems. Clearly MoD did not stock a vast amount of AAR-47 wiring harnesses, LRUs, lighting systems or whatever and the only place the MoD could go to was Boeing. The MoD logistics desk officers for the upgrade found themselves fishing for LRUs, looms, sensors, connectors etc out of various bins as Boeing could not source new replacements.
You would think Boeing would know how to look after simple parts, such as transparencies, rotor blades and alike, by not just stacking them on concrete floors in a big heap. Run out of trestles - no problem. Just carry on and order new parts from the MoD at the end when you find the originals trashed.
It may sound like trivia to some but during the strip-down phase of the build anything that was not recognised or thought to be part of the Mk2 output was removed by Boeing personnel. By removed, I mean brutally, with looms being cut to save time rather than using the LRU connectors as one would normally expect. A clause in the contract had the MoD being responsible for such systems marked as GFE and the scale of the problem only became apparent when Boeing started to order new looms from the MoD to make good all the damage to the 'undisturbed' systems. Clearly MoD did not stock a vast amount of AAR-47 wiring harnesses, LRUs, lighting systems or whatever and the only place the MoD could go to was Boeing. The MoD logistics desk officers for the upgrade found themselves fishing for LRUs, looms, sensors, connectors etc out of various bins as Boeing could not source new replacements.
You would think Boeing would know how to look after simple parts, such as transparencies, rotor blades and alike, by not just stacking them on concrete floors in a big heap. Run out of trestles - no problem. Just carry on and order new parts from the MoD at the end when you find the originals trashed.
Quite right, and all of the above is mentioned and explained in the books.
It boils down to Induction Build Standard. That is for the Service to determine, and agree with the project office, and they Boeing. Commercial's input is to ensure it's typed correctly in the contract by the typing pool; and the Service sponsor checks it, usually delegating it to the Engineering Authority.
The basic problem, and it's always a problem, is the plethora of Service Engineered Mods and Special Trials Fits in the aircraft, especially those that have not been appraised by Boeing or approved by the project office; and so don't appear in the Safety Case. Especially STFs. The Mk1 had 39 STFs. It's easier to cut and paste an extract from The Inconvenient Truth:
The technical procedures are mandated in two Defence Standards. Briefly in 05-123, with the full version in 05-125/2, Specification PDS/8. This partial duplication is confusing to the untrained user. The essential problem is that 123 was written by staff who would seldom have to implement it; whereas 125/2 was written by experienced, current practitioners. That is, the Technical Agencies. One can always tell which was implemented.
However, and correctly, neither mentioned STFs. Therefore, they could have no contractual status and Aircraft Design Authorities (ADA) were permitted to ignore them. It is not uncommon for an ADA to refuse an MoD aircraft permission to land on its property with certain SEMs or STFs fitted (because they have never been proven safe). If they do allow them, and they interfere with their subsequent work, they are removed and discarded unless otherwise agreed in the contract. Often, when the Service later tries to refit them, the real estate is taken up. By definition, these contracts are drawn up by the Aircraft Project Office, whose involvement the STFs are intended to bypass in the first place. So, they often have no knowledge of them.
In other words, we agree!
Edited to add that the book under discussion, The Concealed Evidence, lists each STF and discusses its status (or otherwise) in the Mk2. It's usually 'otherwise!
Last edited by tucumseh; 2nd Feb 2024 at 15:39. Reason: Addition/clarification
Tecumseh,
we may be at crossed purposes in relation to it being a commercial matter. I am not meaning to determine which part of MOD should have been dealing with the matter, rather suggesting that it was a contractual / financial matter for resolution between the parties, if necessary in court. Notwithstanding the myriad preceding issues which you touch on here, and catalogue so comprehensively in your books, one part of the process which seemed to have worked was Boscombe Down identifying that the aircraft was at that time unflyable, and notifying RAF to that effect.
