Originally Posted by
falcon900
Tecumseh,
we may be at crossed purposes in relation to it being a commercial matter. I am not meaning to determine which part of MOD should have been dealing with the matter, rather suggesting that it was a contractual / financial matter for resolution between the parties, if necessary in court. Notwithstanding the myriad preceding issues which you touch on here, and catalogue so comprehensively in your books, one part of the process which seemed to have worked was Boscombe Down identifying that the aircraft was at that time unflyable, and notifying RAF to that effect.
Despite this, someone felt it appropriate to sign off the RTS, and it is their motivation I am interested in. Were they simply over zealous, or are there any fingerprints from above? One way or another, it seems to me that the consequences of it becoming known that the RAF had flown an aircraft in peacetime which they had been told in the strongest terms not to, with such a catastrophic outcome might well have seemed to some as justification for a cover up.
Thanks Falcon,
Commercial's involvement (they were called 'Contracts' then) would have been limited to escalating it to Director General Contracts, a 2-Star. I can't recall precisely who had the job in June 1994, but for a few years before, until at least November 1993, I knew him well, because he was VERY aware that MoD didn't have a leg to stand on in any claim about quality of product in Air Systems. I was asked to brief him more than once, and he quickly understood that AMSO(RAF)'s policy to run down airworthiness, make savings at the expense of safety, and chop direct airworthiness funding by ~28% per year for the 3 years before the accident, handed any legal case to Boeing, or any company, on a plate. That is why his staff were told not to get involved. There's a thread running on another book 'Citadel of Waste' that explains this in detail, relating how AMSO's own Contracts people turned against their Supplier 'colleagues' for the same reason.
It is well-known that MoD sued for damages caused by FADEC, but that contract was let before the policy changes. Nevertheless, it is a crucial event, because this was hidden from Rifkind.
The illegal RTS was issued under Air Vice Marshal Antony Bagnall's name, but there was no formal letter of promulgation. At least, MoD claims there wasn't. The first legal authority to fly the Mk2 was issued by his successor in January 1996; even then the Mk2 was still immature although certain problems had become better understood.
Bagnall's motivation? He actually covered his arse very cleverly, by seeking a Switch-On Only clearance, which means 'not to be relied upon in any way'. Given the mandate not to fly, that meant ground training and famliarisation only. This was due to be renewed on 10 June 1994, a week after the accident. That is, Bagnall had accepted BEFORE the accident that the aircraft would remain unairworthy from 10 June for an indeterminate time. He KNEW he was prohibited from flying it. Obviously, AOC-in-C and Group chose to interpret this RTS (it was a Boscombe progress report, reporting no progress) as an excuse to fly; but as I said, AOC also knew he wasn't permitted. MoD has always waltzed round this aspect of the case, saying AOC and Group had no input to the decision to enter service. But they did - either they chose to ignore an illegal RTS, or escalated it to CAS and were told to get on with it.
Would a 'mere' 2-Star take this decision himself, given 4-Stars were moaning and groaning, and the Army was applying pressure to get the Mk2? I think not. My belief, and it is only that, is he was told to push out the RTS, and obeyed but in a manner which kept his own nose clean in a strictly legal sense. Although not morally. That is not to excuse him. It is telling he has never spoken, whereas his superior, CAS, has serially lied for over 27 years. Misguided loyalty? Or is there something in the files that proves more?
Your final sentence nails it.