Originally Posted by
falcon900
The fact that the Mk 2 was not yet airworthy would have been a commercial matter at that point rather than a US/UK relationship issue surely? I don’t see how the US Government were responsible for the faults at that point, and any attempt to lay blame for the crash at their door would have received short shrift. Similarly any attempt to blame Boeing etc would have led to the whole situation regarding the trials at Boscombe Down quickly becoming public.
The whole situation went pear shaped when the aircraft was released to service. What was the motivation for that? Showing off to the Army all seems a bit flimsy as a justification, and I doubt whether any of the SLF on the fateful flight knew or cared whether it was a MK2 or a MK1. Was there a big picture justification at all, or was it overzealous showing off to senior officers?
I am wondering whether cock up preceded the conspiracy.
The biggest cock-up was the FADEC procurement strategy in the late 80s. Breached every known rule going. When the RAF's Training Development Team ('train the trainers') visited Boeing in 1992/3 seeking a briefing on FADEC, Boeing were sitting waiting to be briefed, because they were not in the contractual loop. That also breached every rule. The problem was perpetuated on Mk3 and Nimrod, the same procedural cock-ups encouraged (not just permitted) by the same 2-Star Director General.
But context is important, and the opening paragraph of CHART is revealing. The reason for the Review was a spate of airworthiness related Chinook Mk1 accidents, some fatal. None more so than ZA721 in the Falklands in 1987. The 721 AAIB report is utterly damning about Boeing, and CHART simply repeated the comments in 1992. A hole not even drilled for a split pin in an actuator? Seals fitted the wrong way round? Seals not fitted at all? And MoD claimed cause was unknown, while Boeing stayed silent. Bollix. It took the AAIB and Sqn Ldr Burke a morning to work it out. That's more Quality Control failures than the recent door falling off. Boeing were actively protected, and to 'go there' would reveal very plausible potential causes of ZD576. (There, a second hole was drilled for a pin, weakening the rod).
The company were deemed by DFS in 1992 not to be a suitable off-shore Design Authority. Everyone knew that anyway, so what waiver was issued allowing their appointment? Even setting that aside, the company should not have accepted the Mk2 contract, as there was no stable baseline. (Remember, FADEC was not part of the Mk2 contract, it was a Mk1 enhancement. Boeing's contract said the Mk1 would turn up for conversion with FADEC fitted. It didnt). And of course MoD should not have offered the contract. The MoD person who makes the DA appointment is named in the contract. As he sits at one of the two lowest technical levels in MoD(PE), then I'm confident he was directed for political reasons. Such political directives were common at the time, but more often 'benefitted' a defence minister's constituency.
When ACAS issued his illegal Release to Service in November 1993, Boscombe's aircraft was an unrepresentative 'prototype', not a Mk2. Why even start testing and trialling the new bits, when you have to start over again when a Mk2 arrives? But MoD wouldn't be able to get anywhere legally or commercally, because Boeing delivered what was (poorly) contracted.
The reasons for unairworthiness (FADEC primarily, but also the likes of MoD refusing to scheme 'essential' mods for the DASH after ZA721) were largely down to MoD. Relatively 'minor' things like Boeing selecting the wrong battery type, and its installation design being unsafe, would have been easily fixed had Boscombe been listened to. So too the fact the emergency radio didn't work in an emergency... Which was academic at the time, as no intercom was cleared to be in the aircraft. A bit of a bugger's muddle I'm afraid, and little wonder no inquiry went there.
I hope that context explains why the Mk2 not being airworthy was not a commercial matter. In that sense, MoD commercial tend only to be involved once a fault investigation becomes a defect investigation, as the technical issues are by definition settled. Attaining and maintaining airworthiness are areas they seldom get involved in.