Despite this, someone felt it appropriate to sign off the RTS, and it is their motivation I am interested in. Were they simply over zealous, or are there any fingerprints from above? One way or another, it seems to me that the consequences of it becoming known that the RAF had flown an aircraft in peacetime which they had been told in the strongest terms not to, with such a catastrophic outcome might well have seemed to some as justification for a cover up.
we may be at crossed purposes in relation to it being a commercial matter. I am not meaning to determine which part of MOD should have been dealing with the matter, rather suggesting that it was a contractual / financial matter for resolution between the parties, if necessary in court. Notwithstanding the myriad preceding issues which you touch on here, and catalogue so comprehensively in your books, one part of the process which seemed to have worked was Boscombe Down identifying that the aircraft was at that time unflyable, and notifying RAF to that effect.
Despite this, someone felt it appropriate to sign off the RTS, and it is their motivation I am interested in. Were they simply over zealous, or are there any fingerprints from above? One way or another, it seems to me that the consequences of it becoming known that the RAF had flown an aircraft in peacetime which they had been told in the strongest terms not to, with such a catastrophic outcome might well have seemed to some as justification for a cover up.
Tecumseh,
we may be at crossed purposes in relation to it being a commercial matter. I am not meaning to determine which part of MOD should have been dealing with the matter, rather suggesting that it was a contractual / financial matter for resolution between the parties, if necessary in court. Notwithstanding the myriad preceding issues which you touch on here, and catalogue so comprehensively in your books, one part of the process which seemed to have worked was Boscombe Down identifying that the aircraft was at that time unflyable, and notifying RAF to that effect.
Despite this, someone felt it appropriate to sign off the RTS, and it is their motivation I am interested in. Were they simply over zealous, or are there any fingerprints from above? One way or another, it seems to me that the consequences of it becoming known that the RAF had flown an aircraft in peacetime which they had been told in the strongest terms not to, with such a catastrophic outcome might well have seemed to some as justification for a cover up.
we may be at crossed purposes in relation to it being a commercial matter. I am not meaning to determine which part of MOD should have been dealing with the matter, rather suggesting that it was a contractual / financial matter for resolution between the parties, if necessary in court. Notwithstanding the myriad preceding issues which you touch on here, and catalogue so comprehensively in your books, one part of the process which seemed to have worked was Boscombe Down identifying that the aircraft was at that time unflyable, and notifying RAF to that effect.
Despite this, someone felt it appropriate to sign off the RTS, and it is their motivation I am interested in. Were they simply over zealous, or are there any fingerprints from above? One way or another, it seems to me that the consequences of it becoming known that the RAF had flown an aircraft in peacetime which they had been told in the strongest terms not to, with such a catastrophic outcome might well have seemed to some as justification for a cover up.
Thanks Falcon,
Commercial's involvement (they were called 'Contracts' then) would have been limited to escalating it to Director General Contracts, a 2-Star. I can't recall precisely who had the job in June 1994, but for a few years before, until at least November 1993, I knew him well, because he was VERY aware that MoD didn't have a leg to stand on in any claim about quality of product in Air Systems. I was asked to brief him more than once, and he quickly understood that AMSO(RAF)'s policy to run down airworthiness, make savings at the expense of safety, and chop direct airworthiness funding by ~28% per year for the 3 years before the accident, handed any legal case to Boeing, or any company, on a plate. That is why his staff were told not to get involved. There's a thread running on another book 'Citadel of Waste' that explains this in detail, relating how AMSO's own Contracts people turned against their Supplier 'colleagues' for the same reason.
It is well-known that MoD sued for damages caused by FADEC, but that contract was let before the policy changes. Nevertheless, it is a crucial event, because this was hidden from Rifkind.
The illegal RTS was issued under Air Vice Marshal Antony Bagnall's name, but there was no formal letter of promulgation. At least, MoD claims there wasn't. The first legal authority to fly the Mk2 was issued by his successor in January 1996; even then the Mk2 was still immature although certain problems had become better understood.
