Originally Posted by
Just This Once...
Yet it became a MoD Commercial 'crisis' as so few of the basics were set before individual aircraft hit the Mk2 programme. For example, the build standard of the aircraft going into the programme was not set, nor were they set for the final output. This was particularly critical for items or systems that the MoD expected to remain undisturbed or returned with the aircraft on completion.
It may sound like trivia to some but during the strip-down phase of the build anything that was not recognised or thought to be part of the Mk2 output was removed by Boeing personnel. By removed, I mean brutally, with looms being cut to save time rather than using the LRU connectors as one would normally expect. A clause in the contract had the MoD being responsible for such systems marked as GFE and the scale of the problem only became apparent when Boeing started to order new looms from the MoD to make good all the damage to the 'undisturbed' systems. Clearly MoD did not stock a vast amount of AAR-47 wiring harnesses, LRUs, lighting systems or whatever and the only place the MoD could go to was Boeing. The MoD logistics desk officers for the upgrade found themselves fishing for LRUs, looms, sensors, connectors etc out of various bins as Boeing could not source new replacements.
You would think Boeing would know how to look after simple parts, such as transparencies, rotor blades and alike, by not just stacking them on concrete floors in a big heap. Run out of trestles - no problem. Just carry on and order new parts from the MoD at the end when you find the originals trashed.
Quite right, and all of the above is mentioned and explained in the books.
It boils down to Induction Build Standard. That is for the Service to determine, and agree with the project office, and they Boeing. Commercial's input is to ensure it's typed correctly in the contract by the typing pool; and the Service sponsor checks it, usually delegating it to the Engineering Authority.
The basic problem, and it's always a problem, is the plethora of Service Engineered Mods and Special Trials Fits in the aircraft, especially those that have not been appraised by Boeing or approved by the project office; and so don't appear in the Safety Case. Especially STFs. The Mk1 had 39 STFs. It's easier to cut and paste an extract from The Inconvenient Truth:
The technical procedures are mandated in two Defence Standards. Briefly in 05-123, with the full version in 05-125/2, Specification PDS/8. This partial duplication is confusing to the untrained user. The essential problem is that 123 was written by staff who would seldom have to implement it; whereas 125/2 was written by experienced, current practitioners. That is, the Technical Agencies. One can always tell which was implemented.
However, and correctly, neither mentioned STFs. Therefore, they could have no contractual status and Aircraft Design Authorities (ADA) were permitted to ignore them. It is not uncommon for an ADA to refuse an MoD aircraft permission to land on its property with certain SEMs or STFs fitted (because they have never been proven safe). If they do allow them, and they interfere with their subsequent work, they are removed and discarded unless otherwise agreed in the contract. Often, when the Service later tries to refit them, the real estate is taken up. By definition, these contracts are drawn up by the Aircraft Project Office, whose involvement the STFs are intended to bypass in the first place. So, they often have no knowledge of them.
In other words, we agree!
Edited to add that the book under discussion, The Concealed Evidence, lists each STF and discusses its status (or otherwise) in the Mk2. It's usually 'otherwise!