Bagnall's motivation? He actually covered his arse very cleverly, by seeking a Switch-On Only clearance, which means 'not to be relied upon in any way'. Given the mandate not to fly, that meant ground training and famliarisation only. This was due to be renewed on 10 June 1994, a week after the accident. That is, Bagnall had accepted BEFORE the accident that the aircraft would remain unairworthy from 10 June for an indeterminate time. He KNEW he was prohibited from flying it. Obviously, AOC-in-C and Group chose to interpret this RTS (it was a Boscombe progress report, reporting no progress) as an excuse to fly; but as I said, AOC also knew he wasn't permitted. MoD has always waltzed round this aspect of the case, saying AOC and Group had no input to the decision to enter service. But they did - either they chose to ignore an illegal RTS, or escalated it to CAS and were told to get on with it.
Would a 'mere' 2-Star take this decision himself, given 4-Stars were moaning and groaning, and the Army was applying pressure to get the Mk2? I think not. My belief, and it is only that, is he was told to push out the RTS, and obeyed but in a manner which kept his own nose clean in a strictly legal sense. Although not morally. That is not to excuse him. It is telling he has never spoken, whereas his superior, CAS, has serially lied for over 27 years. Misguided loyalty? Or is there something in the files that proves more?
Your final sentence nails it.
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Tecumseh,
I am sorry to be droning on about this particular point, but this is where it seems to me that this saga turns from being yet another biblically scandalous procurement debacle into something else. Ok, they screwed up procuring Mk2, so what? I have bought but not yet read Citadels of waste, but am all too familiar with the plot; so much so that I am deferring reading it all until I am in a suitable mental state!
I have no sense that any of the dramatis personae in relation to the crash had any personal culpability in relation to the procurement.
And yet Bagnall felt inclined to sign the RTS, attempting to cover his bases as he did so, and two even more senior officers chose to protect him when the proverbial hit the fan in the most dramatic fashion. Odd.
It would be too cynical to speculate about whether any of them went on to post service employment with any of the contractors involved, so I won’t.
I am sorry to be droning on about this particular point, but this is where it seems to me that this saga turns from being yet another biblically scandalous procurement debacle into something else. Ok, they screwed up procuring Mk2, so what? I have bought but not yet read Citadels of waste, but am all too familiar with the plot; so much so that I am deferring reading it all until I am in a suitable mental state!
I have no sense that any of the dramatis personae in relation to the crash had any personal culpability in relation to the procurement.
And yet Bagnall felt inclined to sign the RTS, attempting to cover his bases as he did so, and two even more senior officers chose to protect him when the proverbial hit the fan in the most dramatic fashion. Odd.
It would be too cynical to speculate about whether any of them went on to post service employment with any of the contractors involved, so I won’t.
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Tecumseh,
I am sorry to be droning on about this particular point, but this is where it seems to me that this saga turns from being yet another biblically scandalous procurement debacle into something else. Ok, they screwed up procuring Mk2, so what? I have bought but not yet read Citadels of waste, but am all too familiar with the plot; so much so that I am deferring reading it all until I am in a suitable mental state!
I have no sense that any of the dramatis personae in relation to the crash had any personal culpability in relation to the procurement.
And yet Bagnall felt inclined to sign the RTS, attempting to cover his bases as he did so, and two even more senior officers chose to protect him when the proverbial hit the fan in the most dramatic fashion. Odd.
It would be too cynical to speculate about whether any of them went on to post service employment with any of the contractors involved, so I won’t.
I am sorry to be droning on about this particular point, but this is where it seems to me that this saga turns from being yet another biblically scandalous procurement debacle into something else. Ok, they screwed up procuring Mk2, so what? I have bought but not yet read Citadels of waste, but am all too familiar with the plot; so much so that I am deferring reading it all until I am in a suitable mental state!
I have no sense that any of the dramatis personae in relation to the crash had any personal culpability in relation to the procurement.
And yet Bagnall felt inclined to sign the RTS, attempting to cover his bases as he did so, and two even more senior officers chose to protect him when the proverbial hit the fan in the most dramatic fashion. Odd.
It would be too cynical to speculate about whether any of them went on to post service employment with any of the contractors involved, so I won’t.
Falcon, I'll leave the book to speak for itself, although when discussing Chinook it concentrates on Mk3. What prompted it was a recent Defence Committee report that, much like any mention of 'procurement cock-ups' on pprune, conflated procurement and requirements setting. (Two ongoing threads are full of it). It complained of procurement failures, and its case studies were requirements failures.
To have personal culpability one must assess proximity to events. No, none of the VSOs were in the project office or Operational Requirements. But one of the officers who reviewed the findings and allegedly agreed with them was Controller Aircraft, Air Marshal Roger Austin. (Source - CAS, ACM Graydon). When discussing Controller Aircraft, MoD always talks of Sir Donald Spiers. He left in April 1994.
Others are Wratten and Day of course, but also Richard Johns and Peter Squire. Michael Graydon (CAS) wrote that they were 'off course by some miles'. Why would he say that to a Marshal of the RAF? Michael Alcock was Chief Engineer from 91-96, in the period airworthiness management was being run down. He became double-hatted as Air Member Logistics in April 1994. One of two recipients of CHART, he knew the Mk2 wasn't airworthy. What did he do about it? Oversaw another ~28% cut in funding, a renewed directive not to undertake safety tasks, and staff threatened with dismissal if they complained or met legal obligations.
You must take these names and then read the Nimrod Review. Ask why Haddon-Cave named and praised (e.g.) Alcock, while crucifying General Sam Cowan for 4% per annum cuts over 5 years, as a result of a political directive. Five x 4% cuts, vs 3 x 28%, the latter directly targeting safety management. And why did he claim the savings at the expense of safety policy of 1987 was issued in 1998? Who benefitted? The same officers.
Yes, as you say, a lot to conceal. Those named, with the exception of Austin (who has never spoken), were drawn out of their hole by CHART in early 2011. They wrote to the media, but their letters were systematically refuted using known facts.
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Programs were very good and stirred the heart strings! Although, I would have liked to have it had more-openly discussed exactly what 'new evidence' (previously undisclosed by MoD) eventually swayed Lord Philip and the panel. I would imagine that the whole CHART report detailing so many airworthiness issues was key and the previously well-hidden BD signal about the ac automatics not doing what was required after a long while in a S&L transit (i.e. turning right instead of left) would have been right up there.
Interestingly, I had not previously heard the lighthouse keeper quite so clearly describing that the ac 'turned inland'.... for me, that says "UFCM" and tallies with Rob B and Tony C's reading of the odd rudder and flight control positions on impact - but guess we'll never know exactly.
But ultimately, Day and Wrotten were never, ever justified in making their adjudication of gross negligence - I think that is now an accepted fact by anyone with a modicum of nous. The legal advice was equally poor - any barrack room lawyer could have seen that 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever' was an impossible burden of proof (it was meant to be) and D&W could not meet it.
However, if we are to be fair (a concept denied to Jon, Rick and their families for far too long), then whilst D &W come across as 'oily' in the extreme, they too, are only human and prone to errors. Whilst they seem reluctant to admit that, they must have had some reason for abandoning any grasp of logic and understanding - no-one could be that stupid without some exceptional 'motivation' to find against those could not answer back. I doubt it was money that was motivating them, or a sense of wider duty (both far too self-centred for that), so it was likely to be external and/or peer pressure - warning of possible loss of face/kudos if they didn't be good little boys and toe the party line. Wonder who it was who applied the pressure ? I doubt it was the PM or senior MoD politicians because they came out in favour of clearing the pilots eventually. Rifkind especially seemed aggrieved that he'd been played for a fool by senior officers. So, who got the ear-worms into D&W - was it CAS? or ACAS? Or Controller Aircraft and his side-kicks DGA2/1, or some faceless civil servant from the MoD/Foreign Office/T&I possibly driven by business execs from across the pond? Perhaps D&W will be fall-guys yet - unless they come clean before they go (doubtful)? There is a good book in there somewhere for conspiracy theorists.....
Interestingly, I had not previously heard the lighthouse keeper quite so clearly describing that the ac 'turned inland'.... for me, that says "UFCM" and tallies with Rob B and Tony C's reading of the odd rudder and flight control positions on impact - but guess we'll never know exactly.
But ultimately, Day and Wrotten were never, ever justified in making their adjudication of gross negligence - I think that is now an accepted fact by anyone with a modicum of nous. The legal advice was equally poor - any barrack room lawyer could have seen that 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever' was an impossible burden of proof (it was meant to be) and D&W could not meet it.
However, if we are to be fair (a concept denied to Jon, Rick and their families for far too long), then whilst D &W come across as 'oily' in the extreme, they too, are only human and prone to errors. Whilst they seem reluctant to admit that, they must have had some reason for abandoning any grasp of logic and understanding - no-one could be that stupid without some exceptional 'motivation' to find against those could not answer back. I doubt it was money that was motivating them, or a sense of wider duty (both far too self-centred for that), so it was likely to be external and/or peer pressure - warning of possible loss of face/kudos if they didn't be good little boys and toe the party line. Wonder who it was who applied the pressure ? I doubt it was the PM or senior MoD politicians because they came out in favour of clearing the pilots eventually. Rifkind especially seemed aggrieved that he'd been played for a fool by senior officers. So, who got the ear-worms into D&W - was it CAS? or ACAS? Or Controller Aircraft and his side-kicks DGA2/1, or some faceless civil servant from the MoD/Foreign Office/T&I possibly driven by business execs from across the pond? Perhaps D&W will be fall-guys yet - unless they come clean before they go (doubtful)? There is a good book in there somewhere for conspiracy theorists.....
So perhaps Bill and Happy suffered from that transient condition known as ‘cognitive impairment’ whilst reviewing the BOIs? They were both pilots after all.
just sayin.
He received his airworthiness delegation from the Chief of Defence Procurement, not via the RAF.
He issued Controller Aircraft Instructions, mandated upon all his staff.
In this context, his role was to provide the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS) with a Controller Aircraft Release, which is a statement by him that the aircraft is airworthy, at a stated Build Standard, and (e.g.) there is a full system of support in place to be able to Maintain Airworthiness of the Mk2 design (his staff) and for the RAF to ensure Continuing Airworthiness of individual aircraft. There must be a valid Safety Case reflecting that Build Standard.
CAIs mandate that CA must offer ACAS an advance notification of his proposed CA Release, and that ACAS must accept this. Only then does CA issue his CAR. ACAS is strictly prohibited from changing it, only allowed to remove the cover sheet and replace it with his own, and the document forms Part 1 of the Release to Service. His letter of promulgation, not the Release itself, is the authority for the RAF to fly the aircraft. If he wants to add anything, he issues a Part 2, normally in the form of Service Deviations. Those of a technical nature must be written by CA's staff.
On Chinook Mk2, it is easier to say what of the above was complied with.
CA stated it was not airworthy. (Source: a report in the form of an INTERIM CA Release, and Boscombe Down reports. All mandated upon ACAS, confirmed by the Mull of Kintyre Review).
ACAS knew this as he asked for a Switch-On Only clearance, which is what he got. (Source: MoD correspondence and minutes of meetings).
There was no valid Safety Case. (Primarily because there was no Certificate of Design for the FADEC Safety Critical Software, which had to be signed by both Boscombe and RSRE Malvern. But the Mk1 Safety Case was also invalid anyway. FADEC was not allowed within a country mile of an RAF Mk2, and there was no legal authority to enter production, based on the criteria set by the Chief Scientific Advisor and issued by Secy of State).
There was no Statement of Operating Intent and Usage at all, when the Mk2 contract was let, without which one wouldn't know where to start on the rest. (Source: Director Flight Safety).
ACAS issued an RTS in November 1993, without articulating the mandate that it be read in conjunction with specific Boscombe reports saying it was not airworthy, and why. The big question is why did he do this? It's not a case of misunderstanding 'INTERIM' or Switch-On Only' (same thing) because Boscombe had written to everyone spelling it out.
ACM Graydon's introduction of AM Austin's role is interesting, which is perhaps why you ask. What formal role has a MoD(PE) 3-Star in an RAF Board of Inquiry? Apart from his junior staff providing briefings or statements to the Board, none. They made one, alluding to what was mentioned above, SEM and STFs not being appraised. But the circumstances, Austin's predecessor Donald Spiers knowing that ACAS had breached a mandate but apparently saying nothing, meant he was sucked in.
However, during the campaign neither Spiers nor Austin were mentioned, until the Air Staff lied to Dr Susan Phoenix, telling her that there was no such thing as an RTS in November 1993, and the only authority to fly was issued by Spiers. That Spiers continued to support the RAF VSOs, means there is something else that made him ignore the VSOs had lied and pointed the finger at him.
It was not an inadvertent error, because at the same time a Defence Minister had written to various MPs mentioning the RTS. It was a deliberate attempt to deceive a family. Who benefitted? When the facts were put to MoD by Dr Phoenix, MoD repeated the lie. This is not rocket science. If your view is challenged, turn round, pull the drawer marked 'RTSs', and look at the date of the previous ones issued by your boss. Lord Philip was not amused, wrote to Minister, and an abject apology was eventually issued. But various committees were misled in the same way, and their official reports repeat the same lie.
Hope this helps.
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IMHO, an excellent program. But I can hardly describe it as ‘enjoyable’.
I wonder….perhaps the film company concerned could produce similar ones dealing with the two contentious Red Arrows tragedies?
I wonder….perhaps the film company concerned could produce similar ones dealing with the two contentious Red Arrows tragedies?
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Program
Is there anyway to view these programs online? I'm away so not able to get them on normal TV
Sorted it's on iplayer now
Sorted it's on iplayer now
Last edited by Shaft109; 3rd Feb 2024 at 17:07. Reason: update
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Aircraft Accidents
Timelord's post no.39 interested me. It was not the first time a VSO has offered his interpretation of what constitutes an accident.
In the period Jun 1968 - Dec 1970 I was HQ22 Group Flight Safety Officer. The CAS, whose name escapes me, decreed that there was no such thing as an accident. Fortunately, our aircraft pool consisted of Chipmunks on 18 University Air Squadrons and some Vampire T11s and Meteor T7s on two Civilian Anti-Aircraft Co-operation Units (CAACUs). They caused little upset.
In the period Jun 1968 - Dec 1970 I was HQ22 Group Flight Safety Officer. The CAS, whose name escapes me, decreed that there was no such thing as an accident. Fortunately, our aircraft pool consisted of Chipmunks on 18 University Air Squadrons and some Vampire T11s and Meteor T7s on two Civilian Anti-Aircraft Co-operation Units (CAACUs). They caused little upset.
Thread Starter
ACM Sir John Grandy CAS Apr 1967 - Apr 1971 :-
Chief of the Air Staff (United Kingdom) - Wikipedia
Interesting comment, Wwyvern, thank you. It was MRAF Grandy that was told by the then CAS that the Mull pilots were "off course" by some miles!
Chief of the Air Staff (United Kingdom) - Wikipedia
Interesting comment, Wwyvern, thank you. It was MRAF Grandy that was told by the then CAS that the Mull pilots were "off course" by some miles!